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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Other warfare & defence issues > Arms negotiation & control
From the destruction of Hiroshima to the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, the international community struggled to halt the nuclear arms race and to prevent the annihilation of humanity. This study offers an accessible and authoritative account of European policy in this critical dimension of world politics. How much influence did Europeans exert in Washington? Why were European objectives often at variance with U.S. expectations? To what extent did differing national agendas on non-proliferation cause friction within the Western Alliance? Schrafstetter and Twigge examine five initiatives designed to prevent or restrain the nuclear arms race: the international option, the commercial option, the moral option, the multilateral option, and the legal option. Their conclusions show the extent to which non-proliferation policy dominated European politics and the transatlantic relationship. The international option focuses on early UN plans for international control of atomic energy (1946-48). The commercial option assesses the influence of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal of 1953 and the impact of civil nuclear power. The moral option charts international attempts to outlaw the testing of nuclear weapons, resulting in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. The multilateral option discusses the role of collective nuclear forces in addressing West German demands for nuclear equality within NATO. The legal option explores British, French, and West German attitudes to nuclear disarmament and charts the international drive to stop the spread of nuclear weapons culminating in the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Throughout the analysis, attention isfocused on the role of the European powers and their influence on both Washington and Moscow.
The United Nations Disarmament yearbook has been a rich source of historical knowledge on developments, trends and achievements of multilateral disarmament for more than 30 years. In early Spring of each year, Part I of the Yearbook is published containing an annual compilation of text and statistics on disarmament-related resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly. In early Autumn, Part II is published presenting the main topics of multilateral consideration during the year, along with a convenient issues-oriented timeline. This year, volume 38 (Part II): 2013, with a foreword by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, summarises developments and trends in 2013 on key issues of multilateral consideration at the international and regional levels; reviews the activity of the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission; and contains a handy timeline of highlights of multilateral disarmament in 2013.
Over the past several years, the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) has been working on a definition of 'nuclear security culture' so that it can be used as a tool to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. A 2001 IAEA report titled "Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities" identified security culture as one of the twelve principles underlying fissile-material security. In February 2005, at a summit in Bratislava, President Bush and President Putin vowed to step up joint efforts to bolster nuclear security, pairing disciplined, well-trained, responsible custodians and protective forces with well-maintained security systems.In July 2005, a series of amendments to the Physical Protection Convention was approved elevating the status of security culture to that of a treaty obligation. Since that time, IAEA member states worked on a concept, definition and guidelines for developing and implementing a robust security culture at nuclear facilities worldwide. This NATO workshop presents the views of experts with the hope to contribute to the IAEA's work and facilitate nuclear security culture worldwide better. Issues include: universality of nuclear security cultures; nuclear security in a nation's culture; differences and similarities between regions such as US, European Union, Japan, etc.; and the advantages of similarities between the regions.
In October 2002 the United States confronted North Korea with suspicions that Pyongyang was enriching uranium in violation of the Agreed Framework that the nations had worked out during the Clinton administration. North Korea subsequently evicted international monitors and resumed its nuclear weapons program. The Peninsula Question chronicles the resulting second Korean nuclear crisis. Japanese journalist Yoichi Funabashi, informed by interviews with more than 160 diplomats and decision makers from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, provides a behind-the-scenes look at the negotiations to denuclearize the peninsula. Between 2002 and 2006, a series of top level diplomats, including the prime minister of Japan, attempted to engage with North Korea. Funabashi illustrates how the individual efforts of these major powers laid the groundwork for multilateral negotiations, first as the trilateral meeting and then as the Six-Party Talks. The first four rounds of talks (2003 2005) resulted in significant progress. Unfortunately, a lack of implementation after that breakthrough ultimately led to North Korea's missile tests in July and subsequent nuclear tests in October 2006. The Peninsula Question provides a window of understanding on the historical, geopolitical, and security concerns at play on the Korean peninsula since 2002. Offering multiple perspectives on the second Korean nuclear crisis, it describes more than just the U.S. and North Korean points of view. It pays special attention to China's dealings with North Korea, providing rare insights to into the decision-making processes of Beijing. This is an important, authoritative resource for understanding the crisis in Korea and diplomacy in Northeast Asia.
This edited collection considers the future of nuclear weapons in world politics in terms of security issues that are important for U.S. and other policy makers. The spread of nuclear weapons also is related to the equally dangerous proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons, and of ballistic missiles of medium and longer ranges. Cold War studies of nuclear weapons emphasized the U.S.-Soviet relationship, deterrence, and bilateral arms control. A less structured post-Cold War world will require more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of roles that nuclear weapons might play in the hands of new nuclear states or non-state actors. As the essays suggest as well, the possibility of terrorism by means of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction introduces other uncertainties into military and policy planning. An important analysis for scholars, students, and researchers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.
This book, based on field research in the West African country of The Gambia, explores how domestic gun control is shaped by international efforts and how local actors interact with international organizations or opt not to do so. The book also shows how the question of who can have what kind of gun under what circumstances is an intrinsic question to modern societies across the world, but it is seldom one that is addressed in sub-Saharan Africa except in cases of post-conflict countries. Small arms control and gun control are often treated as separate efforts, with the former the domain of international actors such as the United Nations and the latter being of concern to the domestic politics of countries such as the United States. By focusing on a country that has never seen the outbreak of a civil war, the book is able to disentangle the complex roots of gun control in Africa, its origins in colonial era legislation, its reverberations across social life, and how it shapes contemporary understandings of groups ranging for security guards to hunters.
The Evolution of Arms Control: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age is the first world history of arms control through time. Drawing on his knowledge of the comparative history of warfare and arms control across preliterate, ancient, medieval, and modern polities, Richard Dean Burns focuses longitudinally on such perennial arms control issues as negotiation, verification, and compliance. Although he does not, for example, allege that war elephants and nuclear weapons are of equal destructive potential, he does discern instructive similarities between Carthage in 202 BCE and Iraq in 1991 AD. Arms control and disarmament measures have been pursued and adopted throughout the history and prehistory of human warfare: sometimes as protocols recognizing evolving humanitarian taboos; sometimes as terms imposed by the victors on the vanquished; and sometimes as accords negotiated between rivals fearful of mutual destruction. Arms control measures ramped up in significance and urgency at the dawn of the 20th century by the introduction of rapid-fire weapons, aircraft, chemical agents, and submarines, and again at mid-century with the advent of weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological-with sophisticated delivery systems. As Burns makes clear, the enormous increase in destructive potential brought about by thermonuclear weaponry essentially changed the nature of war and, therefore, of arms control. 15 illustrations
This book analyzes the elimination of intermediate- range nuclear force missiles through vivid, fresh impressions by those who conducted the INF negotiations. The Reagan-Gorbachev Arms Control Breakthrough brings this period to life through the writing of key participants in the seminal negotiations leading to the completion of the INF Treaty and the ensuing epic struggle to secure its ratification by the U.S. Senate. The book provides an astute balance between the assessments of senior negotiators; "nuts and bolts" observations on specific elements of the Treaty by in-the-trenches negotiators; the tangles that challenged the keenest of legal minds; and the political maneuvers required to bring it through the pits and deadfalls of the Senate. Additionally, The Reagan-Gorbachev Arms Control Breakthrough provides an often-forgotten perspective of the moment, offering the opportunity for retrospective judgment. Is there a test that time demands? Are there "lessons learned," conceived at the time, that still pass that test? The INF Treaty was a pivotal moment in history, which was seized and resulted in a precedent-setting agreement and coincidental lessons from which much of arms control of the past quarter century has advantageously built.
Warfare in the 21st century is far different than warfare throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Conventional warfare was about kinetic force and bending an adversary by might and strength. Skills valued were those related to mastery of weapons and placing ordnance on target. Courage and valor were defined by conflict, militaries were distinct from the population, and occupation was an enduring stage of war. Contemporary warfare, besides continuing to be an exercise in military strength, is composed of missions that depend on skills to forge interpersonal relationships and build sustainable partnerships with a host of actors that once had no voice or role in conflict's duration or conclusion. Today, final victory does not conclude directly from conflict, in fact victory may be subsumed into the larger and more consuming equation of international stability. Twenty-first century warfare is about counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism through an array of strategies that foster collusion and collaboration not acquiescence.Cross-cultural competence (3C) is a suite of competencies and enablers that have been identified as critical to instill in expeditionary military and civilian personnel in the Department of Defense (DoD). Defined as a set of knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes (KSAAs), 3C promotes effective interaction across cultural divides through exchanging ideas and meaning across cultures, facilitating effective cross-cultural interactions to develop and sustain relationships and providing a means to discern meaning from foreign and culturally different behavior. 3C permeates DoD policy, doctrine, strategy and operations and is now being institutionalized in DoD military and civilian education and training. Cross-Cultural Competence for a Twenty-First-Century Military: Culture, the Flipside of COIN is a volume edited by two acknowledged experts on 3C in military learning, policy and research and explores the value and necessity of 3C to developing 21st Century warfighters. This volume features chapters by the editors and a host of multidisciplinary experts that probes all aspects of 3C, from concept to application. The message carried throughout Cross-Cultural Competence for a 21st Century Military is that contemporary and future security endeavors will be successful because winning wars ultimately rest on developing and sustaining cross-cultural relationships as much as it does on weapons and force.
This book explores how human factors, in particular the contested notion of trust, influence the conduct and practice of arms control verification. In the nuclear arena, disarmament verification is often viewed purely in terms of a dispassionate, scientific process. Yet this view is fundamentally flawed since the technical impossibility of 100 per cent verification opens the door to a host of complex issues and questions regarding the process and its outcomes. Central among these is the fact that those involved in any verification inspection process must inevitably conduct their work in a space that falls well short of absolute certainty. The lines between scientific enquiry and human psychology can become blurred and outcomes have the potential to be influenced by perceptions. Drawing on extensive empirical evidence, the authors explore the complex interplay between evidence-based judgements and perceptions of intentions that frames the science of verification. The book provides new insights into the role and influence of human factors in the verification process, shedding light on this 'blind spot' of verification research. It is an invaluable resource for practitioners, academics and students working in arms control and disarmament.
An updated edition of ABC-CLIO's classic reference book on nuclear arms programs and proliferation in nations around the world. Fully updated and revised since its initial publication, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, Second Edition explores all key issues related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and efforts to curb them, from the U.S. atomic bomb project during World War II to current debates on nuclear terrorism, North Korea's nuclear test, and Iran's enrichment program. Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, Second Edition clarifies weapons-related policy debates from both U.S. and international perspectives, offering a detailed look at current technologies, arsenals, weapons tests, and nonproliferation efforts. Readers will find expert analysis of such crucial recent events as Libya's disarmament, the failed WMD search in Iraq, A.Q. Khan's nuclear technology black market, "dirty bombs," developments in North Korea and Iran, and the U.S. plan to aid India's nuclear program-plus recent progress (or lack thereof) on a range of treaties and initiatives. Primary documents include an excerpt from the 1945 U.S. report on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the UN resolution sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear test A detailed and updated chronology highlights major events between 1939-2007 pertaining to the buildup of nuclear weapons and the efforts to control and dismantle them
In this age of asymmetric warfare, battles are fought more and more against armed groups of opponents such as terrorists, insurgents, or transnational criminal organizations. This text is the first to categorize armed groups and analyze their characteristics in a systematic way to provide a thorough overview of all types of armed groups and the role they play in today's security environment. Drawing on international case studies and histories, the work analyzes the objectives, strategies, and internal composition of armed groups and the environments that foster them. It demonstrates that armed groups often behave in an "hybrid" fashion, be it the criminal actions terrorists groups take to fund their goals or the role terrorist actions play in criminal organizations. As such dividing lines blur, governments need to figure out how, where, and when these armed groups are operating in zones of conflict or peace, as well as their motivations, structures, and ultimate objectives. This thorough and groundbreaking study will provide students with a strategic view of who armed groups are, how to analyze them, and what geopolitical and geostrategic factors influence their origins and operations.
In this work, an expert on biological weapons offers a thoughtful examination of the political and technical issues that have affected the implementation of arms control agreements from the 1960s to the present. Arms Control Policy: A Guide to the Issues examines the history of the major arms control treaties since the early 1960s. It offers readers a broad understanding of the ways in which arms control agreements were negotiated and implemented during the Cold War, the international and national events that affected treaty negotiation and implementation, and how the arms control landscape has changed in the war's aftermath. Specifically, the handbook overviews the obligations contained in bilateral U.S.-Soviet/Russian and multilateral arms control agreements covering nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. It also treats such agreements as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty to Ban Land Mines, and the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions. The book concludes with a look at the current challenges in the implementation of arms control agreements and the future of arms control. Primary documents and biographical sketches of key figures support the text Offers a chronology of arms control agreements from the 1960s to the present Maps show placement of land mines in Bosnia and elsewhere Photographs depict the effects of different weapons Includes a glossary of technical arms control terms and acronyms Provides a bibliography including significant materials from history, political science, and public policy
The immense impact of technology on both warfare and security has been clearly demonstrated and has heightened concerns relating to the proliferation of military technology and misuse by irresponsible actors. Technology control regimes are a vital component of national security strategies. This report presents evidence of the increasing relevance of technology in the 21st century and a brief review of the control regimes, as well as the perspectives of progressive developing nations. It highlights the need for a new approach to the management of technology and security issues. Meeting future challenges to arms control and non-proliferation will require wider cooperation among nations in a rapidly changing and interdependent world in which some of the new technologies will further accentuate security sensitivities. The report advocates the abandonment of cold war mindsets and makes a case for a broader cooperative approach to the management of technology controls. International cooperation will be vital for achieving the objectives of non-proliferation, disarmament and global socio-economic progress and will facilitate steps towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the dangers posed by terrorism, thereby fostering enhanced international peace and stability.
Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is an urgent national and international security objective. How to realize this goal is a controversial matter, though. Chemical and biological weapons and missile technology are threats to peace equaled only by nuclear weapons. Yet for the grave dangers they pose, and despite the intense alarm expressed over the proliferation of non-nuclear WMD over the past decade, scholarly studies of national endeavors to stop the spread of these weapons is scant. Cooper remedies this by developing conceptual and normative frameworks to better understand national non-proliferation efforts, then examines competing U.S. and Australian strategies, respectively, of capability denial, non-possession norm building and consequence management. While not wholly incompatible, these competing strategies often impede one another's progress and illuminate larger fissures in Western non-proliferation policies; fissures that ultimately may splinter international coordination and enervate future attempts to prevent the pernicious multiplication of WMDs. Based on extensive primary research, including hundreds of previously classified documents, and interviews with dozens of present and past officials ranging from desk officers to cabinet ministers, Cooper's book will appeal to anybody interested in the issues of implementing effective non-proliferation policies. Policy analysts and scholars alike will benefit from the scholarly account written by a U.S. arms control expert.
This book analyses US and UK efforts to shut down Pakistan's nuclear programme in the 1970s, between the catalytic Indian nuclear test of May 1974 and the decline of sustained non-proliferation activity from mid-1979 onwards. It is a tale of cooperation between Washington and London, but also a story of divisions and disputes. The brutal economic realities of the decade, globalisation, and wider geopolitical challenges all complicated this relationship. Policy and action were also affected by changes elsewhere in the world. Iran's 1979 revolution brought a new form of political Islamic radicalism to prominence. The fears engendered by the Ayatollah and his followers, coupled to the blustering rhetoric of Pakistani leaders, gave rise to the 'Islamic bomb', a nuclear weapon supposedly created by Pakistan to be shared amongst the Muslim ummah. This study thus combines cultural, diplomatic, economic, and political history to offer a rigorous, deeply researched account of a critical moment in nuclear history.
This book explores Eleanor Roosevelt's involvement in the global campaign for nuclear disarmament. Based on an extensive multi-archival research, it assesses her overall contribution to the global anti-nuclear campaign of the early cold war and shows how she constantly tried to raise awareness of the real hazards of nuclear testing. She strove to educate the general public about the implications of the nuclear arms race and, in doing so, she became for many a trustworthy anti-nuclear leader and a reliable voice of conscience.
The United States faces a small number of rogue states that either have or are working to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These NASTIs, or NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention, include such states as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria. U.S. nonproliferation programs and policies have helped to keep this number small, but U.S. and allied counterproliferation programs are essential to reduce the danger. It is up to deterrence, active defenses, passive defenses, decontamination, and counterforce to turn enemy weapons of mass destruction into instruments of limited destructive effect. Warfighters will also have to adopt a different strategy and concept of operations in fighting an adversary that is so heavily armed. This strategy will feature a combination of deception, dispersion, mobility and maneuver, diffused logistics, remote engagement, missile defense bubbles, non-combatant evacuation operations, and large area decontamination. It will also involve upgrades to NBC passive defense measures and equipment, as well as a counterforce capability that can find and destroy a variety of adversary targets, including mobile launchers and deeply buried and hardened underground structures.
Controversy over Iranian nuclear policy has been mounting in both legal and political circles since the early 2000s. Most recently, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), tasked with verifying compliance of Member States with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been expressing concern that Iran's nuclear efforts are directed not solely toward peaceful uses, but also for military purposes. In response, various States have tried, individually and collectively, to engage Iran in agreed frameworks of action that would include an Iranian self-imposed restraint regarding its nuclear development. This volume documents the Iranian nuclear issue, tracing the evolution of international interest and concern with Iran's nuclear policy since the 1970s, when Iran began earnest efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities. Emphasis is nonetheless placed on events since 2002-2003, when it was established that Iran had concealed certain aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA. Alongside reports of the IAEA and Security Council documents, the volume covers diverse sources rather than relying solely on UN organs and agencies, international organizations, or dedicated ad hoc bodies.
The first book to study post-Cold War U.S. nuclear weapons policy. It is based on extensive original research with dozens of the key players, and sheds important new light US foreign policy. "Nuclear Inertia" examines why, despite the Cold War having ended more than ten years ago, the US still maintains an arsenal of over 10 000 nuclear warheads. Most explanations for this are to be found not in the structure of the international system but in domestic politics. Tom Sauer ascribes the lack of change to bureaucratic resistance, dogmatic thinking and lack of political leadership. Clinton tried to change US policy by initiating the 1993-1994 Nuclear Posture Review but was blocked by bureaucratic opposition. Sauer suggests that this points to a lack of civilian control over the military during the Clinton administration.
Based on the annual meeting of the Committee on Atlantic Studies, this important new work addresses the complexities of European defense. It offers perspectives from both sides of the Atlantic--Americans, Canadians, and Europeans--so that the reader can get a complete view of the differences in strategic thinking. Beyond this, it focuses on five major themes: the changes facing Western Europe ... current strategies ... arms control issues ... public opinions on arms control ... and European defense cooperation. With its timely contents and expert contributors, Europe in NATO will interest anyone involved with trans-Atlantic relations, comparative politics, U.S. foreign policy, policy-making, arms control, or Alliance strategies. |
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