In the early and mid 1990s, several African countries demobilized part of their armed forces. In the light of Africa's large development challenges, continuing wars and insecurity, this study analyzes the following questions: to what extent and how have demobilizations contributed to peace and human development? Where did the soldiers go? What can we learn from the different approaches that have been taken? These questions provide insights in the linkages between development and conflict, and provide lessons for demilitarization and peace building efforts in postwar societies.

This invaluable study provides a unique insider's view of the history of Soviet and Russian policy on nuclear weapons modernization and charts the future evolution of the Russian strategic arsenal. Using information that has only recently become available and introducing new, previously unknown data, Sokov concludes that the most important force behind the evolution of the Soviet and Russian strategic arsenal was the military itself, which sought to increase strategic stability by enhancing the survivability of weapons systems. The highly destabilizing posture of the 1970s and 1980s was, he argues, in a sense 'accidental, ' resulting from the failure of several R&D programs and specific features of the Soviet decisionmaking mechanism. The author demonstrates that the role of such factors as the economic crisis, U.S. modernization programs, and general Russian foreign policy goals has been exaggerated by Western analysts. No matter how hard-pressed, Russia will hold to its current plans, Sokov argues. At the same time, the military will be unlikely to engage in a new arms buildup even if the economic situation improves or a nationalist government comes to power. Instead, stability will be sought through better quality of weapons at progressively lower levels. Introducing a wealth of new information on Soviet and Russian national security policymaking, the author explores in meticulous detail such key issues as decisions on weapons development, arms-control negotiations, and the handling of the Soviet nuclear arsenal after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The reader will be able to follow the debates and intrigues between military planners, diplomats, and weapons designers as they clashed over the choice of acquisition programs and negotiating positions. With its combination of informed analysis and use of new documentation, this work will be invaluable for all concerned with U.S.-Russian strategic relations.

Until now, there has been no detailed account of Israel's nuclear history. Previous treatments of the subject relied heavily on rumors, leaks, and journalistic speculations. But with "Israel and the Bomb, " Avner Cohen has forged an interpretive political history that draws on thousands of American and Israeli government documents -- most of them recently declassified and never before cited -- and more than one hundred interviews with key individuals who played important roles in this story. Cohen reveals that Israel crossed the nuclear weapons threshold on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, yet it remains ambiguous about its nuclear capability to this day. What made this posture of "opacity" possible, and how did it evolve?

Cohen focuses on a two-decade period from about 1950 until 1970, during which David Ben-Gurion's vision of making Israel a nuclear-weapon state was realized. He weaves together the story of the formative years of Israel's nuclear program, from the founding of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission in 1952, to the alliance with France that gave Israel the sophisticated technology it needed, to the failure of American intelligence to identify the Dimona Project for what it was, to the negotiations between President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir that led to the current policy of secrecy. Cohen also analyzes the complex reasons Israel concealed its nuclear program -- from concerns over Arab reaction and the negative effect of the debate at home to consideration of America's commitment to nonproliferation.

"Israel and the Bomb" highlights the key questions and the many potent issues surrounding Israel's nuclear history. This book will be a critical resource for students of nuclear proliferation, Middle East politics, Israeli history, and American-Israeli relations, as well as a revelation for general readers.

Despite the ongoing drawdown of strategic forces under the terms of START, both the United States and Russia maintain large arsenals of nuclear weapons poised for immediate launch. Under the most optimistic current scenarios, these arsenals will remain very large and launch-ready for more than a decade. This book, by a distinguished group of coauthors, critically evaluates the current policy of retaining and operating large nuclear arsenals. It reviews U.S. nuclear doctrine and strategy, and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression by former Cold War adversaries and other countries with weapons of mass destruction. The risks of inadvertent as well as deliberate nuclear attack are assessed. The authors argue that small arsenals (low hundreds) on low alert satisfy all justifiable requirements for nuclear weapons. They present a blueprint for making deep cuts in U.S. and Russian deployments, and for lowering their alert level. They explain the implications of shifting to small arsenals for further constraining anti-ballistic missile defenses, strengthening verification, and capping or reducing the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and Britain as well as the threshold nuclear states. The political challenges and opportunities, both domestic and international, for achieving deep reductions in the size and readiness of nuclear forces are analyzed by the authors and by distinguished experts from other countries. The coauthors are Bruce Blair, Jonathan Dean, James Goodby, Steve Fetter, Hal Feiveson, George Lewis, Janne Nolan, Theodore Postol, and Frank von Hippel. An appendix with international perspectives by Li Bin (China), Alexei Arbatov (Russia), Therese Delpech (France), PervezHoodbhoy (Pakistan), Shai Feldman (Israel), Harald Mueller (Germany), and Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana (South Asia).

Assesses the challenges facing the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union in controlling and monitoring military-related exports. These states inherited the weapons, materials and technology of the Soviet Union, but not the ability to control their borders or the movement of sensitive items. This book examines and compares export control development throughout the former Soviet Union and explores the various theoretical approaches involved.

Between 1946 and 1958, the U.S. conducted some 66 nuclear bomb tests in the Marshall Islands. In 1959, this scattering of coral atolls was again chosen as the testing site for a new generation of weapons-long-range missiles fired in the U.S. Then in 1984 a missile fired from California was intercepted by one from Kwajalein atoll: SDI, or Star Wars, was declared a realizable dream. As military researcher Owen Wilkes has noted: "If we could shut down the Pacific Missile Range, we could cut off half the momentum of the nuclear race." This is the story of the preparations for war which every day impinge on tire lives of Pacific Islanders caught on the cutting edge of the nuclear arms race. It is the story of a displaced people contaminated by nuclear fallout, forcibly resettled as their own islands become uninhabitable, and reduced to lives of poverty, ill-health, and dependence. It is also a stirring account of the Marshall Islanders themselves, of their resilience and protest, and of their attempts to seek redress in the courts. It is a shocking and timely study.

With the post-cold war emphasis on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the neglected dimension has been the spread of advanced conventional arms. Yet these are the arms most likely to be used in conflict. They present the greatest diversion from economic and social development, and are the centerpiece of regional security balances. This book examines the policies and practices of the major arms-supplying nations, looks at the impact of weapons purchases on the principal recipient regions and the possibilities for regional arms control, and dissects the economics of arms exports for the producer nations in both the developing and industrialized worlds. The book thoroughly discusses the opportunities for, and obstacles to, achieving multilateral restraint on arms. In addition to the editor, contributors are Ian Anthony, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Nicole Ball, Overseas Development Council; Julian Cooper, University of Birmingham; Lawrence Freedman and Martin Navias, King's College, London; Rodney Jones, Policy Architects International; Ethan Kapstein, University of Minnesota; Michael Klare, Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies; Andrew Mack, Australian National University; Abdel Monem Said Aly, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo; Janne Nolan, Brookings Institution; Andrew Ross, Naval War College; Gerald Segal, International Institute for Strategic Studies; and Gerald Steinberg, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. Copublished with the World Peace Foundation

Victor Israelyan was a senior ambassador in the Soviet Foreign Ministry when the armies of Egypt and Syria invaded Israeli-occupied territory on October 6, 1973. Critical to the outcome of this conflict were the Soviet Union and the United States, whose diplomatic maneuverings behind the scenes eventually ended what came to be known as the Yom Kippur War. During the crisis, however, tensions between the superpowers nearly escalated into nuclear war. Israelyan is the first Soviet official to give us a firsthand account of what actually happened inside the Kremlin during these three important weeks in 1973.

Israelyan's account is a fascinating mixture of memoir, anecdotes, and historical reporting. As a member of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's staff, he was assigned to a four-man task force that attended the many Politburo meetings held during the war. The job of this task force was to take notes and prepare drafts of letters and other documents for the Politburo. In remarkable detail, made possible by his sharp memory and the notes and documents he saved, Israelyan chronicles the day-by-day activities of Kremlin leaders as they confronted the crisis. For the first time we can see how the cumbersome Soviet policy-making mechanism, headed by the Politburo, functioned in a tense international situation. We see how the actions of Henry Kissinger, Anwar Sadat, Hafiz al-Assad, and other participants in the crisis were interpreted in Moscow. From his own experience Israelyan gives us intimate portraits of top Soviet officials including Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Andropov. His access to important documents--including letters from Richard Nixon to Leonid Brezhnev, never officially released in the U.S.--provide a much-needed corrective to assertions made by Kissinger, Nixon, and Sadat about the war.

Supplemented by rare photographs and interviews with other Soviet officials, Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War is more than a record of the past. Israelyan offers a unique vantage point on the continuing Middle East conflict, and his candid assessment of the mindset of Russian leaders is instructive for understanding how the present leadership of Russia faces its new role in the post-Cold War world.

In 1974 Richard Nixon's defense secretary, James Schlesinger, announced that the United States would change its nuclear targeting policy from "assured destruction" to "limited nuclear options." In this account of the Schlesinger Doctrine based on newly declassified documents and extensive interviews with key actors, Terry Terriff challenges the Nixon administration's official explanation of why and how this policy innovation occurred.

In this analysis of naval arms control between the two world wars, Emily Goldman dissects the underlying assumptions of arms control theory that have guided theorizing and practice for the past thirty years. She concludes that because there has been a near-exclusive focus on the behavior of the superpowers and on the consequences of nuclear technology, the arms control process has been artificially constrained in its scope and potential. Returning to the most important historical precedent of arms control prior to the Cold War, Goldman demonstrates that there are two distinct strategies of arms control, one that integrates force limitation with political conflict resolution and one that confines itself to technical limitations exclusively.

Goldman's is the first analytical treatment of the interwar period that examines arms control in both its technical and conflict-resolution dimensions in tandem and traces them through the entire life of the arms control system. By debunking Cold War orthodoxy about arms control and by illuminating how arms control functioned between the wars, Goldman shows how the process of arms control can transcend the narrow goal of regulating the military balance and become a constructive tool for restructuring power relationships.

Worldwide political changes have presented a unique opportunity for forging a new basis of international security relations. The end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the ascending role of the United Nations in regional security affairs have transformed the driving issues of international security. These changes both heighten the demand and offer the potential for global cooperation on an unprecedented scale. Traditional security preoccupations and the foundations of past strategybased on preparation for massive military confrontation are no longer appropriate. Now world leaders must find alternative strategies to ensure international safety. This book brings together a prominent group of experts, including several recently appointed government officials, to examine an alternative form of security, one that emphasizes collaborative rather than confrontational relationships among national military establishment. Global Engagement offers a complete analysis of the concept of cooperative security, which seeks to establish international agreements to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces for mutual benefit. It explains how cooperative security also aims to create mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflict. The contributors identify the trends motivating the movement toward cooperative security and analyze the implications for practical policy action. They examine the problem of controlling advanced conventional munitions, analyze an integrated control arraignment, discuss international principles of equity and their relationship to problems ofsecurity, and offer regional political perspectives while considering social regional security problems. With the altered security environment, cooperation has clearly become the new strategic imperative. Policymakers are challenged to dispose of large arsenals of conventional and nuclear weapons and redirect their efforts to support preventative management of security conditions. Leading the discussion of the security challenges ahead, the authors of this volume debate the utility of cooperative engagement for future strategy.

Dismantling Glory presents the most personal and powerful words ever written about the horrors of battle, by the very soldiers who put their lives on the line. Focusing on American and English poetry from World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War, Lorrie Goldensohn, a poet and pacifist, affirms that by and large, twentieth-century war poetry is fundamentally antiwar. She examines the changing nature of the war lyric and takes on the literary thinking of two countries separated by their common language.World War I poets such as Wilfred Owen emphasized the role of soldier as victim. By World War II, however, English and American poets, influenced by the leftist politics of W. H. Auden, tended to indict the whole of society, not just its leaders, for militarism. During the Vietnam War, soldier poets accepted themselves as both victims and perpetrators of war's misdeeds, writing a nontraditional, more personally candid war poetry.The book not only discusses the poetry of trench warfare but also shows how the lives of civilians -- women and children in particular -- entered a global war poetry dominated by air power, invasion, and occupation. Goldensohn argues that World War II blurred the boundaries between battleground and home front, thus bringing women and civilians into war discourse as never before. She discusses the interplay of fascination and disapproval in the texts of twentieth-century war and notes the way in which homage to war hero and victim contends with revulsion at war's horror and waste.In addition to placing the war lyric in literary and historical context, the book discusses in detail individual poets such as Wilfred Owen, W. H. Auden, Keith Douglas, Randall Jarrell, and a group of poets from the Vietnam War, including W. D. Ehrhart, Bruce Weigl, Yusef Komunyakaa, David Huddle, and Doug Anderson. Dismantling Glory is an original and compelling look at the way twentieth-century war poetry posited new relations between masculinity and war, changed and complicated the representation of war, and expanded the scope of antiwar thinking.

In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.

Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.

The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.

The Soviet response to the first edition of Reflections has been a prime example of the new openness under glasnost in discussing previously taboo subjects. Using new revelations-- such as the fact that Moscow had twice as many troops in Cuba as the Kennedy administration believed-- from key Soviet and Cuban Sources, Garthoff has revised his earlier analysis to produce the most accurate, eye-opening story yet of the 1963 crisis. In this book Raymond L. Garthoff, a participant in the crisis deliberations of the U.S. government, reflects on the nature of the crisis, it's consequences, and it's lessons for the future. He provides a unique combination of memoir, historical analysis, and political interpretations. He gives particular attention to the aftermath and " afterlife" of the crisis and to its bearing on current and future policy. In the first edition of the book in 1987 the Garthoff presented a number of facts for the first time. Since then, more information has become available, particularly form Soviet sources, in part from conferences in which Garthoff participated but even more from individual interviews and research. This new information, much of it presented here in this volume for the first time, helps to fill in gaps in our knowledge about events and motivations on the Soviet side. More importantly, it enlarges our understanding of the crisis interaction.

"This is one of the most important books to come from a university press within the last year ...Seaberg, Nobel Prize laureate, was chairman of the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) when the treaty was negotiated. With a decent time interval now past, he has opened the detailed diary he kept during his AEC tenure. Together with auxiliary materials, including interviews with other participants, he has now written an incisive account of events leading up to the treaty and of the negotiations and their successful conclusion." (Christian Science Monitor). "Drawn from [Seaberg's] personal journal, this book focuses on Kennedy's quest for a comprehensive test ban and on why, 'despite some near misses, this glittering prize, which carried with it the opportunity to arrest the viciously spiralling arms race, eluded our grasp.' More than a memoir, the book draws upon documents and observations of other key participants ...It also provides insights into Kennedy and his Administration as well as giving us the substance of the nuclear test ban debate. Mr. Seaberg is refreshingly fair in his assessment of the merits and failures of the limited treaty that Kennedy achieved." (New York Times). "A detailed and absorbing history of what seems, in retrospect, the innocent and halcyon days of nuclear arms control. Seaberg rightly lays claim to having been an 'insider' in the test ban negotiations, and his first-person account benefits from close friendship with other Kennedy insiders...As might be expected, the book is most interesting for the light it throws upon the thoughts and actions of Kennedy; a surprise is its insight, reflected through the eyes of Kennedy and Harriman, into the personality of Khrushchev...Implicit in Seaborg's portrait of Khrushchev is a view which perhaps had some currency in the Kennedy administration but more recently seems to have fallen out of vogue--that it is possible to deal with the Russians." (Washington Post).

Looks at how nuclear weapons have affected the meaning of war, the psychology of statesmanship, and the formulation of military policy.

"We are dropping cyber bombs. We have never done that before."-U.S. Defense Department official. A new era of war fighting is emerging for the U.S. military. Hi-tech weapons have given way to hi tech in a number of instances recently: A computer virus is unleashed that destroys centrifuges in Iran, slowing that country's attempt to build a nuclear weapon. ISIS, which has made the internet the backbone of its terror operations, finds its network-based command and control systems are overwhelmed in a cyber attack. A number of North Korean ballistic missiles fail on launch, reportedly because their systems were compromised by a cyber campaign. Offensive cyber operations like these have become important components of U.S. defense strategy and their role will grow larger. But just what offensive cyber weapons are and how they could be used remains clouded by secrecy. This new volume by Amy Zegart and Herb Lin is a groundbreaking discussion and exploration of cyber weapons with a focus on their strategic dimensions. It brings together many of the leading specialists in the field to provide new and incisive analysis of what former CIA director Michael Hayden has called "digital combat power" and how the United States should incorporate that power into its national security strategy.

This book provides an introduction to political and strategic aspects of nuclear weaponry. It offers an accessible overview of the concept of nuclear weapons, outlines how thinking about these weapons has developed and considers how nuclear threats can continue to be managed in the future. It includes: Coverage of nuclear testing, proliferation, strategy, global actors and disarmament. Analysis of contemporary topics such as nuclear terrorism. A timeline of key nuclear events. Annotated further reading lists helping you to locate sources for essays and assignments. Summaries, study questions and a glossary of key terms Free SAGE journal articles available on the Resources tab The author will be providing regular updates to his suggested web resources, so be sure to check the Resources tab for the most up-to-date. The Politics of Nuclear Weapons is essential reading for both undergraduate and postgraduate students taking courses in Nuclear Politics.

Steven Hurst traces the development of the Iranian nuclear weapon crisis across its historical context: from the conception of Iran's nuclear programme under the Shah in 1957 to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Emphasising the centrality of domestic politics in decision-making on both sides, Hurst adopts a broader perspective on the Iranian nuclear programme and explains the continued failure of the USA to halt it. He reveals how President Obama's alterations to the American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about a resolution.

Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have improved our understanding of why our decision making processes fail to match standard social science assumptions about rationality. As researchers such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler have shown, people often depart in systematic ways from the predictions of the rational actor model of classic economic thought because of the influence of emotions, cognitive biases, an aversion to loss, and other strong motivations and values. These findings about the limits of rationality have formed the basis of behavioral economics, an approach that has attracted enormous attention in recent years. This collection of essays applies the insights of behavioral economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Behavioral economics gives us a more accurate picture of how people think and, as a consequence, of how they make decisions about whether to acquire or use nuclear arms. Such decisions are made in real-world circumstances in which rational calculations about cost and benefit are intertwined with complicated emotions and subject to human limitations. Strategies for pursuing nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation should therefore, argue the contributors, account for these dynamics in a systematic way. The contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense. The essays also take note of the limitations of a behavioral approach for dealing with situations in which even a single deviation from the predictions of any model can have dire consequences.

In Dark Beyond Darkness, James Blight and janet Lang, among the world's foremost authorities on the Cuban missile crisis, synthesize the findings from their thirty-year project on the most dangerous moment in recorded history. Authoritative, accessible, and written with their usual flair and wit, DBD is the first book to take readers deeply inside the experience and calculations of Fidel Castro, who was willing to martyr Cuba if his new Russian ally would nuke the U.S. and destroy it. Blight and Lang have established that in October 1962, the world was on the brink of Armageddon, and that we escaped by luck. Their history is scary but unimpeachably accurate: we just barely escaped the cold and the dark in October 1962. Their history also comes with a warning: we are currently at risk not only of Armageddon-fast, in a war between superpowers, but Armageddon-in-Slow-Motion (the result a climate catastrophe following a regional nuclear war), and from Armageddon, Oops! (a conflict sparked by an accident, which is misinterpreted, and ends in nuclear war). Drawing on the insights of poets, musicians and novelists, as well as climate scientists and agronomists, they show the terrible risk we run by refusing to abolish nuclear weapons.

To this day, the belief is widespread that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are synonymous, that their ideology and objectives are closely intertwined, and that they have made common cause against the West for decades.
In An Enemy We Created, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn debunk this myth and reveal the much more complex reality that lies beneath it. Drawing upon their unprecedented fieldwork in Afghanistan, as well as their Arabic, Dari, and Pashtu skills, the authors show that the West's present entanglement in Afghanistan is predicated on the false assumption that defeating the Taliban will forestall further terrorist attacks worldwide. While immersing themselves in Kandahar society, the authors interviewed Taliban decision-makers, field commanders, and ordinary fighters, thoroughly exploring the complexity of the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the individuals who established both groups. They show that from the mid-1990s onward, the Taliban and al-Qaeda diverged far more often than they converged. They also argue that this split creates an opportunity to engage the Taliban on two fundamental issues: renouncing al-Qaeda and guaranteeing that Afghanistan will not be a sanctuary for international terrorists. Yet the insurgency is changing, and it could soon be too late to find a political solution. The authors contend that certain aspects of the campaign in Afghanistan, especially night raids, the killings of innocent civilians, and attempts to fragment and decapitate the Taliban are having the unintended consequence of energizing the resistance, creating more opportunities for al-Qaeda, and helping it to attain its objectives.
The first book to fully untangle the myths from the realities in the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, An Enemy We Created is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what's really happening in Afghanistan.

North Korea's development of nuclear weapons raises fears of nuclear war on the peninsula and the specter of terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. It also represents a dangerous and disturbing breakdown in U.S. foreign policy. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb offers an insider's view of what went wrong and allowed this isolated nation a charter member of the Axis of Evil to develop nuclear weapons. Charles L. ""Jack"" Pritchard was intimately involved in developing America's North Korea policy under Presidents Clinton and Bush. Here, he offers an authoritative analysis of recent developments on the Korean peninsula and reveals how the Bush administration's mistakes damaged the prospects of controlling nuclear proliferation. Although multilateral negotiations continue, Pritchard proclaims the Six-Party Talks as a failure. His chronicle begins with the suspicions over North Korea's uranium enrichment program in 2002 that led to the demise of the Clinton-era Agreed Framework. Subsequently, Pyongyang kicked out international monitors and restarted its nuclear weapons program. Pritchard provides a first-hand account of how the Six-Party Talks were initiated and offers a play-by-play account of each round of negotiations, detailing the national interests of the key players China, Japan, Russia, both Koreas, and the United States. The author believes the failure to prevent Kim Jong Il from ""going nuclear"" points to the need for a permanent security forum in Northeast Asia that would serve as a formal mechanism for dialogue in the region. Hard-hitting and insightful, Failed Diplomacy offers a stinging critique of the Bush administration's manner and policy in dealing with North Korea. More hopefully, it suggests what can be learned from missed opportunities.

Available for the first time in many years, Commonsense and Nuclear Warfare presents Russell's keen insights into the threat of nuclear conflict, and his argument that the only way to end this threat is to end war itself.
Written at the height of the Cold War, this volume is crucial for understanding Russell's involvement in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and his passionate campaigning for peace. It remains an extremely important book in today's uncertain nuclear world, and is essential reading for all those interested in Russell and postwar history.
Includes a new introduction by Ken Coates, Chairman of The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

With the end of the Cold War, many nations have set about cutting their military spending, and visions of a large `peace dividend' have emerged. Yet, even today, the arms race remains one of the major projects of humankind, and one of the most unproductive. The Wages of Peace explores some of the consequences and opportunities stemming from the resulting peace dividend. This book charts a middle course between extravagant claims about the improvements in welfare, development or the environment which may be funded by the peace divided, and dire assessments of how militarized economies will collapse as a result of disarmament spiced with warnings that the savings have already been squandered. This book represents the most detailed study of the economic effects of conversion for any country. It breaks new ground in using planning models to examine the environmental effects of disarmament. Based on a decade of studies, this book examines the global, national and local effects of disarmament, focusing on Norway. The findings are cautiously optimistic. The most important peace dividend is peace itself, but economic gains may be expected.