In the late 1940s, the U.S. Department of Defense established a nuclear weapons depository in the Manzano Mountains of New Mexico. For more than 40 years, Manzano Base served as a maintenance and storage site for some of the most destructive weapons ever created. Operated by the U.S. Air Force, the facility was small and obscure, with highly restricted access. Its covert mission fostered a sense of mystery, leaving the public to speculate about what really went on there. The site was decommissioned in 1992 yet its rich history continues to influence America's nuclear weapons program. This book tells the full story of Manzano and the personnel who served there. Firsthand accounts recall their experiences of nuclear weapons accidents, aircraft crashes, UFO/UAF sightings and a radiation demonstration called "tickling the tiger's tail.

This third volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within a contemporary global context, an interdependent characteristic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty along with disarmament and non-proliferation. The scholarly contributions in this volume explore this interrelationship, considering the role of nation States as well as international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring and implementing the Treaty. The 2015 Nuclear Accord with Iran and its implementation is also discussed, highlighting relevant developments in this evolving area. Overall, the volume explores relevant issues, ultimately presenting a number of suggestions for international cooperation in this sensitive field where political discussion often dominates over legal analysis. The important tasks of limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ensuring the safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, calls for the interpretation and application of international legal principles and rules in their relevant context, a task that this book series endeavours to facilitate whilst presenting new information and evaluating current developments in this area of international law. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Dean of Law and Professor of International and Comparative Law at Robson Hall, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba; a Barrister at One Garden Court, London; a Magistrate in Oxfordshire; a Justice of the Peace for England & Wales; a Member of Wolfson College, University of Oxford; and Chair of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); and Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

Scientific and technological change in the life sciences is currently transforming the problem of preventing biological warfare and biological terrorism. This transformation will demand a radical and rigorous new approach to biochemical arms control, for which the existing prohibition regimes for chemical and biological weapons are necessary but insufficient building blocks. Examples from the areas of immunology, the neurosciences, and the neuroendocrine-immune system are used to show the magnitude of the problem. The final section of the book will then outline additional measures required to control biochemical weapons in the 21st century.

Until now little attention has been paid to the development of military capabilities designed to target food crops with biological warfare agents. This book represents the first substantive study of state-run activities in this field. It shows that all biological warfare programs have included a component concerned with the development of anti-crop agents and munitions. Current concern over the proliferation of biological weapons is placed in the context of the initiative to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The author concludes that the risks posed by this form of warfare can be minimized by implementation of regimes concerning the peaceful use and control of plant pathogens that pose a risk to human health and the environment.

Why do some American intelligence officials maintain fallout shelters and private contingency plans to evacuate their families in the event of a Russian nuclear strike--even in today's post-Cold War era of U.S.-Russian partnership? The frightening answer lies within the pages of "War Scare," a terrifying assessment of the prospect for nuclear holocaust in our day. Written by Peter Vincent Pry, a former CIA military analyst, "War Scare" provides a history of our country's little-known brushes with nuclear war and warns that, contrary to popular opinion and the assurances of our political leaders, the possibility of a Russian attack still exists. Nuclear deterrence has been the foundation of Western security for the last 50 years, but since the end of the Cold War, Russian military doctrine has become more destabilizing, and much more dangerous, than is commonly believed.

By making use of a wealth of declassified and unclassified material, Dr. Pry illustrates how Russia's brutal past continues to shape the consciousness and decision making of its leaders, many of whom are unreconstructed ideologues from the old Soviet regime. Gripped by a perpetual perception of imminent threat--a war scare--the Russian General Staff, which controls the technical capability of launching a nuclear strike, has shown itself to be unstable at best. The author explores recent history and near-disasters such as the Bosnian crisis, the Norway missile incident, and U.S. air strikes on Iraq from the perspective of the Russian General Staff, believing that only by understanding their viewpoint can we minimize the risk of unintentionally provoking a deadly attack. Wary of NATO expansion and reeling from the Russian economy's descent into chaos, the General Staff may interpret Western military exercises and operations in the Middle East and elsewhere as concealing surprise aggression against Russia. This is a grave situation, indeed, as even after the START I, II, and III agreements, Russia will retain enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world--not to mention significantly expanded chemical and biological warfare capability. "War Scare" convincingly shows that we ignore these facts at our peril.

The core principle underlying the strategy of nonproliferation - acceptance of a two tier international nuclear order - has become unsustainable. Policy makers and those in the academic world need to turn their attention to exploring new proliferation management strategies premised first and foremost on recognizing that nuclear weapons are here to stay and that determined proliferators can not be stopped from going nuclear. Andrew O'Neil develops this argument in relation to the role of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, the engine house of world economic growth. To what extent does the failing strategy of nonproliferation pose serious challenges for Northeast Asia's security environment? Are there alternative strategies for managing nuclear weapons in the region? Should the presence of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia necessarily be seen in exclusively negative terms, as many experts believe?

This book makes extensive use of Soviet sources to provide the first full analysis of Moscow's ballistic missile defence policy from its origins to the most recent post-Soviet developments. It considers the Soviets' motivations for pursuing an anti-ballistic missile capability and the extent of their success, and reveals that ballistic missile defence policy was used by every political leadership from Krushchev to Yeltsin as a means of sending signals about Moscow's intentions to the West.

"The 1,000 Hour War" was marked by unprecedented speed and force. This book adopts the view that the telecommunications technologies responsible for guiding smart bombs and Patriot missiles to their targets were the same marvels responsible for transmitting to news agencies around the world information about the progress of the war. "The 1,000 Hour War "was a unique case of military action in that it owed both its prosecution and its coverage specifically to satellites, computers, cellular telephones, microwave relay stations, and a myriad of similar technologies.

Concepts associated with nuclear strategy often go beyond any objective logic of deterrence. Nuclear weapons have special roles in different national belief-systems, myths surround them, they have catalyzed tensions already existing in societies, and become symbols of power or of past sins. This book explores the conscious and unconscious beliefs in Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (all voiced in debates about nuclear strategy), about society, the state and power structures, each country's place in the world, the international system, and allies and enemies.

From the dawn of the atomic age to today, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But nuclear weapons cooperation in US alliances has varied significantly between allies and over time. This book explores the history of America's nuclear posture worldwide, delving into alliance structures and interaction during and since the end of the Cold War to uncover the underlying dynamics of nuclear weapons cooperation between the US and its allies. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, the book reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Alliances are ecosystems of exchange rather than mere tools of external balancing, the book argues, and institutional perspectives can offer an unprecedented insight into how structured cooperation can promote policy convergence. -- .

Most nuclear proliferation literature is focused on states seeking nuclear weapons, conducted in most cases clandestinely. The sharing of nuclear weapons technology between states is as important strategically, if unexpected, because nuclear weapons are such a powerful instrument in international politics. This book proposes to answer why, if nuclear weapons are such good preservers of peace, are states not more willing to see them proliferate? Schofield also examines the underlying phenomenon of the threat of proliferation races, and how nonproliferation bargains between adversaries make nuclear sharing far less common. But sharing is not rare. This book proposes a theory to explain nuclear sharing and surveys its rich history from its beginnings in the Second World War, including the cases of France-Israel, US-NATO, Russia-China, Israel-South Africa, China-Pakistan and Pakistan-Iran, as well as the incidence of soft balancing and permissive nuclear sharing in the cases of the US and Japan, Israel and India.

The Gulf War has been the only conflict in the last half-century that featured the possible use of chemical-biological weapons against U.S. forces. Vulnerability to such an attack spurred the Department of Defense to action from the first hint of trouble in August 1990 through the end of hostilities in March 1991. Nearly disbanded in 1972, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps would be the prime force in ensuring that U.S. forces could both survive and sustain combat operations under chemical-biological warfare conditions. Focussing on the work of senior Army officials, this account assesses the degree of readiness achieved by the ground war's initiation and the lessons learned since the conflict.

For an appropriately trained and equipped military force, chemical weapons pose not the danger of mass destruction but the threat of mass disruption, no more deadly than smart munitions or B-52 air strikes. This book will reveal a coordinated response to train and equip U.S. forces did take place prior to the feared Iraqi chemical and biological attacks. Undocumented in any other book, it details the plans that rushed sixty Fox reconnaissance vehicles to the Gulf, the worldwide call for protective suits and masks, and the successful placement of biological agent detectors prior to the air offensive. In addition, the work addresses what really happened at Khamisiyah. Were troops exposed to chemical weapons and what is behind the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome?

Sooner or later, if the world keeps following its current course, there will be a nuclear war. Roger Hilsman, who played a significant role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, is convinced that the only way to prevent an eventual nuclear conflict is to abolish war itself. This study examines and critiques all of the various proposals to date for incorporating nuclear weapons into strategic doctrine and concludes that these efforts have failed. Plans for abolishing only nuclear weapons are, according to Hilsman, good-intentioned but ill-advised attempts to rehabilitate war. Instead, he proposes a gradual transition to world government, which will perform the traditional social and political functions that were in the past served only by war.

War will not disappear immediately. The world must still be prepared to deal with three types of war: wars that have the potential for escalating to a nuclear World War III; wars that are self-confining; and civil wars that cry out for peacekeeping intervention on humanitarian grounds. While the United States will have to be responsible for dealing with potentially nuclear wars, an entirely new force structure will be necessary. Self-confining wars, such as Bosnia, pose a particular problem as far as world public opinion for intervention is concerned; this study proposes solutions to such dilemmas. Finally, because national forces are ill-suited to peacekeeping missions in countries ravaged by civil war, the UN must recruit and maintain an international force along the lines of the French Foreign Legion.

Gudmundsson tells the story of field artillery in the 20th century and its impact on the major conflicts of our time. Its purpose is to provide the reader--whether artilleryman or not--with hitherto unavailable insights on the role that artillery plays in the larger battle and how that has helped shape the world that we live in today. Unique aspects of the book include the treatment of technical issues in non-technical language, the extensive use of German and French sources generally unavailable to the English-speaking reader, the shattering of some long-cherished myths, and the discussion of issues that are often papered over in the literature of field artillery--losses from "friendly fire," the frequent impotence of counter-battery fire, and the French origins of current American doctrine. The bulk of the literature on field artillery can be fairly described as "gunner propaganda." Gudmundsson, with his emphasis on the way artillery interacts with other arms and the dynamics of the battle as a whole, takes a more balanced and a more critical view, dealing with the failures as well as the achievements of field artillery. This study provides a thorough overview of field artillery in non-technical language that will be of interest to military professionals, military historians, and wargamers.

Hitler's tank divisions were some of his most feared troops and most lethal weapons in the taking and securing of territory during World War II. From success to failure, in victory and in defeat, each division played a role in Hitler's campaign against the Allies. This is the first guide to chronicle the history of each division from its inception to its destruction. With painstaking research and attention to detail, Mitcham describes the formation and organization of each, then discusses its overall combat history. He also includes a career sketch of every panzer divisional commander.

While this reference will serve as a valuable research tool, it contains more than facts and figures. Mitcham assesses the performance and quality of each division, including how and why it changed over time. He evaluates strengths and weaknesses during different phases of the conflict in terms of manpower, vehicles, and armor quality. He also analyzes commander performance and its impact on overall efforts. The story follows the panzer legions until their ultimate disposition-destruction or disbanding. Includes a comprehensive index of individuals, units, battles and campaigns.

This book is a treatise on the history of American psychology's role in nuclear war prevention. So writes Marilyn S. Jacobs in the preface to "American Psychology in the Quest for Nuclear Peace." This timely and important study will facilitate the work of those psychologists who wish to use their knowledge and expertise in the cause of nuclear war prevention. Jacobs places the psychologist's struggle for nuclear peace in historical perspective and examines the complicated context in which the threat of nuclear war is embedded; one which is influenced by international relations, economic and political systems and weapons technology. Student and professional psychologists, political scientists, as well as the general reader concerned with the threat of nuclear war will find this book imperative reading.

The study begins by examining the psychologist's role of social responsibility in the nuclear dilemma. Why is psychology involved? How did it become involved? What is the nature of the involvement? Is it appropriate that psychology be involved? The book is directed toward these questions. Jacobs interviews prominent individuals in the peace movement, most notably, Herbert Kelman, Irving Janis, Ralph White, and Thomas Milburn. Other chapters explore the psychologist's role as scientist, government consultant, and social activist.

"Challenge to Deterrence" is based on a panel discussion from the 1985 American Political Science Association meeting in New Orleans. In this comprehensive study, eminent scholars address all aspects of U.S. deterrence policy from both technical and policy aspects. Along with discussions on technology currently available to the U.S. and how it can be used more effectively, contributors speculate on Soviet strategic planning and how the U.S. can get allies, such as Japan and Israel, more involved in deterrence activity.

The lifting of the Iron Curtain in response to pressures for democratic reform in the Eastern Bloc nations and the refusal of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to use the Red Army to police countries of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radically changed international environment. Preceded by over 40 years of peace and stability, unprecedented in the history of modern Europe, the Cold War ended in a climate of upheaval and uncertainty. This volume addresses issues associated with the political and military vacuum created by recent events and explores in depth a problem of military uncertainty: first strike stability. Stephen J. Cimbala argues that war in a system undergoing rapid change, including reductions in forces and political realignment, remains disturbingly possible due to the unforeseeable, inadvertent, and uncontrollable uncertainties that plague decision making and military planning in Washington, Moscow, and other international power centers, hence, first strike instability. This timely volume clarifies the kind of bargain superpowers and their allies have made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems. Cimbala provides enhanced understandings of the concept and practice of nuclear deterrence and of first strike stability in a post-Cold War world that can help direct arms control efforts toward those areas that are most important to actual security. Broad aspects of the problem of first strike stability are set forth in the first chapter which also anticipates some of the connections between political and military levels of analysis discussed in the conclusion. Chapter two introduces the concepts of the state of nature and the state of war, explains how they apply tothe problem of first strike stability, and why the possibility of war, including nuclear war, cannot be excluded. Chapter three focuses on the "New Soviet Thinking" and why the probability of accidental and inadvertent war and escalation is not affected by reducing the levels of armaments alone. Chapter four emphasizes the problems facing the United States and NATO, and the approaches to escalation control which NATO assumes will be implemented, should deterrence fail. The results of the theoretical and administrative confusion over approaches to escalation control, outlined in chapter four, reappear in chapter five in the form of problems for war termination. The controversial issue of eliminating nuclear deterrence, with emphasis on the proposal for elimination by preclusive antinuclear strategic defenses is the focus of chapter six. The final chapter reviews the implications of the preceding chapters and arrives at some startling conclusions. Scholars and students of military affairs, political scientists, government officials, and members of the military establishment will find the up-to-the-minute information and judgements contained in First Strike Stability invaluable aids to their own decision making on this profoundly important world issue.

This book explores the origins, interpretations and meanings of the term biosecurity. It brings together contributors on issues relating to the perceptions of the threat of biological weapons and how states are responding, or not, to the challenges posed by the potential of the products of the life sciences to be used for destructive purposes.

Asia has the world's highest concentration of nuclear weapons and the most significant recent developments related to nuclear proliferation, as well as the world's most critical conflicts and considerable political instability. The containment and prevention of nuclear proliferation, especially in Asia, continues to be a grave concern for the international community. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the state of nuclear arsenals, nuclear ambitions and nuclear threats across different parts of Asia. It covers the Middle East (including Israel), China, India-Pakistan and their confrontation, as well as North Korea. It discusses the conventional warfare risks, risks from non-state armed groups, and examines the attempts to limit and control nuclear weapons, both international initiatives and American diplomacy and interventions. The book concludes by assessing the possibility of nuclear revival, the potential outcomes of international approaches to nuclear disarmament, and the efficacy of coercive diplomacy in containing nuclear proliferation.

The armaments of chemical and biological warfare (CBW), as Eric Coddy shows in this introduction for the concerned layman, are now widely held not just by nation-states, but by terrorist and criminal enterprises. The weapons themselves are relatively inexpensive and very easy to hide, and organizations of just a few dozen people are capable of deploying potentially devastating attacks with them. While in the twentieth century most of our arms-control effort focused, rightly, on nuclear arsenals, in the twenty-first century CBW will almost certainly require just as much attention. This book defines the basics of CBW for the concerned citizen, including non-alarmist scientific descriptions of the weapons and their antidotes, methods of deployment and defensive response, and the likelihood in the current global political climate of additional proliferation.

Vogele provides a contemporary history of the nuclear arms control negotiations of the 1980s, tracing these negotiations from their initiation at the beginning of the decade through the agreements that were reached by the end. Two chapters provide background on arms control efforts from the mid-1950s through 1980. The work is an analytical history of nuclear arms control bargaining processes, and an evaluation of the utility of alternative negotiation strategies for producing agreement. Thus, the history of these negotiations offers lessons for the continuing pursuit of arms control and other cooperative security arrangement in the post-Cold War international order.

This book is a historical and strategic analysis of the nuclear dimension of the US alliance with Australia, Australia's relationship with nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and US extended nuclear deterrence.

Almost the entire southern hemisphere is now covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones. The ones in Latin America and the South Pacific were established during the Cold War, those in Southeast Asia and Africa after its ending. Zones have also been proposed, so far without success, for the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. In this book, analysts from within the respective regions explore the reasons for success and failure in the establishment of the zone, and their utility and limitations as stepping stones to a nuclear-weapon-free world.