This invaluable study provides a unique insider's view of the history of Soviet and Russian policy on nuclear weapons modernization and charts the future evolution of the Russian strategic arsenal. Using information that has only recently become available and introducing new, previously unknown data, Sokov concludes that the most important force behind the evolution of the Soviet and Russian strategic arsenal was the military itself, which sought to increase strategic stability by enhancing the survivability of weapons systems. The highly destabilizing posture of the 1970s and 1980s was, he argues, in a sense 'accidental, ' resulting from the failure of several R&D programs and specific features of the Soviet decisionmaking mechanism. The author demonstrates that the role of such factors as the economic crisis, U.S. modernization programs, and general Russian foreign policy goals has been exaggerated by Western analysts. No matter how hard-pressed, Russia will hold to its current plans, Sokov argues. At the same time, the military will be unlikely to engage in a new arms buildup even if the economic situation improves or a nationalist government comes to power. Instead, stability will be sought through better quality of weapons at progressively lower levels. Introducing a wealth of new information on Soviet and Russian national security policymaking, the author explores in meticulous detail such key issues as decisions on weapons development, arms-control negotiations, and the handling of the Soviet nuclear arsenal after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The reader will be able to follow the debates and intrigues between military planners, diplomats, and weapons designers as they clashed over the choice of acquisition programs and negotiating positions. With its combination of informed analysis and use of new documentation, this work will be invaluable for all concerned with U.S.-Russian strategic relations.

Nuclear weapons are not a subject of intense public discussion and debate, but they should be. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only the beginning; in recent times, nuclear annihilation at the hands of rogues and terrorists has become an even greater concern than the specter of nuclear war between superpowers. In a series of clear, calm, well-reasoned dialogues, longtime scholars and practitioners of peace Richard Falk and David Krieger probe key questions about our nuclear reality and dig beneath the surreal surface tranquility that has largely surrounded its existence. Although the authors agree on much, there are many areas where their thoughts diverge, including their assessment of the value of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and of President Obama s level of commitment to nuclear issues. They put forward new proposals and explore in the dialogues different ways to move ahead. They contend that a nuclear-free future is not a subject to be left only to experts for the so-called experts have brought us to the brink of the nuclear precipice over and over again. Falk and Krieger believe that although none of us has the power to bring about global change alone, together we are immensely powerful powerful enough to overcome the threats of the Nuclear Age and move us appreciably along the path to zero. Covers questions about living in the Nuclear Age including: How have we responded (or failed to respond) to these immensely powerful weapons? Are we capable of escaping their threat? Can civilization make the leap to survival in a world with thousands of nuclear weapons? Will humankind become the victim of its own cleverness? Will we recognize the nuclear dilemma that confronts us in the 21st century? Will we be able also to recognize our power, when acting together, to be a force for change? Will we act soon enough and forcefully enough to assure civilization s survival?"

German Disarmament After World War I examines the Allied disarmament of Germany and the challenges that such an enormous task presented to international efforts in enforcing the Treaty of Versailles. In the twenty-first century, disarmament remains a critical issue for the International community. This new book focuses on three key areas and lessons of Allied disarmament operations from 1920-31: the role and experience of international arms inspectors working amidst an embittered German populace the ramifications of the divergent disarmament priorities of the leaders of the disarmament coalition the effectiveness of united Allied policies backed by sanctions. These major issues are examined within the overall context of the assessment of Allied disarmament operations in Germany. While some historians perceive German disarmament as a failure, this book argues that arms inspectors successfully destroyed Germany's ability to pose a military threat to European security. This new study shows how the destructive legacy of war convinced the victorious nations, especially Britain and France, of the importance in minimizing German military strength. French post-war security concerns, however, were often faced with the unwillingness of Britain to enforce the totality of the military articles of the treaty. German obstruction also influenced Allied disarmament policies. German Disarmament After World War I examines the initial effectiveness of Allied disarmament efforts in Germany and explains how they ultimately disappeared through diverging conceptions of a post-war world. This book will be of great interest to all students of disarmament, the interwar period and of military history, modern European history and security studies.

Throughout the Cold War there were longstanding efforts to control the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) through extensive arms control, deterrence, and defense programs. Since then counterproliferation efforts by the U.S. and international community have accelerated. Given the attention to counterproliferation in the last decade, how effective was the leadership provided by President Clinton and his Secretaries of Defense, Aspin, Perry and Cohen, in providing innovative and effective policies for countering the proliferation of WMD? Comparing the cases of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and U.S. and U.N. efforts in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Joseph R. Cerami examines patterns of organizational leadership and policy innovation in the development and implementation of WMD policy initiatives. Rather than criticize the framework of American and international political institutions, this leadership perspective draws important insights on the capabilities of institutions to further U.S. and international goals and objectives in security policymaking. In doing so, the book argues that the U.S.'s role and the roles of its internal government agencies are most significant in international affairs. Smartly and appealingly positioned at the intersection of theory and practice, Cerami's book crafts a new perspective in international relations and public administration offering great potential for understanding as well as designing policy innovations to counter the proliferation of WMD in the 21st century.

This book interrogates the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement from its inception in July 2005 to its conclusion in the latter part of 2008 through 12 articles, each of which focuses on different aspects of the deal. They discuss the factors that facilitated the deal, the roadblocks that were encountered, and the implications of the deal for the future of India's foreign policy, its energy security and the international non-proliferation regime. Together, they address the internal political dynamics in India and the United States in order to present perspectives of both countries.

Nuclear weapons are not a subject of intense public discussion and debate, but they should be. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only the beginning; in recent times, nuclear annihilation at the hands of rogues and terrorists has become an even greater concern than the specter of nuclear war between superpowers. In a series of clear, calm, well-reasoned dialogues, longtime scholars and practitioners of peace Richard Falk and David Krieger probe key questions about our nuclear reality and dig beneath the surreal surface tranquility that has largely surrounded its existence. Although the authors agree on much, there are many areas where their thoughts diverge, including their assessment of the value of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and of President Obama s level of commitment to nuclear issues. They put forward new proposals and explore in the dialogues different ways to move ahead. They contend that a nuclear-free future is not a subject to be left only to experts for the so-called experts have brought us to the brink of the nuclear precipice over and over again. Falk and Krieger believe that although none of us has the power to bring about global change alone, together we are immensely powerful powerful enough to overcome the threats of the Nuclear Age and move us appreciably along the path to zero. Covers questions about living in the Nuclear Age including: How have we responded (or failed to respond) to these immensely powerful weapons? Are we capable of escaping their threat? Can civilization make the leap to survival in a world with thousands of nuclear weapons? Will humankind become the victim of its own cleverness? Will we recognize the nuclear dilemma that confronts us in the 21st century? Will we be able also to recognize our power, when acting together, to be a force for change? Will we act soon enough and forcefully enough to assure civilization s survival?"

This timely book, published in the lead up to the 2012-14 decision on Trident renewal, makes available for the first time the late Sir Michael Quinlan s private correspondence on nuclear deterrence. It shows why Sir Michael, as Policy Director and then Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence during the last years of the Cold War, became known as the high priest of deterrence: his unparalleled grasp of nuclear strategy, contribution to nuclear doctrine in the UK and NATO, and deep and genuine concern with defence ethics earned him respect and admiration around the world. Even those who challenged him on fundamental questions of strategy and morality (and many of his correspondents fell into this category, as this volume will reveal) recognised his sincere devotion to his cause: the creation of a stable system of east west nuclear deterrence for the prevention of major war. Before he died in 2009, Sir Michael made it known that he wished for his private correspondence to be published. This book helps fulfil that wish. It presents a selection of the most compelling letters among the many thousands in the Quinlan files. It is intended as a memorial to a brilliant man, an important historical record of British nuclear thinking during the cold war, and a contribution to contemporary debates over the future of nuclear deterrence."

The Detente Deception examines the competition between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet bloc in the less developed world during the final years of Detente. Rivero assesses whether or not the Soviet bloc pushed for strategic gains in the Third World and whether this contributed to the U.S. decision to abandon Detente in 1979. This view is articulated by many acclaimed scholars such as Stephen Walt (1992), John Gaddis (1997), and Vladislav Zubok (2007). They make the case that during the final years of Detente and throughout the 1980s, U.S. policy in places such as Nicaragua and Angola was a calculated response to Soviet aggression in the less-developed world. This book challenges this position as the quantitative evidence points to U.S. aggression. Not only did the Western bloc push to maintain dominance over the Third World, archival evidence also suggests the US made significant efforts in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan during the final years of Detente to dismantle the Soviet bloc.

This book assesses how progress in disarmament diplomacy in the last decade has improved human security. In doing so, the book looks at three cases of the development of international norms in this arena. First, it traces how new international normative understandings have shaped the evolution of and support for an Arms Trade Treaty (the supply side of the arms trade); and, second, it examines the small arms international regime and examines a multilateral initiative that aims to address the demand side (by the Geneva Declaration); and, third, it examines the evolution of two processes to ban and regulate cluster munitions. The formation of international norms in these areas is a remarkable development, as it means that a domain that was previously thought to be the exclusive purview of states, i.e. how they procure and manage arms, has been penetrated by multiple influences from worldwide civil society. As a result, norms and treaties are being established to address the domain of arms, and states will have more multilateral restriction over their arms and less sovereignty in this domain. This book will be of much interest to students of the arms trade, international security, international law, human security and IR in general. Denise Garcia is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University, Boston. She is author of Small Arms and Security (Routledge 2006).

Some states have violated international commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. Yet the effects of international sanctions or positive inducements on their internal politics remain highly contested. How have trade, aid, investments, diplomacy, financial measures and military threats affected different groups? How, when and why were those effects translated into compliance with non-proliferation rules? Have inducements been sufficiently biting, too harsh, too little, too late or just right for each case? How have different inducements influenced domestic cleavages? What were their unintended and unforeseen effects? Why are self-reliant autocracies more often the subject of sanctions? Leading scholars analyse the anatomy of inducements through novel conceptual perspectives, in-depth case studies, original quantitative data and newly translated documents. The volume distils ten key dilemmas of broad relevance to the study of statecraft, primarily from experiences with Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, bound to spark debate among students and practitioners of international politics.

This examination of the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime focuses on critical developments, technological in particular, currently endangering the regime. Crucial technologies affecting nuclear weapon proliferation and their potential ramifications for the NPT regime as a whole are examined and potential policy options which could ameliorate or perhaps eliminate the resulting dangers are analysed. Developments and problems raised by the nuclear programmes in Iraq and North Korea receive special attention. The book contributes to the discussion and debate occurring in preparation for the 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference.

This volume presents a range of views on the current state of global nuclear disarmament from eminent scholars from India, Israel and France. Chapters present and analyse the relationships between India, Pakistan and the USA, Russia and the USA, the position of the EU and of Israel. The perspectives presented range from optimism to pessimism on global nuclear disarmament and consequences for human security.

The theory and practice of arms control seemed to have its heyday during the height of the Cold War, with its focus on the East-West conflict and nuclear arms. In the past twenty years, both arms technologies and various practices aimed at their control have continued to develop, but scholarly thinking has not kept up. This volume seeks to redress this scholarly neglect of the range of issues associated with the control of the means of violence, by asking the question: what does arms control mean in the 21st Century?

In asking this question, the volume examines issues surrounding sovereignty, geopolitics, nuclear disarmament, securitization of space, technological developments, human rights, the clearance of landmines, the regulation of small arms and the control of the black market for arms and nuclear secrets. The book discusses terrorism with reference to the case of the suicide attacks in Beirut in 1983 and how the Obama administration is orientating its posture on nuclear arms.

This book was published as a special issue of Contemporary Security Policy.

"A pioneering political-scientific history. . . . Lucidly composed, meticulously documented, and handsomely presented."--The Annals
"A fascinating and compelling story of the beginnings of the Chinese nuclear weapon program."--Arms Control Today

Sanctions are an important tool within the foreign policy of the European Union, which have until now remained obscure to both scholars and the general public. This book examines sanctions as a political tool of influence and evaluates the efficacy of sanctions imposed by the EU against third countries and their ability to bring about the desired outcome. While the principal sanctions activity of the EU takes place under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the author also considers the suspension of development aid under the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, the withdrawal of trade privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences and other sanctions outside these frameworks. Reviewing the sanctions practice of the EU in its virtual entirety, Portela assesses the relevance of classical sanctions theory by testing a series of hypotheses with empirical case-studies attempting to identify the determinants of success of EU sanctions. Enhancing our understanding of the EU's international role, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of international politics, security studies, EU studies, human rights and democracy, conflict management, IPE and development studies.

This title was first piblished in 2000: Christoph Bluth provides a comprehensive and timely analysis of strategic nuclear arms policy in the United States and Russia and examines the collaborative efforts to reduce nuclear weapons through arms control and render nuclear weapons and fissile materials in Russia secure. He concludes that the end of the Cold War has created new and unprecedented dangers and that these dangers require a greater political will and cooperation which have so far been lacking.

Introduction. Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes beyond 1995 (R.M. Timerbaev). Nuclear Arms Control in the Postcold War Era (R. Imai). Toward a Universal Framework of Nuclear Restraint (M.A. Khan). The NPT's Prospects (J.F. Pilat). The Last Nuclear Summit? (M. Reiss). 1995: A Time for Optimism? (B. Sanders). India and the NPT after the Cold War (R.G.C. Thomas). Perspectives of Nonproliferation: A View from Russia (O.A. Grinevsky). The Future of the NPT: A German Perspective (J. Krause). Beyond 1995: The NPT and Europe (H. Muller). The NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Future of Nonproliferation (J.R. Redick). Avoiding Amendment of the NPT (C.N. Van Doren). What Happens to Safeguards if the NPT Goes? (D. Fischer). Does the NPT Matter? (L. Scheinman). Appendix: Toward 1995: United Nations Documents Relating to the Establishment and Functioning of the NPT, 1959-1993. Index.

Moral theologians, defense analysts, conflict scholars, and nuclear experts imagine a world free from nuclear weapons At a 2017 Vatican conference, Pope Francis condemned nuclear weapons. This volume, issued after the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, presents essays from moral theologians, defense analysts, conflict transformation scholars, and nuclear arms control experts, with testimonies from witnesses. It is a companion volume to A World Free from Nuclear Weapons: The Vatican Conference on Disarmament (Georgetown University Press, 2020). Chapters from the perspectives of missile personnel and the military chain of command, industrialists and legislators, and citizen activists show how we might achieve a nuclear-free world. Key to this transition is the important role of public education and the mobilization of lay movements to raise awareness and effect change. This essential collection prepares military professionals, policymakers, everyday citizens, and the pastoral workers who guide them, to make decisions that will lead us to disarmament.

This book assesses how progress in disarmament diplomacy in the last decade has improved human security. In doing so, the book looks at three cases of the development of international norms in this arena. First, it traces how new international normative understandings have shaped the evolution of and support for an Arms Trade Treaty (the supply side of the arms trade); and, second, it examines the small arms international regime and examines a multilateral initiative that aims to address the demand side (by the Geneva Declaration); and, third, it examines the evolution of two processes to ban and regulate cluster munitions. The formation of international norms in these areas is a remarkable development, as it means that a domain that was previously thought to be the exclusive purview of states, i.e. how they procure and manage arms, has been penetrated by multiple influences from worldwide civil society. As a result, norms and treaties are being established to address the domain of arms, and states will have more multilateral restriction over their arms and less sovereignty in this domain. This book will be of much interest to students of the arms trade, international security, international law, human security and IR in general. Denise Garcia is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University, Boston. She is author of Small Arms and Security (Routledge 2006).

In November 2013, a historic agreement on Iran's nuclear program was reached between Iran and the world powers, raising the prospects for a long-term agreement that would end the Iran nuclear crisis and set the stage for normal relations between Iran and the West. This book seeks to provide readers with a comprehensive understanding of this agreement and the protracted process that preceded it. It examines in details the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the world powers, focusing on the origins and evolution of the Iran nuclear crisis, the unilateral and the multilateral sanctions. It also looks at the relationship between nuclear and various non-nuclear regional issues, as well as the long-term implications for the U.S.-Iran relations.

This edited volume explores competing perspectives on the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on the South Asian security environment. The spread of nuclear weapons is one of the world's foremost security concerns. The effect of nuclear weapons on the behaviour of newly nuclear states, and the potential for future international crises, are of particular concern. As a region of burgeoning economic and political importance, South Asia offers a crucial test of proliferation's effects on the crisis behaviour of newly nuclear states. This volume creates a dialogue between scholars who believe that nuclear weapons have stabilized the subcontinent, and those who believe that nuclear weapons have made South Asia more conflict prone. It does so by pairing competing analyses of four major regional crises: the 1987 "Brasstacks" crisis, the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1990, the 1999 Kargil war, which occurred after the nuclear tests; and the 2001-2 Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. In addition, the volume explores the implications of the South Asian nuclear experience for potential new nuclear states such as North Korea and Iran.

The Global Arms Trade is written by a team of security experts drawn from around the world, analysing a phenomenon which has continued to flourish despite the end of the Cold War and the preoccupation with global terrorism after 11 September 2001. It provides a clear description and analysis of the demand for, and supply of, modern weapons systems, and assesses key issues of concern. The comprehensive and in-depth treatment of the subject establishes this volume as a standard reference on the subject. It is divided sections which examine the demand for arms, the supply of arms and the key issues in the global arms trade. Part 1: Introduction. Develops the general conceptual framework by providing and overview of the global arms trade Part 2: Arms Modernization after the Cold War. Focuses on the demand for arms, in terms of defence spending, procurement and modernization Part 3: The Arms Industry after the Cold War. Examines the supply of arms, and the evolution, development of the arms industry, as well as its problems and prospects Part 4: Key Issues in the Global Arms Trade. Discusses the major issues arising from the arms trade phenomenon The global arms trade is a major area of academic and governmental enquiry. With chapters looking at World regions such as Asia, Europe and the Middle East, as well as individual countries, this book will be of particular use and interest to scholars of international relations and security studies, policy analysts and defence professionals.

As counter-profileration is expected to become the central element in the new national security policy of the US, such actions will constitute a central element of every major international conflict in the first decades of the 21st century. One of the most important geostrategic phenomena of the past decade has been the extraordinary diffusion of war-making capabilities from the developed North to the developing South. In the eyes of some proliferant states, possessing nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons would not only add to their regional stature, but would also offer an asymmetrical counter to the West's massive superiority in conventional forces. In the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, a number of countries are assumed to possess varying levels of NBC-weapons capabilities. Reasons for concern include the fact that such weapons have been used in the past; the region's geographic proximity to Europe and the vital interests of the West (which is prepared, under certain circumstances, to use force to protect them); the multiplicity of conflicts and other security problems; and the general instability in the region (including the spread of religious extremism). This important and timely book assesses, in detail, the accuracy of predictions, and perceptions, about a possible military threat from the Southern Mediterranean (Muslim) world; and their impact on NATO's political and military posture. Thanos P. Doxos presents an assessment of the Alliance's options for dealing with the problem. This book represents an invaluable, topical resource for researchers and policy makers.

The National Institute for Public Policy's new book, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence, is the first of its kind. Dr. Keith Payne, the late former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and an unparalleled bipartisan group of senior civilian and military experts critically examined eight basic assumptions of Minimum Deterrence against available evidence. In general, Minimum Deterrence does not fare well under the careful scrutiny. Proponents of a "Minimum Deterrent" US nuclear force posture believe that anywhere from a handful to a few hundred nuclear weapons are adequate to deter reliably and predictably any enemy from attacking the United States now and in the future. Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, their thinking goes, no foreign leader would dare challenge US capabilities. The benefits, advocates claim, of reducing US nuclear weapons to the "minimum" level needed are: better relations with Russia and China, reinforcement of the arms control and Nonproliferation Treaty, billions of defense dollars in savings, and greater international stability on the way to "nuclear zero." As political pressure builds to pursue this vision of minimum US deterrence, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence stands as the seminal study to address the many claims of great benefit against available empirical evidence. This book was published as a National Institute Press monograph, Keith B. Payne and James Schlesinger, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2013) and as a special issue of Comparative Strategy.

This book focuses the public debate on fundamental political problem by defining three approaches to arms control. The three approaches are (l) extend or modify the SALT II Treaty; (2) restructure the present or planned nuclear forces; and (3) establish overall equivalence.