Tarki-Young Hamm's book is a critical inquiry into the dynamics of the armament of North and South Korea from the Korean War period to the 1990s. The author's findings reveal that North Korean military superiority is a myth, used by South Korean governments to legitimize military expenditure. Moreover, defence spending has been used to consolidate authoritarian regimes and mobilize popular support. This analysis describes and explains the armament processes of the two Korean states from a more objective, critical perspective. Hamm considers defence expenditure as the best indicator of armament, rather than bean counts or firepower scores. Finding most offical sources unstable, inconsistent or biased, this book seeks to generate more valid, credible data; and it re-estimates the North Korean defence budget, taking foreign aid and depreciation into account. From this material, the author argues that, contrary to popular opinion, the South has been superior in military capital since the mid-1980s. "Arming the Two Koreas" provides a holistic, rather than reductionist, explanation of armament. Following the Grasmscian conception of state power as the sum of coercion and hegemony/consent

Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States explores theoretical approaches, helping to explain a broad range of perspectives on the problems posed by the threat of proliferation.
With the collapse of the USSR, fifteen fledgling sates inherited a massive Soviet arsenal, unstable political systems, and desperate economies. A "sell everything" mentality threatens to result in the largest arms bazaar in human history, and this potential "fire sale" includes weapons of mass destruction. This book addresses the challenges the new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU) face in controlling and monitoring their sensitive, military-related exports.

With the collapse of the USSR, fifteen fledgling sates inherited a massive Soviet arsenal, unstable political systems, and desperate economies. A "sell everything" mentality threatens to result in the largest arms bazaar in human history, and this potential "fire sale" includes weapons of mass destruction. This book addresses the challenges the new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU) face in controlling and monitoring their sensitive, military-related exports.
"Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States" explores the various theoretical approaches that help explain the development of nonproliferation export control systems in the NIS. The contributors, coming from both the FSU states and the US, provide a broad range of perspectives on the problems posed by the threat of proliferation.

In the aftermath of the Great War, multilateral disarmament was placed at the top of the international agenda by the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations. This book analyzes the naval, air and land disarmament policies of successive British governments from 1919 to 1934, articulating their dilemma either to fulfil their obligations or to avoid them.
Daring and controversial, the present study challenges the hitherto accepted view that Britain occupied the high moral ground by drastically reducing its armaments and argues that, during this period, British disarmament policy was reactive and generally failed to provide the leadership that this extremely sensitive time in international politics demanded.

From the Quasi War with France and the opening of Japan, to the numerous interventions of the 1990s, these events have been situated at the heart of US foreign policy. There are four different explanations as to why the US, throughout its history, has used military force just short of war. Some scholars have suggested that nations use military force on behalf of security objectives. Others have maintained that economic self-interest has motivated many military interventions. Recently many researchers have explored the extent to which the US has used force to promote democracy and human rights, and still more scholars have argued that presidents use limited force for domestic political purposes. Assessing the utility of each of these explanations throughout US history, Meernik employs both historical narrative and statistical techniques to provide a comprehensive account of these important foreign policy events. This engaging, highly informative volume is particularly suited to scholars and students in the fields of international relations, foreign policy, military affairs and history.

Almost overnight, the massive military-industrial assets of the Soviet Union came under the jurisdiction of fifteen states instead of one established government. While only four states inherited weapons of mass destruction, most of the fifteen states of the former Soviet Union can produce sensitive materials and equipment. Because all the states serve as transit points for both legal commerce and illegal smuggling, developing export control systems in all the newly independent states (NIS) has become the cornerstone of the global effort to reduce the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Arms on the Market is the first book to tackle this difficult subject. Not only does it explore the various theoretical approaches that help us understand the development of export control systems in the nis, but it also introduces a unique method for measuring and comparing export control development.

The arms control initiatives which were begun by the superpowers symbolize the beginning of the end of the Cold War, but the passage of time has not resolved disputes about the role of arms control in preserving peace. Both international relations theorists and foreign policy practitioners must decide which security strategy is most appropriate for a post-Cold War world characterized by the decline in superpower hostility and the rise of regional rivalries; the rapid diffusion of knowledge-intensive technologies; and the increasingly complex relationships between political, military and economic issues. The essays in this volume address the question of how should arms control theory and policy be altered to improve the prospects for co-operation. They explore the complexity of national arms control decision-making and multilateral negotiations, and the challenges of reaching domestic and international agreement on verification.

A decade has passed since the superpowers began a series of arms control initiatives which now symbolize the beginning of the end of the Cold War, but the passage of time has not resolved disputes about the role of arms control in preserving peace. Both international relations theorists and foreign policy practitioners must decide which security strategy is most appropriate for a post-Cold War world characterized by the decline in superpower hostility and the rise of regional rivalries; the rapid diffusion of knowledge-intensive technologies; and the increasingly complex relationships between political, military, and economic issues.
How should arms control theory and policy be altered to improve the prospects for cooperation? The essays in this volume address this question by exploring the complexity of national arms control decision-making and multilateral negotiations, and the challenges of reaching domestic and international agreement on verification. Conscious that the gulf between theory and policy is growing at a time when the need for policy-friendly theory is greater than ever, the authors offer a range of jargon-free views from the academic and policy-making worlds, some arguing that growing interdependence creates both the need and the opportunity for a radical reorientation of arms control efforts, while others contend that increasing complexity in arms control problems still constrains what can be negotiated and ratified.

What were the important developments in the military sector in 1988, and what effect did they have on peace and security? What progress was made in the attempts to control military activity and to reduce tension and the chances of war? In short, what are the prospects for a more stable international order? This twentieth edition of the SIPRI Yearbook presents detailed information on arms and arms control issues in a format that is both concise and standardized for ease of use. The Yearbooks attract world-wide attention and are used by governments, arms control negotiators, United Nations delegations, parliaments, scholars, students, the media and citizens as unique and indispensable reference works. The SIPRI Yearbook 1989 continues SIPRI`s review of the latest developments in nuclear weapons, nuclear explosions, world military expenditure, the international arms trade, chemical and biological weapons, the military use of outer space, ongoing armed conflicts and European arms control, and presents the unique annual calendar of military activities required by the Stockholm Document. Efforts to control the arms race - in nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, and space weapons - are described, and the status of negotiations and agreements is analysed. In addition to these regular features and statistics, this latest SIPRI Yearbook contains special studies on the arms trade regulations of seven weapon-exporting countries, on ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World, and on the enhanced role of the United Nations in regional conflict resolution. Its comprehensive coverage makes it an invaluable sourcebook for anyone seeking authoritative, factual information on issues of armaments and disarmament and thus to anyone interested in strategic studies, war studies, peace studies and international relations.

In May 1998, in reaction to India's nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan tested six nuclear weapons. Following this, the country opted for a policy of minimum deterrence, and within a year Pakistan had altered its policy stance by adding the modifier of minimum 'credible' deterrence. This book looks at how this seemingly innocuous shift seriously impacted on Pakistan's nuclear policy direction and whether the concept of minimum has lost its significance in the South Asian region's changed/changing strategic environment. After providing a brief historical background exploring why and how Pakistan carried out the nuclear development program, the book questions why Pakistan could not sustain the minimum deterrence that it had conceptualized in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 test. It examines the conceptual theoretical framework of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to question whether Pakistan's nuclear policy remained consistent with this, as well as to discover the rudimentary factors that are responsible for the inconsistencies with regard to minimum deterrence conceived in this study. The book goes on to look at the policy options that Pakistan had after acquiring the nuclear capability, and what the rationale was for selecting minimum deterrence. The book not only highlights Pakistan deterrent force building, but also analyzes closely Pakistan's doctrinal posture of first use option. Furthermore, it examines the policy towards arms control and disarmament, and discusses whether these individual policy orientations are consistent with the minimum deterrence. Conceptually providing a deeper understanding of Pakistan's post-1998 nuclear policy, this book critically examines whether the minimum deterrence conceived could be sustained both at the theoretical and operational levels. It will be a useful contribution in the field of Nuclear Policy, Security Studies, Asian Politics, Proliferation/Non-Proliferation Studies, and Peace Studies. This book will be of interest to policy makers, scholars, and students of nuclear policy, nuclear proliferation and arms control related research.

Global politics has changed with unaccustomed swiftness since the end of the Cold War. Eastern Europe is free; the Soviet Union has broken up; China presses free market economic reform; and the United States and Russia have declared a joint commitment to end nuclear war. The force of these changes has created a new agenda for global politics and security policy. This does not mean that nuclear weapons have lost their centrality. Nuclear development programs continue in the major holders of advanced weapons. In Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran nuclear intentions are subject to widespread speculation and scrutiny. Negotiations for renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remind us that the treaty requires serious efforts to abolish nuclear weapons. Nuclear Choices points out that the Cold War's end has not banished mistrust. Instead, it has opened the door to frank conversation about the usefulness of force and the need to address common fears. States now face a global choice among alternative nuclear futures. If they desire to avoid runaway nuclear development, the choices come down to three: the status quo, disengagement, or abolition. Larkin argues that if they chose the status quo, they elect a world in which only terror and self-restraint keep devastation at bay, a world in which instant destruction is possible. This study focuses on the nuclear weapons programs of Great Britain, China, and France, because they may be less familiar to students of international affairs. Each of these countries has developed a substantial nuclear capability that could decisively shape the result of coming global nuclear decisions. Larkin concludes that these three minipowers could conclude that nuclearism serves their interests, refuse disengagement, and encourage proliferation. If they are prepared to abandon nuclearism, they have tremendous political leverage on Russia, the United States, and also on undeclared and aspiring nuclear weapons states. For now, only the United Kingdom, France, and China maintain sufficient warhead inventories and production capabilities to have strong effects on how the United States and Russia view their own strategic capabilities. Nuclear Choices asserts that governments, polities, and parties today do not know how to guarantee themselves against weapons of mass destruction. They must either acquire the political and social means to achieve such guarantees or accept a world in which nuclearism will continue to cast its shadow over all aspects of nation building. It will be of interest to political scientists, policymakers, military analysts, and those interested hi the nuclear issue.

This volume examines the conditions necessary for a stable nuclear-weapons-free world and the implications for nuclear disarmament policy. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a road map to nuclear zero, but it is a rudimentary one and it says nothing about the kind of zero to aim for. Preferably, this would be a world where the inhibitions against reversal are strong enough to make it stably non-nuclear. What then are the requirements of stable zero? The literature on nuclear disarmament has paid little attention to this question. By and large, the focus has been on the next steps, and discussions tend to stop where the NPT stops: with the elimination of the weapons. This book seeks to fill a lacuna by examining the requirements of stable zero and their implications for the road map to that goal, starting from the vision to the present day. The volume highlights that a clear conception of the goal not only is important in itself, but can shed light on what kind of disarmament process to promote. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, security studies and IR.

The Washington Conference regulated the inter-war naval race between the world powers. In the era when it was still believed that battleships were the epitome of naval power and a sign of a country's strength, this conference led to limitations on the building of such weapons by the naval powers of Britain, the USA and Japan. This collection of essays deals with many aspects of the conference; the factors that caused it, the interests of the participating nations both present and future, and the results.

The Washington Conference regulated the inter-war naval race between the world powers. In the era when it was still believed that battleships were the epitome of naval power and a sign of a country's strength, this conference led to limitations on the building of such weapons by the naval powers of Britain, the USA and Japan. This collection of essays deals with many aspects of the conference - the factors that caused it, the interests of the participating nations both present and future, and the results.

Today, despite the end of the cold war, more countries have more sophisticated weapons from more numerous suppliers than ever before. This is partly a product of continuing and growing conflicts--especially regional and interethnic ones--but it also reflects the political and economic difficulties of weaning public and private enterprise away from powerful and highly lucrative defense manufacturing and sales.In this compact yet comprehensive volume, Frederic Pearson surveys the broad terrain covered by the concept of "the security dilemma" and points out landmarks along the route proceeding from proliferation to economic interests, to potential "conversion," to the future of defense production and marketing. Along the way we experience the lure of arms sales expositions and fairs and the quandary of deciding whether to arm victims of aggression. The author meticulously describes and documents the twin motives of "welfare and security" in the arms market: who buys weapons, who sells them, where they are produced, and how they are--and are not--used. Through a combination of data, anecdotes, illustrations, and narration accompanied by special feature boxes, we see how arms races have mounted historically and how they might be defused in this, the gathering post-Cold War order.From spears and axes to the radar-eluding stealth aircraft, "The Global Spread of Arms" charts the history of the arms dilemma and brings us up-to-date on myths and recent trends in weapons development internationally. Touching on issues ranging from multinational arms manufacturers to black and gray market consumers, from arms verification to arms autonomy, and from peace dividends to "peace through strength," Pearson presents a balanced view of the policy debate about defense economies, collective security, and how to manage them.Governments of developed and developing countries alike talk about arms control but often fail to act in curtailing arms trade and transfers. Nowhere is the paradox of the "sovereign right to arm" more apparent than in current hot spots detailed by Pearson, including the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, Iraq, North Korea, and South Asia. We see an array of arms trends played out to devastating effect: sanctions, embargoes, multilateral trade and negotiations, smuggling, "arms balancing," and, ultimately, proliferation and escalation cycles. Potential escape routes from weapons dilemmas also are offered in a full review of arms transfer controls.Students of international relations and international political economy, from peace studies to security studies, will join industry and government professionals as well as general readers in finding this primer indispensable to understanding the past and future global arsenal.

In Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) a multinational team of scholars and experts address a developing phenomenon: controlling the use of privatized force by states in international politics. Robust analyses of the evolving, multi-layered tapestry of formal and informal mechanisms of control address the microfoundations of the market, such as the social and role identities of contract employees, their acceptance by military personnel, and potential tensions between them. The extent and willingness of key states-South Africa, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel-to monitor and enforce discipline to structure their contractual relations with PMSCs on land and at sea is examined, as is the ability of the industry to regulate itself. Also discussed is the nascent international legal regime to reinforce state and industry efforts to encourage effective practices, punish inappropriate behavior, and shape the market to minimize the hazards of loosening states' oligopolistic control over the means of legitimate organized violence. The volume presents a theoretically-informed synthesis of micro- and macro-levels of analysis, offering new insights into the challenges of controlling the agents of organized violence used by states for scholars and practitioners alike.

In Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis': Theoretical Approaches, Halit M.E. Tagma and Paul E. Lenze, Jr. analyze the 'crisis' surrounding Iran's nuclear program through a variety of theoretical approaches, including realism, world-systems theory, liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and multi-level games. Through these theories, Tagma and Lenze use established academic perspectives to create a more objective understanding and explanation of the debates and issues. Introducing the concept of eclectic pluralism to the study of international relations, Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis' presents theoretical approaches side by side to explore a complex and evolving international dispute.

This title was first published in 2000: The aim of this text is to explore conventional arms control in Europe. The early chapters provide a primarily historical perspective, looking at the context, foundations, main provisions and institutional structure of the main agreements. The later chapters explore the continuing and likely future roles of the OSCE and NATO in the arms control process. The final chapters examine more contemporary developments by looking at the Adapted CFE Treaty and Vienna Documents agreed at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1998 and the challenges posed to existing arrangements by the changing and emergent security threats that potentially face Europe.

This Adelphi Paper examines the motives behind Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to the end of 2003. It also assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed during this period, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance, subsequently relying on technological infusions from the A.Q. Khan network. Wyn Q. Bowen clearly analyzes the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the Gadhafi regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage, both politically and economically, with the international community, particularly the United States. It explores the process of dismantling the nuclear programme and the question of whether Libya constitutes amodel for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Since 2003, when the world learned that the Islamic Republic of Iran had succeeded in secretly developing a capability to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, the question of Iran's nuclear program has ranked high on the international political and arms control agenda. This book studies the IRI's diplomatic operations in the issue area of arms control and demonstrates how arms control diplomacy has formed an integral part of the IRI's foreign policy during the various phases of its history. Furthermore, it fills a gap in the research literature on Iran's foreign and security policies by providing the first comprehensive account of Iranian arms control diplomacy under the Islamic regime. This book aims at reconstructing Iran's diplomatic operations in four distinct thematic areas of arms control: conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear arms control. It also looks at the diplomatic means by which the IRI's leadership has tried to achieve its arms control objectives. This text also seeks to identify and examine the individual objectives that have guided Iranian policy choices in the domain of arms control. Finally, it places the reconstructed Iranian objectives into a broader context by elaborating on the fundamental values or foreign policy goals that the IRI's arms control objectives have served. This highly informative and thought provoking volume will be valuable reading for students, researchers and academics, as well as for commentators and policy-makers interested in Middle East studies, Iranian studies, international relations and arms control.

The profound changes which have occurred within Eastern Europe and the USSR during the closing years of the 1980s have had direct links with equivalent changes in the East-West political environment. This has resulted in negotiated arms control re-emerging as a principal activity in working towards establishing a new East-West relationship. This volume covers a range of issues from the role of arms control after the INF treaty to NATO strategy and alliance behaviour. It includes domestic and alliance politics as well as the technical treatment of arms control matters, and concludes with a look at the future prospects of East-West arms control.

In Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) a multinational team of scholars and experts address a developing phenomenon: controlling the use of privatized force by states in international politics. Robust analyses of the evolving, multi-layered tapestry of formal and informal mechanisms of control address the microfoundations of the market, such as the social and role identities of contract employees, their acceptance by military personnel, and potential tensions between them. The extent and willingness of key states-South Africa, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel-to monitor and enforce discipline to structure their contractual relations with PMSCs on land and at sea is examined, as is the ability of the industry to regulate itself. Also discussed is the nascent international legal regime to reinforce state and industry efforts to encourage effective practices, punish inappropriate behavior, and shape the market to minimize the hazards of loosening states' oligopolistic control over the means of legitimate organized violence. The volume presents a theoretically-informed synthesis of micro- and macro-levels of analysis, offering new insights into the challenges of controlling the agents of organized violence used by states for scholars and practitioners alike.

This examination of nuclear arms control addresses the question of what kind of posture do second generation nuclear weapons states adopt in a world in which the presumption of non-proliferation is accepted?

This volume examines the conditions necessary for a stable nuclear-weapons-free world and the implications for nuclear disarmament policy. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a road map to nuclear zero, but it is a rudimentary one and it says nothing about the kind of zero to aim for. Preferably, this would be a world where the inhibitions against reversal are strong enough to make it stably non-nuclear. What then are the requirements of stable zero? The literature on nuclear disarmament has paid little attention to this question. By and large, the focus has been on the next steps, and discussions tend to stop where the NPT stops: with the elimination of the weapons. This book seeks to fill a lacuna by examining the requirements of stable zero and their implications for the road map to that goal, starting from the vision to the present day. The volume highlights that a clear conception of the goal not only is important in itself, but can shed light on what kind of disarmament process to promote. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, security studies and IR.

This book offers a novel approach to understanding the puzzle of nuclear proliferation by examining how leaders' beliefs and perceptions about the international system influence states' decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. Today, there is a persisting dilemma over the spread of nuclear weapons for both practitioners and scholars of international affairs. Uncertainty remains whether determined proliferators can be stopped, as shown by the cases of North Korea and Iran. These instances of proliferation raise questions about regional stability, the use of pre-emptive military action, and the potential for reactive-proliferation by neighbouring countries. Despite the serious implications surrounding the spread of these weapons, proliferation scholarship has thus far failed to solve what has been described as the "proliferation puzzle"- why do some countries choose nuclear weapons while others do not? The author argues that understanding basic psychological motivations, such as the role of power and perceptions of self and others, forms a strategic context which provides answers about a leader's willingness to proliferate. Proliferation willingness is a critical, yet frequently overlooked, part of the proliferation equation. Ultimately, it is the combination of willingness and proliferation opportunity (i.e. technical and scientific capabilities) that determines whether a country 'goes nuclear'. By examining several historical instances of proliferation decision-making-in South Africa, India, Libya and Australia-the book's findings highlight the fundamental role of leaders' beliefs in shaping proliferation outcomes. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, political psychology, security studies and IR in general.