The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would ban all nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. As of March 2008, 178 nations had signed it and 144 had ratified. To enter into force, 44 specified nations must ratify it; 35 have done so. The Senate rejected the treaty in 1999; the Bush Administration opposes it. The United States has observed a nuclear test moratorium since 1992. This book discusses elements, arguments and analysis on the comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty.

""Plowshare activists are for more dangerous to the US government than any rapist or murderer or terrorist. Because we are promoting nonviolence.""-Jean Gump, imprisoned for a plowshare action

""What is clear throughout, however, is that members of Plowshares are willing to risk alienation, physical injury, the rupture of relationships and prison, and, as Wilcox observes, like heroes of the past, 'they are greatly hated and feared while they live, a fate reserved for all uncommon martyrs'.""-Hudson Valley Writers Guild

The author explains why North Korea, though impoverished, nevertheless feels compelled to spend enormous amounts of its scarce resources on developing nuclear bombs and missiles capable of being delivered to the US, or at least to US allies. To most Americans this seems slightly bizarre. But Paone's conclusion is that North Korea is quite rational - it simply wants to DETER the US from doing the same thing as it did during the Korea War: killing three to six million Koreans; burning down hundreds of villages, towns and cities; and leaving behind tens of thousands to live the rest of their lives without limbs or with napalm deformed bodies. We in the US may have only vague recollections of the 36,000 Americans killed or the 93,000 wounded in that war; but the Koreans vividly remember their millions of dead and the countless deformed survivors. Paone sets forth his explanation primarily through American military-oriented sources; the diaries of US Generals; over 200 photos of war scenes taken by US Army and US Air Force personnel; daily Press Releases from General Douglas MacArthur's Command in Tokyo and finally American newspaper accounts.

A terrorist attack with nuclear weapons is the most dangerous security issue America faces today--and we are far more vulnerable than we realize. Driven by this knowledge, five men--all members of the Cold War brain trust behind the U.S. nuclear arsenal--have come together to combat this threat, leading a movement that is shaking the nuclear establishment and challenging the United States and other nations to reconsider their strategic policies.

Illuminating and thought-provoking, The Partnership tells the little-known story of their campaign to reduce the threat of a nuclear attack and, ultimately, eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. It is an intimate look at these men--Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and the renowned Stanford physicist Sidney Drell--the origins of their unlikely joint effort, and their dealings with President Obama and other world leaders. Award-winning journalist Philip Taubman has provided an important and timely story of science, history, and friendship--of five men who have decided the time has come to dismantle the nuclear kingdom they worked to build.

In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran's IAEA safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010. The Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, a November 2011 report from IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano to the agency's Board of Governors indicated that Tehran has continued to defy the council's demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but then-IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei told the agency's board in June 2008 that the agency still has questions regarding "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on these matters. This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.

The Cold War did not culminate in World War III as so many in the 1950s and 1960s feared, yet it spawned a host of military engagements that affected millions of lives. This book is the first comprehensive, multinational overview of military affairs during the early Cold War, beginning with conflicts during World War II in Warsaw, Athens, and Saigon and ending with the Cuban Missile Crisis.
A major theme of this account is the relationship between government policy and military preparedness and strategy. Author Jonathan M. House tells of generals engaging in policy confrontations with their governments' political leaders--among them Anthony Eden, Nikita Khrushchev, and John F. Kennedy--many of whom made military decisions that hamstrung their own political goals. In the pressure-cooker atmosphere of atomic preparedness, politicians as well as soldiers seemed instinctively to prefer military solutions to political problems. And national security policies had military implications that took on a life of their own. The invasion of South Korea convinced European policy makers that effective deterrence and containment required building up and maintaining credible forces. Desire to strengthen the North Atlantic alliance militarily accelerated the rearmament of West Germany and the drive for its sovereignty.
In addition to examining the major confrontations, nuclear and conventional, between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing--including the crises over Berlin and Formosa--House traces often overlooked military operations against the insurgencies of the era, such as French efforts in Indochina and Algeria and British struggles in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Aden. Now, more than fifty years after the events House describes, understanding the origins and trajectory of the Cold War is as important as ever. By the late 1950s, the United States had sent forces to Vietnam and the Middle East, setting the stage for future conflicts in both regions. House's account of the complex relationship between diplomacy and military action directly relates to the insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and confrontations that now occupy our attention across the globe.

This monograph provides a timely analysis and thoughtful insights into the challenges faced by the United States in developing a strategy for North Korea. The author examines the complex history of U.S. policy toward North Korea over the last decade that has left the United States in a position of having virtually no influence over the country. He addresses the complicated regional concerns and interests of North Korea's neighbors and how these concerns impact on each of their approaches to North Korea. Most importantly, he looks at how the North Korean culture and history have influenced the attitudes of North Korean society and their relationship with other countries. He concludes by pointing out that despite the numerous challenges, the United States must develop a strategy focused on engaging Pyongyang if we expect to have any influence over the future direction of events in North Korea.

This book analyzes the elimination of intermediate- range nuclear force missiles through vivid, fresh impressions by those who conducted the INF negotiations. The Reagan-Gorbachev Arms Control Breakthrough brings this period to life through the writing of key participants in the seminal negotiations leading to the completion of the INF Treaty and the ensuing epic struggle to secure its ratification by the U.S. Senate. The book provides an astute balance between the assessments of senior negotiators; "nuts and bolts" observations on specific elements of the Treaty by in-the-trenches negotiators; the tangles that challenged the keenest of legal minds; and the political maneuvers required to bring it through the pits and deadfalls of the Senate. Additionally, The Reagan-Gorbachev Arms Control Breakthrough provides an often-forgotten perspective of the moment, offering the opportunity for retrospective judgment. Is there a test that time demands? Are there "lessons learned," conceived at the time, that still pass that test?

In recent decades the debate on nuclear weapons has focused overwhelmingly on proliferation and nonproliferation dynamics. In a series of "Wall Street Journal" articles, however, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn called on governments to rid the world of nuclear weapons, helping to put disarmament back into international security discussions. More recently, U.S. president Barack Obama, prominent U.S. congressional members of both political parties, and a number of influential foreign leaders have espoused the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Turning this vision into reality requires an understanding of the forces driving disarmament forward and those holding it back. "Slaying the Nuclear Dragon" provides in-depth, objective analysis of current nuclear disarmament dynamics. Examining the political, state-level factors that drive and stall progress, contributors highlight the challenges and opportunities faced by proponents of disarmament. These essays show that although conditions are favorable for significant reductions, numerous hurdles still exist. Contributors look at three categories of states: those that generate momentum for disarmament; those with policies that are problematic for disarmament; and those that actively hinder progress--whether openly, secretly, deliberately, or inadvertently.
Nuclear deterrence was long credited with preventing war between the two major Cold War powers, but with the spread of nuclear technology, threats have shifted to other state powers and to nonstate groups. "Slaying the Nuclear Dragon" addresses an urgent need to examine nuclear disarmament in a realistic, nonideological manner.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (New START) agreement was reached in 2011, and both Russia and the United States are bringing nuclear strategic warhead deployments down to roughly 1,500 on each side. In the next round of strategic arms reduction talks, though, U.S. officials hope to cut far deeper; perhaps as low as several hundred warheads on each side-numbers that approach what other nuclear weapons states, such as France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan either have or will soon possess. This, then, raises the question of how compatible such reductions might be with the nuclear activities of other states. How might Russia view the nuclear and military modernization activities of China? How might the continuing nuclear and military competition between Pakistan and India play out? What might the nuclear dynamics be between North and South Korea, Japan, and China? What might other states interested in developing a nuclear weapons option of their own make of the way the superpowers have so far dealt with the nuclear programs in India, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and North Korea? Are "peaceful" nuclear competitions in the Middle and Far East where states build up civilian nuclear programs to help them develop nuclear weapons options inevitable? What, beyond current nuclear control efforts, might help to reduce such nuclear threats? Each of these questions and more are examined with precision in The Next Arms Race.

JOSEPH DORIEL, a leading management and strategy consultant, and former Director General of The Israel Institute of Productivity, developed a special theory and know-how for salvation of enterprises and organizations in danger of collapse due to running out-of-control. Based on personal experience in rescuing various organizations - Industrial, Governmental and Military - he published this book, describing 10 typical viruses of Leadership and Organizational diseases, the method of their early detection before damaging the organization and the ways to overcome the danger of self-destruction caused by an Organizational Virus. The phenomenon of self-destruction processes in organizational systems was first discovered by Albert Einstein, who called it - "PERFECTION OF MEANS BUT CONFUSION OF ENDS." Then Prof. Northcote Parkinson published his famous book, describing some historical failures which may be explained (and could be avoided) by the help of the new theory. In 1983 Prof. Barbara W. Tuchman published her book "THE MARCH OF FOLLY," again, describing devastating mistakes of policy-makers, but without trying to find the mental and organizational "viruses" which caused these catastrophes. And so, till the publication of Doriel's book no systematic approach was developed to handle this kind of phenomena. His applied theory was successfully adopted in a series of Management Seminars on this subject with high-ranking military commanders, as well as Industrial and Public Sector Managers. The contents of a typical course included: - 1)The Systems Approach to diagnose the real problems of an organization and the ways to handle them. 2)Definition of typical organizational viruses which may cause self-destruction of the organization. 3)The way to handle typical organizational diseases. 4)Analyses of real problems in existing organizations, including contemporary warfare strategies, and working out alternative solutions for them.

Bringing together a broad range of important articles from "Foreign Affairs" and ForeignAffairs.com, "Iran and the Bomb" tells the story of the Islamic Republic of Iran's quest for nuclear weapons and the outside world's struggle to respond.
The arguments presented span every significant position on the political spectrum, and the authors include world-renowned experts from several disciplines, backgrounds, and countries, including Jahangir Amuzegar, Ronen Bergman, Ehud Eiran, Richard Haass, Michael Ledeen, James Lindsay, Colin Kahl, Matthew Kroenig, Suzanne Maloney, Mohsen Milani, Scott Sagan, Gary Sick, Ray Takeyh, Kenneth Waltz, and more. An introduction by "Foreign Affairs" Editor Gideon Rose sets the stage for the debates that follow.
Released as policymakers in Washington and other capitals debate whether to deal with the Iran question once and for all, "Iran and the Bomb" contains everything needed to understand the crisis and develop an informed, independent opinion on what should be done about it.

Ever since the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the prospect of nuclear annihilation has haunted the modern world. But as John Mueller reveals in this eye-opening, compellingly argued, and very reassuring book, our obsession with nuclear weapons is unsupported by history, scientific fact, or logic. Examining the entire atomic era, Mueller boldly contends that nuclear weapons have had little impact on history. Although they have inspired overwrought policies and distorted spending priorities, for the most part they have proved to be militarily useless, and a key reason so few countries have taken them up is that they are a spectacular waste of money and scientific talent. Equally important, Atomic Obsession reveals why anxieties about terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons are essentially baseless: a host of practical and organizational difficulties make their likelihood of success almost vanishingly small. Mueller, one of America's most distinguished yet provocative international relations scholars, goes even further, maintaining that our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have produced more suffering and violence than the bombs themselves, and that proliferation of the weapons, while not necessarily desirable, is unlikely to be a major danger or to accelerate. "The book will certainly make you think. Added bonus: It's immensely fun to read." -Stephen M. Walt, ForeignPolicy.com "Meticulously researched and punctuated with a dry wit. Mueller deserves praise for having the guts to shout that the atomic emperor has no clothes." -Arms Control Today "Mueller performs an important service in puncturing some of the inflated rhetoric about nuclear weapons.... An unusual and fruitful perspective on nuclear history." -Science Magazine

"Revisiting the racial origins of the conflict between "civilization" and "savagery" in twentieth-century America"

The atomic age brought the Bomb and spawned stories of nuclear apocalypse to remind us of impending doom. As Patrick Sharp reveals, those stories had their origins well before Hiroshima, reaching back to Charles Darwin and America's frontier.

In "Savage Perils," Sharp examines the racial underpinnings of American culture, from the early industrial age to the Cold War. He explores the influence of Darwinism, frontier nostalgia, and literary modernism on the history and representations of nuclear weaponry. Taking into account such factors as anthropological race theory and Asian immigration, he charts the origins of a worldview that continues to shape our culture and politics.

Sharp dissects Darwin's arguments regarding the struggle between "civilization" and "savagery," theories that fueled future-war stories ending in Anglo dominance in Britain and influenced Turnerian visions of the frontier in America. Citing George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil," Sharp argues that many Americans still believe in the racially charged opposition between civilization and savagery, and consider the possibility of nonwhite "savages" gaining control of technology the biggest threat in the "war on terror." His insightful book shows us that this conflict is but the latest installment in an ongoing saga that has been at the heart of American identity from the beginning--and that understanding it is essential if we are to eradicate racist mythologies from American life.

he role and future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are subjects that sometimes surprise even experts in international security, primarily because it is so often disconcerting to remember that these weapons still exist. Many years ago, an American journalist wryly noted that the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was "a subject that drives the dagger of boredom deep, deep into the heart"- a dismissive quip which would have remained true right up until the moment World War III broke out. The same goes for tactical nuclear weapons: compared to the momentous issues that the East and West have tackled since the end of the Cold War, the scattering of hundreds (or in the Russian case, thousands) of battlefield weapons throughout Europe seems to be almost an afterthought, a detail left behind that should be easy to tidy up. Such complacency is unwise. Tactical nuclear weapons (or NSNWs, "non-strategic nuclear weapons") still exist because NATO and Russia have not fully resolved their fears about how a nuclear war might arise, or how it might be fought. They represent, as Russian analyst Nikolai Sokov once wrote, "the longest deadlock" in the history of arms control. Washington and Moscow, despite the challenges to the "reset" of their relations, point to reductions in strategic arms as a great achievement, but strategic agreements also reveal the deep ambiguity toward nuclear weapons as felt by the former superpower rivals. The numbers in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) are lower than at any point in history, but they are based on leaving each side a reliable ability to destroy up to 300 urban targets each. Inflicting this incredible amount of destruction is, on its face, a step no sane national leader would take. But it is here that tactical weapons were meant to play their dangerous role, for they would be the arms that provided the indispensable bridge from peace to nuclear war. Thus, the structures of Cold War nuclear doctrines on both sides remain in place, only on a smaller scale.

As the United States and Russia negotiate to bring their number of deployed nuclear weapons down, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel continue to bump their numbers up while a growing number of smaller states develop "peaceful" nuclear programs that will bring them closer to getting bombs if they choose. Welcome to the brave new world of tighter, more opaque nuclear competitions, the focus of The Next Arms Race-a must read for policy analysts and planners eager to understand and prevent the worst.

This book looks at how international treaties can be used to establish successful national programmes. It is concerned specifically with national mine action programmes, focusing on the capacity of the national governments (also referred to as "the state") to implement the "Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction." The Convention, which is also referred to as the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) or "Treaty," was finalised on September 18, 1997 in Oslo. Ten years after its creation, the Treaty has proven a successful tool to address the humanitarian disaster caused by landmines, yet most of the mine affected country signatories to the MBT have not been able to meet their clearance deadline. This book examines the underlying reasons for the discrepancy between the terms of the Treaty and the reality of its implementation, exploring its successes and shortcomings. In doing so, the book sets out to answer the research question: considering the disparate levels of success among countries committed to implementing the Mine Ban Treaty, what are the key functions of governments and governance structures in ensuring the successful implementation of the Treaty?

"Mohammed ElBaradei is one of the genuinely great leaders of his generation."--Graham T. Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

As the director of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei played a key role in the most high-stakes conflicts of our time. Contending with the Bush administration's assault on Iraq, the nuclear aspirations of North Korea, and the West's standoff with Iran, he emerged as a lone independent voice, uniquely credible in the Arab world and the West alike. As questions over Iran's nuclear capacity continue to fill the media, ElBaradei's account is both enlightening and fascinating.

ElBaradei takes us inside the nuclear fray, from behind-the-scenes exchanges in Washington and Baghdad to the streets of Pyongyang and the trail of Pakistani nuclear smugglers. He decries an us-versus-them approach and insists on the necessity of relentless diplomacy. "We have no other choice," ElBaradei says. "The other option is unthinkable."

Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers, smaller nuclear powers, and nonstate actors.

Apocalypse Never illuminates why we must abolish nuclear weapons, how we can, and what the world will look like after we do. The twenty-first century has ushered in a world at the atomic edge. The pop culture days of Dr. Strangelove have been replaced by the all-too-real single day of 24. Tad Daley has written a book for the general reader about this most crucial of contemporary challenges. Apocalypse Never maintains that the abolition of nuclear weapons is both essential and achievable, and reveals in fine detail what we need to do-both governments and movements-to make it a reality. Daley insists that while global climate change poses the single greatest long-term peril to the human race, the nuclear challenge in its many incarnations-nuclear terror, nuclear accident, a nuclear crisis spinning out of control- poses the single most immediate peril. Daley launches a wholesale assault on the nuclear double standard-the notion that the United States permits itself thousands of these weapons but forbids others from aspiring to even one-insisting that it is militarily unnecessary, morally indefensible, and politically unsustainable. He conclusively repudiates the most frequent objection to nuclear disarmament, "the breakout scenario"-the possibility that after abolition someone might whip back the curtain, reveal a dozen nuclear warheads, and proceed to "rule the world." On the wings of a brand new era in American history, Apocalypse Never makes the case that a comprehensive nuclear policy agenda from President Obama, one that fully integrates non-proliferation with disarmament, can both eliminate immediate nuclear dangers and set us irreversibly on the road to abolition. In jargon-free language, Daley explores the possible verification measures, enforcement mechanisms, and governance structures of a nuclear weapon-free world. Most importantly, he decisively argues that universal nuclear disarmament is something we can transform from a utopian fantasy into a concrete political goal.

Based on an exhaustive review of formerly classified government documents-as well as previously unexplored corporate filings, office diaries and unguarded interviews-Grant F. Smith has written a riveting story of the 1960s diversion of US weapons-grade nuclear material from an Israeli front company in Pennsylvania into the clandestine Israeli atomic weapons program. The talented but highly conflicted founder of the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC)-Dr. Zalman Mordecai Shapiro alongside his close friend and financial backer David Lowenthal-engaged in a ferocious clandestine drive to funnel the most valuable military material on earth that forever tilted the balance of power between Israel and the world. Divert chronicles Zalman Shapiro's journey from crafting ingenious innovations for the Nautilus nuclear submarine in the 1950s to his costly pursuit of America's most advanced hydrogen bomb designs in the 1970s. Tasked during secret summits with high-level Israeli intelligence agents, guided by Israel's top nuclear arms designers, and defended by Israel and its US lobby, Shapiro and NUMEC drove the CIA and FBI from furious outrage to despair. Presidents from LBJ to Jimmy Carter secretly grappled with how to respond to Israel's brazen theft of American nuclear material before finally deciding to bury the entire affair in classified files. But NUMEC's toxic secrets have refused to be buried alive. Newly declassified wiretaps have risen from the grave, detailing Shapiro's utter contempt for worker and nuclear safety. David Lowenthal's role as an international refugee smuggler between the US, Europe and Israel-before organizing financing for NUMEC-is placed under new scrutiny. This explosive story emerges even as the US Army Corps of Engineers struggles to quietly clean NUMEC's toxic waste near Apollo, Pennsylvania with $170 million in taxpayer funding. At a time when America is coming under intense pressure to attack on the mere suspicion that Iran is diverting nuclear material, Divert stands as the ultimate cautionary tale of how US Middle East policy is continually undermined from within by corruption, immunity, deceit and unwarranted secrecy.

In this title, international experts analyze Pakistan's security and insurgency issues, looking at the threats posed to and by this nuclear-armed Islamic nation. The only country in Islamic world to be formed in the name of Islam and a nuclear power, Pakistan today is struggling for its very existence and is at war with itself. "Pakistan's Quagmire" focuses on the insurgency in Pakistan, a security problem not only for the country, but also for the region and the rest of the world. To foster a thorough understanding of the many aspects of the issue, the book looks at both theoretical and practical aspects, from international relations, conflict processes, and political Islam to the annihilation of the TTP, the presence of Al-Qaeda in tribal regions, and the role of Pakistani military and agencies. The essays are contributed by international scholars, journalists, economist, nuclear security experts, security analysts, and strategists. A unique contribution, "Pakistan's Quagmire" will be an essential resource for students in conflict processes, security studies, political Islam, and US foreign policy as well as for policymakers and professionals looking to better grasp the quagmire caused by insurgency and the ongoing war on terror in Pakistan.