While the Cold War is over, many of the problems it spawned live on. One of the worst of these is the continued presence of vast nuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia. How did the thousands of American bombs come into existence and how did they so rapidly become the United States' first line of defence?;Drawing extensively on previously classified material, Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Steven L Rearden have written a history of this crucial period. They show how American policymakers, and least of all President Truman, never expected nuclear weapons to play such a major strategic role. Yet by relying on the atomic bomb time and again to shore up US defences in the face of worsening relations with the Soviet Union, rather than accept seemingly more costly conventional alternatives, Truman found himself ultimately with no other choice.;The authors not only document and analyze the origins and early evolution of US nuclear strategy, but they also demonstrate the close relationship between decisions affecting such diverse matters as foreign policy, new technologies and the budgetary process. The result is an analysis containing new insights and timely reminders of the myriad complications created by reliance on nuclear weapons.

This volume evaluates the impact of coercive arms control efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the twenty-first century. A new paradigm in arms control is gradually replacing the idea that mutually agreed restrictions on armaments can improve international security. Thus, Hedley Bull's classic definition of arms control as the "cooperation between antagonistic pairs of states in military affairs" needs to be amended by a new notion of coercive arms control as the set of non-cooperative and non-reciprocal measures to restrict the weapons or military capabilities of certain states. This volume addresses the topic of how this ongoing paradigmatic shift will affect the effectiveness of arms control as a conflict management instrument.While some argue that new instruments can complement and strengthen traditional, multilateral and inclusive arms control regimes, others maintain that conflicts and contradictions between coercive and cooperative arms control regimes will severely limit their effectiveness. This volume provides a forum for academics and practitioners from around the globe to discuss these developments in depth and to assess the specific strengths and weaknesses of these new instruments of arms control. This book will be of much interest to students of arms control, global governance, foreign policy and IR/Security Studies in general.

In 1995 a conference will be convened to review and extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This work brings together a group of individuals, including the elected President of the 1995 NPT Conference, to analyze four crucial agenda areas relevant to the Conference: the pre-conference activities to be undertaken by both States Parties and the Conference Secretariat; those security issues that relate to a review of the treaty, such as nuclear disarmament and security assurances; peaceful uses and verification questions; and regional issues.

This book presents the first full and systematic account of Iran's nuclear program from 1979 to 2015. Throughout this time, foreign policy makers, intelligence experts, and scholars on the subject have repeatedly failed to understand the internal dynamics behind Iran's nuclear project and have underestimated the depth of the regime's commitment to develop nuclear weapons. The author presents an account of little-understood episodes in the history of the nuclear project, including an analysis of the decision making process of the "nuclear sanctum." A full account is given of the organizations that ran the project and a listing of the suppliers that made the project possible. Finally, the book offers a detailed analysis of the international sanctions placed on Iran, including the induced anomie and legitimacy crisis which expedited the decision to rollback.

This book examines the strategic implications of Iran's nuclear programme, providing an inventory of the negotiations and a discussion of possible solutions to this pressing international security issue. The Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme has been the cause of one of the most extended international crises of the past decade. Multilateral institutions have been unable to resolve the issue, which has the potential to derail the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Recent failures of diplomatic offers for an extended Iran-EU cooperation and projected US arms sales to Iran's neighbours suggest an imminent escalation of the issue, which has been simmering since first reports about Iranian nuclear fuel-enrichment activities emerged in 2002. Since then, the topic has been the subject of intense media coverage as well as academic and diplomatic debate. This volume brings together analysts and authors with diverse backgrounds, including international diplomats formerly involved in negotiations with Iranian officials. The various chapters bring together different perspectives and empirical analyses, and include detailed assessments of both US and European efforts in diplomatic relations with Iran, as well as of the domestic politics in Iran itself. This book will be of interest to students of Iranian politics, Middle Eastern politics, strategic studies, nuclear proliferation, international security, foreign policy and IR in general.

Despite its portrayal as a bold departure, the Bush Doctrine was not the "new" or "revolutionary" policy instrument that many at the time portended. This work seeks to argue that while it was clear that the Bush Doctrine certainly qualified as a preventive war policy, it is apparent that the adoption of this strategy did not mark a total break with American tradition or earlier Administrations. Warren seeks to dispel arguments pertaining to the supposed "radical" nature of the Bush Doctrine -- based on comparisons with previous National Security Strategies and previous Administrations' penchant for prevention. However, the work also highlights that what was new and bold about the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy of 2002, was its willingness to embrace reinvigorating a nuclear option that could ultimately be used in the context of preventive war. While Obama has struck bold rhetorical notes and promises in relation to limiting the role of nuclear weapons, he has stopped short of changing the status quo on critical issues that have lingered since the Cold War -- such as tactical nuclear weapons and keeping missiles on alert. This book's final section examines the extent to which Obama has attempted to adjust' the nuclear option with the recent release of the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Offering new insights into the Bush doctrine and providing a comprehensive analysis of the current status of the US nuclear weapons strategy, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies and international relations.

Since the mid-1980s there have been substantial cuts in military spending throughout the world, with the exception of Pacific Asia. The end of the Cold War, democratization in Africa and Latin America, structural adjustment programmes, debts and cuts in public spending are just some of the political and economic developments that have instigated and led to changes across the globe in armed forces, arms industries and other military-related activities. This second volume of a study commissioned by UNU/WIDER examines the changes taking place within the military sector. It concludes that there has been little conversion of resources from military to civilian purposes. Neither monetary resources or real resources, such as manpower or industries, have been utilized as a "peace dividend". Instead, the military sector is being restructured and is becoming more globalized and informal.

Originally published in 1985, this book explores the nuclear confrontation between East and West in Europe: where we stand, how we got there and what the future may hold. Its concluding chapter outlines the prospects for nuclear arms control in Europe, and it frames the debate over NATO strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in the years ahead. Can NATO reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons? Can it cope with the issues at all? The chapters on NATO theatre nuclear forces and doctrine provide a rich background to current policy issues. The public debate over NATO's 1979 decision to deploy new American cruise and Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe was hardly unprecedented in NATO's history: similar controversy surrounded NATO deliberations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That debate, however, subsided in the mid-1960s; the nuclear question in Europe was relegated to the 'wilderness', though efforts - largely unavailing - continued within official circles to define more clearly the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defense. Against this backdrop, the nuclear debate emerged again in the 1970s. This title unravels the military and political considerations at play in that debate and maps the European politics surrounding it. Today it can be read in its historical context.

In this book William Durch examines conventional weapons proliferation since World War II, the role of arms transfers in fueling regional conflict, and prospects for curbing the global arms trade. Noting that supply side arms control efforts, which seek to constrain the companies and countries that produce and distribute major conventional weapons, have a poor international track record, Durch argues for a broader approach that tries to get at the demand side of the equation. Addressing the political and regional dynamics that impel arms acquisitions, he looks at how arms control might be combined with confidence and security-building measures to contain demand, and how value-based arms trade control measures like “codes of conduct” could be implemented in stepwise fashion consistent with US national interests in regional stability.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the principal legal barrier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons for the past forty-five years. It promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and insures, through the application of safeguards inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that those technologies are not being diverted toward the production of nuclear weapons. It is also the only multinational treaty that obligates the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) to pursue nuclear disarmament measures. Though there have been many challenges over the years, most would agree that the treaty has largely been successful. However, many are concerned about the continued viability of the NPT. The perceived slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the interest by some countries to consider a weapons program while party to the treaty, and the funding and staffing issues at the IAEA, are all putting considerable strain on the treaty. This manuscript explores those issues and offers some possible solutions to ensure that the NPT will survive effectively for many years to come.

The most difficult challenge for a terrorist organization seeking to build a nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device is obtaining fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Experts acknowledge that obtaining HEU, uranium that has been processed to increase the proportion of the U-235 isotope to over 20%, is the most difficult challenge facing a state or non-state actor seeking to build a nuclear explosive. The large stocks of HEU in civilian use, many not adequately protected, are thus one of the greatest security risks facing the global community at present. This book contains chapters examining the various uses for this material and possible alternatives; the threat posed by this material; the economic, political and strategic obstacles to international efforts to end the use of HEU for commercial and research purposes; as well as new national and international measures that should be taken to further the elimination of HEU.

This book was published as a special issue of The Nonproliferation Review.

This collection examines the theory, practice, and application of state neutrality in international relations. With a focus on its modern-day applications, the studies in this volume analyze the global implications of permanent neutrality for Taiwan, Russia, Ukraine, the European Union, and the United States. Exploring permanent neutrality's role as a realist security model capable of rivaling collective security, the authors argue that permanent neutrality has the potential to decrease major security dilemmas on the global stage.

Bringing the subject of arms control into the arena of complex, multi-polar international relations, this text traces the history of agreements over weapons back to ancient times. The author puts forward a typology of arms control: it occurs at the end of major conflicts, stabilizes balances between states, develops norms of behaviour, manages weapons proliferation, and acts as a tool of international organizations. He examines the evolution of five qualitatively different strategies, and applies the arms control typology to agreements in the post-Cold War world. -- .

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

Fundamental changes in international relations during 1989-90 toppled the pillars of the security policy paradigm which had characterised the Cold War. That convulsion swept aside the last of many nuclear debates to rend NATO. Immediately the nuclear problems which had plagued the 1980s were tossed aside. Yet many important and interesting elements of the decade's nuclear history had not been fully explained. With the nuclear issue's rapid shift to irrelevancy, previously hidden information on the period became at once less secret and more easily available. Thus through extensive interviews with participants and careful analysis of open sources, missing parts of the puzzle emerged. This book is intended to provide a fuller explanation of NATO's last great nuclear debate.

Full Contributors:
Vladimir D. Andrianov, Natalya Bazhanova, Evgeniy Bazhanov, Valery I. Denisov, Georgiy Kaurov, Vladimir Li, Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Valentin I. Moiseyev, James Clay Moltz, Alexander Platkovskiy, Roald Savelyev, Larisa Zabrovskaya, Alexander Zarubin, Alexander Zhebin

In order to help the understanding of international campaigning activities of non-governmental organisations, Tepe analyses the domestic politics of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and provides a theoretical framework through which to access these.

In this book, the authors explore the controversial Iranian nuclear programme through the conceptual lens of nuclear hedging. In 2002, revelations regarding undeclared nuclear facilities thrust Iran's nuclear activities under the spotlight and prompted concerns that Tehran was pursuing nuclear weapons. Iran has always denied nuclear weapons aspirations, yet it cannot be disputed that the Islamic Republic has gone well beyond what is required for a civil nuclear programme based on energy production and scientific research. What, then, is the nature and significance of Iran's nuclear behaviour? Does it form part of a coherent strategy? What can Iran's actions in the nuclear field tell us about Tehran's intentions? And what does the Iranian case teach us about proliferation behaviour more generally? This book addresses these questions by exploring the nature of nuclear hedging and how this approach might be identified, before applying this logic to the Iranian case. It provides fresh insights into the inherently opaque area of nuclear proliferation and a more nuanced interpretation of the Iranian nuclear challenge.

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had many opponents when, in 1995, it came up for extension. The majority of parties opposed extension, and experts expected a limited extension as countries sought alternative means to manage nuclear weapons. But against all predictions, the treaty was extended indefinitely, and without a vote. Networked Nonproliferation offers a social network theory explanation of how the NPT was extended, giving new insight into why international treaties succeed or fail. The United States was the NPT's main proponent, but even a global superpower cannot get its way through coercion or persuasion alone. Michal Onderco draws on unique in-depth interviews and newly declassified documents to analyze the networked power at play. Onderco not only gives the richest account yet of the conference, looking at key actors like South Africa, Egypt, and the EU, but also challenges us to reconsider how we think about American power in international relations. With Networked Nonproliferation, Onderco provides new insight into multilateral diplomacy in general and nuclear nonproliferation in particular, with consequences for understanding a changing global system as the US, the chief advocate of nonproliferation and a central node in the diplomatic networks around it, declines in material power.

There is a significant number of nuclear and radiological sources in Central Asia, which have contributed, are still contributing, or have the potential to contribute to radioactive contamination in the future. Key sources and contaminated sites of concern are: The nuclear weapons tests performed at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS) in Kazakhstan during 1949-1989. A total of 456 nuclear weapons tests have been perf- med in the atmosphere (86), above and at ground surface (30) and underground (340) accompanied by radioactive plumes reaching far out of the test site. Safety trials at STS, where radioactive sources were spread by conventional explosives. Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) within STS and outside STS in Kazakhstan, producing crater lakes (e.g., Tel'kem I and Tel'kem II), waste storage facilities (e.g., LIRA) etc. Technologically enhanced levels of naturally occurring radionuclides (TENORM) due to U mining and tailing. As a legacy of the cold war and the nuclear weapon p- gramme in the former USSR, thousands of square kilometers in the Central Asia co- tries are contaminated. Large amounts of scale from the oil and gas industries contain sufficient amounts of TENORM. Nuclear reactors, to be decommissioned or still in operation. Storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes. In the characterization of nuclear risks, the risks are estimated by integrating the results of the hazard identification, the effects assessment and the exposure assessment.

In this timely work, the author analyzes the use of private military firms and international interventions of the military. Outsourcing to the private sector takes missions away from the military, but the shift towards international intervention adds new, wider functions to the traditional role of defence. If these two trends continue at the present pace, important security functions will be out of control of parliaments, national governments and international authorities. The state monopoly of violence - an achievement of civilization - is at stake.