The escalating arms race and increasing pressure for Third World development have created an intensifying competition for scarce resources. The escalation of the arms race has resulted in slower and more uneven economic growth and development. The disappointing history of disarmament efforts and the unsatisfactory results in establishing a new international economic order underlie the reluctance to perceive a viable relationship between development and disarmament. The seventeen articles in part one of this volume focus on some of the major problems faced by Third World countries, the policy issues posed by the competition between disarmament and development, and offer some guidelines for international disarmament policies.

International experts analyze Pakistan's security and insurgency issues, looking at the threats posed to and by this nuclear-armed Islamic nation. The only country in Islamic world to be formed in the name of Islam and a nuclear power, Pakistan today is struggling for its very existence and is at war with itself. "Pakistan's Quagmire" focuses on the insurgency in Pakistan, a security problem not only for the country, but also for the region and the rest of the world. To foster a thorough understanding of the many aspects of the issue, the book looks at both theoretical and practical aspects, from international relations, conflict processes, and political Islam to the annihilation of the TTP, the presence of Al-Qaeda in tribal regions, and the role of Pakistani military and agencies. The essays are contributed by international scholars, journalists, economist, nuclear security experts, security analysts, and strategists. A unique contribution, "Pakistan's Quagmire" will be an essential resource for students in conflict processes, security studies, political Islam, and US foreign policy as well as for policymakers and professionals looking to better grasp the quagmire caused by insurgency and the ongoing war on terror in Pakistan.

This third volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within a contemporary global context, an interdependent characteristic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty along with disarmament and non-proliferation. The scholarly contributions in this volume explore this interrelationship, considering the role of nation States as well as international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring and implementing the Treaty. The 2015 Nuclear Accord with Iran and its implementation is also discussed, highlighting relevant developments in this evolving area. Overall, the volume explores relevant issues, ultimately presenting a number of suggestions for international cooperation in this sensitive field where political discussion often dominates over legal analysis. The important tasks of limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ensuring the safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, calls for the interpretation and application of international legal principles and rules in their relevant context, a task that this book series endeavours to facilitate whilst presenting new information and evaluating current developments in this area of international law. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Dean of Law and Professor of International and Comparative Law at Robson Hall, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba; a Barrister at One Garden Court, London; a Magistrate in Oxfordshire; a Justice of the Peace for England & Wales; a Member of Wolfson College, University of Oxford; and Chair of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); and Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

Nuclear technology in all countries of the world is subject to controls from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent its misuse for military purposes. Recently these controls (or "safeguards") have come under criticism for lack of effectiveness, and the IAEA has now elaborated a strengthened safeguards system reaching deep into the domains of national sovereignty. Problems and prospects of the new system are discussed in this book by a team of German and international scholars, practitioners and officials.

Federal restrictions on the sale and possession of some firearms were introduced during Prohibition when illegal rumrunners battling for territorial rights commonly used machine guns to destroy the opposition. More sweeping legislation was not passed until 1968, and from that time on the struggle has been between pro- and anti-control forces, with more controls created at state and local levels than at the federal level. However, the mood in Washington has turned, and the question now is how the country can be weaned away from the violence that pervades every aspect of living, from lawlessness to literature, entertainment, and even children's toys. This book traces the history of these gun control measures from the early days to our own violent age.

This is a study of a part of American history that deals not just with gun control as such, but with basic concepts of personal liberty, government responsibility, and the fear of tyranny. All three of these influenced the people who took up arms in the American Revolution and who, for decades afterward, resisted every effort of the central government to substitute a standing army for the armed militia of the states. As the nation grew in size and population, the need for a standing army became apparent, and the nature of the militia changed from that of a purely state organization to an adjunct of the regular army. Still, the view that private individuals were entitled to purchase and keep firearms for their personal use persisted. That this was not a constitutional right was made clear by the Supreme Court in a series of cases beginning as early as 1876.

Federal restrictions on the sale and possession of some firearms were introduced during Prohibition when illegal rumrunners battling for territorial rights commonly used machine guns to destroy the opposition. More sweeping legislation was not passed until 1968, and from that time on the struggle has been between pro- and anti-control forces, with more controls created at state and local levels than at the federal level. However, the mood in Washington has turned, and the question now is how the country can be weaned from the violence that pervades every aspect of living, from lawlessness to literature, entertainment, and even children's toys.

The quest to limit nuclear weapons was a notable feature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in what history may come to judge as the Clinton administration's greatest foreign-policy achievement, an agreement was reached with key former Soviet republics to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Ellis provides a timely and authoritative analysis of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which removed nuclear arsenals equivalent to the combined stockpiles of Britain, France, and China, and ultimately made a significant contribution to U.S. national security at a relatively small cost.

In a fascinating examination of the interplay of domestic and foreign policy, Ellis traces the debates within Congress and the foreign policy establishment, as well as the situation on the ground in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and he details the implementation of the CTR program. He concludes with a look at the current challenges, especially the thousands of non-strategic nuclear warheads still in Russian possession, and prospects of ongoing CTR efforts.

Most nuclear proliferation literature is focused on states seeking nuclear weapons, conducted in most cases clandestinely. The sharing of nuclear weapons technology between states is as important strategically, if unexpected, because nuclear weapons are such a powerful instrument in international politics. This book proposes to answer why, if nuclear weapons are such good preservers of peace, are states not more willing to see them proliferate? Schofield also examines the underlying phenomenon of the threat of proliferation races, and how nonproliferation bargains between adversaries make nuclear sharing far less common. But sharing is not rare. This book proposes a theory to explain nuclear sharing and surveys its rich history from its beginnings in the Second World War, including the cases of France-Israel, US-NATO, Russia-China, Israel-South Africa, China-Pakistan and Pakistan-Iran, as well as the incidence of soft balancing and permissive nuclear sharing in the cases of the US and Japan, Israel and India.

The armaments of chemical and biological warfare (CBW), as Eric Coddy shows in this introduction for the concerned layman, are now widely held not just by nation-states, but by terrorist and criminal enterprises. The weapons themselves are relatively inexpensive and very easy to hide, and organizations of just a few dozen people are capable of deploying potentially devastating attacks with them. While in the twentieth century most of our arms-control effort focused, rightly, on nuclear arsenals, in the twenty-first century CBW will almost certainly require just as much attention. This book defines the basics of CBW for the concerned citizen, including non-alarmist scientific descriptions of the weapons and their antidotes, methods of deployment and defensive response, and the likelihood in the current global political climate of additional proliferation.

Almost the entire southern hemisphere is now covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones. The ones in Latin America and the South Pacific were established during the Cold War, those in Southeast Asia and Africa after its ending. Zones have also been proposed, so far without success, for the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. In this book, analysts from within the respective regions explore the reasons for success and failure in the establishment of the zone, and their utility and limitations as stepping stones to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

""Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons" is accessible, short and breathless. It has the tone of a TED talk: an avid speaker bursting with one big idea and eighteen minutes to hold your attention." --"New York Times"
Nuclear war would be an apocalypse. Nuclear deterrence is effective in a crisis. Nuclear weapons shock and awe opponents. Killing civilians causes leaders to back down. The bomb has kept the peace for sixty-five years. These are the things we think we know about nuclear weapons, but it turns out they are myths, myths that nonetheless still shape our nuclear policy.
In "Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons," Ward Wilson blows the lid off the stale debate surrounding nuclear weapons, stripping away emotion and exaggeration. By drawing on new facts and historical research, Wilson methodically shatters each of these myths in turn. His conclusions will surprise you, enlighten you, and spur debates about whether nuclear weapons have any power and importance in the twenty-first century.

Often lost in the discussion about the nuclear crisis are its regional dynamics. From 2002 China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea struggled to navigate between the unsettling belligerence of North Korea and the unilateral insistence of the United States. This book focuses on their strategic thinking over four stages of the crisis. Drawing on sources from each of the countries, it examines how the four perceived their role in the Six-Party Talks and the regional context, as they eyed each other. The book emphasizes the significance of these talks for the emerging security framework and great power cooperation in Northeast Asia.

In the next few years the US government will make decisions regarding the renewal of its triad of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear weapons that will have huge implications for the security of the country and its allies, its public finances, and the salience of nuclear weapons in global politics. Current plans provide for spending an estimated US$1 trillion over 30 years to modernise or replace the full triad. The purpose of this book is to demonstrate viable alternatives to the current US plan to modernise or replace its full triad of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear weapons. These alternatives would allow the US to maintain deterrence at a lower cost, thereby freeing up funds to ease pressing shortfalls in spending on conventional procurement and nuclear security. Moreover, these alternative structures - which propose a reduction in the size and shape of the US arsenal - offer distinct advantages over the existing plan with regard to maintaining strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China; upholding existing arms-control treaties, in particular New START and the INF Treaty; and boosting the security of US nuclear forces and supporting the global non-proliferation regime, including the NPT. They would also endow the US with a nuclear force better suited to the strategic environment of the twenty-first century and mark an advance on the existing triad with regard to supporting conventional military operations.

The Second Amendment, by far the most controversial amendment to the US Constitution, will soon celebrate its 225th anniversary. Yet, despite the amount of ink spilled over this controversy, the debate continues on into the 21st century. Initially written with a view towards protecting the nascent nation from more powerful enemies and preventing the tyranny experienced during the final years of British rule, the Second Amendment has since become central to discussions about the balance between security and freedom. It features in election contests and informs cultural discussions about race and gender. This book seeks to broaden the discussion. It situates discussion about gun controls within contemporary debates about citizenship, culture, philosophy and foreign policy as well as in the more familiar terrain of politics and history. It features experts on the Constitution as well as chapters discussing the symbolic importance of Annie Oakley, the role of firearms in race, and filmic representations of armed Hispanic girl gangs. It asks about the morality of gun controls and of not imposing them. The collection presents a balanced view between those who favour more gun controls and those who would prefer fewer of them. It is infused with the belief that through honest and open debate the often bitter cultural divide on the Second Amendment can be overcome and real progress made. It contains a diverse range of perspectives including, uniquely, a European perspective on this most American of issues.

Asia has the world's highest concentration of nuclear weapons and the most significant recent developments related to nuclear proliferation, as well as the world's most critical conflicts and considerable political instability. The containment and prevention of nuclear proliferation, especially in Asia, continues to be a grave concern for the international community. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the state of nuclear arsenals, nuclear ambitions and nuclear threats across different parts of Asia. It covers the Middle East (including Israel), China, India-Pakistan and their confrontation, as well as North Korea. It discusses the conventional warfare risks, risks from non-state armed groups, and examines the attempts to limit and control nuclear weapons, both international initiatives and American diplomacy and interventions. The book concludes by assessing the possibility of nuclear revival, the potential outcomes of international approaches to nuclear disarmament, and the efficacy of coercive diplomacy in containing nuclear proliferation.

This book examines the negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of strategic arms during the Cold War, from 1969 to 1979. The negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, which were concluded in two agreements SALT I and SALT II (with only the first ratified), marked a major change in the history of arms control negotiations. For the first time, in the relatively short history of nuclear weapons and negotiations over nuclear disarmament, the two major nuclear powers had agreed to put limits on the size of their nuclear strategic arms. However, the negotiations between the US and USSR were the easy part of the process. The more difficult part was the negotiations among the Americans. Through the study of a decade of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms in the Cold War, this book examines the forces that either allowed US presidents and senior officials to pave a path toward a US arms limitation policy, or prevented them from doing so. Most importantly, the book discusses the meaning of these negotiations and agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, and seeks to identify the intention of the negotiators: Were they aiming at making the world a safer place? What was the purpose of the negotiations and agreements within US strategic thinking, both militarily and diplomatically? Were they aimed at improving relations with the Soviet Union, or only at enhancing the strategic balance as one component of the strategic nuclear deterrence between the two powers? This book will be of much interest to students of Cold War history, arms control, US foreign policy and international relations in general.

This book tells the story of the UN's attempts to monitor and control the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq from the first Gulf War to the continuing search for them today. The non-disclosure and non-cooperation of Iraq in this process led the Allies to war in 2003 and the search for WMD after the deposition of Saddam Hussein has caused acute political embarrassment. Graham Pearson draws out the lessons that can be learned from the experience in Iraq for the control of weapons programs in other rogue states, and the lessons for the UN themselves.

This authoritative account details the doggedly persistent work of the UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) on Iraq which has during the past eight years, in the face of continued Iraqi deception, gradually uncovered more and more of the scope of the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons programmes and established an ongoing monitoring and verification regime. Vital lessons are drawn for international security and for the strengthening of the non proliferation regimes for both chemical and biological weapons.

Enforced disarmament has often been ignored by historians, diplomats, and strategic analaysts. Yet the democracies have imposed some measure of disarmament on their enemies after every major victory since 1815. In many cases, forced disarmament was one of the most important, if not the most important, of their war aims. The demilitarization of Germany and Japan, for example, was one of the most significant post-war measures agreed by the Soviet Union, Britain, and the USA in 1945, whilst the debate on the disarmament measures imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War continues to rage. The efficacy and durability of enforced disarmament measures, and the resistance they are likely to encounter are thus issues of central strategic and political importance. Philip Towle examines the most important peace settlements from the time of Napoleon to Saddam Hussein, in the first major history of this fascinating subject.

Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political context in which they are operating. Command in war is about forging effective strategies and implementing them, making sure that orders are appropriate, well-communicated, and then obeyed. But it is also an intensely political process. This is largely because how wars are fought depends to a large extent on how their aims are set. It is also because commanders in one realm must possess the ability to work with other command structures, including those of other branches of the armed forces and allies. In Command, Lawrence Freedman explores the importance of political as well as operational considerations in command with a series of eleven vivid case studies, all taken from the period after 1945. Over this period, the risks of nuclear escalation led to a shift away from great power confrontations and towards civil wars, and advances in communication technologies made it easier for higher-level commanders to direct their subordinates. Freedman covers defeats as well as victories. Pakistani generals tried to avoid surrender as they were losing the eastern part of their country to India in 1971. Iraq's Saddam Hussein turned his defeats into triumphant narratives of victory. Osama bin Laden escaped the Americans in Afghanistan in 2001. The UK struggled as a junior partner to the US in Iraq after 2003. We come across insubordinate generals, such as Israel's Arik Sharon, and those in the French army in Algeria, so frustrated with their political leadership that they twice tried to change it. At the other end of the scale, Che Guevara in Congo in 1966 and Igor Girkin in Ukraine in 2014 both tried to spark local wars to suit their grandiose objectives. Freedman ends the book with a meditation on the future of command in a world that is becoming increasingly reliant on technologies like artificial intelligence. A wide-ranging and insightful history of the changing nature of command in the postwar era, this will stand as a definitive account of a foundational concept in both military affairs and politics.

This volume comprehensively covers a range of issues related to dynamic norm change in the current major international arms control regimes related to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; small arms and light weapons; cluster munitions; and antipersonnel mines. Arms control policies of all of the key established and rising state actors are considered, as well as those of nonaligned countries, nongovernmental organizations, and international governing bodies.
Recent studies on multilateral arms control tend to focus mostly on "structure," by which opportunities and constraints for action are created. This volume pays equal attention to "agency," through which opportunities and constraints to produce change or maintain the status quo are handled. In addition-and in greater depth than in recent studies-the volume acknowledges the force of moral and ethical impulses (alongside such factors as political, legal, and technological change) in the evolution of arms control norms.
The volume begins with a look at the structure of regimes, at the conflicts residing in these structures, and at the dynamic processes in which these conflicts are worked out. The impact of extrinsic factors on norm dynamics is considered next, including technological change and shifts in attitudes and power structures. Essays on the role of agency in driving norm change conclude the volume, with a particular focus on norm entrepreneurship and the importance of acknowledging the competing justice claims surrounding norm-change efforts.
Contributors: Una Becker-Jakob, Alexis Below, Marco Fey, Giorgio Franceschini, Andrea Hellmann, Gregor Hofmann, Friederike Klinke, Daniel Muller, Harald Muller, Franziska Plummer, Carsten Rauch, Judith Reuter, Elvira Rosert, Annette Schaper, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Tabea Seidler-Diekmann, Simone Wisotzki, Carmen Wunderlich.

This volume examines in detail the major proposals for confidence- and security-building measures that were made at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) held in Stockholm during 1984-86. The CDE produced an historic agreement which included the first provision ever negotiated for on-site inspection on demand. Focusing on major proposals made by NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the neutral and non-aligned nations, the author also evaluates the effects, if adopted, these measures would have in the real world. Providing a unique insider's account of positions taken, he lets the reader draw conclusions about the actual goals of each of the participating groups--reduction of military tensions or propaganda. This book gives the reader an insider's view of a major international security negotiation and unique insight into the positions of participating nations.

Some view the act of reaching agreement as the most significant aspect of the Stockholm Conference. According to this author, it is in fact the content of the CDE agreement that matters. Following a brief review of the background to the CDE, Krehbiel concentrates on a detailed analysis of the major proposals in the areas of notification, information, observation, constraints, and verification. The final two chapters evaluate the resulting agreement, its strengths and weaknesses, and its potential to accomplish CDE goals. The book concludes with a brief assessment of its implementation.

In this book, Michael Krepon analyzes nuclear issues such as missile defenses, space warfare, and treaties, and argues that the United States is on a dangerous course. During the Cold War, Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, facilitated strategic arms control. Now that the Cold War has been replaced by asymmetric warfare, treaties based on nuclear overkill and national vulnerability are outdated and must be adapted to a far different world. A new strategic concept of Cooperative Threat Reduction is needed to replace MAD. A balance is needed that combines military might with strengthened treaty regimes.

Focusing on the 2001-2002 crisis which brought the nuclear rivals to the brink of war, this book explores the dynamics of strategic stability between India and Pakistan. Like the 1999 Kashmir crisis and the 2008 Mumbai crisis, the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament set in motion events that nearly spun out of control. India's military mobilization raised the specter of full-scale war and the possibility that Pakistan, faced with the defeat of its Army, would resort to nuclear weapons. The contributors focus on five main areas: the political history that led to the crisis; the conventional military environment during the crisis; the nuclear environment during the crisis; coercive diplomacy and de-escalation during the crisis; and arms control and confidence-building measures that can help South Asia to avoid similar crises in the future.