Once dismissed as ineffectual, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has in the past twenty years emerged as a powerful international organization. Member states allow the IAEA to render judgment on matters vital to peace and security while nations around the globe comply with its rules and commands on proliferation, safety, and a range of other issues. Robert L. Brown details the IAEA's role in facilitating both control of nuclear weapons and the safe exploitation of nuclear power. As he shows, the IAEA has acquired a surprising amount of power as states, for political and technological reasons, turn to it to supply policy cooperation and to act as an agent for their security and safety. The agency's success in gaining and holding authority rests in part on its ability to apply politically neutral expertise that produces beneficial policy outcomes. But Brown also delves into the puzzle of how an agency created by states to aid cooperation has acquired power over them.

The emergence of the rockets during the Cold War provided the United States and the Soviet Union the ability to spy on each other from space and led to the ballistic missile. The Cold War was the focus of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, and it was this war that drove initial U.S. space policy and strategy. The utilization of space quickly expanded beyond the Cold War protagonists, and unfortunately the domestic and international framework for developing space policy did not keep up with the world's utilization of the space domain. From its inception, U.S. strategy for developing space policy lacked foresight. When it came to developing space policy, every administration seemed to start anew. This lack of foresight resulted in short term fixes leading to long term problems like excessive space debris. The international community also has challenges. With the number of countries, consortiums and companies with satellites on orbit, the international community's governing body for space law and treaties is the United Nations (U.N.). Unfortunately, the U.N. does not have the authority, expertise or structure to create and execute effective space laws and treaties.

Civilization will not survive if we ignore the warnings of John F. Kennedy and the wide pantheon of scientists and statesmen who have advanced a survival agenda for the nuclear age. They have reminded us that we live on a a dangerously conflicted and environmentally battered planet.
The debate about our national agenda should begin with "President John F. Kennedy's Grand and Global Alliance: World Order for the New Century."

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, a November 2011 report from IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but then-IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.

Strategic studies as a field of civilian scholarship has developed along distinctive lines in the United States since World War II. The rapid proliferation and increasing sophistication of weapons technology have required constant revision of strategic theory, while the shifting political climate, both internationally and in the United States, has had an equally powerful impact. One of the field's leading theorists now examines the history and development of American strategic studies, the varied roles assumed by civilian strategists, and their relationship with those charged with developing and carrying out American military and diplomatic policy. This provocative book clearly demonstrates the importance of a sound strategic theory if America is to survive in an age of high arms technology and increased world tensions.

To this day, the belief is widespread that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are synonymous, that their ideology and objectives are closely intertwined, and that they have made common cause against the West for decades.
In An Enemy We Created, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn debunk this myth and reveal the much more complex reality that lies beneath it. Drawing upon their unprecedented fieldwork in Afghanistan, as well as their Arabic, Dari, and Pashtu skills, the authors show that the West's present entanglement in Afghanistan is predicated on the false assumption that defeating the Taliban will forestall further terrorist attacks worldwide. While immersing themselves in Kandahar society, the authors interviewed Taliban decision-makers, field commanders, and ordinary fighters, thoroughly exploring the complexity of the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the individuals who established both groups. They show that from the mid-1990s onward, the Taliban and al-Qaeda diverged far more often than they converged. They also argue that this split creates an opportunity to engage the Taliban on two fundamental issues: renouncing al-Qaeda and guaranteeing that Afghanistan will not be a sanctuary for international terrorists. Yet the insurgency is changing, and it could soon be too late to find a political solution. The authors contend that certain aspects of the campaign in Afghanistan, especially night raids, the killings of innocent civilians, and attempts to fragment and decapitate the Taliban are having the unintended consequence of energizing the resistance, creating more opportunities for al-Qaeda, and helping it to attain its objectives.
The first book to fully untangle the myths from the realities in the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, An Enemy We Created is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what's really happening in Afghanistan.

Iran's nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Tehran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. This book discusses Tehran's compliance with international obligations. It also examines the interim agreement on Iran's nuclear program; the economic sanctions and the authority to lift restrictions in Iran; and the Iran sanctions.

No issue on the foreign policy agenda is more controversial than how to deal with Iran's nuclear program, and Foreign Affairs continues to dominate the debate.
This special collection, Iran and the Bomb 2: A New Hope, pulls together a broad range of pieces that illuminate Iran's turn toward negotiations, the pros and cons of the interim agreement, and the geopolitical and psychological intricacies of the crucial U.S.-Iranian-Israeli triangle. The authors include world-renowned experts from several disciplines and professional backgrounds, and their arguments span every significant position on the political spectrum.
Iran and the Bomb 2: A New Hope offers an excellent overview of the current situation and all the material required for readers to develop their own opinions about how to proceed.

As Iran moves ever closer to a nuclear weapons capability, will other area powers such as Turkey decide to acquire their own nuclear weapons and embark on a crash nuclear weapons program to provide their own deterrent? Or will Turkey's leaders trust in the United States' extended nuclear deterrent for Turkey's security? Col William G. Eldridge has explored this question in depth. To shore up the United States' ability to convince the Turks to stay in the nonnuclear category, he recommends keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilateral alliances with Turkey strong and, with Turkey, establishing a more common vision for the Middle East. He also advises reducing trade barriers with Turkey, maintaining and even increasing military arms trading and aid, keeping US forces in present numbers in Turkey and improving militaryto- military ties, maintaining Turkey as a partner in dual-capable aircraft production, and, for now, keeping some US nuclear weapons in NATO Europe.

When security and arms control analysts list what has helped keep nuclear weapons technologies from spreading, energy economics is rarely, if ever, mentioned. Yet, large civilian nuclear energy programs can-and have-brought states quite a way towards developing nuclear weapons; and it has been market economics, more than any other force, that has kept most states from starting or completing these programs. Since the early 1950s, every major government in the Western Hemisphere, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe has been drawn to atomic power's allure, only to have market realities prevent most of their nuclear investment plans from being fully realized. Adam Smith's Invisible Hand, then, could well determine just how far civilian nuclear energy expands and how much attention its attendant security risks will receive. Certainly, if nuclear power's economics remain negative, diplomats and policymakers could leverage this point, work to limit legitimate nuclear commerce to what is economically competitive, and so gain a powerful tool to help limit nuclear proliferation. If nuclear power finally breaks from its past and becomes the cheapest of clean technologies in market competitions against its alternatives, though, it is unlikely that diplomats and policymakers will be anywhere near as able or willing to prevent insecure or hostile states from developing nuclear energy programs, even if these programs help them make atomic weapons. Will the global spread of nuclear power programs, which could bring many more countries much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities, be an inevitable consequence of energy market economics? Or is such an expansion impossible without government subsidies and new policies to support them? This volume showcases the analyses of some of the world's leading energy experts to shed light on this key 21st century security issue.

After World War II, an atomic hierarchy emerged in the noncommunist world. Washington was at the top, followed over time by its NATO allies and then Israel, with the postcolonial world completely shut out. An Indian diplomat called the system ""nuclear apartheid."" Drawing on recently declassified sources from U.S. and international archives, Shane Maddock offers the first full-length study of nuclear apartheid, casting a spotlight on an ideological outlook that nurtured atomic inequality and established the United States--in its own mind--as the most legitimate nuclear power. Beginning with the discovery of fission in 1939 and ending with George W. Bush's nuclear policy and his preoccupation with the ""axis of evil,"" Maddock uncovers the deeply ideological underpinnings of U.S. nuclear policy--an ideology based on American exceptionalism, irrational faith in the power of technology, and racial and gender stereotypes. The unintended result of the nuclear exclusion of nations such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran is, increasingly, rebellion. Here is an illuminating look at how an American nuclear policy based on misguided ideological beliefs has unintentionally paved the way for an international ""wild west"" of nuclear development, dramatically undercutting the goal of nuclear containment and diminishing U.S. influence in the world.

""Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons" is accessible, short and breathless. It has the tone of a TED talk: an avid speaker bursting with one big idea and eighteen minutes to hold your attention." --"New York Times"
Nuclear war would be an apocalypse. Nuclear deterrence is effective in a crisis. Nuclear weapons shock and awe opponents. Killing civilians causes leaders to back down. The bomb has kept the peace for sixty-five years. These are the things we think we know about nuclear weapons, but it turns out they are myths, myths that nonetheless still shape our nuclear policy.
In "Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons," Ward Wilson blows the lid off the stale debate surrounding nuclear weapons, stripping away emotion and exaggeration. By drawing on new facts and historical research, Wilson methodically shatters each of these myths in turn. His conclusions will surprise you, enlighten you, and spur debates about whether nuclear weapons have any power and importance in the twenty-first century.

The fall of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya has changed political dynamics on the African continent. One immediate concern has been the implications of these developments for the African Union (AU) and its member states. Would overall political dynamics in the AU be changed? Would the most powerful member states use the altered circumstances to enhance their influence on AU policies andframeworks? What would the impact be for the AU's overall authority? In this Discussion Paper series, three edited papers are presented that tackle AU political and institutional dynamics in light of the Arab revolts. A particular puzzle addressed is the current postures of South Africa, Ethiopia and Algeria within the AU. A separate analysis of Nigeria's role was published earlier in the NAI-FOI Lecture Series on African Security. The work in this discussion series reflects the longstanding collaboration between the Swedish Defence Research Agency's Project Studies in African Security and the Nordic Africa Institute to build Africa-related research capacity on peace and security.

The cold war ended more than two decades ago, and with its end came a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons - a luxury that we can no longer indulge.

It's not just the threat of Iran getting the bomb or North Korea doing something rash; the whole complexion of global power politics is changing because of the re-emergence of nuclear weapons as a vital element of statecraft and power politics. In short, we have entered the second nuclear age.

In this provocative and agenda-setting book, Paul Bracken of Yale University argues that we need to pay renewed attention to nuclear weapons and how their presence will transform the way crises develop and escalate. He draws on his years of experience analyzing defense strategy to make the case that the United States needs to start thinking seriously about these issues once again, especially as new countries acquire nuclear capabilities. He walks us through war-game scenarios that are all too realistic, to show how nuclear weapons are changing the calculus of power politics, and he offers an incisive tour of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia to underscore how the United States must not allow itself to be unprepared for managing such crises.

Frank in its tone and farsighted in its analysis, The Second Nuclear Age is the essential guide to the new rules of international politics.

A terrorist attack with nuclear weapons is the most dangerous security issue America faces today--and we are far more vulnerable than we realize. Driven by this knowledge, five men--all members of the Cold War brain trust behind the U.S. nuclear arsenal--have come together to combat this threat, leading a movement that is shaking the nuclear establishment and challenging the United States and other nations to reconsider their strategic policies.

Illuminating and thought-provoking, The Partnership tells the little-known story of their campaign to reduce the threat of a nuclear attack and, ultimately, eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. It is an intimate look at these men--Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and the renowned Stanford physicist Sidney Drell--the origins of their unlikely joint effort, and their dealings with President Obama and other world leaders. Award-winning journalist Philip Taubman has provided an important and timely story of science, history, and friendship--of five men who have decided the time has come to dismantle the nuclear kingdom they worked to build.

What is strategic stability and why is it important? This edited collection offers the most current authoritative survey of this topic, which is central to U.S. strategy in the field of nuclear weapons and great power relations. A variety of authors and leading experts in the field of strategic issues and regional studies offer both theoretical and practical insights into the basic concepts associated with strategic stability, what implications these have for the United States, as well as key regions such as the Middle East, and perspectives on strategic stability in Russia and China. Readers will develop a deeper and more developed understanding of this concent from this engaging and informative work.

The Port Arthur massacre on 28 April 1996, when 35 people were shot dead by Martin Bryant, transformed Australia's gun control debate. Public outrage drove politicians from all sides of politics to embrace gun control. Non-violent 'people power' galvanised government resolve to outlaw semi-automatic weapons, register all guns and tighten gun ownership laws. Simon Chapman's book gives an insider's view of the struggle for gun control, highlighting the public discourse between shooters determined to preserve the right for civilians to bear military-style weapons, and activists dedicated to getting Australia 'off the American path' of gun violence. Law reform is not inevitable. It requires the planned, strategic use of media and advocacy to convert anger into action. The story of the campaign for gun control is a practical guide to achieving humane social change for activists everywhere. With the recent mass shooting at a primary school in Sandy Hook, Connecticut, which has stimulated an unprecedented momentum for meaningful gun controls in the US, the lessons of Port Arthur should be revisited. Simon Chapman is professor of public health at the University of Sydney. He has won multiple awards for his national and international advocacy for tobacco control.