Originally published in 1977, the purpose of this book was to analyse the relationship between the security of two states mutually undergoing strategic disarmament at the time and the need for safeguarding their security by means of a verification system. The book thus studies some of the basic problems in the disarmament debate, issues that had been the subject of great political controversy. Previous studies had been mainly descriptive or historical, lacking in objective political analysis, and tending to political bias, depending on the political school of the author. There was thus some justification for the statement made by some outstanding authorities in the field that 'to date, no systematic analysis has been attempted to determine what disarmament measures would optimally require of verification methods...' Our ambition is to respond to this criticism, at least so far as the strategic context of disarmament is concerned. Chapter 1 introduces us to the enormous range of repercussions caused by a disarmament agreement. Chapter 2 examines the concept of verification, analysing the meaning of the term, presenting various definitions of what verification is and attempting to systematize the concept. It has been noted on many occasions that the verification set up in a disarmament treaty is only one of a number of factors working towards compliance with a treaty. In fact the role of verification in presenting the treaty, and therefore the security of its participants, is to a large extent limited. However, without many other conditions being satisfied verification on its own can do little to preserve the treaty regime. Chapter 3 discusses these conditions. Chapter 4 gives a brief analysis of the concept of national interests in general, and the concept of national security in particular. Among all the elements of 'security', it is military security that plays by far the largest role. Because of this. Chapter 5 considers a specific case of strategic military security, in which security, defined as stable strategic deterrence between two states, is analysed. Finally, Chapter 6 analyses the question of what happens to security based on strategic deterrence when states enter into the disarmament process. More specifically, the role of verification in preserving security in such circumstances is analysed, thereby answering the main problem of the book. The supporting data for Chapter 6 is given in the Appendix.

Is the appearance of new nuclear weapon states inevitable? Who are the sponsors and apologists of nuclear weapons, and why are others in favour of renouncing them? What are the implications for international security of the increasingly wide use of nuclear energy? How can nuclear threats be defused? Originally published in 1985, SIPRI's study suggests some answers to these questions. The book examines the situation in a number of countries of key importance for non-proliferation: the two nuclear-weapon states which have declined to join the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (China and France); a group of nuclear 'threshold' states also remaining outside the Treaty (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain); and a group of states, both developed and developing, which for various reasons have joined the Treaty (Canada, Egypt, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan). The focus of the book is on motivations for and against nuclear proliferation. An analysis of these motivations leads the editor to make detailed recommendations aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Appendices include a list of nuclear facilities in the countries studied, specifying the degree of their coverage by international controls, and other relevant documentation.

Originally published in 1956, atomic policy overshadowed political considerations in the same way that 'the balance of power' had mesmerized European politicians for so long. Admiral Biorklund here makes a general survey of the whole problem. He traces the development of the atom and hydrogen bombs and the history of international atomic policy as revealed by post-war conferences, by official statements, and in official and unofficial publications. His thirty years study of Russia and complete command of the language have enabled him to give a more thorough and authoritative account of the Soviet attitude than has so far appeared in English. He also presents fully the American point of view that the preservation of force is vital to the democracies of the world. Admiral Biorklund makes an expert contribution to a full appreciation of the primary question of the day. He feels that it is unrealistic to attempt a total prohibition of atomic weapons. But it is not therefore necessary to sit with folded arms. By starting with what is politically possible now, he outlines a solution which recognizes that the smaller tactical weapons would have to be tolerated while the heaviest bombs are strictly controlled. Clearly written, his book is extremely readable and of absorbing interest. It presents, soberly and objectively a great deal of information in a readily assimilable form. A large map (available online) plots the position of the world's fissile material (uranium, thorium, lithium, etc.). Assessing every known scrap of information, it has been the most complete map yet published.

For the third year running, this book, originally published in 1984, provided those actively concerned with the dangers of war at the time, with well-researched and up-to-date information on military developments of every kind. Based on material published in the SIPRI Yearbook 1984, this book contains the essential data on nuclear issues, on military expenditure and the arms trade, and examines the breakdown of the arms control talks in 1983.

'I pray that words spoken at this conference may carry beyond walls and reach thousands of ears hitherto deaf to warnings of the final catastrophe.' So said Patrick White in June 1983 at an important symposium organised by the Australian National University to examine the whole issue of nuclear war and its implications for Australia. Many prominent Australians - including H. C. Coombs, Senator Susan Ryan, leading academics and medics - attended the conference along with distinguished experts from overseas, and mingled and talked with many representatives of Australian peace movements. In two intense and emotional days they discussed many different aspects of the crisis that threatens the world, from the latest scientific thinking on possible effects on the atmosphere to the increasingly important role of the women's peace movement and the efforts of ordinary people around the world to stop the nuclear arms race. Originally published in 1983, this book presents the upshot of these deliberations, including unforgettable illustrations of some of the consequences of nuclear war. The book does not pretend to provide the answers, nor does it take any political viewpoint. It does present the authoritative opinions of some of the world's leading minds on the extent of the threat that faces Australia alongside powerful statements from committed men and women from around the world - opinions that will inform and disturb all thinking Australians.

Originally published in 1986, although the pace of arms control negotiations has been stepped up, there is still little sign of agreement. In this paper the author examines the current negotiating effort, with particular emphasis on its implications for European security. He provides an up-to-date analysis of the superpower discussions on nuclear arms control, including the impact of 'star wars', and also of the talks at Vienna on conventional force reductions and at Stockholm on confidence-building measures. He notes a shift in emphasis from 'parity' to 'transparency' in Western proposals, and questions whether this promises greater results than were achieved from earlier approaches. He also warns of the risks of arms control arrangements obstructing possibilities for reforming the European security system.

Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political context in which they are operating. Command in war is about forging effective strategies and implementing them, making sure that orders are appropriate, well-communicated, and then obeyed. But it is also an intensely political process. This is largely because how wars are fought depends to a large extent on how their aims are set. It is also because commanders in one realm must possess the ability to work with other command structures, including those of other branches of the armed forces and allies. In Command, Lawrence Freedman explores the importance of political as well as operational considerations in command with a series of eleven vivid case studies, all taken from the period after 1945. Over this period, the risks of nuclear escalation led to a shift away from great power confrontations and towards civil wars, and advances in communication technologies made it easier for higher-level commanders to direct their subordinates. Freedman covers defeats as well as victories. Pakistani generals tried to avoid surrender as they were losing the eastern part of their country to India in 1971. Iraq's Saddam Hussein turned his defeats into triumphant narratives of victory. Osama bin Laden escaped the Americans in Afghanistan in 2001. The UK struggled as a junior partner to the US in Iraq after 2003. We come across insubordinate generals, such as Israel's Arik Sharon, and those in the French army in Algeria, so frustrated with their political leadership that they twice tried to change it. At the other end of the scale, Che Guevara in Congo in 1966 and Igor Girkin in Ukraine in 2014 both tried to spark local wars to suit their grandiose objectives. Freedman ends the book with a meditation on the future of command in a world that is becoming increasingly reliant on technologies like artificial intelligence. A wide-ranging and insightful history of the changing nature of command in the postwar era, this will stand as a definitive account of a foundational concept in both military affairs and politics.

Drawing upon newly-released official and private papers, this book provides an intimate account of Anglo-American debates over one of the most grave and politically sensitive foreign-policy issues of the early 1960s. It examines the roles played by John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan in the test-ban negotiations between 1961 and 1963. It also describes the way in which contrasting domestic political imperatives and conceptions of how the Cold War could best be won, created tensions between the two allies. Nevertheless, they retained a broad unity of perspective and purpose, eventually producing the imaginative diplomacy that resulted in the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in August 1963.

The contributors to this book explore approaches to building a framework for nuclear governance in the Asia-Pacific - encompassing nuclear safety, security, and safeguards/non-proliferation. Nuclear governance collaboration offers an avenue for states in the Asia-Pacific to tackle the emerging opportunities for and challenges to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the civilian applications of nuclear and radioactive materials. The nature of national actions, bilateral initiatives and regional cooperation in capacity building taking place in East Asia provides a good foundation to pursue a more robust collaborative framework for nuclear governance in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The contributors to this book explore the most critical nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation issues faced by states in the Asia-Pacific and the growing cooperation spearheaded by Southeast Asian countries, China, Japan, South Korea and the United States. This book is a valuable read for academics working on security and strategic studies, international relations, non-traditional security issues as well as nuclear-related issues.

One of the gravest issues facing the global community today is the threat of nuclear war. As a growing number of nations gain nuclear capabilities, the odds of nuclear conflict increase. Yet nuclear deterrence strategies remain rooted in Cold War models that do not take into account regional conflict. Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments offers an innovative theory of brokered bargaining to better understand and solve regional crises. As the world has moved away from the binational relationships that defined Cold War conflict while nuclear weapons have continued to proliferate, new types of nuclear threats have arisen. Moeed Yusuf proposes a unique approach to deterrence that takes these changing factors into account. Drawing on the history of conflict between India and Pakistan, Yusuf describes the potential for third-party intervention to avert nuclear war. This book lays out the ways regional powers behave and maneuver in response to the pressures of strong global powers. Moving beyond debates surrounding the widely accepted rational deterrence model, Yusuf offers an original perspective rooted in thoughtful analysis of recent regional nuclear conflicts. With depth and insight, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments urges the international community to rethink its approach to nuclear deterrence.

The purpose of this book is to narrate important, dynamic events that have taken place in the Indo-U.S. relations, beginning from 1943 to 2013. This includes the American role in India's independence, the Cold War, demise of the Soviet Union, resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorists' attack of American cities in 2001, decline of American power, rise of India, and rise of China. The study is confined to only three areas: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear energy. The defining moment of the twenty-first century occurred in 2008 when these two estranged great democracies engaged one another to work on common goals and establish a strategic relationship between two natural allies.

The establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, a concept more recently broadened to cover all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has been before the international community for decades. In this book, two experts from the region explore why the matter remains unresolved, and outline a comprehensive yet achievable roadmap to a Middle East free of WMD. Weapons of mass destruction pose an existential threat to global peace and security. But nowhere is it more urgent to stem their spread than in the Middle East, a region fraught with mistrust and instability. Accounting for these geopolitical realities, including the ongoing talks to curb Iran's nuclear program, the authors present a practical and innovative strategy to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destructions (WMD). They outline a phased approach toward disarmament in the region, prescribing confidence-building measures and verification tools to create trust among the region's governments. Their vision also sees the realization of a WMD-free zone within a broader regional agenda for security and cooperation to advance socioeconomic and political progress. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, politics and security studies in the Middle East.

The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community's (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences. In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran's civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates. One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.

In the summer of 1997 some twelve lecturers and sixty students met for ten days in Budapest Hungary in a NATO Advanced Studies Institute (ASI) to consider "New Scientific and Technical Aspects of Verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention." In many ways the meeting was ahead of its time. The Ad Hoc Group was only then about to move to the discussion of a rolling text of the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It had been mandated to negotiate the Protocol by the Special Conference which had considered the work of the VEREX process that had taken place following the 1991 Third Review Conference of the Convention. Now, in late 1999, after much further negotiation of the text of the Protocol we are moving towards the endgame of the negotiations. Nevertheless, the scientific and technical issues discussed in the ASI in Hungary continue to be of direct relevance to the verification of the Convention and will continue to be relevant as the eventual Protocol moves from agreement through a Preparatory Commission stage and into full implementation over the next several years. The papers in this volume are much as they were presented in Budapest both in order of presentation and in content. They were designed by the ASI co-directors, Professor Graham Pearson and Ambassador Tibor Toth (Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group) to provide an integrated overview and in-depth analysis of the issues at stake.

Written in a lively and readable style by the world's leading authority on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and US-European relations, Defense of the West is the history of a transatlantic security relationship that has endured for over seventy years. This latest edition of a classic work looks at how developments inside NATO and European Union member states affect their ability to defend against external threats while preserving Western values, in the era of Trump and Brexit. Sloan frankly addresses the failures and shortcomings of Western institutions and member states. But the book emphasizes the continuing importance of value-based transatlantic security cooperation as a vital element of the defense and foreign policies of NATO and EU member states. At a time of heightened tension and political turmoil, at home and abroad, Stan Sloan's lucid and far-sighted analysis is more necessary than ever. -- .

Originally published in 1985 The Decision to Disarm Germany offers a fresh approach to Britain's First World War and Paris Peace Conference policy on the question of German military disarmament. It offers interpretations based on extensive research into unpublished records and private papers and provides important new conclusions about British policy. The book shows the interaction of domestic concerns and strategic considerations in the wartime development of British thinking on the issue of post-war German disarmament and in the post-Armistice formulation and implementation of Britain's German disarmament policy. It establishes the crucial interrelationship in British thinking and policy between German disarmament and general disarmament. It also shows the interwar consequences of wartime attitudes and peace conference policy.

Provides insight into U.S. and Chinese involvement in aid, trade, direct investment and strategic ties in Latin America In recent years, China has become the largest trading partner for more than half the countries in Latin America, and demonstrated major commitments in aid and direct investment in various parts of the region. China has also made a number of strategic commitments to countries like Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela which have long-standing policies opposing U.S. influence in the region. China, the United States, and the Future of Latin America posits that this activity is a direct challenge to the role of the U.S. in Latin America and the Caribbean. Part of a three-volume series analyzing U.S.-China relations in parts of the world where neither country is dominant, this volume analyzes the interactions between the U.S., China, and Latin America. The book series has so far considered the differences in operating styles between China and the U.S. in Central Asia and Southeast Asia. This third volume unpacks the implications of competing U.S. and Chinese interests in countries such as Brazil and Argentina, and China's commitments in Nicaragua and Venezuela. This volume draws upon a variety of policy experts, focusing on the viewpoints of South American and Caribbean scholars as well as scholars from outside states. China's new global reach and its ambitions, as well as the U.S. response, are analyzed in detail.A nuanced examination of current complexities and future implications, China, the United States and the Future of Latin America provides readers with varied perspectives on the changing economic and strategic picture in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The contributors to Strategic Stability in the Post-Cold War World and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament recognize that the collapse of the former Soviet Union has left a conceptual vacuum in the definition of a new world order. Never before have the components of world order all changed so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally. As Henry Kissinger points out, the emergence of a new world order will have to confront three fundamental questions: What are the basic units of the international order? What are their means of interacting? and What are the goals on behalf of which they interact? The main question is whether the establishment and maintenance of an international system will turn out to be a conscious design, or the outgrowth of a trial of strength. The concept of a planning framework that could shape or govern these interactions is emerging and may now be at hand. Capturing this emerging framework is the thrust of the present book, which seeks to reach a consensus on defining a model (calculus) for strategic stability in a changing, multipolar world in the presence of weapons of mass destruction - the model being the core of a conscious design to shape or govern the interactions of nation states in a new world order. The following taxonomy of the dimensions of strategic stability was accepted by the contributors as the first step towards such a model: Stability in geopolitics and balance of power; Arms race stability; Deterrence stability, crisis stability, first strike stability; Stability in the presence of clandestine proliferation. After four gruelling days, this unprecedented gathering of top academic, scientific and military experts from the USA, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, and Israel reached a general agreement that is captured in the Consensus Report; each participant presented an individual contribution that further fleshes out the dimensions of strategic stability. This unprecedented work provides joint concepts for all leaders of the nuclear powers to shape their decisions for the coming decades. And for the first time they can base their decisions on agreed scientific facts, not just political judgments.

Project Atom is a forward-looking, "blue-sky" review of U.S. nuclear strategy and posture in a 2025-2050 world in which nuclear weapons are still necessary. The report highlights and addresses the current deficit in national security attention paid to the continued relevance and importance of U.S. nuclear strategy and force posture, provides a new open-source baseline for understanding the nuclear strategies of other countries, and offers a credible, intellectually tested, and nonpartisan range of options for the United States to consider in revising its own nuclear strategy.

The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998. Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve. Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation.

The Nobel Symposium on A Future Arms Control Agenda was organized by SIPRI to consider how arms control can contribute to creating a cooperative security system based on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the gradual demilitarization of international relations. The proceedings of the symposium include comprehensive discussions of the new normative and structural elements of the post-cold war global security system and the objectives and limits of arms control within that evolving system.

War With Iran: Political, Military and Economic Consequences provides readers both a history of Iran's relationship with the West and an expert's estimation of what the political, human and financial costs of full-scale war with Iran might be. Authors Geoffrey Kemp and John Allen Gay of the Center for the National Interest utilize their years studying and informing America's foreign policy in the Middle East to bring to life the possible outcomes of an American military intervention in Iran. Such a decision would not only have catastrophic consequences on the Persian Gulf, but would also endanger the whole world's delicate economy by heightening instability in a fragile but resource-rich region. Written for anyone with an interest in the future of American foreign policy, War With Iran explores what every player has at stake in the current crisis by analyzing every tension adjacent to it; from America's staunch support of Israel to Iran's own dogged pursuit of advanced nuclear capabilities. Controversial, timely and thoroughly researched, this story stands as a preliminary caution against what would be a devastating meltdown of diplomacy, for which-if peace be the goal-there is always time.