The SIPRI Yearbook 1995 continues SIPRI's review of the latest developments in nuclear weapons, world military expenditure, the international arms trade and arms production, chemical and biological weapons, the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, armed conflicts in 1993, and nuclear and conventional arms control.

Conventional Arms Control: Perspectives on Verification provides an analysis of the political and operational problems of the verification of conventional arms control. The emphasis is on post-cold war Europe and the authors examine the verification problems and opportunities presented by the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and, with regard to the constraints imposed by the negotiators on the verification mechanism, provide a short history of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) and CFE negotiations which led to the Treaty. The book also highlights verification aspects of the operational approach to arms control, as illustrated by negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), examining the evolution of the CSBM verification regime within the CSCE process from the Helsinki Final Act to the Vienna Document 1992. The Open Skies Treaty, its history and its relationship to aerial verification mechanisms in general are analysed. The need to verify force structures and the problems involved are discussed, and the verification lessons of the 1991 Persian Gulf War are presented.

The SIPRI Yearbook 1994 continues SIPRI's review of the latest developments in nuclear weapons, world military expenditure, the international arms trade and arms production, chemical and biological weapons, the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, armed conflicts in 1993, and nuclear and conventional arms control. It is the most complete and authoritative source available for up-to-date information in war studies, strategic studies, peace studies, and international relations.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintaintenance, and in some cases further development of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations of the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.

How have the arms control events of 1992 responded to the unprecedented opportunities for building new security arrangements? The end of the Cold War, with the dismantling of the Soviet Union and other totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, opened new prospects, but also gave rise to new threats and challenges. Important questions concerning developments in the military sector must be asked: how should we deal with these new challenges; what are the prospects for a more stable international order?;This latest edition of the "SIPRI Yearbook" presents detailed information on arms and arms control issues. The yearbooks attract world-wide attention and are used by governments, arms control negotiators, United Nations delegations, parliaments, scholars, students, the media and citizens as a useful reference work. The "SIPRI Yearbook 1993" highlights the link between the environment and international security and emerging armed conflicts, and describes the new UN peace-making and peace-keeping efforts. It analyzes the new security arrangements for Europe and implementation of the recent sweeping nuclear and conventional arms reduction treaties. It examines the post-Soviet th

This book examines the question: is the elimination of nuclear weapons politically feasible and technically practical? With the end of the cold war, a re-thinking of the nuclear foundations of international security is imperative. There are no compelling reasons to perpetuate a cold war-era nuclear security approach. Neither is the world ready to abolish nuclear weapons by agreement. What it is ready for, however, is a radical reappraisal of conventional strategic and disarmament wisdom. The book's explicit focus on non-nuclear security takes issues with prevailing pro- and anti-nuclear views. The study challenges the assumptions of the strategic community that there is no alternative to nuclear security in an anarchic international system and of the advocates of radical nuclear disarmament who propose solutions at the expense of security. Instead, the contributors argue that nuclear weapons abolition should be seen as a long-term process, pursued on a broad political front, aimed at a steady transformation of international politics that encourages security co-operation between states. Individual chapters of the book address the major conceptual, technical, and economic issues in t

In 2017, North Korea shocked the world: test-flying a missile capable of reaching the US, exploding the most powerful nuclear device tested anywhere in a quarter-century, and declaring its nuclear deterrent complete. Today, Kim Jong Un's growing nuclear stockpile represents a grave threat to international security. But this programme means more to him than world glory. State propaganda calls it the 'treasured sword': Kim is determined to keep ruling, and he sees his nukes as the key to regime survival. Kim Jong Un and the Bomb explores the history of North Korea's nuclear weapons development, its present power, and the prospects of containing Kim's arsenal. This book confronts us with a nuclear-armed North Korea that is not going anywhere, and reveals what this means for the US, South Korea and the world. Ankit Panda is an award-winning writer and international security expert. He is Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists, and a senior editor at The Diplomat. He lives in New York.

Economists of the Cowles Commission of the University of Chicago present the first comprehensive study of the long-range effects on world economy of atomic power and its implications for industries producing oil, coal, and electric power. The study includes a consideration of the characteristics of atomic power, covering source and cost of fuels, type of equipment and initial investment required, etc., and an analysis, estimating the future effects of atomic power on residential heating and on the industries producing aluminum, iron and steel, flat glass, phosphate fertilizers, fixed nitrogen, chlorine, caustic soda, cement, bricks, railroad transportation. The final chapter discusses the possibilities of atomic power in industrialization of backward areas. Originally published in 1950. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This twenty-first edition of the SIPRI Yearbook presents detailed information on arms and arms control issues in a format that is both concise and standardized for ease of use. The Yearbooks attract worldwide attention and are useds by governments, arms control negotiators, United Nations delegations, parliaments, scholars, students, the media, and citizens as unique and indispensable reference works.
The SIPRI Yearbook 1990 continues SIPRI's review of the latest developments in nuclear weapons, nuclear explosions, world military expenditure, the international arms trade, chemical and biological weapons, the military use of outer space, ongoing armed conflicts and European arms control, and presents the unique annual calendar of military activities required by the Stockholm Document. Efforts to control the arms race - in nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, and space weapons - are described, and the status of negotiations and agreements is analysed.
In addition to these regular features and statistics, this latest SIPRI Yearbook contains special studies on debt and international security, on the prospects for the 1990 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on laser isotope separation technology, and on the NATO debate over the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. Its comprehensive coverage makes it an invaluable sourcebook for anyone seeking authoritative, factual information on issues of armaments and disarmament and thus to anyone interested in strategic studies, war studies, peace studies, and international relations.

With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reassess basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements. In a comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and forgoing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue. Glaser's provocative work is organized in three parts. "The Questions behind the Questions" evaluates the basic factual and theoretical disputes that underlie disagreements about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. "Alternative Nuclear Worlds" compares "mutual assured destruction capabilities" (MAD)--a world in which both superpowers' societies are highly vulnerable to nuclear retaliation--to the basic alternatives: mutual perfect defenses, U.S. superiority, and nuclear disarmament. Would any basic alternatives be preferable to MAD? Drawing on the earlier sections of the book, "Decisions in MAD" addresses key choices facing American decision makers. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Called "a pioneer work of the first importance" by Staughton Lynd, this book traces the history of pacifism in America from colonial times to the start of World War I. The author describes how the immigrant peace sects-Quaker, Mennonite, and Dunker -faced the challenges of a hostile environment. The peace societies that sprang up after 1815 form the subject of the next section, with particular attention focused upon the American Peace Society and Garrison's New England Non-Resistance Society. A series of chapters on the reactions of these sects and societies to the Civil War, the neglect of pacifism in the postwar period, and the beginnings of a renewal in the years before the outbreak of war in Europe bring the book to a close. The emphasis on the institutional aspects of the movement is balanced throughout by a rich mine of accounts about the experiences of individual pacifists. Originally published in 1968. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Steven Hurst traces the development of the Iranian nuclear weapon crisis across its historical context: from the conception of Iran's nuclear programme under the Shah in 1957 to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Emphasising the centrality of domestic politics in decision-making on both sides, Hurst adopts a broader perspective on the Iranian nuclear programme and explains the continued failure of the USA to halt it. He reveals how President Obama's alterations to the American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about a resolution.

Why and how do countries buy the armaments and defence equipment they do buy? The first volume of this study, published in 1998, examined in detail the processes that lie behind arms procurement decisions in six arms-recipient countries: China, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. This second volume contains similar case studies based on extensive original research by experts from the national academic and defence communities in six more countries. It considers in particular whether arms procurement can become more responsive to the broader objectives of security and public accountability.

The breakup of the Soviet Union left a cold war nuclear legacy consisting of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and a sprawling infrastructure for their production and maintenance. This book examines the fate of this vast nuclear weapon complex and the unprecedented non-proliferation challenges associated with the breakup of a nuclear weapon state. It describes the high-level diplomatic bargaining efforts to consolidate in Russia the nuclear weapons based in newly independent Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and to strengthen central control over these weapons. It surveys the problems associated with dismantling nuclear weapons and the difficulties involved in safely storing and disposing of large stockpiles of fissile material. It reviews the key provisions of the principal nuclear arms control measures and initiatives, including the START I and START II treaties. Finally, the book assesses the contribution of international assistance programmes to the denuclearization process under way in the former Soviet Union.

In 1960, President Kennedy warned of a dangerous future, rife with nuclear-armed states and a widespread penchant for conflict by the end of the century. Thankfully, his prediction failed to pass; in fact, roughly three times as many countries have since opted to give up their nuclear pursuit or relinquish existing weapons than have maintained their arsenals. Nevertheless, clandestine acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by states such as Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and a nuclear North Korea, has reaffirmed the need for United States' commitment to pursuing aggressive counterproliferation strategies, particularly with rogue states. This book looks at the experiences of countries that ventured down the path of nuclear proliferation but were stopped short, and examines how the international community bargains with proliferators to encourage nuclear reversal. It asks why so many states have relented to pressure to abandon their nuclear weapons programs, and which counterproliferation policies have been successful. Rupal N. Mehta argues that the international community can persuade countries to reverse their weapons programs with rewards and sanctions especially when the threat to use military force remains "on the table". Specifically, nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. Historically, the United States has relied on a variety of policy levers-including economic and civilian nuclear assistance and, sometimes, security guarantees, as well as economic sanctions-to achieve nuclear reversal. Underlying these negotiations is the possibility of military intervention, which incentivizes states to accept the agreement (often spearheaded by the United States) and end their nuclear pursuit. The book draws on interviews with current and former policymakers, as well as in-depth case studies of India, Iran, and North Korea, to provide policy recommendations on how best to manage nuclear proliferation challenges from rogue states. It also outlines the proliferation horizon, or the set of state and non-state actors that are likely to have interest in acquiring nuclear technology for civilian, military, or unknown purposes. The book concludes with implications and recommendations for U.S. and global nuclear counterproliferation policy.

From 2005 to 2008, the United States and India negotiated a pathbreaking nuclear agreement that recognised India's nuclear status and lifted longstanding embargoes on civilian nuclear cooperation with India. This book offers the most comprehensive account of the diplomacy and domestic politics behind this nuclear agreement. Domestic politics considerably impeded - and may have entirely prevented - US nuclear accommodation with India; when domestic obstacles were overcome, US India negotiations advanced; and even after negotiations advanced, domestic factors placed conditions on and affected the scope of US India nuclear cooperation. Such a study provides new insights into this major event in international politics, and it offers a valuable framework for analysing additional US strategic and nuclear dialogues with India and with other countries."