The lifting of the Iron Curtain in response to pressures for democratic reform in the Eastern Bloc nations and the refusal of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to use the Red Army to police countries of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radically changed international environment. Preceded by over 40 years of peace and stability, unprecedented in the history of modern Europe, the Cold War ended in a climate of upheaval and uncertainty. This volume addresses issues associated with the political and military vacuum created by recent events and explores in depth a problem of military uncertainty: first strike stability. Stephen J. Cimbala argues that war in a system undergoing rapid change, including reductions in forces and political realignment, remains disturbingly possible due to the unforeseeable, inadvertent, and uncontrollable uncertainties that plague decision making and military planning in Washington, Moscow, and other international power centers, hence, first strike instability. This timely volume clarifies the kind of bargain superpowers and their allies have made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems. Cimbala provides enhanced understandings of the concept and practice of nuclear deterrence and of first strike stability in a post-Cold War world that can help direct arms control efforts toward those areas that are most important to actual security. Broad aspects of the problem of first strike stability are set forth in the first chapter which also anticipates some of the connections between political and military levels of analysis discussed in the conclusion. Chapter two introduces the concepts of the state of nature and the state of war, explains how they apply tothe problem of first strike stability, and why the possibility of war, including nuclear war, cannot be excluded. Chapter three focuses on the "New Soviet Thinking" and why the probability of accidental and inadvertent war and escalation is not affected by reducing the levels of armaments alone. Chapter four emphasizes the problems facing the United States and NATO, and the approaches to escalation control which NATO assumes will be implemented, should deterrence fail. The results of the theoretical and administrative confusion over approaches to escalation control, outlined in chapter four, reappear in chapter five in the form of problems for war termination. The controversial issue of eliminating nuclear deterrence, with emphasis on the proposal for elimination by preclusive antinuclear strategic defenses is the focus of chapter six. The final chapter reviews the implications of the preceding chapters and arrives at some startling conclusions. Scholars and students of military affairs, political scientists, government officials, and members of the military establishment will find the up-to-the-minute information and judgements contained in First Strike Stability invaluable aids to their own decision making on this profoundly important world issue.

"Challenge to Deterrence" is based on a panel discussion from the 1985 American Political Science Association meeting in New Orleans. In this comprehensive study, eminent scholars address all aspects of U.S. deterrence policy from both technical and policy aspects. Along with discussions on technology currently available to the U.S. and how it can be used more effectively, contributors speculate on Soviet strategic planning and how the U.S. can get allies, such as Japan and Israel, more involved in deterrence activity.

This book explores the origins, interpretations and meanings of the term biosecurity. It brings together contributors on issues relating to the perceptions of the threat of biological weapons and how states are responding, or not, to the challenges posed by the potential of the products of the life sciences to be used for destructive purposes.

Most nuclear proliferation literature is focused on states seeking nuclear weapons, conducted in most cases clandestinely. The sharing of nuclear weapons technology between states is as important strategically, if unexpected, because nuclear weapons are such a powerful instrument in international politics. This book proposes to answer why, if nuclear weapons are such good preservers of peace, are states not more willing to see them proliferate? Schofield also examines the underlying phenomenon of the threat of proliferation races, and how nonproliferation bargains between adversaries make nuclear sharing far less common. But sharing is not rare. This book proposes a theory to explain nuclear sharing and surveys its rich history from its beginnings in the Second World War, including the cases of France-Israel, US-NATO, Russia-China, Israel-South Africa, China-Pakistan and Pakistan-Iran, as well as the incidence of soft balancing and permissive nuclear sharing in the cases of the US and Japan, Israel and India.

Weapons of Mass Destruction are diverse and pose unique challenges to governments attempting to keep them out of the wrong hands and preparing to respond to an attack. This text analyzes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons and terrorist groups with a known interest in them. It presents accessible information about the technical challenges posed by each type of weapon, assesses the threats, and reviews the US governmental responses. It provides structured CBRN case studies and allows for easy comparison of threats, challenges, and responses. The text combines weapons and policy information in one comprehensive and comparative resource for researchers and students interested in key issues in modern terrorism and international security.

The armaments of chemical and biological warfare (CBW), as Eric Coddy shows in this introduction for the concerned layman, are now widely held not just by nation-states, but by terrorist and criminal enterprises. The weapons themselves are relatively inexpensive and very easy to hide, and organizations of just a few dozen people are capable of deploying potentially devastating attacks with them. While in the twentieth century most of our arms-control effort focused, rightly, on nuclear arsenals, in the twenty-first century CBW will almost certainly require just as much attention. This book defines the basics of CBW for the concerned citizen, including non-alarmist scientific descriptions of the weapons and their antidotes, methods of deployment and defensive response, and the likelihood in the current global political climate of additional proliferation.

Vogele provides a contemporary history of the nuclear arms control negotiations of the 1980s, tracing these negotiations from their initiation at the beginning of the decade through the agreements that were reached by the end. Two chapters provide background on arms control efforts from the mid-1950s through 1980. The work is an analytical history of nuclear arms control bargaining processes, and an evaluation of the utility of alternative negotiation strategies for producing agreement. Thus, the history of these negotiations offers lessons for the continuing pursuit of arms control and other cooperative security arrangement in the post-Cold War international order.

The Constitution was one of the US Navy's first six original frigates, ordered as a counter to the Barbary corsairs in the Mediterranean. Fast and heavily built, she was nominally rated as a 44 but mounted thirty 24-pdr and twenty-two 12-pdr cannon. Her most famous encounter, after which she became nicknamed 'Old Ironsides' due to British shot being seen bouncing off her hull, involved HMS Guerriere, which she smashed; the same treatment was meted out to HMS Java four months later. Now the oldest commissioned warship afloat in thw world, she is berthed in Boston Harbor. The 'Anatomy of the Ship' series aims to provide the finest documentation of individual ships and ship types ever published. What makes the series unique is a complete set of superbly executed line drawings, both the conventional type of plan as well as explanatory views, with fully descriptive keys. These are supported by technical details and a record of the ship's service history.

This book is a historical and strategic analysis of the nuclear dimension of the US alliance with Australia, Australia's relationship with nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and US extended nuclear deterrence.

In the next few years the US government will make decisions regarding the renewal of its triad of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear weapons that will have huge implications for the security of the country and its allies, its public finances, and the salience of nuclear weapons in global politics. Current plans provide for spending an estimated US$1 trillion over 30 years to modernise or replace the full triad. The purpose of this book is to demonstrate viable alternatives to the current US plan to modernise or replace its full triad of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear weapons. These alternatives would allow the US to maintain deterrence at a lower cost, thereby freeing up funds to ease pressing shortfalls in spending on conventional procurement and nuclear security. Moreover, these alternative structures - which propose a reduction in the size and shape of the US arsenal - offer distinct advantages over the existing plan with regard to maintaining strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China; upholding existing arms-control treaties, in particular New START and the INF Treaty; and boosting the security of US nuclear forces and supporting the global non-proliferation regime, including the NPT. They would also endow the US with a nuclear force better suited to the strategic environment of the twenty-first century and mark an advance on the existing triad with regard to supporting conventional military operations.

Almost the entire southern hemisphere is now covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones. The ones in Latin America and the South Pacific were established during the Cold War, those in Southeast Asia and Africa after its ending. Zones have also been proposed, so far without success, for the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. In this book, analysts from within the respective regions explore the reasons for success and failure in the establishment of the zone, and their utility and limitations as stepping stones to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

This is a reference work for EW engineers which is also intended for university use in advanced undergraduate or graduate-level courses in EW, radar, and aerospace systems. This text reviews the fundamental concepts and physical principles underlying EW receiving systems design analysis, and performance evaluation. The main discussion focuses on radar signals in military applications.

Asia has the world's highest concentration of nuclear weapons and the most significant recent developments related to nuclear proliferation, as well as the world's most critical conflicts and considerable political instability. The containment and prevention of nuclear proliferation, especially in Asia, continues to be a grave concern for the international community. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the state of nuclear arsenals, nuclear ambitions and nuclear threats across different parts of Asia. It covers the Middle East (including Israel), China, India-Pakistan and their confrontation, as well as North Korea. It discusses the conventional warfare risks, risks from non-state armed groups, and examines the attempts to limit and control nuclear weapons, both international initiatives and American diplomacy and interventions. The book concludes by assessing the possibility of nuclear revival, the potential outcomes of international approaches to nuclear disarmament, and the efficacy of coercive diplomacy in containing nuclear proliferation.

The failure of six countries to reach an agreement in the Six-Party Talks on Korea has shown the futility of negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. As Victor Ofosu shows in this timely new study, diplomacy failed because nuclear reversal is not in Pyongyang security, regional, or economic interests. This analysis examines factors which may encourage North Korea and other nuclear powers to reverse their posture, including considerations of constraint surrounding the INF treaty between the United States and Russia. The book also considers arguments criticizing the effectiveness of arms control agreements, the application of security and domestic models of arms control, and how security and domestic issues can deter a state from complying with a treaty.

In this powerful new analysis of the importance of U.S. nuclear proliferation policy, Eric H. Arnett realistically assesses the impact of nuclear proliferation on the ability of the United States to protect what is currently perceived to be its interests. The book offers a thorough review of the effects of nuclear weapons on U.S. power projection forces, the current capabilities of proliferant countries, and the ability of these proliferant to successfully deliver their nuclear weapons. Arnett constructs scenarios that test the relevance of the proliferant arsenals to U.S. capabilities, and probable willingness, to protect its interests in future crisis. Using India, Iran, and Libya to present these scenarios, the book questions whether a proliferant would be immune to intervention from a nuclear superpower or, rather, immune to the purported benefits of nuclear deterrence.

With a special focus on U.S. naval power, this book asks whether nuclear proliferation will limit options and opportunities the U.S. would otherwise have. Will the U.S. have to forego certain regional interests in the face of nuclear attacks on ships and bases? Would the Navy have struck Benghazi had Qaddafi deployed a small nuclear arsenal? Will the Freedom of Navigation Program have to be abandoned in some cases? Or will the U.S. Navy be able to cope through modifications to forces and tactics, as more countries cross the nuclear threshold?

This book presents a fundamental departure in presenting an analysis of the internal dynamics of defense management and decision-making in Pakistan--a new nuclear weapon state. This is an in-depth study of Pakistan's security link with its arms suppliers and defense industrial capacity, and the influence of Pakistan's army on conventional and unconventional defense decisions. The analysis is backed with numerous case studies of defense decisions carried out from 1979-99.

The threat of poison gas, and other related biological warfare agents, holds our society hostage to the possible actions of terrorist groups or rogue states. This study hopes to convince policymakers and the general public that the bad reputation that surrounds the use of gas is largely the result of propaganda, misinformation, and oft-repeated half-truths. With proper precautions and discipline, neither the military nor society need fear gas as a weapon of mass destruction, wielded by dictators and cowards who utilize the loopholes in international agreements and flaunt world opinion. While not advocating the use of toxic gas in warfare, the author argues that education and common sense are the most effective tools to combat the gases that remain in arsenals around the world.

After a discussion of the earliest uses of gas and other similar tactics in warfare, this book explains how our image of gas has been shaped by early pronouncements that branded it a treacherous and barbarous weapon. The fear of retribution, as well as political motivations, prevented the use of gas warfare in the Second World War, but its use resurfaced in later decades both in warfare and in combatting internal strife. The author details various types of gas and discusses the most effective measures to counter each one. He also chronicles the long history of attempts to outlaw gas, why these attempts have failed, and why such efforts are not likely to succeed in the future.

As proven by the recent discovery of ongoing research and tests in India and Pakistan, the nuclear age is not dead. Nuclear weapons, deployed in plentiful numbers during the Cold War by the Americans and Soviets, and, in lesser numbers, by others, were nevertheless controlled in their use by the essential equivalence, of U.S. and Soviet strategic power and by the ability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to dominate the international security environment by means of their global military power. Now the setting within which nuclear weapons exist has been transformed.

Now that the Cold War has ended, and the Soviet Union has vanished, states seeking nuclear weapons operate under decision making rules that are sometimes opaque to Western observers. If the end of the Cold War leads to the unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons, Cimbala stresses that a combination of military hubris and arms control insolvency could lead to new nuclear crises or worse. The author provides a provocative analysis for policy makers and professional military staff as well as scholars and researchers involved with international relations, security studies, and arms control.

Often lost in the discussion about the nuclear crisis are its regional dynamics. From 2002 China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea struggled to navigate between the unsettling belligerence of North Korea and the unilateral insistence of the United States. This book focuses on their strategic thinking over four stages of the crisis. Drawing on sources from each of the countries, it examines how the four perceived their role in the Six-Party Talks and the regional context, as they eyed each other. The book emphasizes the significance of these talks for the emerging security framework and great power cooperation in Northeast Asia.

The Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia--is a region overburdened by unnecessary military expenditures. Despite persistent civil conflicts and militarized regimes in a number of countries in the region, there are actually few genuine external threats, and the armed forces are now largely used to maintain internal security.

A detailed country-by-country assessment of the effectiveness of military forces, and their impact on regional economics, shows that the region remains a mosaic of conflicting national ambitions, but strategic ambitions have been supplanted by internal conflicts, tensions, and politics. Declining military budgets are leading to declining military strength and capability, but they belie the Maghreb's potential for armed conflict and human suffering. Even though the Maghreb is a supplier of oil and natural gas, which usually ensures the attention of the West, this tragedy of arms gets little attention from the outside world. This means that the prospects for the region are continued wasteful military spending, and the resultant harm to national economic and political health.

Stemming from the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, this book asserts that no single institution or country possesses all the resources to effectively address radiological and nuclear threats. Moreover, the book asserts that fundamental scientific challenges must be overcome to achieve new and improved technologies. In response, the book sets forth research strategies that advance the ability to counter nuclear and radiological threats.

A "second nuclear age" has begun in the post-Cold War world. Created by the expansion of nuclear arsenals and new proliferation in Asia, it has changed the familiar nuclear geometry of the Cold War. Increasing potency of nuclear arsenals in China, India, and Pakistan, the nuclear breakout in North Korea, and the potential for more states to cross the nuclear-weapons threshold from Iran to Japan suggest that the second nuclear age of many competing nuclear powers has the potential to be even less stable than the first. Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age assembles a group of distinguished scholars to grapple with the matter of how the United States, its allies, and its friends must size up the strategies, doctrines, and force structures currently taking shape if they are to design responses that reinforce deterrence amid vastly more complex strategic circumstances. By focusing sharply on strategy - that is, on how states use doomsday weaponry for political gain - the book distinguishes itself from familiar net assessments emphasizing quantifiable factors like hardware, technical characteristics, and manpower. While the emphasis varies from chapter to chapter, contributors pay special heed to the logistical, technological, and social dimensions of strategy alongside the specifics of force structure and operations. They never lose sight of the human factor - the pivotal factor in diplomacy, strategy, and war.

More than ten million poison gas' shells, mortar bombs, etc., lie hidden in Europe, many of them relics from World War I. Some were fired and failed to detonate, others were abandoned in old ammunition dumps. Most retain their load of chemical warfare (CW) agents. They are turned up daily in the course of farming and construction. Many European nations have permanent departments concerned with their collection and destruction. Old munitions, when discovered, are usually heavily corroded and difficult to identify. Is it a CW munition? Or an explosive? If CW, what agent does it contain? Once identified, one has to select a destruction method. Some of the methods that have been proposed are less than perfect, and are often complicated by the presence of extraneous chemicals, either mixed with the CW agents during manufacture or formed over decades in the ground. Of particular interest are the insiders' reports on the German CW programmes of both World Wars, and the current status of Russian chemical armaments.

As the public increasingly questioned the war in Vietnam, a group of American scientists deeply concerned about the use of Agent Orange and other herbicides started a movement to ban what they called "ecocide."

David Zierler traces this movement, starting in the 1940s, when weed killer was developed in agricultural circles and theories of counterinsurgency were studied by the military. These two trajectories converged in 1961 with Operation Ranch Hand, the joint U.S.-South Vietnamese mission to use herbicidal warfare as a means to defoliate large areas of enemy territory.

Driven by the idea that humans were altering the world's ecology for the worse, a group of scientists relentlessly challenged Pentagon assurances of safety, citing possible long-term environmental and health effects. It wasn't until 1970 that the scientists gained access to sprayed zones confirming that a major ecological disaster had occurred. Their findings convinced the U.S. government to renounce first use of herbicides in future wars and, Zierler argues, fundamentally reoriented thinking about warfare and environmental security in the next forty years.

Incorporating in-depth interviews, unique archival collections, and recently declassified national security documents, Zierler examines the movement to ban ecocide as it played out amid the rise of a global environmental consciousness and growing disillusionment with the containment policies of the cold war era.

This book provides an analysis of the development and deployment of chemical weapons from 700 BC to the present day. The First World War is examined in detail since it remains the most significant experience of the chemical threat, but the Second World War and post-war conflicts are also evaluated. Additionally, protocols attempting to control the proliferation and use of chemical weapons are assessed. Finally, the book examines the threat (real and imagined) from a chemical warfare attack today by rationally assessing to what extent terrorist groups around the world are capable of making and using such weapons.