Rethinking the Unthinkable examines the future direction of nuclear arms control in the post-Cold War security environment. Believing that the new environment requires a radical rethinking of the purpose and role of nuclear weapons in international politics, the contributors address many fundamental issues influencing further US, Russian and European nuclear arms reductions. This volume is a product of the Project on Rethinking Arms Control, sponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland.

In this new perspective, Iran's quest for nuclear power-in the context of the global energy challenge and the Cold War-era nuclear arms race-takes on new dimension. This study goes beyond current affairs and analyzes interactions between the complex evolution of U.S. policy toward Iran and events in modern Iranian history that shape the determinants of Tehran's foreign policy. Today, the shockwaves of the cataclysm that became known as the Islamic Revolution have irrevocably transcended Iran's frontiers. In the aftermath of the revolution, Afghanistan and Iraq were invaded, and the Republicans, who had gained power thanks to the hostage crisis, now had to shy away in light of the Iran-Contra scandal. The revolution was a byproduct of the great powers' array of geostrategic moves following World War II. This book explores the order that underlies Iran's chaotic dynamics that have potential to bring about unintended results. The best example of this is President Carter's human rights policy, which, unexpectedly, via strange attractor dynamics, led to the fall of the Shah that marked the end of the U.S. twin-pillar policy in the Persian Gulf.

This book explores how the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a leading humanitarian actor, addresses the problem of weapons. A triangulation of strategies such as testimonialization, medicalization and legalization, are investigated, with the help of critical security studies literature, to cultivate an understanding of an effects based approach to weapons. The attempt here is not only to introduce some innovative, conceptual tools but also to provide a coherent and critical narrative of the experiences of the ICRC vis-a-vis states to regulate and prohibit weapons. This experiential account of the ICRC's engagement with the problem of weapons is significant as it produces an empowering, alternative discourse making visible subjugated knowledge in the field of arms control and disarmament.

On November 10, 2017, Pope Francis became the first pontiff in the nuclear era to take a complete stand against nuclear weapons, even as a form of deterrence. At a Vatican conference of leaders in the field of disarmament, he made it clear that the possession of the bomb itself was immoral. A World Free from Nuclear Weapons presents the pope's address and original testimony from Nobel Peace Prize laureates, religious leaders, diplomats, and civil society activists. These luminaries, which include the pope and a Hiroshima survivor, make the moral case against possessing, manufacturing, and deploying nuclear arms. Drew Christiansen, a member of the Holy See delegation to the 2017 United Nations conference that negotiated the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, helps readers to understand this conference in its historical context. A World Free from Nuclear Weapons is a critical companion for scholars of modern Catholicism, moral theology, and peace studies, as well as policymakers working on effective disarmament. It shows how the Church's revised position presents an opportunity for global leaders to connect disarmament to larger movements for peace, pointing toward future action.

More than half a century after the advent of the nuclear age, is the world approaching a tipping point that will unleash an epidemic of nuclear proliferation? Today many of the building blocks of a nuclear arsenal -scientific and engineering expertise, precision machine tools, software, design information -are more readily available than ever before. The nuclear pretensions of so-called rogue states and terrorist organizations are much discussed. But how firm is the resolve of those countries that historically have chosen to forswear nuclear weapons? A combination of changes in the international environment could set off a domino effect, with countries scrambling to develop nuclear weapons so as not to be left behind -or to develop nuclear "hedge" capacities that would allow them to build nuclear arsenals relatively quickly, if necessary. The Nuclear Tipping Point examines the factors, both domestic and transnational, that shape nuclear policy. The authors, distinguished scholars and foreign policy practitioners with extensive government experience, develop a framework for understanding why certain countries may originally have decided to renounce nuclear weapons -and pinpoint some more recent country-specific factors that could give them cause to reconsider. Case studies of eight long-term stalwarts of the nonproliferation regime -Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, and Taiwan -flesh out this framework and show how even these countries might be pushed over the edge of a nuclear tipping point. The authors offer prescriptions that would both prevent such countries from reconsidering their nuclear option and avert proliferation by others. The stakes are enormous and success is far from assured. To keep the tipping point beyond reach, the authors argue, the international community will have to act with unity, imagination, and strength, and Washington's leadership will be essential. Contributors include Leon Feurth, George Washington University; Ellen Laipson, Stimson Center; Thomas W. Lippman, Middle East Institute; Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Derek J. Mitchell, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Jonathan D. Pollack, U.S. Naval War College; Walter B. Slocombe, Caplin and Drysdale; and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The Middle East is a hot spot of proliferation. It contains one state assumed to possess nuclear weapons, several states that tried and failed to develop a military nuclear capability, one state under suspicion of trying to do so, and it is the world region that witnessed the most frequent and severe employment of chemical weapons since the end of World War I. Notwithstanding, not a single arms control regime concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) covers the region as a whole. Instead we have seen several proliferation-related military operations which have rather contributed to destabilization than served non-proliferation. This volume, written under the auspices of the EU Consortium for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament determines the current state of diplomatic efforts to establish a WMD free zone in the Middle East. In doing so, it provides insights into central actors' conflicting political positions, thereby explaining the stalemate of efforts to negotiate a WMD-free zone. Chapters written by renowned experts from academia and policy-oriented think tanks, as well as by next-generation Middle East and arms control experts, introduce the subject to the reader, give background information about arms control initiatives, provide technical expertise, and endeavour to make proposals for arms control measures in support of the creation of a Middle East WMD-free zone.

The National Institute for Public Policy s new book, "Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence," is the first of its kind. Dr. Keith Payne, the late former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and an unparalleled bipartisan group of senior civilian and military experts critically examined eight basic assumptions of Minimum Deterrence against available evidence. In general, Minimum Deterrence does not fare well under the careful scrutiny.

Proponents of a "Minimum Deterrent" US nuclear force posture believe that anywhere from a handful to a few hundred nuclear weapons are adequate to deter reliably and predictably any enemy from attacking the United States now and in the future. Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, their thinking goes, no foreign leader would dare challenge US capabilities. The benefits, advocates claim, of reducing US nuclear weapons to the "minimum" level needed are: better relations with Russia and China, reinforcement of the arms control and Nonproliferation Treaty, billions of defense dollars in savings, and greater international stability on the way to "nuclear zero."

As political pressure builds to pursue this vision of minimum US deterrence, "Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence" stands as the seminal study to address the many claims of great benefit against available empirical evidence.

This book was published as a National Institute Press monograph, Keith B. Payne and James Schlesinger, "Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence" (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2013) and as a special issue of "Comparative Strategy.""

Nuclear Notes is a biannual publication of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) featuring innovative thinking by rising experts in the nuclear field. Its goal is to advance the public debate about nuclear weapons strategy, arms control, nonproliferation, disarmament, and other nuclear issues by providing a forum for sharing new analysis and insight. In particular, this publication seeks to provide an opportunity for graduate students and early career professionals to publish ideas emanating from their independent research or that are connected to their unique vantage point as analysts and implementers of nuclear policy.

The Nuclear Scholars Initiative is a signature program ran by the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI)-to engage emerging nuclear experts in thoughtful and informed debate over how to best address the nuclear community's most pressing problems. The papers included in this volume comprise research from participants in the 2019 Nuclear Scholars Initiative. These papers explore a variety of topics such as the future of arms-control treaties, the role of artificial intelligence and cyber resilience in nuclear security, and the role of regional dynamics in nuclear security.

Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as a Moral Imperative argues that the use of nuclear weapons as a threat in policies of nuclear deterrence violate basic principles of morality and consequently the abolition of nuclear weapons from the world is a moral imperative nations that have them. The focus is on the United States since it will have to take the lead in any program of abolition. The argument is formulated in terms accessible to theorists in different disciplines and activists in a large range of causes. It appeals to principles that are widely shared but whose application to national policies, especially to deterrence by threats of mass destruction, has been debated ever since nuclear weapons were developed. The book explains what is meant by the "immorality" of a national policy, the stake which citizens have in their agents acting morally and the role of their opinions in seeing that they do. The argument of the book is couched in terms of consequences. The effects of the U.S.'s nuclear deterrent on the probability of nuclear war are difficult to calculate; but the harms for the country and others across the globe caused by the immense apparatus necessary to make U.S. threats credible are sufficient to condemn the policy. The last part of the book is devoted to way the U.S. can take the lead in safe and effective steps necessary to abolish the weapons and prevent their reintroduction into the world.

In May 1998, in reaction to India s nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan tested six nuclear weapons. Following this, the country opted for a policy of minimum deterrence, and within a year Pakistan had altered its policy stance by adding the modifier of minimum credible deterrence. This book looks at how this seemingly innocuous shift seriously impacted on Pakistan s nuclear policy direction and whether the concept of minimum has lost its significance in the South Asian region s changed/changing strategic environment.

After providing a brief historical background exploring why and how Pakistan carried out the nuclear development program, the book questions why Pakistan could not sustain the minimum deterrence that it had conceptualized in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 test. It examines the conceptual theoretical framework of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to question whether Pakistan s nuclear policy remained consistent with this, as well as to discover the rudimentary factors that are responsible for the inconsistencies with regard to minimum deterrence conceived in this study. The book goes on to look at the policy options that Pakistan had after acquiring the nuclear capability, and what the rationale was for selecting minimum deterrence. The book not only highlights Pakistan deterrent force building, but also analyzes closely Pakistan s doctrinal posture of first use option. Furthermore, it examines the policy towards arms control and disarmament, and discusses whether these individual policy orientations are consistent with the minimum deterrence.

Conceptually providing a deeper understanding of Pakistan s post-1998 nuclear policy, this book critically examines whether the minimum deterrence conceived could be sustained both at the theoretical and operational levels. It will be a useful contribution in the field of Nuclear Policy, Security Studies, Asian Politics, Proliferation/Non-Proliferation Studies, and Peace Studies. This book will be of interest to policy makers, scholars, and students of nuclear policy, nuclear proliferation and arms control related research. "

This volume evaluates the impact of coercive arms control efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the twenty-first century. A new paradigm in arms control is gradually replacing the idea that mutually agreed restrictions on armaments can improve international security. Thus, Hedley Bull's classic definition of arms control as the "cooperation between antagonistic pairs of states in military affairs" needs to be amended by a new notion of coercive arms control as the set of non-cooperative and non-reciprocal measures to restrict the weapons or military capabilities of certain states. This volume addresses the topic of how this ongoing paradigmatic shift will affect the effectiveness of arms control as a conflict management instrument.While some argue that new instruments can complement and strengthen traditional, multilateral and inclusive arms control regimes, others maintain that conflicts and contradictions between coercive and cooperative arms control regimes will severely limit their effectiveness. This volume provides a forum for academics and practitioners from around the globe to discuss these developments in depth and to assess the specific strengths and weaknesses of these new instruments of arms control. This book will be of much interest to students of arms control, global governance, foreign policy and IR/Security Studies in general.

This edited volume takes stock of the state of research and policy on the issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), ten years after the UN first agreed to deal with the problem. The end of the Cold War originated a series of phenomena that would subsequently come to dominate the political agenda. Perhaps most symptomatic of the ensuing environment is the marked escalation in the scale and dynamics of armed violence, driven by the proliferation of SALW. Events in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia seared into global consciousness the devastating effects of this phenomenon, and of the necessity to engage actively in its limitation and prevention. This edited volume explores and outlines the research and policy on the SALW issue at this critical juncture. In addition to providing a detailed telling of the genesis and evolution of SALW research and advocacy, the volume features a series of essays from leading scholars in the field on both advances in research and action on SALW. It reflects on what has been achieved in terms of cumulative advances in data, methodology and analysis, and looks at the ways in which these developments have helped to inform policy making at national, regional and international levels. Alongside situating and integrating past and present advances in advocacy and international action, Controlling Small Arms also outlines future directions for research and action. This book will be of much interest to students of small arms, peace and conflict studies, peacebuilding, security studies and IR.

This book examines Japan's nuclear identity and its implications for abolition of nuclear weapons. By applying analytical eclecticism in combination with international relations theory, this book categorizes Japan's nuclear identity as a 'nuclear-bombed state' (classical liberalism), 'nuclear disarmament state' (neoliberalism), 'nuclear-threatened state' (classical realism), and a 'nuclear umbrella state' (neorealism). This research investigates whether the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 'genocide' or not, to what degree Japan has contributed to nuclear disarmament, how Japan has been threatened by ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons of North Korea, and how Japan's security policy has been embedded with the nuclear strategy of the United States. It also sheds light on theoretical factors that Japan does not support the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Finally, this book considers the future of Japan's nuclear identity and attempts to explore alternatives for Japan's nuclear disarmament diplomacy toward a world without nuclear weapons.

This edited volume examines the issue of the proliferation of dual-use technology and the efforts of the international community to control these technologies.

Efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) increasingly focus on preventing the proliferation and misuse of dual-use technologies: information, materials and equipment that can be easily applied for peaceful and hostile purposes. The threat of terrorist attacks with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, in particular, makes it necessary to develop a sustainable non-proliferation policy that effectively hinders the misuse of dual-use technologies.

In this book, leading non-proliferation experts from different regions of the world reflect on the political, legal and technical obstacles with an aim to finding a better balance between control and cooperation in dual-use technology transfer regulations. This broad approach makes it possible to compare regimes which may be structurally different but are similar in the way they attempt to regulate dual-use technology transfers by balancing controls and cooperative approaches.

This book will be of much interest to students of weapons proliferation, arms control, global governance, international organizations and international security.

This book offers a comprehensive examination of the important security issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament have returned to the top of the international political agenda. The issue assumes particular importance in regard to NATO, given that some 150-200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are still present in five countries belonging to the Alliance (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey). The past few years have seen animated debate in the United States and Europe on the role of such weapons in the current scenario of international security, and whether they can be further reduced or completely removed from Europe. Bringing together leading scholars and analysts of TNW with country-specific competences, this volume improves our understanding of this debate by providing in-depth analysis of the presence, role, perceived value and destiny of TNWs in Europe. The book addresses the issue in a systematic manner, taking into account the perspectives of all main actors directly or indirectly involved in the debate. This approach provides new and important insights that can inform both theoretical and policy work on a very critical and timely international issue, especially during the ongoing review of NATO's deterrence and defence posture. This book will be of much interest to students of European politics, European security, nuclear proliferation, and IR in general.

This book comprehensively outlines and evaluates the key Obama nuclear weapons policies, developments and initiatives from 2008-2012. Beginning with the administration's vision and goals posited in the 2009 Prague Speech and reaffirmed in the National Security Strategy of 2010, the book assesses the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review, the New START Treaty, the pursuit of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ratification, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference, the Global Nuclear Security Summit - and the extent to which Obama, in the context of such initiatives, has actually upheld the lofty goals posited in Prague and differentiated himself from the nuclear path pursued by the Bush Administration. Additionally, the book evaluates the Obama Administration's dealings with other states in the context of its nuclear weapons policy - in particular, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, India, and China. Offering a comprehensive analysis of the current status of the US nuclear weapons strategy, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies and international relations.

The theory and practice of arms control seemed to have its heyday during the height of the Cold War, with its focus on the East-West conflict and nuclear arms. In the past twenty years, both arms technologies and various practices aimed at their control have continued to develop, but scholarly thinking has not kept up. This volume seeks to redress this scholarly neglect of the range of issues associated with the control of the means of violence, by asking the question: what does arms control mean in the 21st Century? In asking this question, the volume examines issues surrounding sovereignty, geopolitics, nuclear disarmament, securitization of space, technological developments, human rights, the clearance of landmines, the regulation of small arms and the control of the black market for arms and nuclear secrets. The book discusses terrorism with reference to the case of the suicide attacks in Beirut in 1983 and how the Obama administration is orientating its posture on nuclear arms. This book was published as a special issue of Contemporary Security Policy.

Since the end of the Cold War, significant attention has focussed on the issue of nuclear deterrence and in particular whether formal nuclear security guarantees from nuclear weapons states to non-nuclear weapons states involving the possible use of nuclear weapons have a place in the twenty-first century global strategic landscape. Growing support for nuclear disarmament in the US and elsewhere has seen serious doubts being raised about the ongoing utility of extended nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first detailed analysis of the way in which extended nuclear deterrence operates in contemporary Asia. It addresses the following key questions: What does the role of extended nuclear deterrence in Asia tell us about the broader role of extended nuclear deterrence in the contemporary international system? Is this role likely to change significantly in the years ahead? O'Neil uses a theoretical and historical framework to analyse the contemporary and future dynamics of extended nuclear deterrence in Asia and challenges many of the existing orthodox perspectives on the topic. Providing a new perspective on debates surrounding extended nuclear deterrence, this book will be of interest not only to students and scholars of Asian politics, international relations and security studies, but also to policy makers and professionals.

In 2017, the world watched as President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un traded personal insults and escalating threats of nuclear war amid unprecedented shows of military force. Former Pentagon insider and Korean security expert Van Jackson traces the origins of the first American nuclear crisis in the post-Cold War era, and explains the fragile, highly unpredictable way that it ended. Grounded in security studies and informed analysis of the US response to North Korea's increasing nuclear threat, Trump's aggressive rhetoric is analysed in the context of prior US policy failures, the geopolitics of East Asia, North Korean strategic culture and the acceleration of its nuclear programme. Jackson argues that the Trump administration's policy of 'maximum pressure' brought the world much closer to inadvertent nuclear war than many realise - and charts a course for the prevention of future conflicts.

A PDF version of this book is available for free in open access via www.tandfebooks.com as well as the OAPEN Library platform, www.oapen.org. It has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 license and is part of the OAPEN-UK research project. This book examines the current debate on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, notably the international non-proliferation regime and how to implement its disarmament provisions. Discussing the requirements of a new international consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, this book builds on the three pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT): non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It reviews the impact of Cold War and post-Cold War policies on current disarmament initiatives and analyses contemporary proliferation problems: how to deal with the states that never joined the NPT (India, Pakistan and Israel); how states that have been moving toward nuclear weapons have been brought back to non-nuclear-weapon status; and, in particular, how to deal with Iran and North Korea. The analysis centres on the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation in an increasingly multi-centric world involving China and India as well as the US, the European powers and Russia. It concludes with a description and discussion of three different worlds without nuclear weapons and their implications for nuclear disarmament policies. This book will be of great interest to all students of arms control, strategic studies, war and conflict studies, and IR/security studies in general Sverre Lodgaard is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo

Instead of a nuclear flash-point in Cuba or the Korean Peninsula, could the world now be facing one in a Kashmiri mountain village? The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 shook the region, challenged the near-global consensus on non-proliferation and increased the risk that other states would follow suit. The international community has been largely powerless in its response. In the wake of the tests the regions underlying problems have become yet more intractable, the need to resolve them more urgent than ever. This paper argues that attempts to deal with the consequences of the tests are inseparable from the history of nuclear developments in both India and Pakistan.;Sanctions have not succeeded in changing policy in the region and more pragmatic responses are necessary. For example, political stability should be encouraged within the countries concerned, in their relations with each other, and in the wider region. Arms control and measures to increase confidence and security also need to be re-examined and adapted to the changed circumstances.

The United States' commitment to non-proliferation often propels its foreign policy rhetoric. In 2002, George W. Bush framed his goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons within the context of the global war on terror, accusing Iran of being part of the "Axis of Evil." Iran's nuclear program was declared an intolerable threat to global peace and stability. This approach however showed the conflict between the rhetoric of good vs. evil and the need for a pragmatic and measured approach to non-proliferation in the Middle East. The book explores this divergence between the alarmist rhetoric of the Bush Administration's public diplomacy and its actual non-proliferation policy toward Iran. It shows how the two policy directions, the war on terror and negotiations over the nuclear issue, were often at odds. Further, the Administration's desire to change the regime in Iran undermined efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. Ultimately, the policies implemented failed both to shut down Iran's nuclear program and bring significant democratic reform within the Islamic Republic. The book also examines this legacy and how Obama's approach differs or follows that of his predecessor. Lastly, the implications for non-proliferation policies beyond Iran are discussed, as nuclear proliferation remains a key concern in a Middle East plagued by instability.

In Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis': Theoretical Approaches, Halit M.E. Tagma and Paul E. Lenze, Jr. analyze the 'crisis' surrounding Iran's nuclear program through a variety of theoretical approaches, including realism, world-systems theory, liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and multi-level games. Through these theories, Tagma and Lenze use established academic perspectives to create a more objective understanding and explanation of the debates and issues. Introducing the concept of eclectic pluralism to the study of international relations, Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis' presents theoretical approaches side by side to explore a complex and evolving international dispute.

Drawing on previously unpublished Russian archival materials, this book is the first detailed history and current analysis of the North Korean nuclear program. The contributors discuss Soviet-North Korean nuclear relations, economic and military aspects of the nuclear program, the nuclear energy sector, North Korea's negotiations with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, cooperative security, and U.S. policy. Unique in its focus on North Korean attitudes and perspectives, The North Korean Nuclear Program also includes Russian interviews with North Korean officials.