In this book, Jeffrey Knopf investigates domestic sources of state preferences about whether to seek co-operation with other countries on security issues. He does so by examining whether public protest against nuclear weapons influenced US decisions to enter strategic arms talks. The analysis builds on the domestic structure approach to explaining foreign policy, using it as the starting point to develop a new framework with which to trace the influence of societal actors. The book's finding that protest had a major impact suggests that prevailing conceptions of the relation between domestic politics and international co-operation need to be broadened. Existing approaches typically assume that state preferences are set by political leaders or powerful interests, thereby treating the rest of society only as a constraint on state action. In contrast, this book demonstrates that ordinary citizens can also serve as a direct stimulus to the development of a state interest in cooperation.

Since 1969, the United Kingdom always has always had one submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles underwater, undetected, in constant communication, ready at a set notice to fire at targets anywhere in the world. This is part of its Trident Programme, which includes the development, procurement, and operation of the current generation of British nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. Operated by the Royal Navy and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland's west coast, it is the most expensive and most powerful capability of the British military forces. In 2016, the United Kingdom had to decide on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines that will allow the UK to remain in the nuclear business well into the second half of this century. The book presents the political, cultural, technical, and strategic aspects of Trident to provide a thoughtful overview of the UK's complex relationship with nuclear weapons. The authors, both scholars and practitioners, bring together diverse perspectives on the issue, discussing the importance of UK nuclear history as well as the political, legal, and diplomatic aspects of UK nuclear weapons-internationally and domestically. Also addressed are the new technical, military, and strategic challenges to the UK nuclear thinking and strategy.

This book presents a rounded critique of the conventional wisdom about the legality of nuclear weapons by experts in international and constitutional law. Part I addresses the status of nuclear weapons under international law. Scholars on one side of the question draw upon treaties and international custom to argue that most uses of nuclear weapons are illegal and that even mere possession of such weaponry is legally unjustifiable. Others argue that law cannot be imposed on the nuclear weapons states without their consent and that nuclear weapons provide deterrence that binds the superpowers in a peaceful balance of power. Part I concludes with a comprehensive bibliography on nuclear weapons and international law. Part II, the section that focuses on nuclear weapons and American constitutional law, offers widely divergent approaches and conclusions. Although there is no explicit prohibition of such weapons in the United States Constitution, several contributors suggest that the advent of nuclear weapons has so changed the milieu in which constitutional institutions operate that many accepted conclusions must be reexamined. Part III explores the effects of nuclear weapons on the environment and the medical consequences of nuclear war.

The idea of space control and the militarization or weaponization of space has become
increasingly prominent in contemporary society. This book puts the widely-held view that
'arms control in space is not feasible' to the test and aims to explore how, and under what
conditions, arms control in space is feasible and could become a reality. Developing a
hypothesis on the general conditions for preventive arms control, Mutschler uses three major
theoretical approaches to international relations, neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism, and
constructivism, and examines the unsuccessful case of arms control regarding space weapons
and the successful case of arms control in the field of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs).

This book, first published in 1992, examines defence issues as the twentieth century drew to a close. With the end of the Cold War, many of the threats to European security, such as the threat of nuclear war, disappeared. New ones, however, were emerging. The rise of nationalism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction to politically unstable countries, the increase in world population, the debt crisis - all these contributed to security problems that needed to be resolved. The book assesses the possibilities for future European defence and the role that the United States would play in it: will it be prepared to stay in Europe under European leadership, or must it dominate? It also considers the capabilities offered by new military technology and the need for control of weapons of mass destruction.

When states' survival is at stake, do states behave according to norms, do states refrain from using certain weapons based on norms against their use? Adachi presents a comprehensive analytical framework for analysing norm dynamics, incorporating the existing literature, while expanding the norm life cycle model to address contestation of, resistance to diffusion of, and disappearance of norms. He also examines the changing nature of international society, and how the evolving characteristics of this society change how norms are shared. His focus is on norms relating to the use and non-use of weapons, with examples of how norms developed in different places and at different times with regard to particular types of weapons. From the banning of gun use in Japan under Bushido, to international bans on chemical weapons and the foundation of norms on nuclear weapons, he looks not only at how such norms come about, but how they can become contested or disappear. A valuable contribution to the literature on norms in International Relations, this volume will be of particular interest to scholars and students with an interest in the control of arms.

When states' survival is at stake, do states behave according to norms, do states refrain from using certain weapons based on norms against their use? Adachi presents a comprehensive analytical framework for analysing norm dynamics, incorporating the existing literature, while expanding the norm life cycle model to address contestation of, resistance to diffusion of, and disappearance of norms. He also examines the changing nature of international society, and how the evolving characteristics of this society change how norms are shared. His focus is on norms relating to the use and non-use of weapons, with examples of how norms developed in different places and at different times with regard to particular types of weapons. From the banning of gun use in Japan under Bushido, to international bans on chemical weapons and the foundation of norms on nuclear weapons, he looks not only at how such norms come about, but how they can become contested or disappear. A valuable contribution to the literature on norms in International Relations, this volume will be of particular interest to scholars and students with an interest in the control of arms.

In the Treaty of Versailles and the SALT II Treaty, years of painstaking diplomatic effort were lost when the United States Senate refused to provide its consent to ratification. This book provides a comparative assessment of executive-congressional relations and the arms control treaty ratification process. A team of historians, political scientists and policy analysts looks at seven case studies, from Versailles to the INF Treaty, to explore the myriad ways to win and lose treaty ratification battles. This book constitutes a marriage of scholarship and public policy. Michael Krepon is the editor of "Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security". Dan Caldwell has also written "The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate".

Are NATO's mutual security commitments strong enough today to deter all adversaries? Is the nuclear umbrella as credible as it was during the Cold War? Backed by the full range of US and allied military capabilities, NATO's mutual defense treaty has been enormously successful, but today's commitments are strained by military budget cuts and antinuclear sentiment. The United States has also shifted its focus away from European security during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and more recently with the Asia rebalance. Will a resurgent Russia change this? The Future of Extended Deterrence brings together experts and scholars from the policy and academic worlds to provide a theoretically rich and detailed analysis of post--Cold War nuclear weapons policy, nuclear deterrence, alliance commitments, nonproliferation, and missile defense in NATO but with implications far beyond. The contributors analyze not only American policy and ideas but also the ways NATO members interpret their own continued political and strategic role in the alliance. In-depth and multifaceted, The Future of Extended Deterrence is an essential resource for policy practitioners and scholars of nuclear deterrence, arms control, missile defense, and the NATO alliance.

The India-Pakistan relationship is complex and choreographed with wars, protracted conflicts and active disputes. Although the presence of nuclear weapons has decreased the probability of an all-out conventional war, the frequency of minor conflicts and crises have increased manifold. India considers nuclear weapons a deterrent against nuclear strikes, whereas Pakistan assumes that these would deter a nuclear as well as a conventional war. The central argument of this book is that another military engagement between India and Pakistan, similar to one in February 2019, exists with varying degrees of probability, thus challenging the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Until the probabilities of military engagements are minimized, the possibilities of peace and stability in the region would remain elusive. Therefore, the situation asks for scholarly contribution in developing a new paradigm wherein the two nuclear neighbors are made to recognize the need to resolve their disputes instead of just managing them, to avoid recurrence of violent conflicts that can lead to a catastrophic nuclear exchange, no matter how limited it is.

The Challenges of Nuclear Non-Proliferation is an exhaustive survey of the many aspects of non-proliferation efforts. It explains why some nations pursued nuclear programs while others abandoned them, as well as the challenges, strengths, and weaknesses of non-proliferation efforts. It addresses key issues such as concerns over rogue states and stateless rogues, delivery systems made possible by technology, and the connection between nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, examining whether non-proliferation regimes can deal with these threats or whether economic or military sanctions need to be developed. It also examines the feasibility of eliminating or greatly reducing the number of nuclear weapons. A broad survey of one of today's great threats to international security, this text provides undergraduates students with the tools needed to evaluate current events and global threats.

Laurence Pope describes the contemporary dysfunction of the State Department and its Foreign Service. He contends that in the information age diplomacy is more important than ever, and that, as President Obama has stressed, without a "change of thinking" the U.S. may be drawn into more wars it does not need to fight.

This book explores the possibilities for the smaller nations of Europe to make positive contributions to the verification of reductions in conventional forces and arms, a chemical weapons convention and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. .

Drawing on data from three different insurgent groups within the Cambodian conflict, the book shows how the social backgrounds of combatants and commanders cause them to pursue different strategies during a decade-long transition into various postconflict settings, thereby creating different "pathways to peace." By highlighting different vertical and horizontal ranks within the insurgent groups and the role of belligerents' resources and networks, this qualitative study tackles an imbalance in the current research on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), which tends to focus on top-down planning and the technicalities of reintegration programs. It helps explain why conflict dynamics and path-dependencies differ among various social groups within the field of insurgency. By analyzing the social position, life courses and postconflict trajectories of various groups within the insurgency, the book emphasizes the diversity of transitions to peace and "brings the social back in." The study is grounded in in-depth fieldwork conducted in Cambodia and its diaspora, including 168 firsthand interviews with ex-combatants from groups as diverse as Buddhist monks and Christian converts, intellectuals, powerful warlords, civil servants, and female communist soldiers. Using these details, the book not only builds a theory of the social structure and internal logic of armed groups, but also emphasizes the crucial importance of fighters' own narratives about their roles in society. Therefore, in addition to advancing a sociological perspective on post-conflict transitions, the study also provides the most detailed treatment to date of the social fields of the insurgents who fought in the civil war that followed the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979. These social fields continue to have a profound influence on Cambodian politics, even today.

This book suggests a new bargain between the NPT nuclear weapon states and the non-NPT nuclear weapons possessor states, mainly India and Pakistan, through a regional arrangement to help move towards universalization of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The author analyses nuclear proliferation drivers to understand why states acquire and justify possession of nuclear weapons even though most nuclear weapon states no longer are faced with an existential threat to their national security. This study also identifies various challenges being faced by the NPT based nuclear nonproliferation regime, which if left unaddressed, could unravel the nonproliferation regime. It also offers the history of confidence building measures between India and Pakistan, which could be a useful reference for negotiating a Regional Nonproliferation Regime (RNR) in the future.

Much has been written on WMD terrorism, but few books present a systems approach to this problem. In this book, we present an integrated view of WMD terrorism. The threat section reviews several scenarios that a terrorist might use and a very comprehensive list of the possible biological organisms and compounds that can be used as biological, mid-spectrum, and chemical threats. In the science and technology section, the technical aspects of a successful defense against WMD agents are presented. Arguments are presented for the control of the release of scientific information to bolster CB defense. Approaches to biological agent detection and a system for ranking detection technologies are discussed next. The generic approach to biological screening and detection is then illustrated with some applications of generic detectors to water, food, and aerosol. The future of biological detection and identification is also presented, along with a call to perhaps change the paradigms that we are using. The last section of the book deals with response system planning. An example of regional cooperation is presented. Risk-based management is discussed and a practical example of this approach to emergency planning is presented. Arguments for an epidemiological reporting system are presented, while the last chapter discusses means to integrate the various components of a response system via a software tool.

Rising concern over the increasing threat of nuclear war impelled the 2017 United Nations (UN) negotiations and adoption by 122 UN member states of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty seeks to ban nuclear weapons globally in the same way chemical and biological weapons have already been prohibited. This book provides the first in-depth comprehensive analysis of the implications and possibilities of the new treaty, drawing on the insights of international relations, international laws, and disarmament experts and specialists from Europe, America, the Asia-Pacific, and the UN. In a context where existing nuclear weapon states have so far declined to be party to the new treaty, the book examines not only its emergence and significance but also the prospects and possibilities for its implementation, the challenges associated with verifying the new agreement, the role of both civil society and governments, and the treaty's wider implications in addressing regional and global nuclear threats. This book was originally published as a special issue of Global Change, Peace & Security but additionally includes the special section articles on the treaty in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.

Fifty years into the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime, the risks of nuclear war, terrorism, and the threat of further proliferation remain. A lack of significant progress towards disarmament will cast doubt upon the viability of the NPT. By recognizing that certain fissile materials are essential to every nuclear weapon and that controlling their usage provides the foundation for international efforts to limit their spread, this book presents a comprehensive framework for nuclear disarmament. Based upon phased reductions, Shea provides a mechanism for the disposal of weapon-origin fissile material and controls on peaceful nuclear activities and non-explosive military uses. He explores the technological means for monitoring and verification, the legal arrangements required to provide an enduring foundation, and a financial structure which will enable progress. This book will be invaluable to professional organizations, arms control NGOs, government officials, scientists, and politicians. It will also appeal to academics and postgraduate researchers working on security studies, disarmament diplomacy and the politics and science of verification.

Weapons proliferation is one of the most pressing global concerns following the end of the Cold War. Despite the absence of an overarching superpower conflict, armaments and related technologies have continued to spread throughout the international system. This has been particularly true in areas like East Asia and the Middle East, where the traditional two party arms races are not readily apparent. This text addresses these concerns and shortcomings using data on fourteen specific military technological innovations that diffused throughout the international system from 1960 to 1997.

Combining transcultural and comparative approaches, the essays collected here exemplify the emerging field of German-Asian studies. Here, specialists examine the multi-faceted ties between the various German states and China over the past two centuries, as well as more personal relationships during an important period in both countries' histories.

First published in 1979. The report of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, which met from early 1975 to mid-1977, represents a unique attempt to portray defence policy in the context of disarmament and the need to restructure and control the institutions of defence - in particular the defence industry. The report presented the fullest study made by any British political party concerning the implications and consequences of its stated defence policy, and embodied an examination of defence from the perspective of approaches of disarmament. At the same time, the search for a new policy in international relations was harmonised with the further development of a new industrial strategy, concentrating upon the potential for converting part of military industry to civil work. This work which presents a distinctive intervention in the general debate concerning defence policy, industrial and technological planning, economic priorities and public policy, will be of considerable relevance to both specialists in each of these fields as well as the general reader.

From the very start, at the age of twenty-one, Herbert F. York was swept into the century's most daring and dangerous technical achievement, the making of the atomic bomb. Throughout his fifty-year career as scientist and statesman, York has been there - at the center of this formidable and fractious era. His is not a dispassionate scholar's treatise, nor is it a reporter's story clipped from the files. Instead, this is a charged, eye-witness documentary, told in the first person by a principal actor. York takes us backstage to witness key events of our time: to the Manhattan Project for the birth of the atomic bomb; to Lawrence Livermore where the H-bomb was built; to Washington to eavesdrop on how post-war history was being forged; and to Geneva where he tried to stem the madness. Along the way, you'll meet some of our greatest heros and villains - Lawrence, Oppenheimer, Weisskopf, Teller, General Groves, President Eisenhower, and a cast of hundreds - friends, colleagues, enemies, who for more than half a century, held the fate of the world in their hands.

We live in an age of crises that are global in scale and potentially apocalyptic in severity, affecting the lives of millions billions of people. Peter Lee examines the struggle for truth at the heart of these crises to show how political leaders attempt to shape individual behavior, attitudes and identity.

The conventional wisdom, based on realist premises, is that nuclear weapons are an irreversible reality in South Asia, and that efforts to denuclearize the subcontinent are a futile endeavor. As a result, real nuclear arms control in South Asia remains elusive and scholars continue focusing their efforts on how to achieve crisis stability and deterrence stability in future Indo-Pakistani confrontations. However, they tend to analyze India and Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy as if the nuclear competition occurred in complete isolation from the changing dynamics of the international social environment. Using a constructivist model, this study brings nuclear arms control and disarmament back into the debates on the future of Indo-Pakistani relations. Constructivism recognizes the independent impact of international norms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Norm (NNPN), on India and Pakistan's nuclear behavior. Even though the NNPN does not legally bind them, it is reinforced at the global level, and may lead the South Asian rivals to move in the direction of nuclear arms control and disarmament, thus reducing the costs, dangers, and risks of an eternal strategic rivalry. After examining the main tenets of constructivism in international relations, the works delves into the proliferation debate, discussing nuclear reversal and U.S. policy toward the subcontinent since the G. W. Bush administration. It looks at the prospects for nuclear arms control and disarmament in South Asia after the U.S.-India nuclear deal of 2008, and the nuclear abolitionist wave during the first Obama administration. It concludes with the contribution of social constructivism to understanding how changes in the India-Pakistan nuclear status quo can happen.