This book provides the first comprehensive overview of Japan's arms control policy, unilateral and multilateral, analyzing its origins and later development. Japan has played an important part in shaping non-nuclear policies and the author pays particular attention to this global aspect of Japanese policy. First published in 1990, this title is part of the Bloomsbury Academic Collections series.

On September 10, 1996, The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Copmprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), prohibiting nuclear explosions worldwide, in all environments. The treaty calls for a global verification system, including a network of 321 monitoring stations distributed around the globe, a data communications network, an international data center (IDC), and on-site inspections, to verify compliance. This volume presents certain recent research results pertaining on methods used to process data recorded by instruments of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and addressing recording infrasound signals generated by atmospheric explosions. Six papers treating data processing provide an important selection of topics expected to contribute to improving our ability to successfully monitor a CTBT. Five papers concerning infrasound include descriptions of ways in which that important research area can contribute to CTBT monitoring, the automatic processing of infrasound data, and site conditions that serve to improve the quality of infrasound data.

Return to Armageddon covers the extraordinary years spanning the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, a period when the United States, through its victory in the Cold War, led the world away from the brink of nuclear annihilation, and then slowly became aware of the increased threat of nuclear confrontation in a world more splintered than ever before and more at the mercy of fanatics and zealots.

This book, first published in 1995, explores how the everyday person reasons about nuclear strategy. James DeNardo's data reveals surprising patterns of thinking on basic issues from SDI, arms control, and proliferation to the end of the Cold War. The book describes a fascinating cast of players, including 'Nice Hawks' like Ronald Reagan, who wanted to give SDI to the Russians, and the 'NIFFs,' whose procurement rule, expressed simply, was: 'If they have it, we don't want it, but they don't have it, we should get it.' To explain his remarkable evidence, Professor DeNardo presents an innovative theory of intuitive deterrence reasoning. He then confronts the theory with data from professional nuclear strategists. His discovery that the amateur's strategic reasoning defies all conventional theories lays the groundwork for a new understanding of national security politics. His demonstration that professional strategists reason like novices - that we are all Amateur Strategists - challenges the intellectual foundations of modern deterrence theory, public opinion studies, and game theory.

This book, first published in 1995, explores how the everyday person reasons about nuclear strategy. James DeNardo's data reveals surprising patterns of thinking on basic issues from SDI, arms control, and proliferation to the end of the Cold War. The book describes a fascinating cast of players, including 'Nice Hawks' like Ronald Reagan, who wanted to give SDI to the Russians, and the 'NIFFs,' whose procurement rule, expressed simply, was: 'If they have it, we don't want it, but they don't have it, we should get it.' To explain his remarkable evidence, Professor DeNardo presents an innovative theory of intuitive deterrence reasoning. He then confronts the theory with data from professional nuclear strategists. His discovery that the amateur's strategic reasoning defies all conventional theories lays the groundwork for a new understanding of national security politics. His demonstration that professional strategists reason like novices - that we are all Amateur Strategists - challenges the intellectual foundations of modern deterrence theory, public opinion studies, and game theory.

The final volume in the trilogy The Struggle Against the Bomb, this book presents the inspiring and dramatic story of how citizen activists helped curb the arms race and prevent nuclear war. Examining events from 1971 to 2003, the author continues the account he began in two earlier volumes, One World or None and Resisting the Bomb. The book shows how pressure from the Nuclear Freeze campaign in the United States, the European Nuclear Disarmament campaign, and comparable movements around the world foiled the nuclear ambitions of hawkish government officials and forced the world toward nuclear arms control and disarmament. A leading historian and peace researcher, the author combines extensive scholarly research with an account of how the largest mass movement of modern times saved the world from nuclear annihilation.

The massive movement against nuclear weapons began with the invention of the atomic bomb in 1945 and lasted throughout the Cold War. Antinuclear protesters of all sorts mobilized in defiance of the move toward nuclear defense in the wake of the Cold War. They influenced U.S. politics, resisting the mindset of nuclear deterrence and mutually-assured destruction. The movement challenged Cold War militarism and restrained leaders who wanted to rely almost exclusively on nuclear weapons for national security. Ultimately, a huge array of activists decided that nuclear weapons made the country less secure, and that, through testing and radioactive fallout, they harmed the very people they were supposed to protect. Rethinking the American Antinuclear Movement provides a short, accessible overview of this important social and political movement, highlighting key events and figures, the strengths and weaknesses of the activists, and its lasting effects on the country. It is perfect for anyone wanting to obtain an introduction to the American antinuclear movement and the massive reach of this transnational concern.

The massive movement against nuclear weapons began with the invention of the atomic bomb in 1945 and lasted throughout the Cold War. Antinuclear protesters of all sorts mobilized in defiance of the move toward nuclear defense in the wake of the Cold War. They influenced U.S. politics, resisting the mindset of nuclear deterrence and mutually-assured destruction. The movement challenged Cold War militarism and restrained leaders who wanted to rely almost exclusively on nuclear weapons for national security. Ultimately, a huge array of activists decided that nuclear weapons made the country less secure, and that, through testing and radioactive fallout, they harmed the very people they were supposed to protect. Rethinking the American Antinuclear Movement provides a short, accessible overview of this important social and political movement, highlighting key events and figures, the strengths and weaknesses of the activists, and its lasting effects on the country. It is perfect for anyone wanting to obtain an introduction to the American antinuclear movement and the massive reach of this transnational concern.

The Nobel Symposium on A Future Arms Control Agenda was organized by SIPRI to consider how arms control can contribute to creating a cooperative security system based on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the gradual demilitarization of international relations. The proceedings of the symposium include comprehensive discussions of the new normative and structural elements of the post-cold war global security system and the objectives and limits of arms control within that evolving system.

In this book, Christoph Bluth provides an original analysis of one of the most perplexing periods of Soviet foreign and military policy--the build up of strategic forces from the death of Stalin to the SALT I agreement. Bluth outlines Soviet strategic arms policy in this period, identifies the principal interest groups involved and studies a number of critical decisions taken in relation to strategic bombers, strategic nuclear forces based at sea, ballistic missile defence and the military uses of space. Strategic arms policy in the Khrushchev period exhibited a number of apparent paradoxes which the author explains. As well as examining external threat assessment and wider foreign policy, he pays particular attention to the role of domestic factors such as Khrushchev's endeavours to shift resources away from the military industries to agriculture and the production of consumer goods. Bluth is therefore able to demonstrate how domestic priorities and internal power struggles account for some of the seeming inconsistencies of military and foreign policy. Given current reassessments of the nature of the Soviet military threat and the revival of interest in the Khrushchev period, this book is most topical. Using source material hitherto unavailable, Bluth combines, for the first time, an analysis of foreign, military and domestic policy. Soviet strategic arms policy before SALT will, therefore, be of interest to a wide range of students and specialists of Soviet affairs, strategic studies and international relations.

International nuclear disarmament is at a standstill. A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World discusses steps that should be taken to restart the disarmament process, including de-alerting nuclear weapons, ending production of fissile material, and introducing policies of 'no first use'. The book includes a history of attempts to eliminate nuclear weapons, together with a summary of the arguments for and against; an analysis of whether nuclear weapons prevented a war in Europe between 1945 and 1991; and a worldwide survey of public opinion on nuclear weapons.

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

World-renowned political thinkers and scientists write on nuclear weapons and war in the twenty-first century. The contributors include Mikhail Gorbachev, who first declared 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought', Robert McNamara, US Defense Secretary at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War; and Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat, the only scientist to resign from the Manhattan Project, where the world's first nuclear weapons were produced.

The Cold War may be over, but you wouldn't know it from the tens of thousands of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction still held by Russia, the United States, and other world powers. Arguing that the time has come to dispense with incremental approaches to arms control, Admiral Stansfield Turner, the former head of the CIA and an experienced senior military commander, proposes a practical yet safe plan--strategic escrow--that would move the world into a new and secure millennium. The paperback edition of this widely acclaimed work has been updated to consider the implications of such a build-down if applied to non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, Admiral Turner details how a plan for weapons reduction could be carried out for biological and chemical weapons and what tactical and strategic differences exist between de-escalation of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.

Established in 1986 as an independent, nonprofit organization of scientists VERTIC provides reliable information on verification, a process which establishes whether all parties are complying with their obligations under an agreement. These agreements may be international agreements on arms control or the environment, or agreements between different communities within a state. For many TV and radio journalists, VERTIC is the first port of call: It is frequently consulted for its knowledge of international and national agreements and for its technical expertise.

The first VERTIC yearbook, on verification-related issues in the spheres of arms control and the environment, was published in 1991. In 1993, its subject matter was expanded to include peacekeeping. The new 1997 volume is divided into two parts. The first half of the book contains twelve original essays analyzing the arms control, peacekeeping, and environmental issues in 1996. The second half contains a greatly expanded collection of twenty-one primary documents that scholars and policy practitioners will find indispensable-- from the Cairo Declaration to the Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit to the complete text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the attendant declarations.

Why did the Carter Administration's conventional arms transfer restraint policy fail? What can be learnt from that failure? Using the theoretical lens of the implementation approach this book examines the origins, context, development and fate of the Administration's conventional arms transfer restraint policy.

With the end of the Cold War, the UN has shown a new dynamism, reflecting a qualitative change in attitudes and perceptions of the international community. The focus of this book is on the ability of the UN to sustain this dynamism into the future. It examines the roles of the UN in the vital areas of international peace and security as well as the realms of human rights, disarmament and arms control and economic development. The contributors, who are experts on the UN, address the conditions which can make the UN more effective and present suggestions on the ways to improve the utilization of the world organization so as to increase its efficacy.

This report examines the prospects for defence industries in Central and Eastern Europe as they attempt to restructure in the wake of the dramatic changes in the security environment brought about by the end of the cold war. Chapters examine key factors affecting the process of industrial restructuring in the region: the role of military doctrine, the trend in national military expenditure, the process of internalization of the defence industry, and the role of arms exports. Contributors: Ian Anthony, Shannon Kile, Evamaria Loose-Weintraub

While many books discuss how nations can prevent the proliferation of biological and nuclear weapons, this unique and controversial volume begins with the premise that these weapons will certainly multiply despite our desperate desire to slow this process. How worried should we be and what should we do? In From Lambs to Lions, Thomas Preston examines current trends in the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons capabilities, know-how, and technologies for both state and non-state actors-and then projects these trends over the coming ten to fifteen years to assess how they might impact existing security relationships between states. With a new preface to the paperback edition, Thomas Preston also addresses the threat of biological and nuclear weapons proliferation that faces the Obama administration. How might a nuclear North Korea or Iran constrain U.S. freedom of action in its foreign or military policies? How might U.S. security be impacted by the current biotechnical revolution and spread of bioweapons know-how to opponents? How might terror groups like Al Qaeda make use of such weapons in future attacks against the United States or its allies around the world? These are the central, most fundamental questions facing American security policy over the coming decades, and to ignore them is to put ourselves at risk for new 9/11-style surprises. For answers, and for some potentially surprising reassurances, this clear and informative book will be invaluable.

Resisting the Bomb continues the story, begun in the award-winning One World or None, of humanity's efforts to avert nuclear destruction. Beginning with the catastrophic atmospheric nuclear weapons tests of 1954, it describes the gradual development of a grassroots, worldwide movement for nuclear disarmament. By the late 1950's and early 1960's, this campaign had taken on mass dimensions in many nations, with antinuclear protests simultaneously drawing hundreds of thousands of people in dozens of countries.

The movement engaged the efforts of some of the world's most prominent and revered intellectuals, such as Albert Schweitzer and Bertrand Russell, and had a substantial impact on major political, labor, and religious groups, as well as on public opinion. Even within the relatively closed confines of Communist countries, antinuclear activities emerged and exerted pressure on public officials. As a result, the public policy of numerous countries began to shift away from a reliance upon nuclear war and toward curbing the nuclear arms race -- a process that culminated in the partial test ban treaty, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and other arms control measures of the 1960's.

This is the first comprehensive account of worldwide nuclear disarmament activism and its consequences during these years. The book is based on extensive research, in fifteen countries, on more than a hundred peace groups and government agencies. Many of the documents -- such as those drawn from the files of the U.S. State Department, the Atomic Energy Authority of Great Britain, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union -- were until recently classified as top secret. Now,together with personal interviews and material drawn from peace movement periodicals, they contribute to a vivid panorama of the global antinuclear campaign and provide startling revelations about the efforts of government officials to repress, contain, and, finally, accommodate to popular protest.

In negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention delegates have addressed the question of how to verify compliance with those provisions which relate to the production and non-production of relevant chemicals. In order to facilitate the work of the negotiators, the Pugwash movement and SIPRI gave a group of fourteen scientific and other experts on the negotiations the task of analysing how the current Convention provisions would be applied to a specific chemical, thiodiglycol. This chemical can be used as a precursor to the chemical warfare agent, mustard gas. In eleven chapters and an annexe, the authors present their individual findings, illustrated with tables and figures. The steering committee of the project have provided summaries in introductory and concluding chapters. The particular problems of monitoring thiodiglycol production outlined may serve as a model for monitoring other chemicals which will be covered by the future Chemical Weapons Convention.

"A pioneering political-scientific history. . . . Lucidly composed, meticulously documented, and handsomely presented."--The Annals
"A fascinating and compelling story of the beginnings of the Chinese nuclear weapon program."--Arms Control Today

This book examines the importance of global nuclear order, emphasising the importance of perspective in our understanding of it, and its significance in international politics. Addressing a gap in existing literature, this book provides an introduction to nuclear weapon states and their relationship with the global nuclear order/disorder paradigm. It explores four main themes and aims to: 1. conceptualise the dichotomous paradigm of global nuclear order/disorder; 2. outline the different phases of global nuclear order/disorder from 1945 to present; 3. address the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the wider international nuclear non-proliferation regime; 4. provide an overview of every nuclear weapon state's national nuclear doctrines throughout the years. The book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, security studies, Cold War studies, foreign policy and IR, more generally.

Are nuclear arsenals safe from cyber-attack? Could terrorists launch a nuclear weapon through hacking? Are we standing at the edge of a major technological challenge to global nuclear order? These are among the many pressing security questions addressed in Andrew Futter's ground-breaking study of the cyber threat to nuclear weapons. Hacking the Bomb provides the first ever comprehensive assessment of this worrying and little-understood strategic development, and it explains how myriad new cyber challenges will impact the way that the world thinks about and manages the ultimate weapon. The book cuts through the hype surrounding the cyber phenomenon and provides a framework through which to understand and proactively address the implications of the emerging cyber-nuclear nexus. It does this by tracing the cyber challenge right across the nuclear weapons enterprise, explains the important differences between types of cyber threats, and unpacks how cyber capabilities will impact strategic thinking, nuclear balances, deterrence thinking, and crisis management. The book makes the case for restraint in the cyber realm when it comes to nuclear weapons given the considerable risks of commingling weapons of mass disruption with weapons of mass destruction, and argues against establishing a dangerous norm of "hacking the bomb." This timely book provides a starting point for an essential discussion about the challenges associated with the cyber-nuclear nexus, and will be of great interest to scholars and students of security studies as well as defense practitioners and policy makers.