Now in its seventeenth year, the Stockhom International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook brings together information on world armaments and the efforts made to limit or reduce them. Compiled from open sources by an international staff working on neutral ground, the yearbook examines pressing issues such as nuclear and space weapons, chemical and biological warfare and military technology, and military expenditure and the arms trade.

Helps us to better understand the dangers of U.S. nuclear strategy, and reminds us that it is a strategy we can resist.

Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East remains an issue of concern. Saudi Arabia's actions will largely rest on Iran's decisions, and discussions and preparations within Saudi Arabia would suggest that it is ready to react to potential shifts in the region's nuclear powers. Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons uses an "inside out" approach that emphasises the Saudis' own national interests in relation to the nuclear threat, and their understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in defense, foreign policy and the concept of deterrence. It is the first study with comprehensive use of the local Arabic language military and civilian media to provide this understanding of official thinking and policy. The Saudi case study is contextualised against the prevailing proliferation models, to conclude that the Saudi case shares both commonalities and elements of uniqueness with other proliferation cases, implying the need for a 'multi-causal' approach. Its comparative analysis also suggests potential implications applicable more broadly to the issue of nuclear proliferation. A comprehensive study of Saudi Arabia's attitude to nuclear weapons, this book offers an exploration of nuclear proliferation that would interest students, scholars and policymakers working in Middle East studies, as well as Military and nuclear proliferation studies.

This book analyzes the United States and Russia's nuclear arms control and deterrence relationships and how these countries must lead current and prospective efforts to support future nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. The second nuclear age, following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, poses new challenges with respect to nuclear-strategic stability, deterrence and nonproliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia, and the potential for new nuclear weapons states in the Middle East, create new possible axes of conflict potentially stressful to the existing world order. Other uncertainties include the interest of major powers in developing a wider spectrum of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, possibly for use in limited nuclear wars, and the competitive technologies for antimissile defenses being developed and deployed by the United States and Russia. Other technology challenges, including the implications of cyberwar for nuclear deterrence and crisis management, are also considered. Political changes also matter. The early post-Cold War hopes for the emergence of a global pacific security community, excluding the possibility of major war, have been dashed by political conflict between Russia and NATO, by the roiled nature of American domestic politics with respect to international security, and by a more assertive and militarily competent China. Additionally, the study includes suggestions for both analysis and policy in order to prevent the renewed U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race and competition in new technologies. This volume would be ideal for graduate students, researchers, scholars and anyone who is interested in nuclear policy, international studies, and Russian politics.

This book examines Japan's nuclear identity and its implications for abolition of nuclear weapons. By applying analytical eclecticism in combination with international relations theory, this book categorizes Japan's nuclear identity as a 'nuclear-bombed state' (classical liberalism), 'nuclear disarmament state' (neoliberalism), 'nuclear-threatened state' (classical realism), and a 'nuclear umbrella state' (neorealism). This research investigates whether the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 'genocide' or not, to what degree Japan has contributed to nuclear disarmament, how Japan has been threatened by ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons of North Korea, and how Japan's security policy has been embedded with the nuclear strategy of the United States. It also sheds light on theoretical factors that Japan does not support the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Finally, this book considers the future of Japan's nuclear identity and attempts to explore alternatives for Japan's nuclear disarmament diplomacy toward a world without nuclear weapons.

This new Handbook is a comprehensive examination of the rich and complex issues of nuclear proliferation in the early 21st century. The volume presents the most up-to-date analysis and policy recommendations on these critical issues by recognized, leading scholars in the field, and will become the go-to book for scholars and practitioners studying or shaping policies on nuclear proliferation. In the context of rising regional instability and conflict, along with increased incidents of global terrorism, and in a dynamic, uncertain political environment, emerging nuclear proliferation threats-from both states and terrorist groups-are seen as growing dangers giving rise to increasing global insecurity. The future of the decades-long effort to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction is therefore at a crossroads today. If international nonproliferation efforts are to be successful, an integrated, multi-tiered response will almost certainly be necessary. But a serious, thorough, and clear-eyed examination of the range of threats, challenges, and opportunities facing the international community is a necessary first step.That is what this Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation is intended to do. The volume is divided into four major sections. Section I is intended to be a primer that explains the basic technologies involved with nuclear proliferation-including the basics of weapons design, the fuel cycle (including uranium enrichment and plutonium production), and some of the technologies and procedures that have been developed to detect covert nuclear weapons programs and, in the event of their use or discovery, to trace the weapons back to their state of origin. Section II presents detailed threat assessments of proliferation risks across the globe, including specific regions and countries. It also explains the various tools developed by the international community to address these proliferation threats-including the NPT, IAEA safeguards, and various international treaties and arrangements. Section III addresses the proliferation risks and political/technological challenges arising from nuclear energy production.Finally, the fourth section examines the problems of nuclear security and terrorism, including the risks of nuclear terrorism, potential loss of controls over nuclear weapons and materials, and the programs designed to improve nuclear security across the globe. This Handbook will be of great interest to students of nuclear proliferation, arms control, global governance, diplomacy, and global security and IR general.

John A. Vasquez explains the processes that cause the spread of interstate war by looking at how contagion worked to bring countries into the First World War. Analysing all the key states that declared war, the book is comprised of three parts. Part I lays out six models of contagion: alliances, contiguity, territorial rivalry, opportunity, 'brute force' and economic dependence. Part II then analyses in detail the decision making of every state that entered the war from Austria-Hungary in 1914 to the United States and Greece in 1917. Part III has two chapters - the first considers the neutral countries, and the second concludes the book with an overarching theoretical analysis, including major lessons of the war and new hypotheses about contagion. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, conflict studies and international history, especially those interested in the spread of conflict, or the First World War.

In this book, Jeffrey Knopf investigates domestic sources of state preferences about whether to seek cooperation with other countries on security issues. He does so by examining whether public protest against nuclear weapons influenced US decisions to enter strategic arms talks. The analysis builds on the domestic structure approach to explaining foreign policy, using it as the starting point to develop a new framework with which to trace the influence of societal actors. The book's finding that protest had a major impact suggests that prevailing conceptions of the relation between domestic politics and international cooperation need to be broadened. Existing approaches typically assume that state preferences are set by political leaders or powerful interests, thereby treating the rest of society only as a constraint on state action. In contrast, this book demonstrates that ordinary citizens can also serve as a direct stimulus to the development of a state interest in cooperation.

Great power competition has returned after a generation of absence, and the U.S. military edge over prospective opponents is eroding. Whereas the United States previously could overwhelm adversaries with sheer force, if necessary, it now needs every advantage it can get. This study analyzes how the United States might inflict surprise on its adversaries to gain a strategic advantage. Surprise is one aspect of a broader discussion in the national security literature on innovative operational concepts, which may serve as force multipliers to enable the United States to get more out of existing capabilities. A follow up to CSIS's highly successful 2018 study Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts, this report highlights several components of a successful surprise, including exploiting adversary vulnerabilities, using intelligence and technology, employing secrecy and deception, and doing the unexpected. The report also contains over a dozen vignettes illustrating potential future surprises.

Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future.

Over the past fifteen years, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons has been a staple in International Relations courses because of its brevity and crystal-clear explanations. The new edition, An Enduring Debate, continues the important discussion of nuclear proliferation and the dangers of a nuclear-armed world. With new chapters on the questions surrounding a nuclear North Korea, Iran, and Iraq and the potential for a world free of nuclear weapons, this Third Edition will continue to generate a lively classroom experience.

The growing threat of biological and chemical weapons (BCW) has created the frightening prospect of terrorist attacks by states, state-sanctioned terrorist organizations, and destructive individuals loose in our midst. What can we do to prepare for this threat? This illuminating and often disturbing book brings together the views of leading thinkers--in science, medicine, international and constitutional law, law enforcement, intelligence, and crisis management--on all diverse aspects of this challenge based on their statements at the November 1998 Hoover Institution Conference on Biological and Chemical Weapons. The New Terror takes a hard look at the most pressing BCW issues facing the international community and realistic options for preventing, deterring against, and mitigating the consequences of the use of BCW.

Der Besitz von Kernwaffen hatte fur Grossbritannien nicht nur militarische Bedeutung, sondern diente daruber hinaus der Erhaltung des Grossmachtstatus. Dieses Interesse war auch die treibende Kraft der britischen Nichtverbreitungspolitik, die zu einem zentralen Aspekt der Aussenpolitik wurde und in den Beziehungen zu den USA, zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich eine entscheidende Rolle spielte. Wahrend die Briten von den USA als Lieferanten moderner Kernwaffentechnologie abhangig waren, drangten sie die Bundesrepublik zum Verzicht auf Nuklearwaffen. Dem ehemaligen Kriegsgegner Deutschland, obwohl inzwischen zum Verbundeten geworden, wollte man weiterhin nur einen niedrigeren Rang in der internationalen Szenerie gewahren. Aus diesen grundsatzlichen Zielen ergaben sich die britische Position in den Teststopp-Verhandlungen, die Ablehnung von Planen zur Grundung einer multilateralen NATO-Atomstreitmacht (MLF) und die Haltung Londons in den Verhandlungen uber einen Nichtverbreitungsvertrag. Aus der Presse: ..". an important contribution towards a more complete understanding of the dynamics of postwar international history." Journal of European Integration History 2 / 2000"

This book evaluates President Hassan Rouhani's foreign policy during his first two years in office, looking at the case studies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, the UAE, Turkey, and Syria, as well as the Iran-US relationship. President Rouhani came to power in Iran in 2013 promising to reform the country's long-contentious foreign policy. His top priorities were rehabilitating the Iranian economy, ending the nuclear dispute, rebuilding relations with the US, and mending ties with Iran's neighbors. It is argued here that while President Rouhani has made progress in the Iran-US relationship, in nuclear negotiations and some bilateral relationships, his broader success has been hampered by regional political developments and domestic competition. Further, it is contended that his future success will be guided by emerging regional tensions, including whether Iran's neighbors will accept the terms of the nuclear agreement.

It is estimated that today some 2.7% of world GDP ($1.5 trillion) is spent on arms. In 2014 Lockheed Martin, the US defence contractor, had revenues of $45 billion the equivalent of the GDP of Tunisia. This book explores the business behind these breathtaking figures and explains how the arms industry makes its money. The book begins by defining the industry, explaining why the sector is important, outlining its prime contractors and key supply chains. Its cost categories (from R&D to maintenance), the role of technical innovation, and the sector's dependence on the monopsony buying power of Government, are all examined. The structure-conduct and performance model is used to show the workings of the arms market and its various entry and exit conditions, and the sector's performance is analysed through various indicators including exports, development time scales, cost overruns and profitability. The complex choice problems of domestic procurement are considered alongside sales to foreign governments and the opportunities that may present for bribery and corruption. The Military-Industrial-Political-Complex (MIPC) is unpacked and the behaviour of its major agents national defence agencies, the armed forces, producer groups, political agents (voters, political parties and budget-maximising bureaucracies) is scrutinised, both in times of conflict (expansion) and peace (contraction). The book concludes by considering future trends, such as whether arms industries are better under state or private ownership, and how they can meet the challenge of new threats in different forms. The discussion throughout is anchored to case studies from all parts of the world, including Brazil, Korea, Japan, Russia as well as UK, US and Europe. As an authoritative non-technical introduction to the economics of arms industries, it is suitable for students of business studies, politics, international relations, political economy, strategic and defence studies as well as for courses on microeconomics and industrial economics. As a masterly summation from one of the world's leading defence economists, it will also be required reading for staff in defence ministries, procurement agencies, the armed forces and strategic studies think-tanks throughout the world.

This book offers a collection of texts by Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker (1912-2007), a major German universal scientist who was also a pioneer in physics, philosophy, religion on issues of politics and peace research. He worked with Werner Heisenberg and Otto Hahn in the German "Uranverein", obtained a patent for plutonium during World War II and was an opponent of the nuclear armament of the German armed forces (1957). Furthermore, he published a study on the inability to defend Germany (1971) that was instrumental in the debate on defensive defense since the mid 1970s. He wrote on war and peace, peace and truth, policy implications of nuclear energy, on ethical issues of modern strategy, on consequences of war and war prevention and on the theory of power. He coined the term "world domestic policy" which still covers a valid theory for political, institutional secured world peace in the atomic age.

We live in an age of crises that are global in scale and potentially apocalyptic in severity, affecting the lives of millions billions of people. Peter Lee examines the struggle for truth at the heart of these crises to show how political leaders attempt to shape individual behavior, attitudes and identity.

Covering the development of the atomic bomb during the Second World War, the origins and early course of the Cold War, and the advent of the hydrogen bomb in the early 1950s, Churchill and the Bomb explores a still neglected aspect of Winston Churchill's career - his relationship with and thinking on nuclear weapons. Kevin Ruane shows how Churchill went from regarding the bomb as a weapon of war in the struggle with Nazi Germany to viewing it as a weapon of communist containment (and even punishment) in the early Cold War before, in the 1950s, advocating and arguably pioneering what would become known as "mutually assured destruction" as the key to preventing the Cold War flaring into a calamitous nuclear war. While other studies of Churchill have touched on his evolving views on nuclear weapons, few historians have given this hugely important issue the kind of dedicated and sustained treatment it deserves. In Churchill and the Bomb, however, Kevin Ruane has undertaken extensive primary research in Britain, the United States and Europe, and accessed a wide array of secondary literature, in producing an immensely readable yet detailed, insightful and provocative account of Churchill's nuclear hopes and fears.

Much recent writing about international politics understandably highlights the many changes that have followed from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This book, by contrast, analyzes an important continuity that, the author argues, will characterize international strategic affairs well into the new century: nuclear deterrence will remain at the core of the security policies of the world's great powers and will continue to be an attractive option for many less powerful states worried about adversaries whose capabilities they cannot match. The central role of nuclear deterrence persists despite the advent of a new international system in which serious military threats are no longer obvious, the use of force is judged irrelevant to resolving most international disputes, and states' interests are increasingly defined in economic rather than military terms. Indeed, the author suggests why these changes may increase the appeal of nuclear deterrence in the coming decades. Beginning with a reconsideration of nuclear deterrence theory, the book takes issue with the usual emphasis on the need for invulnerable retaliatory forces and threats that leaders can rationally choose to carry out. The author explains why states, including badly outgunned states, can rely on nuclear deterrent strategies despite the difficulty they may face in deploying invulnerable forces and despite the implausibility of rationally carrying out their threats of retaliation. In the subsequent empirical analysis that examines the security policies of China, Britain, and France and taps recently declassified documents, the author suggests that the misleading standard view of what is often termed rational deterrence theory may well reflect the experience, or at least aspirations, of the Cold War superpowers more than the logic of deterrence itself. Case studies assessing the nuclear deterrent policies of China, Britain, and France highlight the reasons why their experience, rather than that of the more frequently studied Cold War superpowers, better reflects the strategic and economic factors likely to shape states' security policies in the twenty-first century. The book concludes by drawing out the implications of the author's theoretical and empirical analysis for the future role of nuclear weapons.

Much has been written on WMD terrorism, but few books present a systems approach to this problem. In this book, we present an integrated view of WMD terrorism. The threat section reviews several scenarios that a terrorist might use and a very comprehensive list of the possible biological organisms and compounds that can be used as biological, mid-spectrum, and chemical threats. In the science and technology section, the technical aspects of a successful defense against WMD agents are presented. Arguments are presented for the control of the release of scientific information to bolster CB defense. Approaches to biological agent detection and a system for ranking detection technologies are discussed next. The generic approach to biological screening and detection is then illustrated with some applications of generic detectors to water, food, and aerosol. The future of biological detection and identification is also presented, along with a call to perhaps change the paradigms that we are using. The last section of the book deals with response system planning. An example of regional cooperation is presented. Risk-based management is discussed and a practical example of this approach to emergency planning is presented. Arguments for an epidemiological reporting system are presented, while the last chapter discusses means to integrate the various components of a response system via a software tool.