The book is a comprehensive study of India's relationship with the non-proliferation regime, and its transformative evolution from a perennial outlier to one seeking greater integration with the regime and its normative structures. The highlight of this study is its incisive conceptual analysis of the regime as a functional system and its structural complexities, which brings forth new insights on the regime's core ideas like non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. The book also provides an extensive non-Western narrative on the concept of counter-proliferation and its conceivable role and influence in the regime. It breaks new ground in explaining India's quest for an anti-proliferation strategy, which could determine its status and future in the emerging global nuclear order. It will be a substantial contribution to the literature on India's approach towards non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and disarmament, and will enhance the understanding of the impact of the regime's normative structures on India's nuclear decisions.

Nuclear Notes is a publication of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) featuring innovative thinking by rising experts in the nuclear field. Its goal is to advance the public debate about nuclear weapons strategy, arms control, nonproliferation, disarmament, and other nuclear issues by providing a forum for sharing new analysis and insight. In particular, this publication seeks to provide an opportunity for graduate students and early career professionals to publish ideas emanating from their independent research or that are connected to their unique vantage point as analysts and implementers of nuclear policy.

LA INMINENTE INVASION DE LA GUERRA DE LA DROGA DE MEXICO
Tras haber observado los carteles mexicanos de la droga durante anos, la experta en seguridad fronteriza Sylvia Longmire nos conduce a lo mas profundo de ese mundo para ser testigos de una peligrosa subcultura clandestina que hara lo que sea necesario para proveer drogas a un bien dispuesto publico de consumidores estadounidenses.
Los carteles han crecido cada vez mas en los ultimos anos, construyendo submarinos que suben por las costas de America Central y excavando complicados tuneles por los que transportan drogas hacia el norte y por donde llevan de vuelta dinero en efectivo y armas largas de gran potencia fabricadas en Estados Unidos para fomentar la guerra del narcotrafico.
Sirviendose de su larga experiencia de trabajo con temas fronterizos, Longmire da vida a la real amenaza que representan los carteles mexicanos que operan no solo por toda la frontera del suroeste, sino tambien en lo mas profundo de todos los rincones de Estados Unidos.
Sylvia Longmire tambien ofrece soluciones reales a los criticos dilemas que enfrentan Mexico y Estados Unidos, entre ellas programas para impedir que los jovenes mexicanos se unan a los carteles y cambios en las leyes antidrogas a ambos lados de la frontera.

Nuclear Notes is a biannual publication of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) featuring innovative thinking by rising experts in the nuclear field. Its goal is to advance the public debate about nuclear weapons strategy, arms control, nonproliferation, disarmament, and other nuclear issues by providing a forum for sharing new analysis and insight. In particular, this publication seeks to provide an opportunity for graduate students and early career professionals to publish ideas emanating from their independent research or that are connected to their unique vantage point as analysts and implementers of nuclear policy.

This work, focused on the hegemonic power and exacerbated militarism that represent projects and realities like the anti-missile "defense" conceived by different administrations in the US after World War II, is a thorough investigation into this problem. The author searched on the origins of the American military project and the evolution of military science and technology during the four decades of the so-called "Cold War" and in the context of the landscape of contemporary international politics and the great confrontation with the then Soviet adversary. The research is framed within the historical sciences and policies, extending the period of post-Cold War and to the Barack Obama administration, appreciating the impact of geo-strategic deployment of the anti-missile "defense," for international security and the relations of the United States with Europe, Russia and China, in a stage convulsive and turbulent of the international system in transition or development in the XXI century.

In 2007 two former U.S. secretaries of state, a defense secretary, and a former senator wrote persuasively in the Wall Street Journal that the time had come to move seriously toward a nuclear-free world. Almost two years later, the Global Zero movement was born with its chief aim to rid the world of such weapons once and for all by 2030. But is it realistic or even wise to envision a world without nuclear weapons? More and more people seem to think so. Barack Obama has declared "America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons". But that is easier said than done. Michael O'Hanlon places his own indelible stamp on this critical issue, putting forth a "friendly skeptic's case for nuclear disarmament". Calls to "ban the bomb" are as old as the bomb itself, but the pace and organization of nonproliferation campaigns have picked up greatly recently. The growing Global Zero movement, for example, wants treaty negotiations to begin in 2019. Would this be prudent or even feasible in a world that remains dangerous, divided, and unpredictable? After all, America's nuclear arsenal has been its military trump card for much of the period since World War II. Pursuing a nuclear weapons ban prematurely or carelessly could alarm allies, leading them to consider building their own weapons - the opposite of the intended effect. O'Hanlon clearly presents the dangers of nuclear weapons and the advantages of disarmament as a goal. But even once an accord is in place, he notes, temporary suspension of restrictions may be necessary in response to urgent threats such as nuclear "cheating" or discovery of an advanced biological weapons program. To take all nuclear options off the table forever strengthens the hand of those that either do not make that pledge or do not honor it. For the near term, traditional approaches to arms control, including dismantling existing bomb inventories, can pave the way to make a true nonproliferation regime possible in the decades ahead.

This book examines the U.S.-foreign partnership efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling and terrorist travel. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Megaports Initiative in 2003 to deter, detect, and interdict nuclear or other radiological materials smuggled through foreign seaports. The Initiative funds the installation of radiation detection equipment at select seaports overseas and trains foreign personnel to use this equipment to scan shipping containers entering and leaving these seaports, regardless of destination. Additionally, the U.S. government has identified four key gaps in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. The book evaluates how U.S. capacity-building efforts address those gaps and assesses the extent to which the U.S. government is measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps.

Drawing on his knowledge of the comparative history of warfare and arms control across preliterate, ancient, medieval, and modern polities, Richard Dean Burns focuses longitudinally on such perennial arms control issues as negotiation, verification, and compliance. Although he does not, for example, allege that war elephants and nuclear weapons are of equal destructive potential, he does discern instructive similarities between Carthage in 202 BCE and Iraq in 1991 AD. Arms control and disarmament measures have been pursued and adopted throughout the history and prehistory of human warfare: sometimes as protocols recognizing evolving humanitarian taboos; sometimes as terms imposed by the victors on the vanquished; and sometimes as accords negotiated between rivals fearful of mutual destruction. Arms control measures ramped up in significance and urgency at the dawn of the 20th century by the introduction of rapid-fire weapons, aircraft, chemical agents, and submarines, and again at mid-century with the advent of weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological-with sophisticated delivery systems. As Burns makes clear, the enormous increase in destructive potential brought about by thermonuclear weaponry essentially changed the nature of war and, therefore, of arms control.

War With Iran: Political, Military and Economic Consequences provides readers both a history of Iran's relationship with the West and an expert's estimation of what the political, human and financial costs of full-scale war with Iran might be. Authors Geoffrey Kemp and John Allen Gay of the Center for the National Interest utilize their years studying and informing America's foreign policy in the Middle East to bring to life the possible outcomes of an American military intervention in Iran. Such a decision would not only have catastrophic consequences on the Persian Gulf, but would also endanger the whole world's delicate economy by heightening instability in a fragile but resource-rich region. Written for anyone with an interest in the future of American foreign policy, War With Iran explores what every player has at stake in the current crisis by analyzing every tension adjacent to it; from America's staunch support of Israel to Iran's own dogged pursuit of advanced nuclear capabilities. Controversial, timely and thoroughly researched, this story stands as a preliminary caution against what would be a devastating meltdown of diplomacy, for which-if peace be the goal-there is always time.

We are at a critical juncture in world politics. Nuclear strategy and policy have risen to the top of the global policy agenda, and issues ranging from a nuclear Iran to the global zero movement are generating sharp debate. The historical origins of our contemporary nuclear world are deeply consequential for contemporary policy, but it is crucial that decisions are made on the basis of fact rather than myth and misapprehension. In Nuclear Statecraft, Francis J. Gavin challenges key elements of the widely accepted narrative about the history of the atomic age and the consequences of the nuclear revolution.

On the basis of recently declassified documents, Gavin reassesses the strategy of flexible response, the influence of nuclear weapons during the Berlin Crisis, the origins of and motivations for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, and how to assess the nuclear dangers we face today. In case after case, he finds that we know far less than we think we do about our nuclear history. Archival evidence makes it clear that decision makers were more concerned about underlying geopolitical questions than about the strategic dynamic between two nuclear superpowers.

Gavin's rigorous historical work not only tells us what happened in the past but also offers a powerful tool to explain how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Nuclear Statecraft provides a solid foundation for future policymaking.

India has long been motivated to modernize its military, and it now has the resources. But so far, the drive to rebuild has lacked a critical component --strategic military planning. India's approach of arming without strategic purpose remains viable, however, as it seeks great-power accommodation of its rise and does not want to appear threatening. What should we anticipate from this effort in the future, and what are the likely ramifications? Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta answer those crucial questions in a book so timely that it reached number two on the nonfiction bestseller list in India.

"Two years after the publication of "Arming without Aiming," our view is that India's strategic restraint and its consequent institutional arrangement remain in place. We do not want to predict that India's military-strategic restraint will last forever, but we do expect that the deeper problems in Indian defense policy will continue to slow down military modernization." --from the preface to the paperback edition

Nuclear technology is dual use in nature, meaning that it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to build nuclear weapons. Despite security concerns about proliferation, the United States and other nuclear nations have regularly shared with other countries nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge for peaceful purposes. In Atomic Assistance, Matthew Fuhrmann argues that governments use peaceful nuclear assistance as a tool of economic statecraft. Nuclear suppliers hope that they can reap the benefits of foreign aid improving relationships with their allies, limiting the influence of their adversaries, enhancing their energy security by gaining favorable access to oil supplies without undermining their security. By providing peaceful nuclear assistance, however, countries inadvertently help spread nuclear weapons.

Fuhrmann draws on several cases of "Atoms for Peace," including U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from 1957 to 1979; Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986; French, Italian, and Brazilian nuclear exports to Iraq from 1975 to 1981; and U.S. nuclear cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008. He also explores decision making in countries such as Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria to determine why states began (or did not begin) nuclear weapons programs and why some programs succeeded while others failed. Fuhrmann concludes that, on average, countries receiving higher levels of peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to pursue and acquire the bomb especially if they experience an international crisis after receiving aid."

Nuclear technology is dual use in nature, meaning that it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to build nuclear weapons. Despite security concerns about proliferation, the United States and other nuclear nations have regularly shared with other countries nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge for peaceful purposes. In Atomic Assistance, Matthew Fuhrmann argues that governments use peaceful nuclear assistance as a tool of economic statecraft. Nuclear suppliers hope that they can reap the benefits of foreign aid improving relationships with their allies, limiting the influence of their adversaries, enhancing their energy security by gaining favorable access to oil supplies without undermining their security. By providing peaceful nuclear assistance, however, countries inadvertently help spread nuclear weapons.

Fuhrmann draws on several cases of "Atoms for Peace," including U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from 1957 to 1979; Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986; French, Italian, and Brazilian nuclear exports to Iraq from 1975 to 1981; and U.S. nuclear cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008. He also explores decision making in countries such as Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria to determine why states began (or did not begin) nuclear weapons programs and why some programs succeeded while others failed. Fuhrmann concludes that, on average, countries receiving higher levels of peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to pursue and acquire the bomb especially if they experience an international crisis after receiving aid."

Local Peacebuilding and National Peace is a collection of essays that examines the effects of local peacebuilding efforts on national peace initiatives. The book looks at violent and protracted struggles in which local people have sought to make their own peace with local combatants in a variety of ways, and how such initiatives have affected and have been affected by national level strategies. Chapters on theories of local and national peacemaking are combined with chapters on recent efforts to carry out such processes in warn torn societies such as Africa, Asia, and South America, with essays contributed by experts who were actually actively involved in the peacemaking process. With its unique focus on the interaction of peacemaking at local and national levels, the book will fill a gap in the literature. It will be of interest to students and researchers in such fields as peace studies, conflict resolution, international relations, postwar recovery and development.

While many books discuss how nations can prevent the proliferation of biological and nuclear weapons, this unique and controversial volume begins with the premise that these weapons will certainly multiply despite our desperate desire to slow this process. How worried should we be and what should we do? In From Lambs to Lions, Thomas Preston examines current trends in the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons capabilities, know-how, and technologies for both state and non-state actors-and then projects these trends over the coming ten to fifteen years to assess how they might impact existing security relationships between states. With a new preface to the paperback edition, Thomas Preston also addresses the threat of biological and nuclear weapons proliferation that faces the Obama administration. How might a nuclear North Korea or Iran constrain U.S. freedom of action in its foreign or military policies? How might U.S. security be impacted by the current biotechnical revolution and spread of bioweapons know-how to opponents? How might terror groups like Al Qaeda make use of such weapons in future attacks against the United States or its allies around the world? These are the central, most fundamental questions facing American security policy over the coming decades, and to ignore them is to put ourselves at risk for new 9/11-style surprises. For answers, and for some potentially surprising reassurances, this clear and informative book will be invaluable.

Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget around $1.1 billion across three agencies -- DOD, DOE and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups. The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START I Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials. The State Department manages the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev. These centers provide research grants to scientists and engineers so that they will not sell their knowledge to other nations or terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided assistance with export and border control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department of Energy manages programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that help nuclear scientists and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises. DOE is also helping Russia dispose of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut-down its remaining plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants. Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia's willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President's ability to waive certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.

DDR is an essential compnent of international peacebuilding schemes. This title is the first appraisal of its effectiveness in a variety of international contexts. It draws out lessons to be learned.In countries affected by war, the cessation of hostilities inevitably produces a large number of demobilised combatants, most of them lacking any basic means of support or livelihood. The failure to respond to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of such former combatants can cause high levels of insecurity, at worst a resumption of armed conflict. Accordingly DDR is now a regular component of post-conflict reconstruction efforts around the world. Postwar Recovery provides a unique study of DDR in action. Drawing upon the experience of four major war-torn societies - Afghanistan, Kosovo, El Salvador and Sierra Leone - the author provides the first comparative analysis of DDR, exploring the planning, implementation and effectiveness of DDR in each country. In a final chapter, the author draws out the lessons to be learned.

Much has been said and written about the failure of U.S. intelligence to prevent the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and its overestimation of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction under Saddam Hussein. This book focuses instead on the central role that intelligence-collection systems play in promoting arms control and disarmament. Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith Hansen bring more than fifty combined years of experience to this discussion of the capabilities of technical systems, which are primarily based in space. Their history of the rapid advancement of surveillance technology is a window into a dramatic reconceptualization of Cold War strategies and policy planning. Graham and Hansen focus on the intelligence successes against Soviet strategic nuclear forces and the quality of the intelligence that has made possible accurate assessments of WMD programs in North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Their important insights shed a much-needed light on the process of verifying how the world harnesses the proliferation of nuclear arms and the continual drive for advancements in technology.

Adopted in April 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 obliges all states to take steps to prevent non-state actors, especially terrorist organizations and arms traffickers, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related materials. The United Nations placed itself firmly in the center of one of the world's key international security challenges. Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism brings together renowned scholars and policymakers to examine a wide range of new policy-related questions arising from the resolution's impact on the bio-scientific community, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the IAEA, trade and customs, and counter-proliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The impact of 1540 goes beyond setting new legal requirements. It focuses on enforcement not only nationally but also internationally, pressing all states to place their own houses in order. Among the key questions is how the resolution will change the existing network of non-proliferation regimes. Will it merely reinforce requirements of the existing non-proliferation treaties? Or will it offer a legal framework for counter-proliferation activities and other measures to enforce the non-proliferation network? This book provides an overview of the novel policy questions UNSCR 1540's future implementation and enforcement will offer for years to come. Contributors include Jeffrey Almond, Thomas J. Biersteker (Brown University), Olivia Bosch (Chatham House), Gerald Epstein (CSIS), Chandre Gould (Center for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town )], Ron Manley (former OPCW Director of Verification) Sarah Meek (ISS), Siew Gay Ong (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore), Elizabeth Prescott (AAAS Congressional Fellow), Tariq Rauf (IAEA), Will Robinson (World Customs Organization), Roelof Jan Manschot (Eurojust), Peter van Ham (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), Ted Whiteside (NATO), and Angela Woodward (VERTIC).

Gun-related violence remains an intractable problem despite a decline in the past decade. Some believe the solution lies in stricter gun control laws while others think these measures would be ineffective or counter-productive. Guns, Gun Policy, and Elections examines current gun control policy, and explains how it was adopted by discussing the roles and interactions of elected officials, interest groups, political parties, and the public. Original research on media coverage and public opinion, as well as a chapter on state policy (Virginia) make the book both informative and accessible. The book focuses on the utility of gun policy, and its discussion of policy impact is grounded in real-world politics. The importance of gun control in the Presidential elections of 2000 and 2004, as well as some U.S. Senate and statewide offices is placed in the context of both a policy input and consequence.

The emergence of a European policy on armaments is an important and politically controversial component in the building of Europe. Should European cooperation on armaments be designed from a market and a competition perspective, and according to supranational decision making? Or is it the emerging European defense policy and intergovernmental decision-making style that should determine such cooperation? The controversy and tension between the ways of framing this issue highlight fundamental questions in European politics. Organizing European Cooperation shows that the issue of armaments has been conceptualized within two different projects of European integration: the political economy project, developed through the EC, and the defense and security project, organized through NATO, the WEU, and recently through the EU. By employing an innovative theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of European politics the author's analysis of both public actors, such as the Council, the European Commission, and NATO, and non-state actors, such as aerospace companies and business interest organizations, makes this book a valuable tool for anyone trying to understand the interaction between two European organizational fields-market and defense-and the emergence of a new European organizational field on armaments.

Non-proliferation assistance programs, including co-operative threat reduction, are being examined to help reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the FY2004 National Defense Authorisation Act, Congress authorised the Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. This book analyses the range of possibilities for applying CTR funds, what kinds of assistance may be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance. A key underlying issue is whether countries that pose particular risks are prepared to provide adequate co-operation to achieve CTR objectives. As many observers have noted, CTR programs cannot be precisely replicated in other countries. A common factor must be the willingness of such states to co-operate. One school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention. Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus additionally on states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.

Arms control, for decades at the core of the foreign policy consensus, today is among the more contentious issues in American politics. It is pilloried and considered out of mode in many conservative quarters, while being viewed as nearly sacrosanct in many liberal circles. In this new book, Michael Levi and Michael O'Hanlon argue that neither the left nor the right has a correct view of the proper utility of arms control in the age of terror. Arms control in the traditional sense--lengthy treaties to limit nuclear and other military competitions among the great powers--is no longer particularly useful. Nor should arms control be pursued as a means to the end of constraining the power of nations or of promoting global government. It is still a critical tool, though, for controlling dangerous technologies, particularly those that, in the hands of hostile states or terrorist organizations, could cause massive death and destruction. Arms control and coercive action, including military force, must be integrated into an overall strategy for preventing proliferation, now more than ever before. Arms control should be used to gain earlier warning of illicit activities inside dangerous states, allowing the international community to take coercive action in a timely way. The authors propose three new criteria to guide future arms control efforts, designed to respond to today's geopolitical realities. Arms control must focus on the dangers of catastrophic technology, not so much in the hands of major powers as of small states and terrorist groups. Their criteria lead to a natural focus on nuclear and biological technologies. Much tougher measures to prevent countries from gaining nuclear weaponstechnoloty while purportedly complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and procedures for controlling dangerous biological technologies will be most prominent in this framework, while lower priority is giben to efforts such as bilateral nuclear accords and most types of arms control for outer space. This book provides a framework for an effective arms control strategy in a new age of international security.

More than half a century after the advent of the nuclear age, is the world approaching a tipping point that will unleash an epidemic of nuclear proliferation? Today many of the building blocks of a nuclear arsenal -scientific and engineering expertise, precision machine tools, software, design information -are more readily available than ever before. The nuclear pretensions of so-called rogue states and terrorist organizations are much discussed. But how firm is the resolve of those countries that historically have chosen to forswear nuclear weapons? A combination of changes in the international environment could set off a domino effect, with countries scrambling to develop nuclear weapons so as not to be left behind -or to develop nuclear "hedge" capacities that would allow them to build nuclear arsenals relatively quickly, if necessary. The Nuclear Tipping Point examines the factors, both domestic and transnational, that shape nuclear policy. The authors, distinguished scholars and foreign policy practitioners with extensive government experience, develop a framework for understanding why certain countries may originally have decided to renounce nuclear weapons -and pinpoint some more recent country-specific factors that could give them cause to reconsider. Case studies of eight long-term stalwarts of the nonproliferation regime -Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, and Taiwan -flesh out this framework and show how even these countries might be pushed over the edge of a nuclear tipping point. The authors offer prescriptions that would both prevent such countries from reconsidering their nuclear option and avert proliferation by others. The stakes are enormous and success is far from assured. To keep the tipping point beyond reach, the authors argue, the international community will have to act with unity, imagination, and strength, and Washington's leadership will be essential. Contributors include Leon Feurth, George Washington University; Ellen Laipson, Stimson Center; Thomas W. Lippman, Middle East Institute; Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Derek J. Mitchell, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Jonathan D. Pollack, U.S. Naval War College; Walter B. Slocombe, Caplin and Drysdale; and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Center for Strategic and International Studies.