Using newly released documents, the author presents an integrated look at American nuclear policy and diplomacy in crises from the Berlin blockade to Vietnam. The book answers the question of why, when the atomic bomb had been used with such devastating effect against the Japanese Empire in 1945, American leaders put this most apocalyptic of weapons back on the shelf, never to be used again in anger. It documents the myopia of Potomac strategists in involving the US in wars of attrition in Korea and Southeast Asia, marginal areas where American vital interests were in no way endangered. Despite the presence of hundreds, then thousands of nuclear bombs and warheads in the nation's stockpile, the greatest military weapon in history became politically impossible to use. And yet overwhelming nuclear superiority did serve its ultimate purpose in the Cold War. When American vital interests were threatened - over Berlin and Cuba - the Soviets backed down from confrontation. Despite errors in strategic judgement brought on by fear of Communist expansion, and in some cases outright incompetence, the ace in the hole proved decisive.

This volume is based on a multidisciplinary approach towards biological and chemical threats that can, and have been previously used in bioterrorism attacks around the globe. Current knowledge and evidence-based principles from the fields of synthetic biology, microbiology, plant biology, chemistry, food science, forensics, tactics, infective medicine, psychology and others are compiled to address numerous aspects and the complexity of bioterrorism attacks. The main focus is on biological threats, especially in the context of synthetic biology and its emerging findings that can be observed as possible threat and tool. The book examines microorganisms and their possible use in forensics, i.e. as possible detection tool that could enable fast and precise detection of possible treats. A number of plant derived components are also discussed as possible agents in bioterrorism attacks, and in relation to infectious disease pathology. Another integral part is food safety, especially in terms of large food supply chains, like airline caterings, institutionalized kitchens etc. Food can be observed as a possible mean of delivery of various agents (biological and chemical) for bioterrorism attacks. Steps on how to recognize specific critical points in a food supply chain, along with proposed corrective activities are discussed. Examples from around the globe, along with the methodological approach on how to differentiate bioterrorism attacks from other epidemics are provided. However, epidemics are also discussed in the context of migrations, with the special emphasis on the current refugee migrations that affect not only Europe, but also the United States. The book will be of interest to experts from various fields of science as well as professionals working in the field. The book encompasses examples and tools developed for easier, more specific, and faster detection of possible bioterrorism treats, along with proposed actions for some aspects of a bioterrorism attack.

This book is open access under a CC BY-NC 2.5 license. On April 22, 1915, the German military released 150 tons of chlorine gas at Ypres, Belgium. Carried by a long-awaited wind, the chlorine cloud passed within a few minutes through the British and French trenches, leaving behind at least 1,000 dead and 4,000 injured. This chemical attack, which amounted to the first use of a weapon of mass destruction, marks a turning point in world history. The preparation as well as the execution of the gas attack was orchestrated by Fritz Haber, the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin-Dahlem. During World War I, Haber transformed his research institute into a center for the development of chemical weapons (and of the means of protection against them). Bretislav Friedrich and Martin Wolf (Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society, the successor institution of Haber's institute) together with Dieter Hoffmann, Jurgen Renn, and Florian Schmaltz (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science) organized an international symposium to commemorate the centenary of the infamous chemical attack. The symposium examined crucial facets of chemical warfare from the first research on and deployment of chemical weapons in WWI to the development and use of chemical warfare during the century hence. The focus was on scientific, ethical, legal, and political issues of chemical weapons research and deployment - including the issue of dual use - as well as the ongoing effort to control the possession of chemical weapons and to ultimately achieve their elimination. The volume consists of papers presented at the symposium and supplemented by additional articles that together cover key aspects of chemical warfare from 22 April 1915 until the summer of 2015.

The future of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in the 21st century is not entirely predictable from the Cold War past. Nor is it easy to foresee on the basis of what has happened since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Cimbala contends that nuclear weapons and the psychology of nuclear deterrence will remain important after 2000, but the character of that importance will change. No longer will nuclear weapons be the dominators of military technology. Instead, advanced technology conventional weapons, based on information and electronics, will supplant nuclear weapons as the instruments of military supremacy in the 21st century.

What, Cimbala asks, can be expected of nuclear weapons in the 21st century, given what we have learned from previous experience in the Cold War and in the 1990s? Cimbala expects that nuclear weapons will spread among currently non-nuclear states, and states with regional grievances or hegemonic aspirations will seek to deploy small nuclear forces as deterrents against neighbors or against outside intervention by the United States in regional conflicts. Regional rogue states may also obtain nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, as Cimbala explains, the international balance of power is unlikely to change. As he makes clear, power will be less dependent on deployed military platforms and more dependent on information warfare. A thoughtful and provocative analysis that will be of particular interest to policy makers, scholars, and other researchers involved with arms control, security studies, and international relations.

This book offers theoretical analysis on the context and on the dual function of military technology, as well as case studies on the third generation of nuclear weapons, on the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, on the driving forces of chemical armament and on the military use of nuclear energy as a possible propellant for bombers and in outer space. Five chapters written by three physicists from the USA, USSR and UK and two peace researchers from Japan and West Germany focus on SDI: its technical foundations, consequences for strategic stability and war as well as on its contradictions and on a case of armament dynamics theory. The book concludes with three chapters on the implications of the military use of outer space for international law from a Western, an Eastern and a Third World perspective, with views from West Germany, Hungary and Barbados, respectively.

This book investigates drivers and trends in nuclear proliferation in the Global South. Based on an in-depth analysis of South Africa's nuclear history, it examines general causes of proliferation, such as technical capabilities and constraints; a country's motivation to build a nuclear bomb; and particular domestic and international situations. It also highlights Britain's role in the development of technological capability in South Africa and explains how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Finally, the study offers effective solutions to the problem of nuclear proliferation in developing countries.

This book presents a detailed history of chemical warfare development during the First World War and discusses design approaches to gas masks and the performance of new filter materials that decontaminate chemical warfare agents (CWA) when applied in the vapor phase. It describes multifunctional nanocomposites containing zinc and zirconium (hydr)oxides, graphite oxide and silver or gold nanoparticles as reactive adsorbents for the degradation of the CWAs vapors. In addition it examines in detail the surface properties that are most important in the mineralization performance.

This second Volume in the book Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law discusses the legal interpretation and implementation of verification and compliance with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 1996; and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 1957. It specifically examines the question, contested in recent academic writings, whether the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is competent to verify not only the correctness, but also the completeness of national declarations. Topical legal issues of verification and its technical and political limits as well as peaceful settlement of disputes and countermeasures are discussed in-depth. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for a further constructive discourse on the topic at both national and international levels. A Third Volume, to be published in Autumn 2016, will focus on legal issues of safety and security of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Professor of International Law, Royal Holloway University of London; a Member of Wolfson College, Oxford; Chairman of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Honorary President, International Society for Military Law and the Law of War; Rapporteur of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Prolife ration and Contemporary International Law.

With the concept of 'Atomic Anxiety', this book offers a novel perspective on one of the most important and longstanding puzzles of international politics: the non-use of U.S. nuclear weapons. By focusing on the fear surrounding nuclear weapons, it explains why nuclear deterrence and the nuclear taboo are working at cross purposes in practice.

This volume is a collection of contributions by world-leading experts in the nuclear field who participated in the educational activities of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO). It features some of most prominent scholars and practitioners who contributed in fundamental ways to shaping policies, strategies, theories, scholarly studies, and debates in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. On the occasion of ISODARCO's 50th anniversary this book revisits a selection of contributions that capture the pressing issues during the five decades of continuous engagement in disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Containing the histories (from 1945 to the present) of the nuclear strategies of NATO, Britain and France, and of the defence preferences of the FRG (West Germany) this book shows how strategies were functions of a perceived Soviet threat and an American 'nuclear guarantee'. There were three options for West Europeans: a compromise with differing American needs in NATO, pursued by Britain and the FRG; national nuclear forces, developed by Britain and France; and projects for an independent European nuclear force.

Three policy actions taken during the Revolutionary War period helped form the military supply and acquisition structure still in place today. These include the formation of a management structure; the choice of management methods; and debates related to ancillary issues such as R&D, fostering of expertise, encouraging innovation, and the role of the federal government in the development of an industrial base. To provide valuable context, Horgan looks not only at decisions made by the Continental Congress, but also at the environment in which these plans were made. Of the wide range of methods used to procure the supplies needed for war, many were harsh measures taken by beleaguered policy makers, forced to desperate steps by the demands of war.

The organizational structure created to manage the supply effort was, Horgan reveals, in constant flux, characterized by the abandoning of one failed experiment in favor of another that would soon be exposed as equally unsuccessful. The two major weapons of the period, the big guns of Army artillery and navel ordnance and Navy ships, are examined within this framework. Horgan explores how the Congress managed their acquisition, including procedures related to the manufacture of artillery in private sector founders and government facilities, as well as the construction projects for Navy ships. She demonstrates how policy decisions made during these early years relate to the present policy environment for the acquisition of major weapon systems.

Once dismissed as ineffectual, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has in the past twenty years emerged as a powerful international organization. Member states allow the IAEA to render judgment on matters vital to peace and security while nations around the globe comply with its rules and commands on proliferation, safety, and a range of other issues. Robert L. Brown details the IAEA's role in facilitating both control of nuclear weapons and the safe exploitation of nuclear power. As he shows, the IAEA has acquired a surprising amount of power as states, for political and technological reasons, turn to it to supply policy cooperation and to act as an agent for their security and safety. The agency's success in gaining and holding authority rests in part on its ability to apply politically neutral expertise that produces beneficial policy outcomes. But Brown also delves into the puzzle of how an agency created by states to aid cooperation has acquired power over them.

The implementation of disarmament requirements imposed by the Security Council after the Second Gulf War established a strong and unequal power relationship between the United Nations and Iraq. Although the ensuing struggle over imposed disarmament has been a major issue in world politics, international relations theorists continue to ignore it. Deaver argues that this case has important theoretical implications. Using sociological insights and a behavioral approach, he examines the power relationship as well as Iraqi resistance from 1991 to 1998. Theorists are likely to find these analytic tools useful since they provide a ready means of studying the micro-foundations of power relations in generalized terms. Behavior such as supervision, surveillance, inspection, and monitoring are widespread and growing in world politics. A focus on tactics demonstrates the role of monitoring in maintaining and strengthening the relationship between the United Nations and Iraq. An analysis of dynamics makes comprehensible Iraqi losses of sovereignty and the eventual collapse of the relationship. Contrary to popular opinion, whoever escalated tensions hurt their own cause: Iraqi resistance contributed greatly to United Nations gains, while the United Nations successes led to the collapse of its relationship with Iraq.

In 1943, on orders from the German Air Ministry, young physicist Peter P. Wegener left the Russian front and reported to the Baltic village of Peenemunde. His assignment was to work at the supersonic wind tunnels of the rocket laboratories of the German Army. Here Wernher von Braun led a team that developed the V-2, the world's first large rocket-powered guided missile, and laid much of the groundwork for postwar rocket development.;In this book, Wegener recounts his experiences during Hitler's time, World War II, and his years at Peenemunde. He tells how he was working one night in August 1943 when the allies bombed the laboratories, but left the wind tunnels undamaged. The tunnels were moved to Bavaria, and Wegener was ordered to follow in 1944. After the war, the tunnels were moved again - this time to the United States, accompanied by the author and other German scientists. Shortly before the end of the war, Wegener visited Germany's underground V-2 production plant to retrieve archival material on aerodynamics that had been stored in caves for safekeeping.;He described the appalling history of the concentration camps where SS guards watched over inmates who toiled underground in inhuman conditions and often did not survive. A photo essay enhances this memoir.

Offering a new perspective on the widely discussed debate on how the international community would respond to a nuclear-armed Iran, this critical research challenges the prevailing wisdom that a nuclear Iran would provoke a nuclear proliferation cascade in the Middle East.Hobbs and Moran assess the proliferation calculus of four key countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Syria, as well exploring the possibility that Iran would transfer nuclear materials to terrorists groups. The authors conclude that a nuclear domino effect would be highly unlikely, even in the face of an Iranian bomb, thus undermining one of the major arguments used in support of pre-emptive military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.A range of policy measures are outlined, that could be enacted by the international community to further reduce the risk of a regional proliferation cascade, making this text a must-read for policy makers, security and international relations scholars and all those with an interest in the Middle East.

This book offers an in-depth historical and technical description of Iran's nuclear program in political, economic, and strategic contexts. The author points out this issue's connections with the evolution of global and regional strategic balances, as well as the stability of the international regime against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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The second amendment is the most hotly debated and controversial right in the Constitution. In light of the recent surge of school shootings and other gun-related crimes, gun policy has become one of our leading national concerns, affecting politicians, gun manufacturers, sport shooters, and ordinary citizens alike.

Showcasing viewpoints from all sides of the gun control debate, Gun Control and Gun Rights, presents the first balanced gun policy textbook for use by undergraduates, graduate students, law students and the general public.

This comprehensive anthology includes selections from legal cases, hunting stories, public policy briefs and journalistic accounts. Anyone looking for a fair, even-handed account of the gun issue will find it in this book.

This work offers a practical, non-theoretical introduction to the principles, application and benefits of multi-sensor technology in smart weapon development, surveillance systems, and an increasing variety of non-military applications. It also provides an overview of MMW (Millimeter-Wave) and IR (infrared) sensor constraints, design principles, system alternatives and targeting applications.

"When Virgil sang of arms and the man, words like ""smart"" and ""friendly"" characterized the warrior, not his weapons. Today, because of modern technology, these terms are more often used to describe the machine than the man. Dramatic advances have spawned a generation of weapon systems designed to tell friend from foe, to stalk the enemy with precision and stealth, and to destroy him with unprecedented efficiency. But can ordinary Americans operate and support these advanced systems, or have emerging technologies pushed military hardware beyond the capabilities of the people the armed forces can expect to attract and retain? How can the military better match weapons and skills? Martin Binkin looks at the complex issues from several angles, starting with skill levels and jobs in today's military. He profiles America's arsenal in the 1990s and examines the implications of electronic warfare for manpower needs. Links among hardware complexity, reliability, and maintenance are unraveled, and current demographic trends traced. The study assesses various policy options available to hedge against the possibility that the military could become squeezed between growing demands for technologically adept people and a declining supply of recruits. Among these are efforts to design simpler systems with more reliable engineering techniques. Binkin reviews ways to make weapons easier to maintain, stressing component accessibility, technical documentation, and automated diagnostics. He covers the use of advanced technology to prepare people to handle new systems. Finally, he discusses the principal manpower management alternatives-expanding the role of women, substituting civilians, retaining more personnel, and returning to conscription. "

When Major Michael Donnelly was instructing his U.S. Air Force student pilots, he used to tell them three things: Timing is everything; it's nice to be lucky; and there is no justice. Highly decorated fighter pilot, proud young patriot, loyal friend with a mischievous sense of humor, loving husband and father of two, he could not have imagined the tragic meaning those words would assume just a few years after his tour of duty in Desert Storm. In 1996 Major Donnelly was diagnosed with ALS, Lou Gehrig's Disease, at the unusually young age of 35; the onset of this illness marked the beginning of a kind of torture beyond the scope of even the most rigorous military survival training. Betrayed by his body, eventually paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair, he experienced another betrayal perhaps even more difficult to comprehend--betrayal by his country. For despite the fact that over 110,000 Desert Storm veterans are sick, many dying of mysterious cancers and neurological diseases, including more than ten times the normal incidence of ALS--and despite all evidence pointing to U.S. troops having been dosed by low levels of Iraqi nerve agents and exposed to chemical weapons' fallout--the Pentagon adamantly denies any connection between their illnesses and their service in the Gulf War. "Falcon's Cry: A Desert Storm Memoir," Michael Donnelly's unforgettable story, is his courageous attempt to unearth the truth and force an acknowledgment of that truth by the government he and his fellow veterans defended with their lives.

Flying 44 fighter jet combat missions in a war fought on an all-or-nothing scale was thrilling for Michael Donnelly. When the war was won, he and his country rejoiced in the knowledge that, unlike in Vietnam, America had gotten it right in the Persian Gulf. Less than a decade later, the world is learning what veterans and their families have known since Desert Storm--we did not get it right at all. Saddam Hussein is still terrorizing a large portion of the globe. Moreover, we did not learn the lesson of Agent Orange which the Department of Defense denied for decades was the cause of early deaths and birth defects among Vietnam veterans and their families. Yet, thanks largely to the testimony of the author before the House of Representatives in 1997, a first step has been taken toward justice for the tens of thousands of Desert Storm veterans who are suffering virtually in isolation, many without any medical or disability benefits. Major Donnelly believes the truth about Gulf War Illnesses will be uncovered by studies funded in the recently passed Omnibus Appropriations bill, as well as through stories like his own, and he fervently hopes that America can, at last, get it right.