The problem of moral luck is that there is a contradiction in our
common sense ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our
thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by
luck. For example, two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in
the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. We
blame the killer driver more than the merely reckless driver,
because we believe that the killer driver is more blameworthy.
Nevertheless, this idea contradicts another feature of our thinking
captured in this moral principle: A person's blameworthiness cannot
be affected by that which is not within her control. Thus, our
ordinary thinking about moral responsibility implies that the
drivers are and are not equally blameworthy. In Defense of Moral
Luck aims to make progress in resolving this contradiction. Hartman
defends the claim that certain kinds of luck in results,
circumstance, and character can partially determine the degree of a
person's blameworthiness. He also explains why there is a puzzle in
our thinking about moral responsibility in the first place if luck
often affects a person's praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.
Furthermore, the book's methodology provides a unique way to
advance the moral luck debate with arguments from diverse areas in
philosophy that do not bottom out in standard pro-moral luck
intuitions.
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