John A. Vasquez explains the processes that cause the spread of interstate war by looking at how contagion worked to bring countries into the First World War. Analysing all the key states that declared war, the book is comprised of three parts. Part I lays out six models of contagion: alliances, contiguity, territorial rivalry, opportunity, 'brute force' and economic dependence. Part II then analyses in detail the decision making of every state that entered the war from Austria-Hungary in 1914 to the United States and Greece in 1917. Part III has two chapters - the first considers the neutral countries, and the second concludes the book with an overarching theoretical analysis, including major lessons of the war and new hypotheses about contagion. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, conflict studies and international history, especially those interested in the spread of conflict, or the First World War.

This book analyzes the United States and Russia's nuclear arms control and deterrence relationships and how these countries must lead current and prospective efforts to support future nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. The second nuclear age, following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, poses new challenges with respect to nuclear-strategic stability, deterrence and nonproliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia, and the potential for new nuclear weapons states in the Middle East, create new possible axes of conflict potentially stressful to the existing world order. Other uncertainties include the interest of major powers in developing a wider spectrum of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, possibly for use in limited nuclear wars, and the competitive technologies for antimissile defenses being developed and deployed by the United States and Russia. Other technology challenges, including the implications of cyberwar for nuclear deterrence and crisis management, are also considered. Political changes also matter. The early post-Cold War hopes for the emergence of a global pacific security community, excluding the possibility of major war, have been dashed by political conflict between Russia and NATO, by the roiled nature of American domestic politics with respect to international security, and by a more assertive and militarily competent China. Additionally, the study includes suggestions for both analysis and policy in order to prevent the renewed U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race and competition in new technologies. This volume would be ideal for graduate students, researchers, scholars and anyone who is interested in nuclear policy, international studies, and Russian politics.

In this book, Jeffrey Knopf investigates domestic sources of state preferences about whether to seek cooperation with other countries on security issues. He does so by examining whether public protest against nuclear weapons influenced US decisions to enter strategic arms talks. The analysis builds on the domestic structure approach to explaining foreign policy, using it as the starting point to develop a new framework with which to trace the influence of societal actors. The book's finding that protest had a major impact suggests that prevailing conceptions of the relation between domestic politics and international cooperation need to be broadened. Existing approaches typically assume that state preferences are set by political leaders or powerful interests, thereby treating the rest of society only as a constraint on state action. In contrast, this book demonstrates that ordinary citizens can also serve as a direct stimulus to the development of a state interest in cooperation.

Great power competition has returned after a generation of absence, and the U.S. military edge over prospective opponents is eroding. Whereas the United States previously could overwhelm adversaries with sheer force, if necessary, it now needs every advantage it can get. This study analyzes how the United States might inflict surprise on its adversaries to gain a strategic advantage. Surprise is one aspect of a broader discussion in the national security literature on innovative operational concepts, which may serve as force multipliers to enable the United States to get more out of existing capabilities. A follow up to CSIS's highly successful 2018 study Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts, this report highlights several components of a successful surprise, including exploiting adversary vulnerabilities, using intelligence and technology, employing secrecy and deception, and doing the unexpected. The report also contains over a dozen vignettes illustrating potential future surprises.

Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future.

The growing threat of biological and chemical weapons (BCW) has created the frightening prospect of terrorist attacks by states, state-sanctioned terrorist organizations, and destructive individuals loose in our midst. What can we do to prepare for this threat? This illuminating and often disturbing book brings together the views of leading thinkers--in science, medicine, international and constitutional law, law enforcement, intelligence, and crisis management--on all diverse aspects of this challenge based on their statements at the November 1998 Hoover Institution Conference on Biological and Chemical Weapons. The New Terror takes a hard look at the most pressing BCW issues facing the international community and realistic options for preventing, deterring against, and mitigating the consequences of the use of BCW.

This book evaluates President Hassan Rouhani's foreign policy during his first two years in office, looking at the case studies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, the UAE, Turkey, and Syria, as well as the Iran-US relationship. President Rouhani came to power in Iran in 2013 promising to reform the country's long-contentious foreign policy. His top priorities were rehabilitating the Iranian economy, ending the nuclear dispute, rebuilding relations with the US, and mending ties with Iran's neighbors. It is argued here that while President Rouhani has made progress in the Iran-US relationship, in nuclear negotiations and some bilateral relationships, his broader success has been hampered by regional political developments and domestic competition. Further, it is contended that his future success will be guided by emerging regional tensions, including whether Iran's neighbors will accept the terms of the nuclear agreement.

It is estimated that today some 2.7% of world GDP ($1.5 trillion) is spent on arms. In 2014 Lockheed Martin, the US defence contractor, had revenues of $45 billion the equivalent of the GDP of Tunisia. This book explores the business behind these breathtaking figures and explains how the arms industry makes its money. The book begins by defining the industry, explaining why the sector is important, outlining its prime contractors and key supply chains. Its cost categories (from R&D to maintenance), the role of technical innovation, and the sector's dependence on the monopsony buying power of Government, are all examined. The structure-conduct and performance model is used to show the workings of the arms market and its various entry and exit conditions, and the sector's performance is analysed through various indicators including exports, development time scales, cost overruns and profitability. The complex choice problems of domestic procurement are considered alongside sales to foreign governments and the opportunities that may present for bribery and corruption. The Military-Industrial-Political-Complex (MIPC) is unpacked and the behaviour of its major agents national defence agencies, the armed forces, producer groups, political agents (voters, political parties and budget-maximising bureaucracies) is scrutinised, both in times of conflict (expansion) and peace (contraction). The book concludes by considering future trends, such as whether arms industries are better under state or private ownership, and how they can meet the challenge of new threats in different forms. The discussion throughout is anchored to case studies from all parts of the world, including Brazil, Korea, Japan, Russia as well as UK, US and Europe. As an authoritative non-technical introduction to the economics of arms industries, it is suitable for students of business studies, politics, international relations, political economy, strategic and defence studies as well as for courses on microeconomics and industrial economics. As a masterly summation from one of the world's leading defence economists, it will also be required reading for staff in defence ministries, procurement agencies, the armed forces and strategic studies think-tanks throughout the world.

Politics and technology intersect in the international effort to prevent nuclear proliferation. Written for scientists, policy makers, journalists, students, and concerned citizens, The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation makes a highly complex subject understandable. This comprehensive overview provides information about both the basic technologies and the political realities. Methods of producing weapon materials -- plutonium and highly enriched uranium -- as well as their use in bombs are described in detail, as is the generally successful international effort to prevent the spread of the ability to make nuclear weapons.

In explaining the problems the world will face if nuclear weapons become generally available, Mozley summarizes and reviews the methods used to prevent proliferation and describes the status of those nations involved in trade in nuclear materials. He places emphasis on the danger of attack by renegade nations or terrorist groups, particularly the possibility that weapon material might be stolen from the presently impoverished and unstable former Soviet Union.

This book offers a collection of texts by Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker (1912-2007), a major German universal scientist who was also a pioneer in physics, philosophy, religion on issues of politics and peace research. He worked with Werner Heisenberg and Otto Hahn in the German "Uranverein", obtained a patent for plutonium during World War II and was an opponent of the nuclear armament of the German armed forces (1957). Furthermore, he published a study on the inability to defend Germany (1971) that was instrumental in the debate on defensive defense since the mid 1970s. He wrote on war and peace, peace and truth, policy implications of nuclear energy, on ethical issues of modern strategy, on consequences of war and war prevention and on the theory of power. He coined the term "world domestic policy" which still covers a valid theory for political, institutional secured world peace in the atomic age.

We live in an age of crises that are global in scale and potentially apocalyptic in severity, affecting the lives of millions billions of people. Peter Lee examines the struggle for truth at the heart of these crises to show how political leaders attempt to shape individual behavior, attitudes and identity.

WINNER OF THE PULITZER PRIZE
The first full account of how the Cold War arms race finally came to a close, this riveting narrative history sheds new light on the people who struggled to end this era of massive overkill, and examines the legacy of the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that remain a threat today.
Drawing on memoirs, interviews in both Russia and the US, and classified documents from deep inside the Kremlin, David E. Hoffman examines the inner motives and secret decisions of each side and details the deadly stockpiles that remained unsecured as the Soviet Union collapsed. This is the fascinating story of how Reagan, Gorbachev, and a previously unheralded collection of scientists, soldiers, diplomats, and spies changed the course of history.

Covering the development of the atomic bomb during the Second World War, the origins and early course of the Cold War, and the advent of the hydrogen bomb in the early 1950s, Churchill and the Bomb explores a still neglected aspect of Winston Churchill's career - his relationship with and thinking on nuclear weapons. Kevin Ruane shows how Churchill went from regarding the bomb as a weapon of war in the struggle with Nazi Germany to viewing it as a weapon of communist containment (and even punishment) in the early Cold War before, in the 1950s, advocating and arguably pioneering what would become known as "mutually assured destruction" as the key to preventing the Cold War flaring into a calamitous nuclear war. While other studies of Churchill have touched on his evolving views on nuclear weapons, few historians have given this hugely important issue the kind of dedicated and sustained treatment it deserves. In Churchill and the Bomb, however, Kevin Ruane has undertaken extensive primary research in Britain, the United States and Europe, and accessed a wide array of secondary literature, in producing an immensely readable yet detailed, insightful and provocative account of Churchill's nuclear hopes and fears.

Much recent writing about international politics understandably highlights the many changes that have followed from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This book, by contrast, analyzes an important continuity that, the author argues, will characterize international strategic affairs well into the new century: nuclear deterrence will remain at the core of the security policies of the world's great powers and will continue to be an attractive option for many less powerful states worried about adversaries whose capabilities they cannot match. The central role of nuclear deterrence persists despite the advent of a new international system in which serious military threats are no longer obvious, the use of force is judged irrelevant to resolving most international disputes, and states' interests are increasingly defined in economic rather than military terms. Indeed, the author suggests why these changes may increase the appeal of nuclear deterrence in the coming decades. Beginning with a reconsideration of nuclear deterrence theory, the book takes issue with the usual emphasis on the need for invulnerable retaliatory forces and threats that leaders can rationally choose to carry out. The author explains why states, including badly outgunned states, can rely on nuclear deterrent strategies despite the difficulty they may face in deploying invulnerable forces and despite the implausibility of rationally carrying out their threats of retaliation. In the subsequent empirical analysis that examines the security policies of China, Britain, and France and taps recently declassified documents, the author suggests that the misleading standard view of what is often termed rational deterrence theory may well reflect the experience, or at least aspirations, of the Cold War superpowers more than the logic of deterrence itself. Case studies assessing the nuclear deterrent policies of China, Britain, and France highlight the reasons why their experience, rather than that of the more frequently studied Cold War superpowers, better reflects the strategic and economic factors likely to shape states' security policies in the twenty-first century. The book concludes by drawing out the implications of the author's theoretical and empirical analysis for the future role of nuclear weapons.

Much has been written on WMD terrorism, but few books present a systems approach to this problem. In this book, we present an integrated view of WMD terrorism. The threat section reviews several scenarios that a terrorist might use and a very comprehensive list of the possible biological organisms and compounds that can be used as biological, mid-spectrum, and chemical threats. In the science and technology section, the technical aspects of a successful defense against WMD agents are presented. Arguments are presented for the control of the release of scientific information to bolster CB defense. Approaches to biological agent detection and a system for ranking detection technologies are discussed next. The generic approach to biological screening and detection is then illustrated with some applications of generic detectors to water, food, and aerosol. The future of biological detection and identification is also presented, along with a call to perhaps change the paradigms that we are using. The last section of the book deals with response system planning. An example of regional cooperation is presented. Risk-based management is discussed and a practical example of this approach to emergency planning is presented. Arguments for an epidemiological reporting system are presented, while the last chapter discusses means to integrate the various components of a response system via a software tool.

Commitment and Compliance is the first book to evaluate the impact on state behaviour of international norms adopted in forms that are not legally binding. The use of such 'soft law' has increased dramatically with the proliferation of international organizations. Whether and how such norms can be used effectively to supplement or substitute for legally binding obligations forms the heart of this discussion. In the study, a project of the American Society of International Law, the authors examine four areas of international law: human rights, the environment, arms control, and trade and finance. For each area, they assess the use of non-binding norms and ask whether such norms engender state compliance. More generally, the discussion also addresses the nature of international law and the role of non-binding norms in the international legal system.

This will be the first book that deals with the use of commercial satellite imagery to monitor non-proliferation of nuclear weapons non-intrusively from space by an international organisation. The book deals with both the technical as well as policy issues related to the nuclear weapons non-proliferation issues. The authors discuss how an international organisation such as the International Atomic Energy Agency can use information derived from satellites to enhance its policing task.

Thousands of people around the world are maimed and killed by landmines and unexploded ammunition every year. International law classifies landmines as 'evil in themselves', but minefields are expressions of 'political minefields' that create them and allow them to persist. In this travelogue through Iraq, Laos, Cambodia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan and New York City, we follow Matthew Bolton's quest for solutions to the landmine crisis and emerging autonomous weapons. Throughout his journey we meet deminers, paramilitaries, journalists, mercenaries, diplomats, aid workers, and campaigners working in and around the minefields. It is a must-read for those working to alleviate the devastation of war.

The 32nd edition of the SIPRI Yearbook analyses developments in 2000 in o Security and conflicts o Military spending and armaments o Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

It contains extensive annexes on the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements and a chronology of security- and arms control-related events.

Despite its "Peace Constitution" and close security ties to the United States, Japan designs and produces an extensive array of high-tech missiles, tanks, warships and aircraft. As much as these weapons are a testimony to the advancement of Japanese technology, they are also powerful symbols of the potential for Japanese political and military self-reliance. Yet, despite all of the advanced military hardware, Japan has not developed an autonomous military-industrial complex in the post-World War II period.;Exploring the complicated issue of Japanese political and military autonomy in the half-century since World War II, this work focuses on the institutions, individuals, ideas and interests that have shaped Japanese policy in this area. The author demonstrates that the simple model of US pressure leading to Japanese response does not hold true; he shows instead the dynamic policy-making process involving such key players as government, industry, interest groups and the media.;Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the issue of Japanese autonomy, versus alliance with the United States has become urgent. This text suggests the implications of this debate for Japan's future effor

The 1998 yearbook continues SIPRI's annual analyses of developments in global and regional major armed conflicts; in conflict prevention, management and resolution; in world military expenditure, arms production, arms transfers, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and in arms control and disarmament. Special studies in this volume include: * major armed conflicts * armed conflict prevention, management and resolution * multilateral peace missions in 1997 * regional studies of the Middle East peace process, Russia and the conflicts and peaceful settlement of disputes in its environment, and new security arrangements in Europe * world military expenditure and arms production * Russian military expenditure * the 100 largest arms-producing companies * military research and development * the trade in major conventional weapons * multilateral military-related export controls * nuclear, chemical and biological arms control * new nuclear weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa * implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention * conventional arms control * the ban on anti-personnel land-mines