This volume examines the conditions necessary for a stable nuclear-weapons-free world and the implications for nuclear disarmament policy. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a road map to nuclear zero, but it is a rudimentary one and it says nothing about the kind of zero to aim for. Preferably, this would be a world where the inhibitions against reversal are strong enough to make it stably non-nuclear. What then are the requirements of stable zero? The literature on nuclear disarmament has paid little attention to this question. By and large, the focus has been on the next steps, and discussions tend to stop where the NPT stops: with the elimination of the weapons. This book seeks to fill a lacuna by examining the requirements of stable zero and their implications for the road map to that goal, starting from the vision to the present day. The volume highlights that a clear conception of the goal not only is important in itself, but can shed light on what kind of disarmament process to promote. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, security studies and IR.

Global politics has changed with unaccustomed swiftness since the end of the Cold War. Eastern Europe is free; the Soviet Union has broken up; China presses free market economic reform; and the United States and Russia have declared a joint commitment to end nuclear war. The force of these changes has created a new agenda for global politics and security policy. This does not mean that nuclear weapons have lost their centrality. Nuclear development programs continue in the major holders of advanced weapons. In Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran nuclear intentions are subject to widespread speculation and scrutiny. Negotiations for renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remind us that the treaty requires serious efforts to abolish nuclear weapons. Nuclear Choices points out that the Cold War's end has not banished mistrust. Instead, it has opened the door to frank conversation about the usefulness of force and the need to address common fears. States now face a global choice among alternative nuclear futures. If they desire to avoid runaway nuclear development, the choices come down to three: the status quo, disengagement, or abolition. Larkin argues that if they chose the status quo, they elect a world in which only terror and self-restraint keep devastation at bay, a world in which instant destruction is possible. This study focuses on the nuclear weapons programs of Great Britain, China, and France, because they may be less familiar to students of international affairs. Each of these countries has developed a substantial nuclear capability that could decisively shape the result of coming global nuclear decisions. Larkin concludes that these three minipowers could conclude that nuclearism serves their interests, refuse disengagement, and encourage proliferation. If they are prepared to abandon nuclearism, they have tremendous political leverage on Russia, the United States, and also on undeclared and aspiring nuclear weapons states. For now, only the United Kingdom, France, and China maintain sufficient warhead inventories and production capabilities to have strong effects on how the United States and Russia view their own strategic capabilities. Nuclear Choices asserts that governments, polities, and parties today do not know how to guarantee themselves against weapons of mass destruction. They must either acquire the political and social means to achieve such guarantees or accept a world in which nuclearism will continue to cast its shadow over all aspects of nation building. It will be of interest to political scientists, policymakers, military analysts, and those interested hi the nuclear issue.

In May 1998, in reaction to India's nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan tested six nuclear weapons. Following this, the country opted for a policy of minimum deterrence, and within a year Pakistan had altered its policy stance by adding the modifier of minimum 'credible' deterrence. This book looks at how this seemingly innocuous shift seriously impacted on Pakistan's nuclear policy direction and whether the concept of minimum has lost its significance in the South Asian region's changed/changing strategic environment. After providing a brief historical background exploring why and how Pakistan carried out the nuclear development program, the book questions why Pakistan could not sustain the minimum deterrence that it had conceptualized in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 test. It examines the conceptual theoretical framework of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to question whether Pakistan's nuclear policy remained consistent with this, as well as to discover the rudimentary factors that are responsible for the inconsistencies with regard to minimum deterrence conceived in this study. The book goes on to look at the policy options that Pakistan had after acquiring the nuclear capability, and what the rationale was for selecting minimum deterrence. The book not only highlights Pakistan deterrent force building, but also analyzes closely Pakistan's doctrinal posture of first use option. Furthermore, it examines the policy towards arms control and disarmament, and discusses whether these individual policy orientations are consistent with the minimum deterrence. Conceptually providing a deeper understanding of Pakistan's post-1998 nuclear policy, this book critically examines whether the minimum deterrence conceived could be sustained both at the theoretical and operational levels. It will be a useful contribution in the field of Nuclear Policy, Security Studies, Asian Politics, Proliferation/Non-Proliferation Studies, and Peace Studies. This book will be of interest to policy makers, scholars, and students of nuclear policy, nuclear proliferation and arms control related research.

The profound changes which have occurred within Eastern Europe and the USSR during the closing years of the 1980s have had direct links with equivalent changes in the East-West political environment. This has resulted in negotiated arms control re-emerging as a principal activity in working towards establishing a new East-West relationship. This volume covers a range of issues from the role of arms control after the INF treaty to NATO strategy and alliance behaviour. It includes domestic and alliance politics as well as the technical treatment of arms control matters, and concludes with a look at the future prospects of East-West arms control.

This examination of nuclear arms control addresses the question of what kind of posture do second generation nuclear weapons states adopt in a world in which the presumption of non-proliferation is accepted?

This title was first published in 2000: The aim of this text is to explore conventional arms control in Europe. The early chapters provide a primarily historical perspective, looking at the context, foundations, main provisions and institutional structure of the main agreements. The later chapters explore the continuing and likely future roles of the OSCE and NATO in the arms control process. The final chapters examine more contemporary developments by looking at the Adapted CFE Treaty and Vienna Documents agreed at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1998 and the challenges posed to existing arrangements by the changing and emergent security threats that potentially face Europe.

This Adelphi Paper examines the motives behind Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to the end of 2003. It also assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed during this period, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance, subsequently relying on technological infusions from the A.Q. Khan network. Wyn Q. Bowen clearly analyzes the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the Gadhafi regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage, both politically and economically, with the international community, particularly the United States. It explores the process of dismantling the nuclear programme and the question of whether Libya constitutes amodel for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

In Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) a multinational team of scholars and experts address a developing phenomenon: controlling the use of privatized force by states in international politics. Robust analyses of the evolving, multi-layered tapestry of formal and informal mechanisms of control address the microfoundations of the market, such as the social and role identities of contract employees, their acceptance by military personnel, and potential tensions between them. The extent and willingness of key states-South Africa, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel-to monitor and enforce discipline to structure their contractual relations with PMSCs on land and at sea is examined, as is the ability of the industry to regulate itself. Also discussed is the nascent international legal regime to reinforce state and industry efforts to encourage effective practices, punish inappropriate behavior, and shape the market to minimize the hazards of loosening states' oligopolistic control over the means of legitimate organized violence. The volume presents a theoretically-informed synthesis of micro- and macro-levels of analysis, offering new insights into the challenges of controlling the agents of organized violence used by states for scholars and practitioners alike.

Since 2003, when the world learned that the Islamic Republic of Iran had succeeded in secretly developing a capability to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, the question of Iran's nuclear program has ranked high on the international political and arms control agenda. This book studies the IRI's diplomatic operations in the issue area of arms control and demonstrates how arms control diplomacy has formed an integral part of the IRI's foreign policy during the various phases of its history. Furthermore, it fills a gap in the research literature on Iran's foreign and security policies by providing the first comprehensive account of Iranian arms control diplomacy under the Islamic regime. This book aims at reconstructing Iran's diplomatic operations in four distinct thematic areas of arms control: conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear arms control. It also looks at the diplomatic means by which the IRI's leadership has tried to achieve its arms control objectives. This text also seeks to identify and examine the individual objectives that have guided Iranian policy choices in the domain of arms control. Finally, it places the reconstructed Iranian objectives into a broader context by elaborating on the fundamental values or foreign policy goals that the IRI's arms control objectives have served. This highly informative and thought provoking volume will be valuable reading for students, researchers and academics, as well as for commentators and policy-makers interested in Middle East studies, Iranian studies, international relations and arms control.

Victor Israelyan was a senior ambassador in the Soviet Foreign Ministry when the armies of Egypt and Syria invaded Israeli-occupied territory on October 6, 1973. Critical to the outcome of this conflict were the Soviet Union and the United States, whose diplomatic maneuverings behind the scenes eventually ended what came to be known as the Yom Kippur War. During the crisis, however, tensions between the superpowers nearly escalated into nuclear war. Israelyan is the first Soviet official to give us a firsthand account of what actually happened inside the Kremlin during these three important weeks in 1973.

Israelyan's account is a fascinating mixture of memoir, anecdotes, and historical reporting. As a member of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's staff, he was assigned to a four-man task force that attended the many Politburo meetings held during the war. The job of this task force was to take notes and prepare drafts of letters and other documents for the Politburo. In remarkable detail, made possible by his sharp memory and the notes and documents he saved, Israelyan chronicles the day-by-day activities of Kremlin leaders as they confronted the crisis. For the first time we can see how the cumbersome Soviet policy-making mechanism, headed by the Politburo, functioned in a tense international situation. We see how the actions of Henry Kissinger, Anwar Sadat, Hafiz al-Assad, and other participants in the crisis were interpreted in Moscow. From his own experience Israelyan gives us intimate portraits of top Soviet officials including Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Andropov. His access to important documents--including letters from Richard Nixon to Leonid Brezhnev, never officially released in the U.S.--provide a much-needed corrective to assertions made by Kissinger, Nixon, and Sadat about the war.

Supplemented by rare photographs and interviews with other Soviet officials, Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War is more than a record of the past. Israelyan offers a unique vantage point on the continuing Middle East conflict, and his candid assessment of the mindset of Russian leaders is instructive for understanding how the present leadership of Russia faces its new role in the post-Cold War world.

This book offers a novel approach to understanding the puzzle of nuclear proliferation by examining how leaders' beliefs and perceptions about the international system influence states' decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. Today, there is a persisting dilemma over the spread of nuclear weapons for both practitioners and scholars of international affairs. Uncertainty remains whether determined proliferators can be stopped, as shown by the cases of North Korea and Iran. These instances of proliferation raise questions about regional stability, the use of pre-emptive military action, and the potential for reactive-proliferation by neighbouring countries. Despite the serious implications surrounding the spread of these weapons, proliferation scholarship has thus far failed to solve what has been described as the "proliferation puzzle"- why do some countries choose nuclear weapons while others do not? The author argues that understanding basic psychological motivations, such as the role of power and perceptions of self and others, forms a strategic context which provides answers about a leader's willingness to proliferate. Proliferation willingness is a critical, yet frequently overlooked, part of the proliferation equation. Ultimately, it is the combination of willingness and proliferation opportunity (i.e. technical and scientific capabilities) that determines whether a country 'goes nuclear'. By examining several historical instances of proliferation decision-making-in South Africa, India, Libya and Australia-the book's findings highlight the fundamental role of leaders' beliefs in shaping proliferation outcomes. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, political psychology, security studies and IR in general.

Rethinking the Unthinkable examines the future direction of nuclear arms control in the post-Cold War security environment. Believing that the new environment requires a radical rethinking of the purpose and role of nuclear weapons in international politics, the contributors address many fundamental issues influencing further US, Russian and European nuclear arms reductions. This volume is a product of the Project on Rethinking Arms Control, sponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland.

This book explores how the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a leading humanitarian actor, addresses the problem of weapons. A triangulation of strategies such as testimonialization, medicalization and legalization, are investigated, with the help of critical security studies literature, to cultivate an understanding of an effects based approach to weapons. The attempt here is not only to introduce some innovative, conceptual tools but also to provide a coherent and critical narrative of the experiences of the ICRC vis-a-vis states to regulate and prohibit weapons. This experiential account of the ICRC's engagement with the problem of weapons is significant as it produces an empowering, alternative discourse making visible subjugated knowledge in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Defence is the ultimate public good, and it thus falls to government to determine the appropriate amount of public revenue to commit to the defence of the realm. This will depend on history, strategic threat, international security obligations, entreaties from allies and, of course, the threat faced. The Political Economy of Defence is structured to identify, explain and analyse the policy, process and problems that government faces from the starting point of national security through to the ultimate objective of securing a peaceful world. Accordingly, it provides insights into how defence budgets are determined and managed, offering relevant and refreshingly practical policy perspectives on defence finance, defence and development trade-offs, sovereignty vs globalisation debates, and many other pertinent issues. It will appeal to policymakers, analysts, graduate students and academics interested in defence economics, political economy, public economics and public policy.

The Middle East is a hot spot of proliferation. It contains one state assumed to possess nuclear weapons, several states that tried and failed to develop a military nuclear capability, one state under suspicion of trying to do so, and it is the world region that witnessed the most frequent and severe employment of chemical weapons since the end of World War I. Notwithstanding, not a single arms control regime concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) covers the region as a whole. Instead we have seen several proliferation-related military operations which have rather contributed to destabilization than served non-proliferation. This volume, written under the auspices of the EU Consortium for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament determines the current state of diplomatic efforts to establish a WMD free zone in the Middle East. In doing so, it provides insights into central actors' conflicting political positions, thereby explaining the stalemate of efforts to negotiate a WMD-free zone. Chapters written by renowned experts from academia and policy-oriented think tanks, as well as by next-generation Middle East and arms control experts, introduce the subject to the reader, give background information about arms control initiatives, provide technical expertise, and endeavour to make proposals for arms control measures in support of the creation of a Middle East WMD-free zone.

Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as a Moral Imperative argues that the use of nuclear weapons as a threat in policies of nuclear deterrence violate basic principles of morality and consequently the abolition of nuclear weapons from the world is a moral imperative nations that have them. The focus is on the United States since it will have to take the lead in any program of abolition. The argument is formulated in terms accessible to theorists in different disciplines and activists in a large range of causes. It appeals to principles that are widely shared but whose application to national policies, especially to deterrence by threats of mass destruction, has been debated ever since nuclear weapons were developed. The book explains what is meant by the "immorality" of a national policy, the stake which citizens have in their agents acting morally and the role of their opinions in seeing that they do. The argument of the book is couched in terms of consequences. The effects of the U.S.'s nuclear deterrent on the probability of nuclear war are difficult to calculate; but the harms for the country and others across the globe caused by the immense apparatus necessary to make U.S. threats credible are sufficient to condemn the policy. The last part of the book is devoted to way the U.S. can take the lead in safe and effective steps necessary to abolish the weapons and prevent their reintroduction into the world.

The National Institute for Public Policy s new book, "Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence," is the first of its kind. Dr. Keith Payne, the late former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and an unparalleled bipartisan group of senior civilian and military experts critically examined eight basic assumptions of Minimum Deterrence against available evidence. In general, Minimum Deterrence does not fare well under the careful scrutiny.

Proponents of a "Minimum Deterrent" US nuclear force posture believe that anywhere from a handful to a few hundred nuclear weapons are adequate to deter reliably and predictably any enemy from attacking the United States now and in the future. Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, their thinking goes, no foreign leader would dare challenge US capabilities. The benefits, advocates claim, of reducing US nuclear weapons to the "minimum" level needed are: better relations with Russia and China, reinforcement of the arms control and Nonproliferation Treaty, billions of defense dollars in savings, and greater international stability on the way to "nuclear zero."

As political pressure builds to pursue this vision of minimum US deterrence, "Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence" stands as the seminal study to address the many claims of great benefit against available empirical evidence.

This book was published as a National Institute Press monograph, Keith B. Payne and James Schlesinger, "Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence" (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2013) and as a special issue of "Comparative Strategy.""

In May 1998, in reaction to India s nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan tested six nuclear weapons. Following this, the country opted for a policy of minimum deterrence, and within a year Pakistan had altered its policy stance by adding the modifier of minimum credible deterrence. This book looks at how this seemingly innocuous shift seriously impacted on Pakistan s nuclear policy direction and whether the concept of minimum has lost its significance in the South Asian region s changed/changing strategic environment.

After providing a brief historical background exploring why and how Pakistan carried out the nuclear development program, the book questions why Pakistan could not sustain the minimum deterrence that it had conceptualized in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 test. It examines the conceptual theoretical framework of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to question whether Pakistan s nuclear policy remained consistent with this, as well as to discover the rudimentary factors that are responsible for the inconsistencies with regard to minimum deterrence conceived in this study. The book goes on to look at the policy options that Pakistan had after acquiring the nuclear capability, and what the rationale was for selecting minimum deterrence. The book not only highlights Pakistan deterrent force building, but also analyzes closely Pakistan s doctrinal posture of first use option. Furthermore, it examines the policy towards arms control and disarmament, and discusses whether these individual policy orientations are consistent with the minimum deterrence.

Conceptually providing a deeper understanding of Pakistan s post-1998 nuclear policy, this book critically examines whether the minimum deterrence conceived could be sustained both at the theoretical and operational levels. It will be a useful contribution in the field of Nuclear Policy, Security Studies, Asian Politics, Proliferation/Non-Proliferation Studies, and Peace Studies. This book will be of interest to policy makers, scholars, and students of nuclear policy, nuclear proliferation and arms control related research. "

This volume evaluates the impact of coercive arms control efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the twenty-first century. A new paradigm in arms control is gradually replacing the idea that mutually agreed restrictions on armaments can improve international security. Thus, Hedley Bull's classic definition of arms control as the "cooperation between antagonistic pairs of states in military affairs" needs to be amended by a new notion of coercive arms control as the set of non-cooperative and non-reciprocal measures to restrict the weapons or military capabilities of certain states. This volume addresses the topic of how this ongoing paradigmatic shift will affect the effectiveness of arms control as a conflict management instrument.While some argue that new instruments can complement and strengthen traditional, multilateral and inclusive arms control regimes, others maintain that conflicts and contradictions between coercive and cooperative arms control regimes will severely limit their effectiveness. This volume provides a forum for academics and practitioners from around the globe to discuss these developments in depth and to assess the specific strengths and weaknesses of these new instruments of arms control. This book will be of much interest to students of arms control, global governance, foreign policy and IR/Security Studies in general.

This edited volume takes stock of the state of research and policy on the issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), ten years after the UN first agreed to deal with the problem. The end of the Cold War originated a series of phenomena that would subsequently come to dominate the political agenda. Perhaps most symptomatic of the ensuing environment is the marked escalation in the scale and dynamics of armed violence, driven by the proliferation of SALW. Events in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia seared into global consciousness the devastating effects of this phenomenon, and of the necessity to engage actively in its limitation and prevention. This edited volume explores and outlines the research and policy on the SALW issue at this critical juncture. In addition to providing a detailed telling of the genesis and evolution of SALW research and advocacy, the volume features a series of essays from leading scholars in the field on both advances in research and action on SALW. It reflects on what has been achieved in terms of cumulative advances in data, methodology and analysis, and looks at the ways in which these developments have helped to inform policy making at national, regional and international levels. Alongside situating and integrating past and present advances in advocacy and international action, Controlling Small Arms also outlines future directions for research and action. This book will be of much interest to students of small arms, peace and conflict studies, peacebuilding, security studies and IR.

This edited volume examines the issue of the proliferation of dual-use technology and the efforts of the international community to control these technologies.

Efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) increasingly focus on preventing the proliferation and misuse of dual-use technologies: information, materials and equipment that can be easily applied for peaceful and hostile purposes. The threat of terrorist attacks with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, in particular, makes it necessary to develop a sustainable non-proliferation policy that effectively hinders the misuse of dual-use technologies.

In this book, leading non-proliferation experts from different regions of the world reflect on the political, legal and technical obstacles with an aim to finding a better balance between control and cooperation in dual-use technology transfer regulations. This broad approach makes it possible to compare regimes which may be structurally different but are similar in the way they attempt to regulate dual-use technology transfers by balancing controls and cooperative approaches.

This book will be of much interest to students of weapons proliferation, arms control, global governance, international organizations and international security.

With the 2005 Review Conference of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the background, this book provides a fully detailed but accessible and accurate introduction to the technical aspects of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons for the specialist and non-specialist alike. It considers nuclear weapons from varying perspectives, including the technology perspective, which views them as spillovers from nuclear energy programmes; and the theoretical perspective, which looks at the collision between national and international security - the security dilemma - involved in nuclear proliferation. It aims to demonstrate that international security is unlikely to benefit from encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons except in situations where the security complex is already largely nuclearised. The political constraints on nuclear spread as solutions to the security dilemma are also examined in three linked categories, including an unusually full discussion of the phenomenon of nuclear-free zones, with particular emphasis on the zone covering Latin America. The remarkably consistent anti-proliferation policies of the USA from Baruch to Bush are debated and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty itself, with special attention paid to the international atomic energy's safeguards system is frankly appraised. -- .

This book offers a comprehensive examination of the important security issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament have returned to the top of the international political agenda. The issue assumes particular importance in regard to NATO, given that some 150-200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are still present in five countries belonging to the Alliance (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey). The past few years have seen animated debate in the United States and Europe on the role of such weapons in the current scenario of international security, and whether they can be further reduced or completely removed from Europe. Bringing together leading scholars and analysts of TNW with country-specific competences, this volume improves our understanding of this debate by providing in-depth analysis of the presence, role, perceived value and destiny of TNWs in Europe. The book addresses the issue in a systematic manner, taking into account the perspectives of all main actors directly or indirectly involved in the debate. This approach provides new and important insights that can inform both theoretical and policy work on a very critical and timely international issue, especially during the ongoing review of NATO's deterrence and defence posture. This book will be of much interest to students of European politics, European security, nuclear proliferation, and IR in general.

This book comprehensively outlines and evaluates the key Obama nuclear weapons policies, developments and initiatives from 2008-2012. Beginning with the administration's vision and goals posited in the 2009 Prague Speech and reaffirmed in the National Security Strategy of 2010, the book assesses the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review, the New START Treaty, the pursuit of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ratification, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference, the Global Nuclear Security Summit - and the extent to which Obama, in the context of such initiatives, has actually upheld the lofty goals posited in Prague and differentiated himself from the nuclear path pursued by the Bush Administration. Additionally, the book evaluates the Obama Administration's dealings with other states in the context of its nuclear weapons policy - in particular, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, India, and China. Offering a comprehensive analysis of the current status of the US nuclear weapons strategy, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies and international relations.

The theory and practice of arms control seemed to have its heyday during the height of the Cold War, with its focus on the East-West conflict and nuclear arms. In the past twenty years, both arms technologies and various practices aimed at their control have continued to develop, but scholarly thinking has not kept up. This volume seeks to redress this scholarly neglect of the range of issues associated with the control of the means of violence, by asking the question: what does arms control mean in the 21st Century? In asking this question, the volume examines issues surrounding sovereignty, geopolitics, nuclear disarmament, securitization of space, technological developments, human rights, the clearance of landmines, the regulation of small arms and the control of the black market for arms and nuclear secrets. The book discusses terrorism with reference to the case of the suicide attacks in Beirut in 1983 and how the Obama administration is orientating its posture on nuclear arms. This book was published as a special issue of Contemporary Security Policy.