The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and
the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is
familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates,
structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread
distortions in executive pay. "Pay without Performance" presents a
disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own
pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if
firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders.
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards
have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the
executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed
account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement
benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have
camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay.
Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt
shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly,
by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers'
incentives.
This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance
on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution,
the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more
independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather,
boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by
eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate
them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive
compensation and corporate governance, "Pay without Performance"
points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving
corporate performance.
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