The global threat of nuclear weapons is one of today's key policy issues. Using a wide variety of sources, including recently declassified information, Nathan E. Busch offers detailed examinations of the nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, Iraq, India, and Pakistan, as well as the emerging programs in Iran and North Korea. He also assesses the current debates in international relations over the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the post--Cold War world. Busch explores how our understanding of nuclear proliferation centers on theoretical disagreements about how best to explain and predict the behavior of states. His study bridges the gap between theory and empirical evidence by determining whether countries with nuclear weapons have adequate controls over their nuclear arsenals and fissile material stockpiles (such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium). Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of various systems of nuclear weapons regulation, Busch projects what types of controls proliferating states are likely to employ and assesses the threat posed by the possible theft of fissile materials by aspiring nuclear states or by terrorists. No End in Sight provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of issues at the forefront of contemporary international affairs. With the resurgence of the threat of nuclear terrorism, Busch's insights and conclusions will prove critical to understanding the implications of nuclear proliferation.

Defence is the ultimate public good, and it thus falls to government to determine the appropriate amount of public revenue to commit to the defence of the realm. This will depend on history, strategic threat, international security obligations, entreaties from allies and, of course, the threat faced. The Political Economy of Defence is structured to identify, explain and analyse the policy, process and problems that government faces from the starting point of national security through to the ultimate objective of securing a peaceful world. Accordingly, it provides insights into how defence budgets are determined and managed, offering relevant and refreshingly practical policy perspectives on defence finance, defence and development trade-offs, sovereignty vs globalisation debates, and many other pertinent issues. It will appeal to policymakers, analysts, graduate students and academics interested in defence economics, political economy, public economics and public policy.

This book explores what political conditions must be established and what obstacles overcome for the fi ve offi cial Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)- China, France, Russia, the UK and US- to eliminate their nuclear weapons. The different views and positions of a range of actors concerning nuclear weapons issues- including elite perspectives and public opinion- and the political assumptions underpinning them, are discussed to develop a more democratic approach to disarmament. Addressing the lack of detailed analysis concerning the meaning of nuclear disarmament for the domestic political orders of NWS, the book critically explores different approaches to and theories of disarmament within legal, political and technical literatures and orthodox and critical theory. It also builds on previous discussions of nuclear possession, restraint, arms control, and disarmament- concerning both nuclear possessor and non- possessor states- identifying the insights these works provide regarding how NWS disarmament may be advanced. Contributing to theoretical debates concerning how domestic politics interacts with and determines states' international behaviour, the book will be of interest to all scholars and students of history, politics, international relations, security studies, military history, war studies, peace studies, confl ict, democracy, and global governance.

Analyses emerging and future security architecture in light of the contemporary key literature on the subject of nuclear disarmament. Offers a renewed mechanism to promote peace and achieve disarmament in the twenty-first century.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention entirely prohibits biological warfare, but it has no effective verification mechanism to ensure that the 140-plus States Parties are living up to their obligations. From 1995-2001 the States Parties attempted to negotiate a Protocol to the Convention to remedy this deficiency. On 25 July 2001 the United States entirely rejected the final text which would probably have been acceptable to most other states. The book investigates how this disaster came about, and the potential consequences of the failure of American leadership.

Is the world ready for nuclear Jihad?

"Showdown with Nuclear Iran "is a gripping and detailed expose of Iran's relentless pursuit of atomic weapons and its apocalyptic goal of wiping Israel off the face of the earth. Michael D. Evans, who has been working in the Middle East for the last three decades, cuts through the official lies an ddeceptions of the Iranian government and reveals in terrifying detail:

• how close the radical Islamic republic is to fulfilling its nuclear ambitions
• how Iran's president believes he has a divine mission to destroy Israel and cripple the United States in a nuclear holocaust
• and what America must do to avert this global disaster

With the Middle East poised at the brink, "Showdown with Nuclear Iran "provides much-needed perspective on the current crisis and the dire threat that a nuclear Iran poses to the existence of Israel and global stability.

"The most detailed account of the Iranian regime's determination, policy, and plan to acquire military nuclear capabilities. Mike Evans delves into the roots of the Iranian revolution and explores Iranian history to better understand a major challenge to the western world. he compellingly analyzes policy options for confronting this threat." ―Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya'Alon, red., former Chief of Staff, Israeli Defense Force

This book, first published in 1992, examines defence issues as the twentieth century drew to a close. With the end of the Cold War, many of the threats to European security, such as the threat of nuclear war, disappeared. New ones, however, were emerging. The rise of nationalism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction to politically unstable countries, the increase in world population, the debt crisis - all these contributed to security problems that needed to be resolved. The book assesses the possibilities for future European defence and the role that the United States would play in it: will it be prepared to stay in Europe under European leadership, or must it dominate? It also considers the capabilities offered by new military technology and the need for control of weapons of mass destruction.

Ideological debate is one component of the intellectual background to Soviet policy-making. Originally published in 1987, this paper explores how Soviet writers wrestle with the challenge to their ideology that is posed by the threat of nuclear war. What, for example, is the relationship between the values of peace and of socialism? What drives the arms race? Is capitalism inherently militaristic, or is a demilitarized capitalism conceivable? Is the outcome of history predetermined or open? It is shown that the range of permissible views is wider than often assumed, and that the constraints of Soviet ideology do not exclude evolution towards a more cooperative approach to international security.

Originally published in 1977, the purpose of this book was to analyse the relationship between the security of two states mutually undergoing strategic disarmament at the time and the need for safeguarding their security by means of a verification system. The book thus studies some of the basic problems in the disarmament debate, issues that had been the subject of great political controversy. Previous studies had been mainly descriptive or historical, lacking in objective political analysis, and tending to political bias, depending on the political school of the author. There was thus some justification for the statement made by some outstanding authorities in the field that 'to date, no systematic analysis has been attempted to determine what disarmament measures would optimally require of verification methods...' Our ambition is to respond to this criticism, at least so far as the strategic context of disarmament is concerned. Chapter 1 introduces us to the enormous range of repercussions caused by a disarmament agreement. Chapter 2 examines the concept of verification, analysing the meaning of the term, presenting various definitions of what verification is and attempting to systematize the concept. It has been noted on many occasions that the verification set up in a disarmament treaty is only one of a number of factors working towards compliance with a treaty. In fact the role of verification in presenting the treaty, and therefore the security of its participants, is to a large extent limited. However, without many other conditions being satisfied verification on its own can do little to preserve the treaty regime. Chapter 3 discusses these conditions. Chapter 4 gives a brief analysis of the concept of national interests in general, and the concept of national security in particular. Among all the elements of 'security', it is military security that plays by far the largest role. Because of this. Chapter 5 considers a specific case of strategic military security, in which security, defined as stable strategic deterrence between two states, is analysed. Finally, Chapter 6 analyses the question of what happens to security based on strategic deterrence when states enter into the disarmament process. More specifically, the role of verification in preserving security in such circumstances is analysed, thereby answering the main problem of the book. The supporting data for Chapter 6 is given in the Appendix.

In mid-1980 a second conference for the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would take place in Geneva. Given the importance of preventing, or at least slowing down, nuclear weapon proliferation, this conference would be a crucial event in the field of arms control and disarmament. For many countries the technical and economic barriers to proliferation had disappeared, and the only remaining barriers were political. In an attempt to contribute to the discussions at the NPT Review Conference, SIPRI assembled a group of experts from a number of countries to discuss the technical aspects of the control of fissionable materials in non-military applications. The meeting took place in Stockholm, 12-16 October 1978. Originally published in 1979, this book on nuclear energy and nuclear weapon proliferation contains the papers presented at the symposium and reflects the discussions at the meeting.

In the early 1980s there had been an upsurge of public concern over the nuclear threat to Europe. Already saturated with nuclear weapons, Europe faced controversial new deployments and there was alarm over military strategies for nuclear war in the region. It is in this context that the idea of nuclear weapon-free zones had captured the popular imagination and became a political issue in Europe. Not only would such zones build confidence and raise the nuclear threshold, but they would be first steps towards a more comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1983 Nuclear Disengagement in Europe probes the question of nuclear weapon-free zones in the region. Pugwash and SIPRI arranged a meeting at which an international team of lawyers, scientists, politicians and military experts gave background information and provided an appraisal of problems regarding the zone initiatives as well as benefits that would accrue. Possible elements in a European zone arrangement were elaborated on and procedures towards the establishment of such a zone were suggested.

For the third year running, this book, originally published in 1984, provided those actively concerned with the dangers of war at the time, with well-researched and up-to-date information on military developments of every kind. Based on material published in the SIPRI Yearbook 1984, this book contains the essential data on nuclear issues, on military expenditure and the arms trade, and examines the breakdown of the arms control talks in 1983.

The debate on no-first-use of nuclear weapons has been conducted on a number of fronts. First use of nuclear weapons has come under challenge from many different directions: from church synods, from international lawyers, in debates at the United Nations, and from strategic thinkers. Originally published in 1984, this book takes stock for and against no-first-use and examines the political, military and arms control implications of such a commitment.

Is the appearance of new nuclear weapon states inevitable? Who are the sponsors and apologists of nuclear weapons, and why are others in favour of renouncing them? What are the implications for international security of the increasingly wide use of nuclear energy? How can nuclear threats be defused? Originally published in 1985, SIPRI's study suggests some answers to these questions. The book examines the situation in a number of countries of key importance for non-proliferation: the two nuclear-weapon states which have declined to join the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (China and France); a group of nuclear 'threshold' states also remaining outside the Treaty (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain); and a group of states, both developed and developing, which for various reasons have joined the Treaty (Canada, Egypt, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan). The focus of the book is on motivations for and against nuclear proliferation. An analysis of these motivations leads the editor to make detailed recommendations aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Appendices include a list of nuclear facilities in the countries studied, specifying the degree of their coverage by international controls, and other relevant documentation.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty had recently undergone its third formal review by its signatories, who had assessed its effectiveness and considered how it might better be implemented. This book, originally published in 1987, written by experts many of whom were leading participants in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime at the time, examines the whole range of issues connected with nuclear non-proliferation and the treaty. It looks at non-proliferation from the point of view of nuclear nations, non-nuclear nations and the nuclear industry. It assesses the work of the international monitoring bodies and reconsiders the place of non-proliferation in the changing balance of global nuclear power. It concludes by discussing the way forward.

Originally published in 1985, the level of anxiety and suspicion between the USA and the USSR had rarely been higher. Many advocates of arms control believed that effective verification would reduce tensions and lessen the risk of war. This book analyses the two main issues of verification. One is technological: what are the present capabilities of various verification techniques and what is their potential? The devices and methods currently employed by the two major nuclear powers and by international organizations to monitor the compliance of states with arms control or disarmament treaties are examined. The second issue is political: how do US and Soviet approaches compare, what are the roles of domestic and bureaucratic politics, and on what criteria can a workable standard of adequacy be based? In short, how much is enough? Although the study concludes that a number of significant arms control measures can already be adequately verified, modern weapons are becoming more mobile and it is becoming easier to conceal them. There is a danger that the ability to hide weapons will outstrip the ability to find them. Verification cannot promise to detect all violations; a workable standard of adequacy in verification must derive from the ability to detect militarily significant violations.

There is growing interest world wide in nuclear-free zones. Originally published in 1987, this book explores the question of what constitutes a nuclear-free zone and charts the progress of the movement to establish them. The book shows how definitions of nuclear-free zones vary from those intended to exclude everything nuclear (including nuclear power installations and the dumping of nuclear waste) to those aiming to exclude nuclear weapons in a limited way. Special attention is paid to the three treaties which have established major international nuclear-free zones, (Latin America, South Pacific, Antarctica) examining their strengths and weaknesses as well as areas where the idea has been proposed (Balkans, Africa). The book concludes with a review of problems and prospects for the future.

Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics. The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

The nuclear arms race had dominated international politics for the two decades prior to publication. Originally published in 1975, this symposium examines the dynamics of change within the arms race and the attempts at controlling and limiting it. At the time the nuclear arms race was strongly technologically determined, as Herbert York demonstrates in discussing the impact of MIRV. Such progress as has been made in nuclear disarmament has been far outdistanced by the technological developments so that, as Jack Ruina argues, SALT is only important when seen as part of a process of negotiating arms limitations. The most significant result of this technological advance has been the emergence of a qualitatively new system of international politics which Hans Morgenthau analyses. This system is essentially bipolar in nuclear terms and the history of the disarmament negotiations, as reviewed by William Epstein, is an exercise in freezing this structure. The negotiations themselves, particularly SALT, and the prospects for further progress are discussed extensively by Thomas Schelling, Kosta Tsipis, George Rathjens and others. The book also surveys developments in chemical and biological warfare and includes an important paper on chemical warfare agents by the Soviet chemist, O.A. Ruetov. The final section looks at recent developments in the theory of conflict and its applications in the Middle East, South Africa and a number of developing countries.

In the late 1980s it was felt that World War III could start in the Pacific. Long regarded by the USA as an American lake, the Pacific was now a focus of competition between the superpowers. The USSR, whose nuclear-arms navy was limited to their north Pacific ports, now had a major new naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. In response to this new threat, the Americans were planning more urgently for nuclear war in the Pacific, adding to their own mighty arsenal in the region and taunting the Soviets with aggressive surveillance and military exercises. The Soviets did the same. For 40 years, Pacific Islanders have had cause to resent the use of their ocean as a nuclear playground: of the five nuclear powers, three - the USA, USSR and China - launched missiles into the Pacific for text purposes; two - the USA and Britain - exploded nuclear devices there but had stopped; and one, France, continued to test nuclear bombs in one of its colonies. Pacific Islanders now have cause to fear that the ocean is becoming a nuclear battleground. Originally published in 1987, this book tells the story of the nuclear men in the Pacific and of those people they 'displaced' and irradiated. It is also about what these people and their governments had begun to do in response. The nuclear issue had transformed the political landscape of Micronesia and the South Pacific in the 1980s, loosening the US grip and making the French increasingly unpopular. The people of these remote communities, largely forgotten or considered dispensable, had a nuclear past made for them. Now they want to make their own future.

Europe has everything to lose from nuclear war, and nothing to gain from it. Yet it is nuclear deterrence that we are relying on to shield us from war. More and more people are coming to believe that security under a nuclear shield is an illusion, and that nuclear deterrence embodies a dangerous paradox. It is too close to provocation, it cannot prevent nuclear blackmail, and its short-term success can only lead to proliferation and ultimate instability. In this book, originally published in 1983, philosophers go behind the rhetoric of the nuclear debate and analyse the dangers of deterrence. The contributors all share a concern about the radical confusions that have arisen concerning nuclear deterrence. Showing how unilateral arguments can be developed from hard-headed political and military considerations, they stress their belief that carefully managed unilateralism is the best method for securing the political independence of Western Europe. The doctrine is not founded on sheer moral idealism. This book will be essential reading for anyone engaged in the public discussion of defence policy.

Moral and political questions are vitally relevant to the issue of survival in the nuclear age. Ethics has much to teach us about the meaning of national defence and civic responsibility in the nuclear state. For instance, those in NATO who argue for increased spending on such weapons do so with the intention of defending the values of the West. They must therefore be absolutely sure that they are not - as the contributors to this volume, originally published in 1984, powerfully suggest - undermining or destroying those values by the very means they adopt to preserve them. With the continued success of nuclear deterrence itself in question, responsible citizens feel an urgent need to assess the clash between personal doubts, cherished principles and their governments' loudly voiced moral certainties. In Objections to Nuclear Defence, professional philosophers of widely varying persuasions provide new analyses of these problems. They spell out clearly and vividly the moral and political objections - objections to the concrete nuclear policies of the Western governments today. Often impassioned but always rational, the book will be of special interest to students of international affairs, peace studies and applied philosophy as well as to the general reader who is trying to choose between political parties in Europe or North America.

As nuclear weapons become ever more sophisticated, so the deterrence debate becomes increasingly complex. The 'Ban the Bomb' slogans of the 1950s had been replaced by cries for 'nuclear-free zones', and talk of 'megatonnage' and 'fallout' had given way to talk of 'tactical' nuclear weapons and 'limited strike capability'. Originally published in 1982, this book considers the ethical issues raised by nuclear policies and by the debate between proponents of the multilateralist/unilateralist approaches to disarmament and arms control at the time. It is not, like so many books on the subject, an ideological statement: there are essays by defence strategists which put the case for deterrence and essays by academics and churchmen which strenuously oppose it. The book also includes an essay on attempts to mitigate the appalling brutality of the many 'conventional' wars since 1945. At a time when the rhetoric and misinformation produced on both sides of the debate continued to obscure many vital issues, this book was welcome, sensible and necessary.