A collection of essays on the nuclear revolution and the end of the Cold War by E. P. Thompson, Mike Davis, Raymond Williams, Rudolf Bahro, Lucio Magri, Etienne Balibar, Roy and Zhores Medvedev, John Cox, Saburo Kugai, Marcus Raskin, Noam Chomsky, Alan Wolfe, Mary Kaldorf and Fred Halliday.

Helps us to better understand the dangers of U.S. nuclear strategy, and reminds us that it is a strategy we can resist.

This collection of studies is one of the most lucid and sober analyses of the dangers of nuclear war, which mankind is facing. Written by natural and social scientists, the book should be read both by statesmen and by the general public. Looking towards the end of the century it makes clear the growing dangers. Avoiding complacency on the other hand, and prophecies of doom on the other, it contains a message of hope and an appeal to wisdom.

The essential history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during the Nixon Administration How did Richard Nixon, a president so determined to compete for strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, become one of the most successful arms controllers of the Cold War? Drawing on newly opened Cold War archives, John D. Maurer argues that a central purpose of arms control talks for American leaders was to channel nuclear competition toward areas of American advantage and not just international cooperation. While previous accounts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have emphasized American cooperative motives, Maurer highlights how Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shaped negotiations, balancing their own competitive interests with proponents of cooperation while still providing a coherent rationale to Congress. Within the arms control agreements, American leaders intended to continue deploying new weapons, and the arms control restrictions, as negotiated, allowed the United States to sustain its global power, contain communism, and ultimately prevail in the Cold War.

An in-depth analysis of nearly all chemical and biological weapons, their effects, and the politics surrounding their deployment.

The Control Agenda is a sweeping account of the history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), their rise in the Nixon and Ford administrations, their downfall under President Carter, and their powerful legacies in the Reagan years and beyond. Matthew Ambrose pays close attention to the interplay of diplomacy, domestic politics, and technology, and finds that the SALT process was a key point of reference for arguments regarding all forms of Cold War decision making. Ambrose argues elite U.S. decision makers used SALT to better manage their restive domestic populations and to exert greater control over the shape, structure, and direction of their nuclear arsenals. Ambrose also asserts that prolonged engagement with arms control issues introduced dynamic effects into nuclear policy. Arms control considerations came to influence most areas of defense decision making, while the measure of stability SALT provided allowed the examination of new and potentially dangerous nuclear doctrines. The Control Agenda makes clear that verification and compliance concerns by the United States prompted continuous reassessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions; assessments that later undergirded key U.S. policy changes toward the Soviet Union. Through SALT's many twists and turns, accusations and countercharges, secret backchannels and propaganda campaigns the specter of nuclear conflict loomed large.

In Dark Beyond Darkness, James Blight and janet Lang, among the world's foremost authorities on the Cuban missile crisis, synthesize the findings from their thirty-year project on the most dangerous moment in recorded history. Authoritative, accessible, and written with their usual flair and wit, DBD is the first book to take readers deeply inside the experience and calculations of Fidel Castro, who was willing to martyr Cuba if his new Russian ally would nuke the U.S. and destroy it. Blight and Lang have established that in October 1962, the world was on the brink of Armageddon, and that we escaped by luck. Their history is scary but unimpeachably accurate: we just barely escaped the cold and the dark in October 1962. Their history also comes with a warning: we are currently at risk not only of Armageddon-fast, in a war between superpowers, but Armageddon-in-Slow-Motion (the result a climate catastrophe following a regional nuclear war), and from Armageddon, Oops! (a conflict sparked by an accident, which is misinterpreted, and ends in nuclear war). Drawing on the insights of poets, musicians and novelists, as well as climate scientists and agronomists, they show the terrible risk we run by refusing to abolish nuclear weapons.

This book relates a complex ethical (re)assessment of the continued reliance by some states on nuclear weapons as instruments of state power. This (re)assessment is more urgent considering the relatively recent intensification of great power conflict dynamics and the nuclear-weapon states' recommitments to modernizing, augmenting, or tailoring their nuclear forces to address vital state and alliance interests. And, especially since the beginning of the administration of U.S. President Donald J. Trump, these recommitments have accelerated the degree to which the political and moral dilemmas of (the threat of) nuclear use define and intensify existential risks for specific states and the international community at large. To execute this (re)assessment, this book details how strategic, political, legal, and moral reasoning are deeply intertwined on the questions of vital state and global values. Its ontological assumptions are taken from a broadly construed IR Constructivist stance, and its epistemological approach applies non-ideal moral principles informed by Kantian thought to selected problems of nuclear-armed security competition as they evolved since President Barack Obama's 2009 Prague Declaration. This non-ideal moral approach employed is committed to the view that the dual imperatives of humanity's survival and the common security of states requires an international order which privileges considerations of justice over power-political considerations. This non-ideal moral approach is a necessary element of theorizing a set of practices to effectively address the challenges and dilemmas of reordering international politics in terms of justice.

From 2005 to 2008, the United States and India negotiated a pathbreaking nuclear agreement that recognised India's nuclear status and lifted longstanding embargoes on civilian nuclear cooperation with India. This book offers the most comprehensive account of the diplomacy and domestic politics behind this nuclear agreement. Domestic politics considerably impeded - and may have entirely prevented - US nuclear accommodation with India; when domestic obstacles were overcome, US India negotiations advanced; and even after negotiations advanced, domestic factors placed conditions on and affected the scope of US India nuclear cooperation. Such a study provides new insights into this major event in international politics, and it offers a valuable framework for analysing additional US strategic and nuclear dialogues with India and with other countries."

Are nuclear arsenals safe from cyber-attack? Could terrorists launch a nuclear weapon through hacking? Are we standing at the edge of a major technological challenge to global nuclear order? These are among the many pressing security questions addressed in Andrew Futter's ground-breaking study of the cyber threat to nuclear weapons. Hacking the Bomb provides the first ever comprehensive assessment of this worrying and little-understood strategic development, and it explains how myriad new cyber challenges will impact the way that the world thinks about and manages the ultimate weapon. The book cuts through the hype surrounding the cyber phenomenon and provides a framework through which to understand and proactively address the implications of the emerging cyber-nuclear nexus. It does this by tracing the cyber challenge right across the nuclear weapons enterprise, explains the important differences between types of cyber threats, and unpacks how cyber capabilities will impact strategic thinking, nuclear balances, deterrence thinking, and crisis management. The book makes the case for restraint in the cyber realm when it comes to nuclear weapons given the considerable risks of commingling weapons of mass disruption with weapons of mass destruction, and argues against establishing a dangerous norm of "hacking the bomb." This timely book provides a starting point for an essential discussion about the challenges associated with the cyber-nuclear nexus, and will be of great interest to scholars and students of security studies as well as defense practitioners and policy makers.

In July 2015, multilateral talks with Iran culminated in an agreement called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), through which Iran committed to limits on its nuclear program in exchange for relief from sanctions put in place by the United States and other nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent international organization that administers safeguards designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for nonpeaceful purposes, was requested to verify and monitor Irans implementation of these commitments. The U.S. Department of State coordinates the United States financial and policy relationship with IAEA. This book, which updates the preliminary findings from an interim report released in February 2016 (GAO-16-417), examines the JCPOA commitments that IAEA has been asked to verify and monitor and its authorities to do so; the resources IAEA has identified as necessary to verify and monitor those JCPOA commitments; and potential challenges and mitigating actions IAEA and others have identified with regard to verifying and monitoring the JCPOA.

Victor Israelyan was a senior ambassador in the Soviet Foreign Ministry when the armies of Egypt and Syria invaded Israeli-occupied territory on October 6, 1973. Critical to the outcome of this conflict were the Soviet Union and the United States, whose diplomatic maneuverings behind the scenes eventually ended what came to be known as the Yom Kippur War. During the crisis, however, tensions between the superpowers nearly escalated into nuclear war. Israelyan is the first Soviet official to give us a firsthand account of what actually happened inside the Kremlin during these three important weeks in 1973.

Israelyan's account is a fascinating mixture of memoir, anecdotes, and historical reporting. As a member of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's staff, he was assigned to a four-man task force that attended the many Politburo meetings held during the war. The job of this task force was to take notes and prepare drafts of letters and other documents for the Politburo. In remarkable detail, made possible by his sharp memory and the notes and documents he saved, Israelyan chronicles the day-by-day activities of Kremlin leaders as they confronted the crisis. For the first time we can see how the cumbersome Soviet policy-making mechanism, headed by the Politburo, functioned in a tense international situation. We see how the actions of Henry Kissinger, Anwar Sadat, Hafiz al-Assad, and other participants in the crisis were interpreted in Moscow. From his own experience Israelyan gives us intimate portraits of top Soviet officials including Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Andropov. His access to important documents--including letters from Richard Nixon to Leonid Brezhnev, never officially released in the U.S.--provide a much-needed corrective to assertions made by Kissinger, Nixon, and Sadat about the war.

Supplemented by rare photographs and interviews with other Soviet officials, Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War is more than a record of the past. Israelyan offers a unique vantage point on the continuing Middle East conflict, and his candid assessment of the mindset of Russian leaders is instructive for understanding how the present leadership of Russia faces its new role in the post-Cold War world.

This encyclopedia presents important research on Turkey. Some of the topics discussed herein include the prospects and challenges involved in Turkey and United States defense cooperation; Turkey-Kurdish regional government relations after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq; Turkey's new regional security role's implications for the U.S.; and Turkey's background and relations with the United States.

The new biannual, peer-reviewed Journal of Romanian Studies, jointly developed by The Society for Romanian Studies and ibidem Press, examines critical issues in Romanian studies, linking work in that field to wider theoretical debates and issues of current relevance, and serving as a forum for junior and senior scholars. The journal also presents articles that connect Romania and Moldova comparatively with other states and their ethnic majorities and minorities, and with other groups by investigating the challenges of migration and globalization and the impact of the European Union. Issue No. 2 contains: Lucian Leustean: Romania, the Paris Peace Conference and the Protection System of Race, Language and Religion Minorities: A Reassessment. Gavin Bowd: Between France and Romania, Between Science and Propaganda. Emmanuel de Martonne in 1919. Doina Anca Cretu: Humanitarian Aid in the Bulwark of Bolshevism: The American Relief Administration and the Quest for Sovereignty in Post-World War I Romania. Gabor Egry: Made in Paris? Contested Regions and Political Regionalism during and after Peacemaking: Szekelyfoeld and the Banat in a Comparative Perspective. Svetlana Suveica: Against the Imposition of the Foreign Yoke: The Bessarabians Write to Wilson (1919). Florian Kuhrer-Wielach: A fertile and flourishing garden: Alexandru Vaida-Voevod's Political Account Ten Years after Versailles.

This book examines the U.S.-foreign partnership efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling and terrorist travel. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Megaports Initiative in 2003 to deter, detect, and interdict nuclear or other radiological materials smuggled through foreign seaports. The Initiative funds the installation of radiation detection equipment at select seaports overseas and trains foreign personnel to use this equipment to scan shipping containers entering and leaving these seaports, regardless of destination. Additionally, the U.S. government has identified four key gaps in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. The book evaluates how U.S. capacity-building efforts address those gaps and assesses the extent to which the U.S. government is measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps.

Until now, there has been no detailed account of Israel's nuclear history. Previous treatments of the subject relied heavily on rumors, leaks, and journalistic speculations. But with "Israel and the Bomb, " Avner Cohen has forged an interpretive political history that draws on thousands of American and Israeli government documents -- most of them recently declassified and never before cited -- and more than one hundred interviews with key individuals who played important roles in this story. Cohen reveals that Israel crossed the nuclear weapons threshold on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, yet it remains ambiguous about its nuclear capability to this day. What made this posture of "opacity" possible, and how did it evolve?

Cohen focuses on a two-decade period from about 1950 until 1970, during which David Ben-Gurion's vision of making Israel a nuclear-weapon state was realized. He weaves together the story of the formative years of Israel's nuclear program, from the founding of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission in 1952, to the alliance with France that gave Israel the sophisticated technology it needed, to the failure of American intelligence to identify the Dimona Project for what it was, to the negotiations between President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir that led to the current policy of secrecy. Cohen also analyzes the complex reasons Israel concealed its nuclear program -- from concerns over Arab reaction and the negative effect of the debate at home to consideration of America's commitment to nonproliferation.

"Israel and the Bomb" highlights the key questions and the many potent issues surrounding Israel's nuclear history. This book will be a critical resource for students of nuclear proliferation, Middle East politics, Israeli history, and American-Israeli relations, as well as a revelation for general readers.

Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget around $1.1 billion across three agencies -- DOD, DOE and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups. The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START I Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials. The State Department manages the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev. These centers provide research grants to scientists and engineers so that they will not sell their knowledge to other nations or terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided assistance with export and border control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department of Energy manages programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that help nuclear scientists and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises. DOE is also helping Russia dispose of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut-down its remaining plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants. Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia's willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President's ability to waive certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.

Non-proliferation assistance programs, including co-operative threat reduction, are being examined to help reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the FY2004 National Defense Authorisation Act, Congress authorised the Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. This book analyses the range of possibilities for applying CTR funds, what kinds of assistance may be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance. A key underlying issue is whether countries that pose particular risks are prepared to provide adequate co-operation to achieve CTR objectives. As many observers have noted, CTR programs cannot be precisely replicated in other countries. A common factor must be the willingness of such states to co-operate. One school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention. Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus additionally on states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.

The use of economic sanctions to stem weapons proliferation acquired a new dimension in the 1990's. While earlier legislation required the cut-off of foreign aid to countries engaged in specified nuclear proliferation activities and mentioned other sanctions as a possible mechanism for bringing countries into compliance with goals of treaties or international agreements, it was not until 1990 that Congress enacted explicit guidelines for trade sanctions related to missile proliferation. In that year a requirement for the President to impose sanctions against US persons or foreign persons engaging in trade of items or technology listed in the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex (MTCR Annex) was added to the Arms Export Control Act and to the Export Administration Act of 1979. Subsequently, Congress legislated economic sanctions against countries that contribute to the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in a broad array of laws. This book offers a listing and brief description of legal provisions that require or authorise the imposition of some form of economic sanction against countries, companies, or persons who violate U.S. non-proliferation norms. For each provision, information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their duration, what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing sanctions, and what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions.

Many believe that terrorists could cause more deaths and destruction with nuclear weapons than by any other means. The United States and the world community have tried for decades to avoid that spectre through the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242), the Nunn-Lugar Co-operative Threat Reduction Program, and many other measures. Many have called the attention to the problem; websites with current resources include the Nuclear Control Institute, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the centre for Non-proliferation Studies. In the wake of the September 11 attack, the nuclear threat has taken a new urgency. This book addresses potential terrorist capabilities.

This book provides information on the background and current status of the regimes intended to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to US national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established to restrict world trade in these goods and technologies and to monitor certain civil applications. The nuclear non-proliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organisations and domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. The nuclear regime represents a near-universal international consensus opposing any further spread of nuclear weapons. Since the beginning of the nuclear age, US leadership has played a decisive role in the development of the regime. The regime is being challenged from several directions, as demonstrated by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear detonations in 1998. Many observers believe the success of the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be a top priority and that its outcome will strongly influence the effectiveness of other regimes dedicated to controlling chemical and biological weapons and missiles.

A unique overview of the United States' current nuclear command, control, and communications system and its modernization for the digital age Concerns about the security of nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems are not new, but they are becoming more urgent. While modernization is crucial to the future success of NC3 systems, the transition from analog to digital technologies has the potential to introduce vulnerabilities and unintended consequences. Nuclear infrastructure and command could be penetrated, corrupted, destroyed, or spoofed, leading to a loss of positive control (the ability to fire weapons) or negative control (the ability to prevent unauthorized or accidental use). Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications explores the current NC3 system and its vital role in ensuring effective deterrence, contemporary challenges posed by cyber threats, new weapons technologies, and the consensus across the nuclear enterprise of the need to modernize the United States' Cold War-era system of systems. This volume, edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, offers the first overview of US NC3 since the 1980s. Part 1 provides an overview of the history, strategy, and technology associated with NC3 and how it enables deterrence strategy as the basis of national defense. Parts 2 and 3 identify how the US military's NC3 works, the challenges of introducing digital technologies and the potential security threats, and how the system could fail if these considerations are not taken into account. Part 4 explains the progress NC3 has made thus far, and how we might move forward. During this critical juncture, policymakers, practitioners, and scholars will find this an invaluable resource to understanding our current NC3 system, its relationship to effective deterrence, what must be done to modernize NC3, and how to ensure this transition is undertaken safely and successfully.

Do alliances curb efforts by states to develop nuclear weapons? Atomic Assurance looks at what makes alliances sufficiently credible to prevent nuclear proliferation; how alliances can break down and so encourage nuclear proliferation; and whether security guarantors like the United States can use alliance ties to end the nuclear efforts of their allies. Alexander Lanoszka finds that military alliances are less useful in preventing allies from acquiring nuclear weapons than conventional wisdom suggests. Through intensive case studies of West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a series of smaller cases on Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan, Atomic Assurance shows that it is easier to prevent an ally from initiating a nuclear program than to stop an ally that has already started one; in-theater conventional forces are crucial in making American nuclear guarantees credible; the American coercion of allies who started, or were tempted to start, a nuclear weapons program has played less of a role in forestalling nuclear proliferation than analysts have assumed; and the economic or technological reliance of a security-dependent ally on the United States works better to reverse or to halt that ally's nuclear bid than anything else. Crossing diplomatic history, international relations, foreign policy, grand strategy, and nuclear strategy, Lanoszka's book reworks our understanding of the power and importance of alliances in stopping nuclear proliferation.

A reappraisal of classic arms control theory that advocates for reprioritizing deterrence over disarmament in a new era of nuclear multipolarity The United States faces a new era of nuclear arms racing for which it is conceptually unprepared. Great power nuclear competition is seemingly returning with a vengeance as the post-Cold War international order morphs into something more uncertain, complicated, and dangerous. In this unstable third nuclear age, legacy nonproliferation and disarmament instruments designed for outmoded conditions are ill-equipped to tame the complex dynamics of a multipolar nuclear arms race centered on China, Russia, and the United States. International relations scholar David A. Cooper proposes relearning, reviving, and adapting classic arms control theory and negotiating practices to steer the world away from threatening and destabilizing nuclear arms races. He surveys the history of nuclear arms control efforts, revisits strategic theory's view of nuclear competition dynamics, and interviews US nuclear policy practitioners about both the past and the emerging era. To prepare for this third nuclear age, Cooper recommends adapting the Cold War's classical paradigm of adversarial arms control for the contemporary landscape. Rather than prioritizing disarmament to eliminate nuclear weapons, this neoclassical approach would pursue pragmatic agreements to stabilize deterrence relationships among today's nuclear rivals. Drawing on an extensive theoretical and practical study of the Cold War and its aftermath, Cooper distills relevant lessons that could inform the United States' long-term efforts to navigate the unprecedented dangers of nuclear multipolarity. Diverging from other recent books on the topic, Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age provides analysts with a more hard-nosed strategic approach. In this very different era of great power rivalry, this book will be a must-read for scholars, students, and practitioners of nuclear arms control.

As a new administration reshapes American security policy, a leading scholar of U.S. foreign relations and national security reviews the most critical problems facing the Middle East, and the United States policy and actions to address them.