The Iranian nuclear crisis is a proxy arena for competing visions about the functioning of international relations. This book is the first to provide comprehensive and comparative analyses to conceptualise the interaction between 'hegemonic structures' and those actors resisting them using the Iranian nuclear case as an illustration. It analyses the foreign policies of China, Russia and Turkey towards the Iranian nuclear programme and thereby answers the question to what extent these policies are indicative of a security culture that resists hegemony. Based on 70 elite interviews with experts and decision-makers closely involved with the Iranian nuclear file, it analyses resistance to hegemony across its ideational, material and institutional framework conditions. The cases examined show how 'compliance' on the part of China, Russia and Turkey with parts of US approaches to the Iranian nuclear conflict has been selective, and how US policy preferences in the Iran dossier have been resisted on other occasions. As such, the Iran nuclear case serves as an illustration to shed light on the contemporaneous interaction of the forces of consent and coercion in international politics. This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners in International Relations, Security Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis.

First published in 1979. The report of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, which met from early 1975 to mid-1977, represents a unique attempt to portray defence policy in the context of disarmament and the need to restructure and control the institutions of defence - in particular the defence industry. The report presented the fullest study made by any British political party concerning the implications and consequences of its stated defence policy, and embodied an examination of defence from the perspective of approaches of disarmament. At the same time, the search for a new policy in international relations was harmonised with the further development of a new industrial strategy, concentrating upon the potential for converting part of military industry to civil work. This work which presents a distinctive intervention in the general debate concerning defence policy, industrial and technological planning, economic priorities and public policy, will be of considerable relevance to both specialists in each of these fields as well as the general reader.

Bitzinger examines the phenomenon of attempted self-reliance in arms production within Asia, and assesses the extent of success in balancing this independence with the growing requirements of next-generation weapons systems. He analyzes China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia. The overarching question in the book is whether self-reliance is a strategically viable solution for development and manufacturing of arms. Given the ever-changing dynamics and increasing demand for sophisticated next-generation weaponry, will these countries be able to individually sustain their domestic defense industries and constantly update their technologies? This is the first book to analyze arms production from a regional perspective.

Conflict resolution and promotion of regional cooperation in South Asia has assumed a new urgency in the aftermath of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, and underlined by the outbreak of fighting in Kargil in 1999, full mobilization on the border during most of 2002, and continued low-intensity warfare and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The stability of nuclear deterrence between the two countries is therefore a matter of great urgency and has found a place on the scholarly agenda of security studies in South Asia. Several books have been written on India's nuclear programme, but these have been mostly analytical histories. The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship is a new departure in that it is the first time that a group of scholars from the South Asian subcontinent have collectively tried to apply deterrence theory and international relations theory to South Asia. This volume will be useful to those in politics and international relations, security and military studies, and defence and strategy studies as well as to policymakers and government officials.

Containing the Atom, the product of three years of research by the members of the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) network, is a comprehensive study of the theory and practice of international nuclear negotiations. Well-known experts in the field test eleven cases of international nuclear negotations covering: strategic arms control; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Nuclear Weapons Free Zones; Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Review Conference; Nuclear Materials removed from the defense weapons programs; Nuclear diplomacy with North Korea; Nuclear risks in the Barents region; Nuclear safety; French-Japanese nuclear negotiations; and the nuclear plant perspective on negotiations. Each case study analyzes the actors, strategies, processes, structures, and outcomes and weighs the impact of the negotiations on security, energy, trade, and the environment.

Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament provides a historical review of key themes and issues in international security and arms control, focusing on efforts in the 20th century to control the spread and use of armaments and to prevent war. This book summarizes the rich and proud traditions of arms control and disarmament, their critical role in ensuring a non-catastrophic course throughout history (especially the dangerous period of the Cold War), and their continuing relevance and role in the emerging post-Cold War world. It also seeks to reinforce a broad perspective of key terms in order to capture the scope and range of their application yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Given this combined tradition and focus, this Dictionary serves two purposes. As a historical dictionary, it chronicles key terms, personalities, events, and agreements as a ready reference from which to launch a more extensive investigation. But it also seeks to capture the breadth of current and future applications by presenting the vocabulary of traditional and non-traditional approaches. The book includes a large dictionary of more than 1,000 key terms, as well as a comprehensive bibliography divided into multiple categories, an extensive chronology, and a timeline. This book can also serve as a useful desk reference for the policy practitioner. The pace and intensity of the practice of arms control often eliminates the luxury of conventional study of past or related arms control efforts. The dictionary seeks to provide a relevant sampling of treaty and agreement details and of the specific terms of reference of arms control to allow productive progress in a policy work environment. Researchers and students will also find the dictionary to be a useful reference tool. Much of the formal literature in the field, such as treaty texts and policy pronouncements, is written in technical language without elaboration. Also, many references to agreements are posed in shorthand intended only for the policy practi

Are nuclear arsenals safe from cyber-attack? Could terrorists launch a nuclear weapon through hacking? Are we standing at the edge of a major technological challenge to global nuclear order? These are among the many pressing security questions addressed in Andrew Futter's ground-breaking study of the cyber threat to nuclear weapons. Hacking the Bomb provides the first ever comprehensive assessment of this worrying and little-understood strategic development, and it explains how myriad new cyber challenges will impact the way that the world thinks about and manages the ultimate weapon. The book cuts through the hype surrounding the cyber phenomenon and provides a framework through which to understand and proactively address the implications of the emerging cyber-nuclear nexus. It does this by tracing the cyber challenge right across the nuclear weapons enterprise, explains the important differences between types of cyber threats, and unpacks how cyber capabilities will impact strategic thinking, nuclear balances, deterrence thinking, and crisis management. The book makes the case for restraint in the cyber realm when it comes to nuclear weapons given the considerable risks of commingling weapons of mass disruption with weapons of mass destruction, and argues against establishing a dangerous norm of "hacking the bomb." This timely book provides a starting point for an essential discussion about the challenges associated with the cyber-nuclear nexus, and will be of great interest to scholars and students of security studies as well as defense practitioners and policy makers.

Doomsday or Deterrence? argues against the majority of premises and conclusions of the antinuclear argument as existed in 1986 when this study was first published. Feher and Heller's study claims that social changes are important to curb technology trends that lean toward the construction of nuclear weapons, as well as using the 'West' as its own value that needs to be defended and emphasising the importance of understanding the true feelings behind the antinuclear argument. This title will be of interest to students of politics and international relations.

Despite clear legal rules and political commitments, no significant progress has been made in nuclear disarmament for two decades. Moreover, not even the use of these weapons has been banned to date. New ideas and strategies are therefore necessary. The author explores an alternative approach to arms control focusing on the human dimension rather than on States' security: "humanization" of arms control! The book explores the preparatory work on arms control treaties and in particular the role of civil society. It analyzes the positive experiences of the movements against chemical weapons, anti-personnel mines, and cluster munitions, as well as the recent conclusion of the Arms Trade Treaty. The author examines the question of whether civil society will be able to replicate the success strategies that have been used, in particular, in the field of anti-personnel mines (Ottawa Convention) and cluster munitions (Oslo Convention) in the nuclear weapons field. Is there any reason why the most destructive weapons should not be outlawed by a legally binding instrument? The book also explains the effects of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, on human beings, the environment, and global development, thereby focusing on vulnerable groups, such as indigenous peoples, women, and children. It takes a broad approach to human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights. The author concludes that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal under international humanitarian and human rights law and, moreover, constitutes international crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In his general conclusions, the author makes concrete proposals for the progress toward a world without nuclear weapons.

Return to Armageddon covers the extraordinary years spanning the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations, a period when the United States, through its victory in the Cold War, led the world away from the brink of nuclear annihilation, and then slowly became aware of the increased threat of nuclear confrontation in a world more splintered than ever before.

This volume examines the conditions necessary for a stable nuclear-weapons-free world and the implications for nuclear disarmament policy. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a road map to nuclear zero, but it is a rudimentary one and it says nothing about the kind of zero to aim for. Preferably, this would be a world where the inhibitions against reversal are strong enough to make it stably non-nuclear. What then are the requirements of stable zero? The literature on nuclear disarmament has paid little attention to this question. By and large, the focus has been on the next steps, and discussions tend to stop where the NPT stops: with the elimination of the weapons. This book seeks to fill a lacuna by examining the requirements of stable zero and their implications for the road map to that goal, starting from the vision to the present day. The volume highlights that a clear conception of the goal not only is important in itself, but can shed light on what kind of disarmament process to promote. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, security studies and IR.

This work addresses the main strategic issues in today's Persian Gulf, a region that could easily produce a crisis that would encourage international political and economic involvement. Topics discussed include: strategic balances, modernization, internal stability, and weapons of mass destruction.

In the aftermath of the Great War, multilateral disarmament was placed at the top of the international agenda by the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations. This book analyzes the naval, air and land disarmament policies of successive British governments from 1919 to 1934, articulating their dilemma either to fulfil their obligations or to avoid them. Daring and controversial, the present study challenges the hitherto accepted view that Britain occupied the high moral ground by drastically reducing its armaments and argues that, during this period, British disarmament policy was reactive and generally failed to provide the leadership that this extremely sensitive time in international politics demanded.

Doomsday or Deterrence? argues against the majority of premises and conclusions of the antinuclear argument as existed in 1986 when this study was first published. Feher and Heller's study claims that social changes are important to curb technology trends that lean toward the construction of nuclear weapons, as well as using the 'West' as its own value that needs to be defended and emphasising the importance of understanding the true feelings behind the antinuclear argument. This title will be of interest to students of politics and international relations.

This book interrogates the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement from its inception in July 2005 to its conclusion in the latter part of 2008 through 12 articles, each of which focuses on different aspects of the deal. They discuss the factors that facilitated the deal, the roadblocks that were encountered, and the implications of the deal for the future of India's foreign policy, its energy security and the international non-proliferation regime. Together, they address the internal political dynamics in India and the United States in order to present perspectives of both countries.

When does the legitimate application of military technology to the problem of national defence become needlessly provocative? What obstacles must developing countries overcome if they hope to use military technology effectively? And when might military technology itself become a cause of conflict? Eric Arnett addresses these questions in the context of four particularly important Asian states - China, India, Pakistan, and Iran - from the perspectives of regional specialists and experts in technology and military affairs. The resulting analyses demonstrate the link between military technology and conflict, which is more palpable in southern Asia than elsewhere, while suggesting that it must be approached in a more nuanced way than has been the case so far in discussions of the region.

The view that America and Russia have burned their candles on security cooperation with respect to nuclear weapons is simply mistaken. This timely study identifies twelve themes or issue areas that must be addressed by the United States and Russia if they are to provide shared, successful leadership in the management of nuclear world order. Designed as supplementary reading in upper division and graduate courses in national security policy, defense, and nuclear arms control, it is also suitable for courses taught at military staff and command colleges and-or war colleges.

This book is the first systematic examination of the emerging arms race in Asia. The global trade in arms is to a large degree underpinned by the strong demand for arms in Asia and the Middle East, the two largest arms export markets in the world. Of these two regions Asia has become particularly significant, led by the emergence of China and India as major powers. It is therefore not surprising that the rapid military modernisation in Asia, accompanied by significant increases in the size and sophistication of armed forces, has generated attention as to its trends, key characteristics, causes and implications. This phenomenon, which has become evident since the end of the Cold War, has also been widely described as an Asian 'arms race'. This book evaluates the key conceptual ideas which can shed light on this phenomenon, as well as examining the complex mix of internal, external and technological factors that have led to its emergence. The volume explores the way in which the arms race is leading ultimately to three distinctive blocs in the emerging geostrategic landscape: a loose bloc of US allies in the region; a counter-bloc of potential US adversaries; and a neutral bloc of states with industrial age armed forces whose allegiances will vary according to circumstances and geostrategic developments. The Arms Race in Asia concludes that if the emerging arms race is left unchecked, it is likely that Asia will increasingly become a region of instability, marked by conflicts and interstate wars. The book will be of great interest to students of Asian politics, strategic studies, defence studies, security studies and IR in general.

This book examines the dynamics of relations and the substance of the negotiations between the international community and Iran over the latter's nuclear programme. Iran's nuclear programme and the alleged threat to international peace and security remains one of the most important issues in the United States, as well as in European foreign affairs. In the US, Iran has dominated the political discourse for over three decades and Europe has spent considerable political capital in finding a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear ambitions. While relations between both states remain subject to mutual hostility, the EU remains a channel of communication and since 2003 has maintained a multilateral negotiation framework. By and large, the narrative on nuclear negotiations is dominated by constructivist and realist literature, portraying relations between the US and Iran in ideological terms as a prolonged struggle for regional influence. Embedded within conflict resolution and diplomatic theory, this work attempts to bridge this gap. Drawing upon primary documents and interviews, the text examines negotiation behaviour, and strategies and tools of statecraft, as well as analysing technical aspects of initiatives concerning the nuclear programme. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international diplomacy, Middle Eastern politics, security studies and IR in general.

The Global Arms Trade is written by a team of security experts drawn from around the world, analysing a phenomenon which has continued to flourish despite the end of the Cold War and the preoccupation with global terrorism after 11 September 2001. It provides a clear description and analysis of the demand for, and supply of, modern weapons systems, and assesses key issues of concern. The comprehensive and in-depth treatment of the subject establishes this volume as a standard reference on the subject. It is divided sections which examine the demand for arms, the supply of arms and the key issues in the global arms trade. Part 1: Introduction. Develops the general conceptual framework by providing and overview of the global arms trade Part 2: Arms Modernization after the Cold War. Focuses on the demand for arms, in terms of defence spending, procurement and modernization Part 3: The Arms Industry after the Cold War. Examines the supply of arms, and the evolution, development of the arms industry, as well as its problems and prospects Part 4: Key Issues in the Global Arms Trade. Discusses the major issues arising from the arms trade phenomenon The global arms trade is a major area of academic and governmental enquiry. With chapters looking at World regions such as Asia, Europe and the Middle East, as well as individual countries, this book will be of particular use and interest to scholars of international relations and security studies, policy analysts and defence professionals.

Many countries have the capacity to construct nuclear weapons - even relatively poor and small ones, as the North Korean example shows us. So far, only one country - South Africa - has voluntarily given up its nuclear weapons programme. Three others - Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus - gave up the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War. A number of others (including Australia, Sweden and Switzerland) have at one time or another made plans to build nuclear weapons, but eventually opted not to do so. These stories can shed significant light on the prospects for nuclear disarmament - one of the biggest global challenges of our time. Yet they have received little scrutiny in the academic literature to date. This volume addresses that gap, bringing together scholars, practitioners and politicians to reflect on the history of nuclear exits (and nuclear non-entries) and to draw out some key lessons for future nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Although progress on reducing nuclear arsenals has been frustratingly slow, there are strong indications that world opinion is increasingly supportive of nuclear exits. Organizations such as International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Medical Association have all taken a strong stand against nuclear weapons. Ultimately ridding the world of nuclear weapons requires politicians to take determined action - to decide in favour of nuclear exits. The chapters in this volume show that such decisions are possible and that a worldwide nuclear exit is achievable - within our lifetimes. This book was published as a special issue of Medicine, Conflict and Survival.

This book examines the prospects and challenges of a global phase-out of highly enriched uranium-and the risks of this material otherwise being used by terrorists to make atom bombs. Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have demonstrated repeatedly that they seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Unbeknownst even to many security specialists, tons of bomb-grade uranium are trafficked legally each year for ostensibly peaceful purposes. If terrorists obtained even a tiny fraction of this bomb-grade uranium they could potentially construct a nuclear weapon like the one dropped on Hiroshima that killed tens of thousands. Nuclear experts and policymakers have long known of this danger but - so far - have taken only marginal steps to address it. This volume begins by highlighting the lessons of past successes where bomb-grade uranium commerce has been eliminated, such as from Argentina's manufacture of medical isotopes. It then explores the major challenges that still lie ahead: for example, Russia's continued use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in dozens of nuclear facilities. Each of the book's thirteen case studies offers advice for reducing HEU in a specific sector. These insights are then amalgamated into nine concrete policy recommendations for U.S. and world leaders to promote a global phase-out of bomb-grade uranium. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, international relations and security studies.

Once dismissed as ineffectual, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has in the past twenty years emerged as a powerful international organization. Member states allow the IAEA to render judgment on matters vital to peace and security while nations around the globe comply with its rules and commands on proliferation, safety, and a range of other issues. Robert L. Brown details the IAEA's role in facilitating both control of nuclear weapons and the safe exploitation of nuclear power. As he shows, the IAEA has acquired a surprising amount of power as states, for political and technological reasons, turn to it to supply policy cooperation and to act as an agent for their security and safety. The agency's success in gaining and holding authority rests in part on its ability to apply politically neutral expertise that produces beneficial policy outcomes. But Brown also delves into the puzzle of how an agency created by states to aid cooperation has acquired power over them.

This book examines the politics of biological disarmament, focusing on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a treaty regime and the cornerstone of biological disarmament efforts. Biological weapons have long been banned, but the ban needs strengthening. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is the cornerstone of this disarmament regime. After years of deadlock and disappointment its Sixth Review Conference in 2006 generated new hope that biological disarmament could be reinforced from within. This book studies the intricate diplomacy of the Sixth Review Conference as a key moment in the recovery of self-confidence by the treaty parties. It makes detailed proposals for developing an accountability framework and stronger institutions so that the treaty regime can work better. It examines alternative futures for the BWC and the trajectories to be avoided or encouraged in the short, medium and longer terms as its regime evolves. Controversially, by comparing treaty constraints on biological, chemical and nuclear weapons it restores the BWC firmly to the realm of disarmament rather than arms control and rescues it from misleading identifications with counterproliferation and counterterrorism models. This book will appeal to policy-makers, diplomats and students of biological weapons, weapons of mass destruction, international security and IR in general. Nicholas A. Sims is Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He is author of four books on aspects of disarmament.

China's nuclear capability is crucial for the balance of power in East Asia and the world. As this book reveals, there have been important changes recently in China's nuclear posture: the movement from a minimum deterrence posture toward a medium nuclear power posture; the pursuit of space warfare and missile defence capabilities; and, most significantly, the omission in the 2013 Defence White Paper of any reference to the principle of No First Use. Employing the insights of structural realism, this book argues that the imperatives of an anarchic international order have been the central drivers of China's nuclear assertiveness. The book also assesses the likely impact of China's emerging nuclear posture on its neighbours and on the international strategic balance, especially with the United States. The book concludes by examining China's future nuclear directions in the context of its apparent shift toward a more offensive-oriented international strategy.