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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Other warfare & defence issues > Arms negotiation & control
Despite its "Peace Constitution" and close security ties to the United States, Japan designs and produces an extensive array of high-tech missiles, tanks, warships and aircraft. As much as these weapons are a testimony to the advancement of Japanese technology, they are also powerful symbols of the potential for Japanese political and military self-reliance. Yet, despite all of the advanced military hardware, Japan has not developed an autonomous military-industrial complex in the post-World War II period.;Exploring the complicated issue of Japanese political and military autonomy in the half-century since World War II, this work focuses on the institutions, individuals, ideas and interests that have shaped Japanese policy in this area. The author demonstrates that the simple model of US pressure leading to Japanese response does not hold true; he shows instead the dynamic policy-making process involving such key players as government, industry, interest groups and the media.;Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the issue of Japanese autonomy, versus alliance with the United States has become urgent. This text suggests the implications of this debate for Japan's future effor
The 1998 yearbook continues SIPRI's annual analyses of developments in global and regional major armed conflicts; in conflict prevention, management and resolution; in world military expenditure, arms production, arms transfers, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and in arms control and disarmament. Special studies in this volume include: * major armed conflicts * armed conflict prevention, management and resolution * multilateral peace missions in 1997 * regional studies of the Middle East peace process, Russia and the conflicts and peaceful settlement of disputes in its environment, and new security arrangements in Europe * world military expenditure and arms production * Russian military expenditure * the 100 largest arms-producing companies * military research and development * the trade in major conventional weapons * multilateral military-related export controls * nuclear, chemical and biological arms control * new nuclear weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa * implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention * conventional arms control * the ban on anti-personnel land-mines
The breakup of the Soviet Union left a cold war nuclear legacy consisting of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and a sprawling infrastructure for their production and maintenance. This book examines the fate of this vast nuclear weapon complex and the unprecedented non-proliferation challenges associated with the breakup of a nuclear weapon state. It describes the high-level diplomatic bargaining efforts to consolidate in Russia the nuclear weapons based in newly independent Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and to strengthen central control over these weapons. It surveys the problems associated with dismantling nuclear weapons and the difficulties involved in safely storing and disposing of large stockpiles of fissile material. It reviews the key provisions of the principal nuclear arms control measures and initiatives, including the START I and START II treaties. Finally, the book assesses the contribution of international assistance programmes to the denuclearization process under way in the former Soviet Union.
Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has puzzled
scholars and commentators. Some have claimed that it was a purely
political maneuver, while others have explained it as a ruse
conjured up by presidential advisers to weaken Soviet resolve.
"From the Hardcover edition.
For thirteen years, since his resignation from the chairmanship of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Lilienthal has kept silent on the atom, turning his energies and talents to the field of international development. Now the first chairman of the AEC speaks out on the vital question of disarmament, on the role of the atom in modern life, and on the AEC itself. His views are controversial, and will not be popular in many quarters. Mr. Lilienthal thinks that the present disarmament negotiations are premature and dangerous, that our view of the place of the atom in the modern world has been mainly wrong, and that the functions of the AEC should be largely absorbed into other government and private activities. Originally published in 1963. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Why would a nation, in the midst of a vicious and unrestricted war, hesitate to employ a weapon guaranteed to inflict massive casualties on the enemy? Major Frederic Brown offers here the first critical analysis of this curious World War II phenomenon. He investigates the nature of restraints-political, military, economic, and psychological-operative in varying degrees between 1919 and 1945, when U.S. chemical warfare policy was being formed. Starting with the experiences of toxic agent use during World War I, Major Brown shows how various restraints to gas warfare developed during the inter-war years. He then discusses the World War II experience. In the conclusion Major Brown relates his findings to contemporary conflicts and offers important implications for the future of the cold war. Originally published in 1968. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The intelligence community's flawed assessment of Iraq's weapons systems -- and the Bush administration's decision to go to war in part based on those assessments -- illustrates the political and policy challenges of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this comprehensive assessment, defense policy specialists Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer find disturbing trends in both the collection and analysis of intelligence and in its use in the development and implementation of security policy. Analyzing a broad range of recent case studies -- Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, North Korea's defiance of U.N. watchdogs, Russia's transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran and China's to Pakistan, the Soviet biological warfare program, weapons inspections in Iraq, and others -- the authors find that intelligence collection and analysis relating to WMD proliferation are becoming more difficult, that policy toward rogue states and regional allies requires difficult tradeoffs, and that using military action to fight nuclear proliferation presents intractable operational challenges. Ellis and Kiefer reveal that decisions to use -- or overlook -- intelligence are often made for starkly political reasons. They document the Bush administration's policy shift from nonproliferation, which emphasizes diplomatic tools such as sanctions and demarches, to counterproliferation, which at times employs interventionist and preemptive actions. They conclude with cogent recommendations for intelligence services and policy makers.
In the twenty-five years after 1989 the world enjoyed the deepest peace in its history. The Rise and Fall of Peace on Earth examines that singular quarter century, describing how and why peace was established and then fell apart. Mandelbaum argues that peace ended because three important countries - Vladimir Putin's Russia in Europe, Xi Jinping's China in East Asia, and the Shia clerics' Iran in the Middle East - put an end to it with aggressive nationalist policies aimed at overturning the prevailing political arrangements in their respective regions. The three had a common motive: a dictatorial regime's need to survive in a democratic age with their prospects for economic growth uncertain. Mandelbaum further argues that the key to a return of peace lies in the advent of genuine democracy, including free elections and the protection of religious, economic, and political liberty. Since democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, The Rise and Fall of Peace on Earth has a dual message: the world has a formula for peace, but there is no way to ensure that all countries embrace it.
In the early and mid 1990s, several African countries demobilized part of their armed forces. In the light of Africa's large development challenges, continuing wars and insecurity, this study analyzes the following questions: to what extent and how have demobilizations contributed to peace and human development? Where did the soldiers go? What can we learn from the different approaches that have been taken? These questions provide insights in the linkages between development and conflict, and provide lessons for demilitarization and peace building efforts in postwar societies.
"At the moment, the revision of security policy and the formation of a new consensus to support it are still at an early stage of development. The idea of comprehensive security cooperation among the major military establishments to form an inclusive international security arrangement has been only barely acknowledged and is only partially developed. The basic principle of cooperation has been proclaimed in general terms in the Paris Charter issued in November of 1990. Important implementing provisions have been embodied in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties. Except for the regulation of U.S. and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) strategic forces, however, these arrangements apply only to the European theater and even there have not been systematically developed. The formation of a new security order requires that cooperative theaters of military engagement be systematically developed. Clearly that exercise will stretch the minds of all those whose thinking about security has been premised on confrontational methods. Nonetheless, such a stretching is unavoidable. The new security problems are driven by powerful forces, reshaping the entire international context. They impose starkly different requirements. They will deflect even the impressive momentum of U.S. military traditions. The eventual outcome is uncertain. It turns upon political debates yet to be held, consensus judgements yet to form, and events and their implications yet to unfold. Fundamental reconceptualization of security policy is a necessary step in the right direction, and it is important to get on with it. Getting on with it means defining the new concept of cooperative security, identifying the trends that motivate it, outlining its implications for practical policy action, and acknowledging its constraints. These tasks are the purpose of this essay. "
One of the gravest issues facing the global community today is the threat of nuclear war. As a growing number of nations gain nuclear capabilities, the odds of nuclear conflict increase. Yet nuclear deterrence strategies remain rooted in Cold War models that do not take into account regional conflict. Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments offers an innovative theory of brokered bargaining to better understand and solve regional crises. As the world has moved away from the binational relationships that defined Cold War conflict while nuclear weapons have continued to proliferate, new types of nuclear threats have arisen. Moeed Yusuf proposes a unique approach to deterrence that takes these changing factors into account. Drawing on the history of conflict between India and Pakistan, Yusuf describes the potential for third-party intervention to avert nuclear war. This book lays out the ways regional powers behave and maneuver in response to the pressures of strong global powers. Moving beyond debates surrounding the widely accepted rational deterrence model, Yusuf offers an original perspective rooted in thoughtful analysis of recent regional nuclear conflicts. With depth and insight, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments urges the international community to rethink its approach to nuclear deterrence.
This anthology presents the complete text of thirty-four treaties that have effectively contained the spread of nuclear, biological, and conventional weapons during the Cold War and beyond. The treaties are placed in historical context by individual commentaries from noted authorities Thomas Graham Jr. and Damien J. LaVera, which provide unique insights on each treaty's negotiation and implementation. During the 1990s, numerous arms control agreements were concluded under U.N. or U.S. leadership. In 1995, one hundred sixty-five nations agreed to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Many nations ratified important chemical and biological weapons conventions, a pact to reduce conventional forces in Europe, and agreements to limit testing of weapons of mass destruction. More recent treaties seeking to restrain small arms trafficking and ban land mines are also highlighted and analyzed. Graham concludes with lessons learned from the collective negotiation and verification history of these treaties, ongoing efforts to limit weaponry, and general observations on the status and effectiveness of these agreements. There is no comparable resource available for diplomats, international lawyers, and arms control specialists.
In the twenty-five years after 1989, the world enjoyed the deepest peace in history. In The Rise and Fall of Peace on Earth, the eminent foreign policy scholar Michael Mandelbaum examines that remarkable quarter century, describing how and why the peace was established and then fell apart. To be sure, wars took place in this era, but less frequently and on a far smaller scale than in previous periods. Mandelbaum argues that the widespread peace ended because three major countries - Vladimir Putin's Russia in Europe, Xi Jinping's China in East Asia, and the Shia clerics' Iran in the Middle East - put an end to it with aggressive nationalist policies aimed at overturning the prevailing political arrangements in their respective regions. The three had a common motive: their need to survive in a democratic age with their countries' prospects for economic growth uncertain. Mandelbaum further argues that the key to the return of peace lies in the advent of genuine democracy, including free elections and the protection of religious, economic, and political liberty. Yet, since recent history has shown that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, The Rise and Fall of Peace on Earth has a dual message: while the world has a formula for peace, there is no way to ensure that all countries will embrace it.
WINNER OF THE PULITZER PRIZE
Israel has made a unique contribution to the nuclear age. It has created a special "bargain" with the bomb. Israel is the only nuclear-armed state that does not acknowledge its possession of the bomb, even though its existence is a common knowledge throughout the world. It only says that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. The bomb is Israel's collective ineffable--the nation's last great taboo. This bargain has a name: in Hebrew, it is called "amimut," or opacity. By adhering to the bargain, which was born in a secret deal between Richard Nixon and Golda Meir, Israel has created a code of nuclear conduct that encompasses both governmental policy and societal behavior. The bargain has deemphasized the salience of nuclear weapons, yet it is incompatible with the norms and values of a liberal democracy. It relies on secrecy, violates the public right to know, and undermines the norm of public accountability and oversight, among other offenses. It is also incompatible with emerging international nuclear norms. Author of the critically acclaimed "Israel and the Bomb," Avner Cohen offers a bold and original study of this politically explosive subject. Along with a fair appraisal of the bargain's strategic merits, Cohen critiques its undemocratic flaws. Arguing that the bargain has become increasingly anachronistic, he calls for a reform in line with domestic democratic values as well as current international nuclear norms. Most ironic, he believes Iran is imitating Israeli "amimut." Cohen concludes with fresh perspectives on Iran, Israel, and the effort toward global disarmament.
Based on a detailed analysis of archives and high level interviews this book looks at the role of beliefs, culture and identity in the making of British nuclear policy from 1945 through to the present day. This book also examines Britain's nuclear experience by moving away from traditional interpretations of why states develop and maintain nuclear weapons by adopting a more contemporary approach to political theory. Traditional mainstream explanations tend to stress the importance of factors such as the 'maximization of power', the pursuit of 'national security interests' and the role of 'structure' in a largely anarchic international system. This book does not dismiss these approaches, but argues that British experience suggests that focusing on 'beliefs', 'culture' and 'identity', provides a more useful insight and distinctive interpretation into the process of British nuclear decision making than the more traditional approaches.
John A. Vasquez explains the processes that cause the spread of interstate war by looking at how contagion worked to bring countries into the First World War. Analysing all the key states that declared war, the book is comprised of three parts. Part I lays out six models of contagion: alliances, contiguity, territorial rivalry, opportunity, 'brute force' and economic dependence. Part II then analyses in detail the decision making of every state that entered the war from Austria-Hungary in 1914 to the United States and Greece in 1917. Part III has two chapters - the first considers the neutral countries, and the second concludes the book with an overarching theoretical analysis, including major lessons of the war and new hypotheses about contagion. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, conflict studies and international history, especially those interested in the spread of conflict, or the First World War.
The Small Arms Survey 2015 examines the role of weapons and armed violence in humanity's appropriation of the earth's wildlife and mineral riches - in Africa, where the poaching of elephants and rhinos is becoming increasingly militarised, and near resource extraction sites around the world. In addition to presenting updates on the UN small arms process and the top arms importers and exporters, the volume assesses how recent technological developments affect weapons marking, record-keeping, and tracing; reviews small arms flows to Egypt, Libya, and Syria; and evaluates a stockpile management initiative in south-east Europe. The 'armed actors' section sheds light on the arms and ammunition used by insurgents in northern Mali, the decline of the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda, and the use of floating armouries by private security companies in the Indian Ocean. This edition also analyses conditions that are driving young people to adopt high-risk coping strategies in Burundi.
The US-India nuclear deal, popularly known as the 123 Agreement, announced by George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh on 18 July 2005, was a defining moment in the relationship of the two countries, as also India's relationship with the non-proliferation regime. The Bush administration's implied recognition of India's nuclear weapons, and its abrupt reversal of three decades of sanctions to restore Indian access to nuclear fuel, reactors, and dual-use technologies despite being a non-proliferation treaty non-signatory, led to contentious debates in both India and the USA. A Debate to Remember emphasizes the multifaceted debate in India over the nuclear deal using concepts from science and technology studies. It focuses on the intense contestation over the civil-military mix of India's separation plan, the competition between the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline and the nuclear deal, the role of retired nuclear scientists, and the issue of liability that has stalled the full implementation of the nuclear deal. The impact of domestic factors on issues ranging from the civil-military status of breeder reactors to the Indian insistence on no restriction on future nuclear testing in the 123 Agreement is also revealed in this book.
Economists of the Cowles Commission of the University of Chicago present the first comprehensive study of the long-range effects on world economy of atomic power and its implications for industries producing oil, coal, and electric power. The study includes a consideration of the characteristics of atomic power, covering source and cost of fuels, type of equipment and initial investment required, etc., and an analysis, estimating the future effects of atomic power on residential heating and on the industries producing aluminum, iron and steel, flat glass, phosphate fertilizers, fixed nitrogen, chlorine, caustic soda, cement, bricks, railroad transportation. The final chapter discusses the possibilities of atomic power in industrialization of backward areas. Originally published in 1950. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The adaptation of the 1990 CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures were both completed by the November 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit meeting. In the new century, Europe will continue to elaborate further co-operative security arrangements to better respond to new risks and challenges in the field of security and help create stability in areas of tension and conflict. The aim is twofold: to strengthen the pan-European process of building confidence and security; and to develop measures and arms control-related arrangements below the continental level - at the regional and subregional levels. This research report examines the record of CSBMs in Europe as well as regional arms control efforts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It contains important reference material on military security endeavours of this type.
The immense impact of technology on both warfare and security has been clearly demonstrated and has heightened concerns relating to the proliferation of military technology and misuse by irresponsible actors. Technology control regimes are a vital component of national security strategies. This report presents evidence of the increasing relevance of technology in the 21st century and a brief review of the control regimes, as well as the perspectives of progressive developing nations. It highlights the need for a new approach to the management of technology and security issues. Meeting future challenges to arms control and non-proliferation will require wider cooperation among nations in a rapidly changing and interdependent world in which some of the new technologies will further accentuate security sensitivities. The report advocates the abandonment of cold war mindsets and makes a case for a broader cooperative approach to the management of technology controls. International cooperation will be vital for achieving the objectives of non-proliferation, disarmament and global socio-economic progress and will facilitate steps towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the dangers posed by terrorism, thereby fostering enhanced international peace and stability.
If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control...An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--Choice Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. |
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