Throughout the Cold War there were longstanding efforts to control the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through extensive arms control, deterrence, and defense programs. Since then counterproliferation efforts by the U.S. and international community have accelerated. Given the attention to counterproliferation in the last decade, how effective was the leadership provided by President Clinton and his Secretaries of Defense, Aspin, Perry and Cohen, in providing innovative and effective policies for countering the proliferation of WMD? Comparing the cases of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and U.S. and U.N. efforts in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Joseph R. Cerami examines patterns of organizational leadership and policy innovation in the development and implementation of WMD policy initiatives. Rather than criticize the framework of American and international political institutions, this leadership perspective draws important insights on the capabilities of institutions to further U.S. and international goals and objectives in security policymaking. In doing so, the book argues that the U.S.'s role and the roles of its internal government agencies are most significant in international affairs. Smartly and appealingly positioned at the intersection of theory and practice, Cerami's book crafts a new perspective in international relations and public administration offering great potential for understanding as well as designing policy innovations to counter the proliferation of WMD in the 21st century.

As counter-profileration is expected to become the central element in the new national security policy of the US, such actions will constitute a central element of every major international conflict in the first decades of the 21st century. One of the most important geostrategic phenomena of the past decade has been the extraordinary diffusion of war-making capabilities from the developed North to the developing South. In the eyes of some proliferant states, possessing nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons would not only add to their regional stature, but would also offer an asymmetrical counter to the West s massive superiority in conventional forces.

In the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, a number of countries are assumed to possess varying levels of NBC-weapons capabilities. Reasons for concern include the fact that such weapons have been used in the past; the region s geographic proximity to Europe and the vital interests of the West (which is prepared, under certain circumstances, to use force to protect them); the multiplicity of conflicts and other security problems; and the general instability in the region (including the spread of religious extremism).

This important and timely book assesses, in detail, the accuracy of predictions, and perceptions, about a possible military threat from the Southern Mediterranean (Muslim) world; and their impact on NATO s political and military posture. Thanos P. Doxos presents an assessment of the Alliance s options for dealing with the problem. This book represents an invaluable, topical resource for researchers and policy makers."

This book explains the conditions under which great powers are likely to cooperate to improve their security by engaging in qualitative arms control. In agreeing to limit or proscribe certain classes of weapons, states will constrain their military capabilities and therefore decrease the threat they pose to potential adversaries. Focusing on the expected military impact of technological change and the capacity of states to confidently monitor the activities of its negotiating partners, it may be possible to forge lasting agreements that improves the security of the participating states. However, at other times, the nature technological change may force states to engage in competitive behavior, precluding cooperation and increasing the probability of conflict. Examining a diverse set of cases, including the Washington Naval Conference, The World Disarmament Conference at Geneva, the Baruch Plan for the International Control of Atomic Energy, and the SALT I Accords (including the ABM Treaty), this volume presents a persuasive, comprehensive and interesting contribution to the literature on arms racing and arms control, and should be of interest to students of international relations theory and security studies. By presenting a theoretical-informed model that explicitly links the security strategies of states to their choices about development and deployment of new weapons and, consequently, their willingness to engage in arms control cooperation, this book provides an important refinement upon existing theoretical and historical approaches.

This book is the first systematic examination of the emerging arms race in Asia. The global trade in arms is to a large degree underpinned by the strong demand for arms in Asia and the Middle East, the two largest arms export markets in the world. Of these two regions Asia has become particularly significant, led by the emergence of China and India as major powers. It is therefore not surprising that the rapid military modernisation in Asia, accompanied by significant increases in the size and sophistication of armed forces, has generated attention as to its trends, key characteristics, causes and implications. This phenomenon, which has become evident since the end of the Cold War, has also been widely described as an Asian 'arms race'. This book evaluates the key conceptual ideas which can shed light on this phenomenon, as well as examining the complex mix of internal, external and technological factors that have led to its emergence. The volume explores the way in which the arms race is leading ultimately to three distinctive blocs in the emerging geostrategic landscape: a loose bloc of US allies in the region; a counter-bloc of potential US adversaries; and a neutral bloc of states with industrial age armed forces whose allegiances will vary according to circumstances and geostrategic developments. The Arms Race in Asia concludes that if the emerging arms race is left unchecked, it is likely that Asia will increasingly become a region of instability, marked by conflicts and interstate wars. The book will be of great interest to students of Asian politics, strategic studies, defence studies, security studies and IR in general.

This book offers valuable insights into the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation. Through the development of new datasets and the application of cutting edge research methods, contributors to this volume significantly advance the frontiers of research on nuclear weapons. Essays in this volume address why states acquire nuclear weapons, why they engage in nuclear cooperation, and also explore the relationship between nuclear weapons possession and a variety of security and diplomatic consequences. In addition to accelerating the development of an empirical research agenda, the chapters combine to form a coherent storyline that shows nuclear technology and capabilities have been under appreciated as a cause of proliferation in recent scholarly literature. For scholars and practitioners alike, there is a strategic logic to nuclear assistance that is essential to understand. Moreover, several of the essays show that the consequences of nuclear proliferation are more complex than is conventionally understood. Nuclear weapons can have both stabilizing and destabilizing effects. Nuclear weapons may simultaneously cause their owners to become more influential, more successful in the wars they choose to fight, and to have less intense conflicts, when these conflicts occur. This book will be of much interest to students of arms control and nuclear proliferation, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR.

Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 is a path-breaking work that uses biographical techniques to test one of the most important and widely debated questions in international politics: Did the advent of the nuclear bomb prevent the Third World War? Many scholars and much conventional wisdom assumes that nuclear deterrence has prevented major power war since the end of the Second World War; this remains a principal tenet of US strategic policy today. Others challenge this assumption, and argue that major war would have been `obsolete' even without the bomb. This book tests these propositions by examining the careers of ten leading Cold War statesmen-Harry S Truman; John Foster Dulles; Dwight D. Eisenhower; John F. Kennedy; Josef Stalin; Nikita Krushchev; Mao Zedong; Winston Churchill; Charles De Gaulle; and Konrad Adenauer-and asking whether they viewed war, and its acceptability, differently after the advent of the bomb. The book's authors argue almost unanimously that nuclear weapons did have a significant effect on the thinking of these leading statesmen of the nuclear age, but a dissenting epilogue from John Mueller challenges this thesis.

Whether possessed by a state or non-state actor, the specter of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), and more specifically, nuclear weapons and their associated material, present a significant threat to global security. Notwithstanding the fact that there are fewer nuclear weapons today than the massive stockpiles that existed during the height of the Cold War, the complexities relating to nuclear security have in many ways intensified amid globalization and porous borders. More states in volatile regions possess such weapons, UN Security Council states are busily modernizing their weapons, and non-states actors have made it clear their intention to use such weapons should they attain them. The emerging prospect of a cyber-attack, or a misunderstanding that could potentially evolve into a limited regional nuclear war, would both have dire global ramifications and are scenarios that should not be considered farfetched. Additionally, concerns pertaining to chemical and biological weapons, the associated ramifications relating to nuclear terrorism, and broader limitations of the NPT regime, all pose major challenges to global stability. In considering all of these areas, this foundational primer for the Rowman and Littlefield WMD Series seeks to inform and advance policy debate in ways that support international security, while also adding important connective tissue between analytical areas in the IR and historical domains that often remain separate. Offering a comprehensive analysis of the evolution and current status of WMDs, this volume will be of great interest to scholars, analysts, and students of security studies, international history, and international relations.

The most difficult challenge for a terrorist organization seeking to build a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device is obtaining fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Experts acknowledge that obtaining HEU, uranium that has been processed to increase the proportion of the U-235 isotope to over 20%, is the most difficult challenge facing a state or non-state actor seeking to build a nuclear explosive. The large stocks of HEU in civilian use, many not adequately protected, are thus one of the greatest security risks facing the global community at present. This book contains chapters examining the various uses for this material and possible alternatives; the threat posed by this material; the economic, political and strategic obstacles to international efforts to end the use of HEU for commercial and research purposes; as well as new national and international measures that should be taken to further the elimination of HEU. This book was published as a special issue of The Nonproliferation Review.

China, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation is an empirically and conceptually path-breaking book that documents China's participation in international arms control and non-proliferation regimes from 1985 to 2001. The book focuses on the distinction between US expectations of Chinese compliance, which China has not always met, and international standards, against which Chinese performance is acceptable. This will be the standard staple work dealing with China and international arms control and will be invaluable to those dealing with Chinese security studies, foreign policy, international relations and arms control and disarmament.

This book examines the dynamics of relations and the substance of the negotiations between the international community and Iran over the latter's nuclear programme. Iran's nuclear programme and the alleged threat to international peace and security remains one of the most important issues in the United States, as well as in European foreign affairs. In the US, Iran has dominated the political discourse for over three decades and Europe has spent considerable political capital in finding a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear ambitions. While relations between both states remain subject to mutual hostility, the EU remains a channel of communication and since 2003 has maintained a multilateral negotiation framework. By and large, the narrative on nuclear negotiations is dominated by constructivist and realist literature, portraying relations between the US and Iran in ideological terms as a prolonged struggle for regional influence. Embedded within conflict resolution and diplomatic theory, this work attempts to bridge this gap. Drawing upon primary documents and interviews, the text examines negotiation behaviour, and strategies and tools of statecraft, as well as analysing technical aspects of initiatives concerning the nuclear programme. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international diplomacy, Middle Eastern politics, security studies and IR in general.

The North Korean nuclear threat has created an enormous amount of apprehension in the international community in recent years. In 2003, the Six Party Talks brought together the US, China, Russia, Japan as well as South and North Korea to negotiate a multilateral resolution of this nuclear issue. This book examines this multilateral attempt, and will look at the Six Party Talks as a study of multilateralism, differentiating it from empirical studies on the Korean peninsula. The author discusses the positions of the major players in regard to the Korean Peninsula in terms of their views of multilateralism and their willingness to commit themselves to it. The book goes to question why multilateralism failed to achieve its stated purpose in this instance, and examines how this failure can be resolved in the future.

Epistemic communities represent networks of knowledge-based experts that help articulate cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, define the self-interests of a state, or formulate specific policies for state decision makers. However, the role of these scientists and knowledgeable professionals in nuclear policy formulation is poorly understood. Thoroughly documented and making excellent use of source material, Politics and the Bomb provides refreshingly new empirical evidence and theoretical analysis of the importance of scientists and experts behind the creation of new non-proliferation agreements. Simply not another book on nuclear proliferation, Sara Z. Kutchesfahani explores the differences in the emergence, composition, and influence mechanisms of the epistemic communities behind the nuclear non-proliferation policy formulation in Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. In doing so she eloquently demonstrates how the role of these non-proliferation experts lead to the possibility of creating more effective non-proliferation policies in the future and hints at the need to sustain non-proliferation epistemic communities in all countries that can provide input to the global proliferation problem until it is solved.

The theory and practice of arms control seemed to have its heyday during the height of the Cold War, with its focus on the East-West conflict and nuclear arms. In the past twenty years, both arms technologies and various practices aimed at their control have continued to develop, but scholarly thinking has not kept up. This volume seeks to redress this scholarly neglect of the range of issues associated with the control of the means of violence, by asking the question: what does arms control mean in the 21st Century? In asking this question, the volume examines issues surrounding sovereignty, geopolitics, nuclear disarmament, securitization of space, technological developments, human rights, the clearance of landmines, the regulation of small arms and the control of the black market for arms and nuclear secrets. The book discusses terrorism with reference to the case of the suicide attacks in Beirut in 1983 and how the Obama administration is orientating its posture on nuclear arms. This book was published as a special issue of Contemporary Security Policy.

This book presents the first full and systematic account of Iran's nuclear program from 1979 to 2015. Throughout this time, foreign policy makers, intelligence experts, and scholars on the subject have repeatedly failed to understand the internal dynamics behind Iran's nuclear project and have underestimated the depth of the regime's commitment to develop nuclear weapons. The author presents an account of little-understood episodes in the history of the nuclear project, including an analysis of the decision making process of the "nuclear sanctum." A full account is given of the organizations that ran the project and a listing of the suppliers that made the project possible. Finally, the book offers a detailed analysis of the international sanctions placed on Iran, including the induced anomie and legitimacy crisis which expedited the decision to rollback.

This book examines the prospects and challenges of a global phase-out of highly enriched uranium-and the risks of this material otherwise being used by terrorists to make atom bombs. Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have demonstrated repeatedly that they seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Unbeknownst even to many security specialists, tons of bomb-grade uranium are trafficked legally each year for ostensibly peaceful purposes. If terrorists obtained even a tiny fraction of this bomb-grade uranium they could potentially construct a nuclear weapon like the one dropped on Hiroshima that killed tens of thousands. Nuclear experts and policymakers have long known of this danger but - so far - have taken only marginal steps to address it. This volume begins by highlighting the lessons of past successes where bomb-grade uranium commerce has been eliminated, such as from Argentina's manufacture of medical isotopes. It then explores the major challenges that still lie ahead: for example, Russia's continued use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in dozens of nuclear facilities. Each of the book's thirteen case studies offers advice for reducing HEU in a specific sector. These insights are then amalgamated into nine concrete policy recommendations for U.S. and world leaders to promote a global phase-out of bomb-grade uranium. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, international relations and security studies.

Since the end of the Cold War, significant attention has focussed on the issue of nuclear deterrence and in particular whether formal nuclear security guarantees from nuclear weapons states to non-nuclear weapons states involving the possible use of nuclear weapons have a place in the twenty-first century global strategic landscape. Growing support for nuclear disarmament in the US and elsewhere has seen serious doubts being raised about the ongoing utility of extended nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first detailed analysis of the way in which extended nuclear deterrence operates in contemporary Asia. It addresses the following key questions: What does the role of extended nuclear deterrence in Asia tell us about the broader role of extended nuclear deterrence in the contemporary international system? Is this role likely to change significantly in the years ahead? O'Neil uses a theoretical and historical framework to analyse the contemporary and future dynamics of extended nuclear deterrence in Asia and challenges many of the existing orthodox perspectives on the topic. Providing a new perspective on debates surrounding extended nuclear deterrence, this book will be of interest not only to students and scholars of Asian politics, international relations and security studies, but also to policy makers and professionals.

Nuclear weapons are not a subject of intense public discussion and debate, but they should be. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only the beginning; in recent times, nuclear annihilation at the hands of rogues and terrorists has become an even greater concern than the specter of nuclear war between superpowers. In a series of clear, calm, well-reasoned dialogues, longtime scholars and practitioners of peace Richard Falk and David Krieger probe key questions about our nuclear reality and dig beneath the surreal surface tranquility that has largely surrounded its existence. Although the authors agree on much, there are many areas where their thoughts diverge, including their assessment of the value of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and of President Obama s level of commitment to nuclear issues. They put forward new proposals and explore in the dialogues different ways to move ahead. They contend that a nuclear-free future is not a subject to be left only to experts for the so-called experts have brought us to the brink of the nuclear precipice over and over again. Falk and Krieger believe that although none of us has the power to bring about global change alone, together we are immensely powerful powerful enough to overcome the threats of the Nuclear Age and move us appreciably along the path to zero. Covers questions about living in the Nuclear Age including: How have we responded (or failed to respond) to these immensely powerful weapons? Are we capable of escaping their threat? Can civilization make the leap to survival in a world with thousands of nuclear weapons? Will humankind become the victim of its own cleverness? Will we recognize the nuclear dilemma that confronts us in the 21st century? Will we be able also to recognize our power, when acting together, to be a force for change? Will we act soon enough and forcefully enough to assure civilization s survival?"

This examination of the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime focuses on critical developments, technological in particular, currently endangering the regime. Crucial technologies affecting nuclear weapon proliferation and their potential ramifications for the NPT regime as a whole are examined and potential policy options which could ameliorate or perhaps eliminate the resulting dangers are analysed. Developments and problems raised by the nuclear programmes in Iraq and North Korea receive special attention. The book contributes to the discussion and debate occurring in preparation for the 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference.

German Disarmament After World War I examines the Allied disarmament of Germany and the challenges that such an enormous task presented to international efforts in enforcing the Treaty of Versailles. In the twenty-first century, disarmament remains a critical issue for the International community. This new book focuses on three key areas and lessons of Allied disarmament operations from 1920-31: the role and experience of international arms inspectors working amidst an embittered German populace the ramifications of the divergent disarmament priorities of the leaders of the disarmament coalition the effectiveness of united Allied policies backed by sanctions. These major issues are examined within the overall context of the assessment of Allied disarmament operations in Germany. While some historians perceive German disarmament as a failure, this book argues that arms inspectors successfully destroyed Germany's ability to pose a military threat to European security. This new study shows how the destructive legacy of war convinced the victorious nations, especially Britain and France, of the importance in minimizing German military strength. French post-war security concerns, however, were often faced with the unwillingness of Britain to enforce the totality of the military articles of the treaty. German obstruction also influenced Allied disarmament policies. German Disarmament After World War I examines the initial effectiveness of Allied disarmament efforts in Germany and explains how they ultimately disappeared through diverging conceptions of a post-war world. This book will be of great interest to all students of disarmament, the interwar period and of military history, modern European history and security studies.

Throughout the Cold War there were longstanding efforts to control the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through extensive arms control, deterrence, and defense programs. Since then counterproliferation efforts by the U.S. and international community have accelerated. Given the attention to counterproliferation in the last decade, how effective was the leadership provided by President Clinton and his Secretaries of Defense, Aspin, Perry and Cohen, in providing innovative and effective policies for countering the proliferation of WMD? Comparing the cases of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and U.S. and U.N. efforts in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Joseph R. Cerami examines patterns of organizational leadership and policy innovation in the development and implementation of WMD policy initiatives. Rather than criticize the framework of American and international political institutions, this leadership perspective draws important insights on the capabilities of institutions to further U.S. and international goals and objectives in security policymaking. In doing so, the book argues that the U.S.'s role and the roles of its internal government agencies are most significant in international affairs. Smartly and appealingly positioned at the intersection of theory and practice, Cerami's book crafts a new perspective in international relations and public administration offering great potential for understanding as well as designing policy innovations to counter the proliferation of WMD in the 21st century.

This book interrogates the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement from its inception in July 2005 to its conclusion in the latter part of 2008 through 12 articles, each of which focuses on different aspects of the deal. They discuss the factors that facilitated the deal, the roadblocks that were encountered, and the implications of the deal for the future of India's foreign policy, its energy security and the international non-proliferation regime. Together, they address the internal political dynamics in India and the United States in order to present perspectives of both countries.

The Detente Deception examines the competition between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet bloc in the less developed world during the final years of Detente. Rivero assesses whether or not the Soviet bloc pushed for strategic gains in the Third World and whether this contributed to the U.S. decision to abandon Detente in 1979. This view is articulated by many acclaimed scholars such as Stephen Walt (1992), John Gaddis (1997), and Vladislav Zubok (2007). They make the case that during the final years of Detente and throughout the 1980s, U.S. policy in places such as Nicaragua and Angola was a calculated response to Soviet aggression in the less-developed world. This book challenges this position as the quantitative evidence points to U.S. aggression. Not only did the Western bloc push to maintain dominance over the Third World, archival evidence also suggests the US made significant efforts in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan during the final years of Detente to dismantle the Soviet bloc.

Nuclear weapons are not a subject of intense public discussion and debate, but they should be. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only the beginning; in recent times, nuclear annihilation at the hands of rogues and terrorists has become an even greater concern than the specter of nuclear war between superpowers. In a series of clear, calm, well-reasoned dialogues, longtime scholars and practitioners of peace Richard Falk and David Krieger probe key questions about our nuclear reality and dig beneath the surreal surface tranquility that has largely surrounded its existence. Although the authors agree on much, there are many areas where their thoughts diverge, including their assessment of the value of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and of President Obama s level of commitment to nuclear issues. They put forward new proposals and explore in the dialogues different ways to move ahead. They contend that a nuclear-free future is not a subject to be left only to experts for the so-called experts have brought us to the brink of the nuclear precipice over and over again. Falk and Krieger believe that although none of us has the power to bring about global change alone, together we are immensely powerful powerful enough to overcome the threats of the Nuclear Age and move us appreciably along the path to zero. Covers questions about living in the Nuclear Age including: How have we responded (or failed to respond) to these immensely powerful weapons? Are we capable of escaping their threat? Can civilization make the leap to survival in a world with thousands of nuclear weapons? Will humankind become the victim of its own cleverness? Will we recognize the nuclear dilemma that confronts us in the 21st century? Will we be able also to recognize our power, when acting together, to be a force for change? Will we act soon enough and forcefully enough to assure civilization s survival?"

This timely book, published in the lead up to the 2012-14 decision on Trident renewal, makes available for the first time the late Sir Michael Quinlan s private correspondence on nuclear deterrence. It shows why Sir Michael, as Policy Director and then Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence during the last years of the Cold War, became known as the high priest of deterrence: his unparalleled grasp of nuclear strategy, contribution to nuclear doctrine in the UK and NATO, and deep and genuine concern with defence ethics earned him respect and admiration around the world. Even those who challenged him on fundamental questions of strategy and morality (and many of his correspondents fell into this category, as this volume will reveal) recognised his sincere devotion to his cause: the creation of a stable system of east west nuclear deterrence for the prevention of major war. Before he died in 2009, Sir Michael made it known that he wished for his private correspondence to be published. This book helps fulfil that wish. It presents a selection of the most compelling letters among the many thousands in the Quinlan files. It is intended as a memorial to a brilliant man, an important historical record of British nuclear thinking during the cold war, and a contribution to contemporary debates over the future of nuclear deterrence."

This book assesses how progress in disarmament diplomacy in the last decade has improved human security. In doing so, the book looks at three cases of the development of international norms in this arena. First, it traces how new international normative understandings have shaped the evolution of and support for an Arms Trade Treaty (the supply side of the arms trade); and, second, it examines the small arms international regime and examines a multilateral initiative that aims to address the demand side (by the Geneva Declaration); and, third, it examines the evolution of two processes to ban and regulate cluster munitions. The formation of international norms in these areas is a remarkable development, as it means that a domain that was previously thought to be the exclusive purview of states, i.e. how they procure and manage arms, has been penetrated by multiple influences from worldwide civil society. As a result, norms and treaties are being established to address the domain of arms, and states will have more multilateral restriction over their arms and less sovereignty in this domain. This book will be of much interest to students of the arms trade, international security, international law, human security and IR in general. Denise Garcia is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University, Boston. She is author of Small Arms and Security (Routledge 2006).