There is an increasing focus on the need for national implementation of treaties. International law has traditionally left enforcement to the individual parties, but more and more treaties contain arrangements to induce States to comply with their commitments. Experts in this 2007 book examine three forms of such mechanisms: dispute settlement procedures in the form of international courts, non-compliance procedures of an administrative character, and enforcement of obligation by coercive means. Three fields are examined, namely human rights, international environmental law, and arms control and disarmament. These areas are in the forefront of the development of international law and deal with multilateral, rather than purely bilateral issues. Each part of the book on human rights, international environmental law and arms control contain a general introduction and case studies of the relevant treaties in the field. Will appeal widely to both generalists and specialists in international law and relations.

In this book, Dr Christoph Bluth presents an original analysis of the build up of strategic forces from the death of Stalin to the SALT I agreement. The author outlines Soviet strategic arms policy, he identifies the principal interest groups involved and he studies a number of critical decisions taken in relation to strategic bombers, ICBMs, strategic nuclear forces based at sea, ballistic missile defence and the military uses of space. Strategic arms policy in the Khrushchev period exhibited a number of apparent paradoxes, which the author explains. As well as examining external threat assessment and wider foreign policy, he pays particular attention to the role of domestic factors such as Khrushchev's endeavours to shift resource away from military industries to agriculture and consumer goods production. The author is therefore able to demonstrate how domestic priorities and internal power struggles account for the seeming inconsistencies of Soviet military and foreign policy.

In this analysis of naval arms control between the two world wars, Emily Goldman dissects the underlying assumptions of arms control theory that have guided theorizing and practice for the past thirty years. She concludes that because there has been a near-exclusive focus on the behavior of the superpowers and on the consequences of nuclear technology, the arms control process has been artificially constrained in its scope and potential. Returning to the most important historical precedent of arms control prior to the Cold War, Goldman demonstrates that there are two distinct strategies of arms control, one that integrates force limitation with political conflict resolution and one that confines itself to technical limitations exclusively.

Goldman's is the first analytical treatment of the interwar period that examines arms control in both its technical and conflict-resolution dimensions in tandem and traces them through the entire life of the arms control system. By debunking Cold War orthodoxy about arms control and by illuminating how arms control functioned between the wars, Goldman shows how the process of arms control can transcend the narrow goal of regulating the military balance and become a constructive tool for restructuring power relationships.

The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998. Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve. Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation.

"Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race" responds to a growing concern that changes in the life sciences and the nature of warfare could lead to a resurgent interest in chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities. By bringing together a wide range of historical material and current literature in the field of CBW arms control, the book reveals how these two disparate fields might be integrated to precipitate a biochemical arms race among major powers, rogue states, or even non-state actors.
It seeks to raise awareness among policy practitioners, the academic community, and the media that such an arms race may be looming if developments are left unattended, and to provide policy options on how it--and it's devastating consequences--could be avoided. After identifying weaknesses in the international regime structures revolving around the Biological Weapons and Chemical Weapons Conventions, it provides policy proposals to deal with gaps and shortcomings in each prohibition regime individually, and then addresses the widening gap between them.

The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998.
Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve.
Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation.

This book examines Japan's nuclear identity and its implications for abolition of nuclear weapons. By applying analytical eclecticism in combination with international relations theory, this book categorizes Japan's nuclear identity as a 'nuclear-bombed state' (classical liberalism), 'nuclear disarmament state' (neoliberalism), 'nuclear-threatened state' (classical realism), and a 'nuclear umbrella state' (neorealism). This research investigates whether the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 'genocide' or not, to what degree Japan has contributed to nuclear disarmament, how Japan has been threatened by ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons of North Korea, and how Japan's security policy has been embedded with the nuclear strategy of the United States. It also sheds light on theoretical factors that Japan does not support the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Finally, this book considers the future of Japan's nuclear identity and attempts to explore alternatives for Japan's nuclear disarmament diplomacy toward a world without nuclear weapons.

Gun Crusaders is a fascinating inside look at how the four-million member National Rifle Association and its committed members come to see each and every gun control threat as a step down the path towards gun confiscation, and eventually socialism. Enlivened by a rich analysis of NRA materials, meetings, leader speeches, and unique in-depth interviews with NRA members, Gun Crusaders focuses on how the NRA constructs and perceives threats to gun rights as one more attack in a broad liberal cultural war. Scott Melzer shows that the NRA promotes a nostalgic vision of frontier masculinity, whereby gun rights defenders are seen as patriots and freedom fighters, defending not the freedom of religion, but the religion of individual rights and freedoms.

Often lost in the discussion about the nuclear crisis are its regional dynamics. Since 2002, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea have struggled to navigate between the unsettling belligerence of North Korea and the unilateral insistence of the United States. This book focuses on their strategic thinking over four stages of the crisis. Drawing on sources from each of the countries, it examines how the four perceived their role in the Six-Party Talks and the regional context, as they eyed each other. The book emphasizes the significance of these talks for the emerging security framework and great power cooperation in Northeast Asia.

While policy makers and scholars have long devoted considerable attention to strategies like deterrence, which threaten others with unacceptable consequences, such threat-based strategies are not always the best option. In some cases, a state may be better off seeking to give others a greater sense of security, rather than by holding their security at risk. The most prominent use of these security assurances has been in conjunction with efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Ongoing concerns about the nuclear activities of countries like Iran and North Korea, and the possible reactions of other states in their regions, have catapulted this topic into high profile. This book represents the first study to explore the overall utility of assurance strategies, to evaluate their effectiveness as a tool for preventing nuclear proliferation, and to identify conditions under which they are more or less likely to be effective.

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation.

Excessive military spending reduces the available financial reserves for health, education, and other human needs. For poor countries, it increases poverty, unemployment, and destitution. It also strengthens dictatorial tendencies in politics and acts against democratic values. If we want to achieve peace, eliminate poverty, decrease inequality, and achieve social justice, we should devote all our energies to reducing military spending and using the released resources for economic development. For that, we need a concerted effort to encourage disarmament. This new volume provides reflections and insights from leading public figures and activists who oppose military expenditure in any form. Many of the contributions to this volume were presented as speeches at the 'Disarm! For a Climate of Peace' meeting held in Berlin in 2016, organized by the International Peace Bureau. The volume also includes additional research-oriented chapters to complement the transcripts from the International Peace Bureau meeting.

In every decade of the nuclear era, one or two states have developed nuclear weapons despite the international community's opposition to proliferation. In the coming years, the breakdown of security arrangements, especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, could drive additional countries to seek their own nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and missiles. This likely would produce greater instability, more insecure states, and further proliferation. Are there steps concerned countries can take to anticipate, prevent, or dissuade the next generation of proliferators? Are there countries that might reassess their decision to forgo a nuclear arsenal? This volume brings together top international security experts to examine the issues affecting a dozen or so countries' nuclear weapons policies over the next decade. In Part I, National Decisions in Perspective, the work describes the domestic political consideration and international pressures that shape national nuclear policies of several key states. In Part II, Fostering Nonproliferation, the contributors discuss the factors that shape the future motivations and capabilities of various states to acquire nuclear weapons, and assess what the world community can do to counter this process. The future utility of bilateral and multilateral security assurances, treaty-based nonproliferation regimes, and other policy instruments are covered thoroughly.

Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are among the fingers in the dike preventing the unthinkable nuclear, biological, and chemical catastrophe. For decades the ability to ascertain whether states are hiding germ weapons programs has been nonexistent because the 1975 bioweapons ban has no inspection measures. Yet, in 1995 a small United Nations inspection corps pulled off a spectacular verification feat in the face of concerted resistance from Iraq's Saddam Hussein and popular skepticism that it was even possible to conduct effective biological inspections. Working from sketchy intelligence--and hampered by the Iraqis' extensive concealment and deception measures--the inspectors busted open Iraq's cover stories and wrested a confession of biowarfare agent production from Baghdad. This rigorously researched book tells that compelling story through the firsthand accounts of the inspectors who, with a combination of intrepidness, ingenuity, and a couple of lucky breaks, took the lid off Iraq's bioweapons program and pulled off an improbable victory for peace and international security. The book concludes by drawing lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, by placing the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and by making recommendations to reduce those risks.
While written as an engaging, analytical historical narrative that explains what the biological inspectors knew, when and how they knew it, and how they outmaneuvered the Iraqis, this book's real contributions are the inspectors' blueprint to "get it right" with regard to the verification challenges associated with the bioweapons ban, and the author's roadmap to address the overall biological threats facing the world today.

Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are among the fingers in the dike preventing the unthinkable nuclear, biological, and chemical catastrophe. For decades the ability to ascertain whether states are hiding germ weapons programs has been nonexistent because the 1975 bioweapons ban has no inspection measures. Yet, in 1995 a small United Nations inspection corps pulled off a spectacular verification feat in the face of concerted resistance from Iraq's Saddam Hussein and popular skepticism that it was even possible to conduct effective biological inspections. Working from sketchy intelligence--and hampered by the Iraqis' extensive concealment and deception measures--the inspectors busted open Iraq's cover stories and wrested a confession of biowarfare agent production from Baghdad. This rigorously researched book tells that compelling story through the firsthand accounts of the inspectors who, with a combination of intrepidness, ingenuity, and a couple of lucky breaks, took the lid off Iraq's bioweapons program and pulled off an improbable victory for peace and international security. The book concludes by drawing lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, by placing the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and by making recommendations to reduce those risks.
While written as an engaging, analytical historical narrative that explains what the biological inspectors knew, when and how they knew it, and how they outmaneuvered the Iraqis, this book's real contributions are the inspectors' blueprint to "get it right" with regard to the verification challenges associated with the bioweapons ban, and the author's roadmap to address the overall biological threats facing the world today.

"Getting to Zero" takes on the much-debated goal of nuclear zero--exploring the serious policy questions raised by nuclear disarmament and suggesting practical steps for the nuclear weapon states to take to achieve it.
It documents the successes and failures of six decades of attempts to control nuclear weapons proliferation and, within this context, asks the urgent questions that world leaders, politicians, NGOs, and scholars must address in the years ahead.

"Getting to Zero" takes on the much-debated goal of nuclear zero--exploring the serious policy questions raised by nuclear disarmament and suggesting practical steps for the nuclear weapon states to take to achieve it.
It documents the successes and failures of six decades of attempts to control nuclear weapons proliferation and, within this context, asks the urgent questions that world leaders, politicians, NGOs, and scholars must address in the years ahead.

Dozens of states have long been capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, yet only a few have actually done so. Jacques E. C. Hymans finds that the key to this surprising historical pattern lies not in externally imposed constraints, but rather in state leaders' conceptions of the national identity. Synthesizing a wide range of scholarship from the humanities and social sciences to experimental psychology and neuroscience, Hymans builds a rigorous model of decisionmaking that links identity to emotions and ultimately to nuclear policy choices. Exhaustively researched case studies of France, India, Argentina, and Australia - two that got the bomb and two that abstained - demonstrate the value of this model while debunking common myths. This book will be invaluable to policymakers and concerned citizens who are frustrated with the frequent misjudgments of states' nuclear ambitions, and to scholars who seek a better understanding of how leaders make big foreign policy decisions.

Dozens of states have long been capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, yet only a few have actually done so. Jacques E. C. Hymans finds that the key to this surprising historical pattern lies not in externally imposed constraints, but rather in state leaders' conceptions of the national identity. Synthesizing a wide range of scholarship from the humanities and social sciences to experimental psychology and neuroscience, Hymans builds a rigorous model of decisionmaking that links identity to emotions and ultimately to nuclear policy choices. Exhaustively researched case studies of France, India, Argentina, and Australia - two that got the bomb and two that abstained - demonstrate the value of this model while debunking common myths. This book will be invaluable to policymakers and concerned citizens who are frustrated with the frequent misjudgments of states' nuclear ambitions, and to scholars who seek a better understanding of how leaders make big foreign policy decisions.

In 2017, the world watched as President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un traded personal insults and escalating threats of nuclear war amid unprecedented shows of military force. Former Pentagon insider and Korean security expert Van Jackson traces the origins of the first American nuclear crisis in the post-Cold War era, and explains the fragile, highly unpredictable way that it ended. Grounded in security studies and informed analysis of the US response to North Korea's increasing nuclear threat, Trump's aggressive rhetoric is analysed in the context of prior US policy failures, the geopolitics of East Asia, North Korean strategic culture and the acceleration of its nuclear programme. Jackson argues that the Trump administration's policy of 'maximum pressure' brought the world much closer to inadvertent nuclear war than many realise - and charts a course for the prevention of future conflicts.

In 2008, the iconic doomsday clock of the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists"was set at five minutes to midnight--two minutes closer to Armageddon than in 1962, when John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev went eyeball to eyeball over missiles in Cuba We still live in an echo chamber of fear, after eight years in which the Bush administration and its harshest critics reinforced each other's worst fears about the Bomb. And yet, there have been no mushroom clouds or acts of nuclear terrorism since the Soviet Union dissolved, let alone since 9/11.
Our worst fears still could be realized at any time, but Michael Krepon argues that the United States has never possessed more tools and capacity to reduce nuclear dangers than it does today - from containment and deterrence to diplomacy, military strength, and arms control. The bloated nuclear arsenals of the Cold War years have been greatly reduced, nuclear weapon testing has almost ended, and all but eight countries have pledged not to acquire the Bomb. Major powers have less use for the Bomb than at any time in the past. Thus, despite wars, crises, and Murphy's Law, the dark shadows cast by nuclear weapons can continue to recede.
Krepon believes that positive trends can continue, even in the face of the twin threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation that have been exacerbated by the Bush administration's pursuit of a war of choice in Iraq based on false assumptions. Krepon advocates a "back to basics" approach to reducing nuclear dangers, reversing the Bush administration's denigration of diplomacy, deterrence, containment, and arms control. As he sees it, "The United States has stumbled before, but America has also made it through hard times and rebounded. With wisdom, persistence, and luck, another dark passage can be successfully navigated."

Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the "tradition of non-use," a time-honored obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear states--thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user.
The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.

Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the "tradition of non-use," a time-honored obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear states--thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user.
The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.

There is a significant number of nuclear and radiological sources in Central Asia, which have contributed, are still contributing, or have the potential to contribute to radioactive contamination in the future. Key sources and contaminated sites of concern are: The nuclear weapons tests performed at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS) in Kazakhstan during 1949-1989. A total of 456 nuclear weapons tests have been perf- med in the atmosphere (86), above and at ground surface (30) and underground (340) accompanied by radioactive plumes reaching far out of the test site. Safety trials at STS, where radioactive sources were spread by conventional explosives. Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) within STS and outside STS in Kazakhstan, producing crater lakes (e.g., Tel'kem I and Tel'kem II), waste storage facilities (e.g., LIRA) etc. Technologically enhanced levels of naturally occurring radionuclides (TENORM) due to U mining and tailing. As a legacy of the cold war and the nuclear weapon p- gramme in the former USSR, thousands of square kilometers in the Central Asia co- tries are contaminated. Large amounts of scale from the oil and gas industries contain sufficient amounts of TENORM. Nuclear reactors, to be decommissioned or still in operation. Storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes. In the characterization of nuclear risks, the risks are estimated by integrating the results of the hazard identification, the effects assessment and the exposure assessment.

Based on extensive research in government archives and private papers, this book analyzes the secret debate within the Eisenhower administration over the pursuit of a nuclear test-ban agreement. In contrast to much recent scholarship, this study concludes that Eisenhower strongly desired to reach an accord with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to cease nuclear weapons testing. For Eisenhower, a test ban would ease Cold War tensions, slow the nuclear arms race, and build confidence toward disarmament; however, he faced continual resistance from his early scientific advisers, most notably Lewis L. Strauss and Edward Teller. Extensive research into previously unavailable government archival sources and collections of private manuscripts reveals the manipulative acts of test-ban opponents and other factors that inhibited Eisenhower's actions throughout his presidency. Meticulously analyzed, these sources underscore Eisenhower's dependence on the counsel of his science advisors, such as Strauss, James R. Killian, and George B. Kistiakowsky, to determine the course he pursued in regard to several components of his national security strategy. In addition to its comprehensive analysis of the test-ban debate, this book makes important contributions to the scholarly literature assessing Eisenhower's leadership and his approach to arms control.