This new Handbook is a comprehensive examination of the rich and complex issues of nuclear proliferation in the early 21st century. The future of the decades-long effort to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction is at a crossroads today. If international nonproliferation efforts are to be successful, an integrated, multi-tiered response will almost certainly be necessary. A serious, thorough, and clear-eyed examination of the range of threats, challenges, and opportunities facing the international community is a necessary first step. This Handbook, which presents the most up-to-date analysis and policy recommendations on these critical issues by recognized, leading scholars in the field, intends to provide such an examination. The volume is divided into three major parts: Part I presents detailed threat assessments of proliferation risks across the globe, including specific regions and countries. Part II explains the various tools developed by the international community to address these proliferation threats. Part III addresses the proliferation risks and political challenges arising from nuclear energy production, including potential proliferation by aspiring states and nonstate groups. This Handbook will be of great interest to students and practitioners of nuclear proliferation, arms control, global governance, diplomacy, and global security and IR general.

This book offers a broader theory of nuclear deterrence and examines the way nuclear and conventional deterrence interact with non-military factors in a series of historical case studies. The existing body of literature largely leans toward the analytical primacy of nuclear deterrence and it is often implicitly assumed that nuclear weapons are so important that, when they are present, other factors need not be studied. This book addresses this omission. It develops a research framework that incorporates the military aspects of deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, together with various perceptual factors, international circumstances, domestic politics, and norms. This framework is then used to re-examine five historical crises that brought two nuclear countries to the brink of war: the hostile asymmetric nuclear relations between the United States and China in the early 1960s; between the Soviet Union and China in the late 1960s; between Israel and Iraq in 1977-1981; between the United States and North Korea in 1992-1994; and, finally, between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The main empirical findings challenge the common expectation that the threat of nuclear retaliation represents the ultimate deterrent. In fact, it can be said, with a high degree of confidence, that it was rather the threat of conventional retaliation that acted as a major stabilizer. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, cold war studies, deterrence theory, security studies and IR in general.

Return to Armageddon covers the extraordinary years spanning the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations, a period when the United States, through its victory in the Cold War, led the world away from the brink of nuclear annihilation, and then slowly became aware of the increased threat of nuclear confrontation in a world more splintered than ever before.

The studies in this book concern the nature of international law, how it is and is not constituted, and whether commitments that are not legally binding can change the behaviour of states as well as or better than legal norms do.

Exploring what we know - and don't know - about how nuclear weapons shape American grand strategy and international relations.The world first confronted the power of nuclear weapons when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The global threat of these weapons deepened in the following decades as more advanced weapons, aggressive strategies, and new nuclear powers emerged. Ever since, countless books, reports, and articles - and even a new field of academic inquiry called 'security studies' - have tried to explain the so-called nuclear revolution. Francis J. Gavin argues that scholarly and popular understanding of many key issues about nuclear weapons is incomplete at best and wrong at worst. Among these important, misunderstood issues are: how nuclear deterrence works; whether nuclear coercion is effective; how and why the United States chose its nuclear strategies; why countries develop their own nuclear weapons or choose not to do so; and, most fundamentally, whether nuclear weapons make the world safer or more dangerous. These and similar questions still matter because nuclear danger is returning as a genuine threat. Emerging technologies and shifting great-power rivalries seem to herald a new type of cold war just three decades after the end of the U.S.-Soviet conflict that was characterized by periodic prospects of global Armageddon. Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy helps policymakers wrestle with the latest challenges. Written in a clear, accessible, and jargon-free manner, the book also offers insights for students, scholars, and others interested in both the history and future of nuclear danger.

This book examines the issue of nuclear disarmament in different strategic, political, and regional contexts. This volume seeks to provide a rich theoretical and practical insight to one of the major topics in the field of international security: global abolishment of nuclear weapons. Renewed calls for a nuclear weapons-free world have sparked a wide academic debate on both the attainability of such goal and the steps that should be taken. Comparably less attention, however, has been paid to theoretically informed considerations of the consequences of nuclear abolition. Comprising essays from leading scholars and experts within the field, this collection discusses the fundamental theoretical and conceptual foundations of nuclear disarmament and subsequently tries to assess its hypothetical impact in global and regional contexts. The varied methodological approach of the contributors aims to advance a multi-theoretical and multi-perspectival view of the issue. The book is organized in three main sections: 'Strategic Perspectives', dealing with the specific constraints and facilitators for the states to achieve their core objectives; 'Political Perspectives', with the focus on the power of norms, belief-systems and ideas; and 'Regional Perspectives', with the analyses of seven regional and/or state-specific nuclear contexts. As a whole, the volume provides a detailed, complex overview of the risks and opportunities that are embedded in the vision of a nuclear weapon-free world. This book will be of great interest to students of nuclear proliferation, arms control, war and conflict studies, international relations and security studies.

The emergence of a European policy on armaments is an important and politically controversial component in the building of Europe. Should European cooperation on armaments be designed from a market and a competition perspective, and according to supranational decision making? Or is it the emerging European defense policy and intergovernmental decision-making style that should determine such cooperation? The controversy and tension between the ways of framing this issue highlight fundamental questions in European politics. Organizing European Cooperation shows that the issue of armaments has been conceptualized within two different projects of European integration: the political economy project, developed through the EC, and the defense and security project, organized through NATO, the WEU, and recently through the EU. By employing an innovative theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of European politics the author's analysis of both public actors, such as the Council, the European Commission, and NATO, and non-state actors, such as aerospace companies and business interest organizations, makes this book a valuable tool for anyone trying to understand the interaction between two European organizational fields-market and defense-and the emergence of a new European organizational field on armaments.

Epistemic communities represent networks of knowledge-based experts that help articulate cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, define the self-interests of a state, or formulate specific policies for state decision makers. However, the role of these scientists and knowledgeable professionals in nuclear policy formulation is poorly understood. Thoroughly documented and making excellent use of source material, Politics and the Bomb provides refreshingly new empirical evidence and theoretical analysis of the importance of scientists and experts behind the creation of new non-proliferation agreements. Simply not another book on nuclear proliferation, Sara Z. Kutchesfahani explores the differences in the emergence, composition, and influence mechanisms of the epistemic communities behind the nuclear non-proliferation policy formulation in Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. In doing so she eloquently demonstrates how the role of these non-proliferation experts lead to the possibility of creating more effective non-proliferation policies in the future and hints at the need to sustain non-proliferation epistemic communities in all countries that can provide input to the global proliferation problem until it is solved.

Bitzinger examines the phenomenon of attempted self-reliance in arms production within Asia, and assesses the extent of success in balancing this independence with the growing requirements of next-generation weapons systems. He analyzes China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia. The overarching question in the book is whether self-reliance is a strategically viable solution for development and manufacturing of arms. Given the ever-changing dynamics and increasing demand for sophisticated next-generation weaponry, will these countries be able to individually sustain their domestic defense industries and constantly update their technologies? This is the first book to analyze arms production from a regional perspective.

If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's "tit for tat," only strategies based on an ideal type of "enhanced contingent restraint" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the basic security behaviors of states, the book has implications that go beyond the three bilateral arms control cases Weber discusses--implications that remain important despite the end of superpower rivalry. "An important theoretical analysis of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the area of arms control.. An excellent work on a subject that has received very little attention."--Choice

Originally published in 1992.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This volume brings together writings by Prof. Ramesh Thakur on the challenge of nuclear weapons, covering more than three decades of researching, thinking and writing on the topic.

The core problem of this work can be disaggregated into several components. The essays approach the problem primarily as a normative and political project, not as an analytical project. Chapters 1 3 in Part One describe the scholar-practitioner interface in trying to come to grips with the nature and magnitude of the challenge, the main policy impact of the development of nuclear weapons on security strategy, and the different collective nuclear futures from among which policymakers must choose.

The bulk of the world s nuclear weapons are held by Russia and the United States, who also conducted most of the nuclear testing. But in the 1980s and 1990s, world attention was focused on nuclear testing in the Pacific by France as an established NPT nuclear-weapons-state (NWS), then India and Pakistan as they broke through the NPT normative barrier to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 and consolidated their status as non-NPT nuclear-armed states, followed finally by North Korea which became the first country to defect from and break out of the NPT to conduct nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013. While the world is trying to figure out how to coax North Korea back into the NPT bottle, it is simultaneously struggling with the challenge of trying to keep Iran in the NPT non-nuclear box. Meanwhile, India has been accommodated as a de facto nuclear-armed state outside the NPT regime. The eight chapters in Part Two address these regional nuclear challenges.

The various regional challenges have served to highlight serious deficiencies in the normative architecture of the nuclear arms control and disarmament regime. The five chapters in Part Three deal with the international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament machinery and regime, including regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. In addition, the nuclear proliferation and terrorism agendas merged as a nightmare challenge in the minds of policymakers after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. This is discussed in chapter 15, while chapter 16 asks if the NPT anomalies have become so many and so substantial that the treaty is incapable of functioning much longer as the anchor of the global nuclear arms control regime.

The concluding chapter brings together the various disparate strands of the analysis to argue for moving towards a world of progressively reduced nuclear weapons in numbers, reduced salience of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines and deployments, and an eventually denuclearized world.

This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, international organisations, diplomacy and security studies.
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Twenty years post-independence Ukraine remains split, still floundering toward viable democracy. Active participation in civic affairs required for democracy is unfamiliar for most Ukrainian citizens, having internalized centuries of divisive oppression under a series of authoritarian regimes. Democracy-building and peace-building require participant agency and voice; rising out of oppression, people often need support to speak about and transform their lived experiences. Peacebuilding with Women in Ukraine: Using Narrative to Envision a Common Future, by Maureen P. Flaherty, explores the roles women's shared narrative, dialogue, and group-visioning play in the support of personal empowerment and bridge building between diverse communities. Despite participants' initial beliefs that their regional counterparts shared little in common with them, in the process of telling their personal life stories women were able to reflect upon their own values and strengths, and with this rooting, they were then able to reach out to others. Rather than looking for differences, participants sought ways to express a shared vision for an inclusive, functional, peace-building future for themselves, their families, and Ukraine as a whole. Peacebuilding with Women in Ukraine is a model for emancipatory social action and social change, while the women's stories offer a window into the formative years and present-day lives of eighteen women born and raised in the Soviet Union. This study is a unique contribution to peace studies and to the history and building of a country that has most often had its history written for it.

There is a high risk that someone will use, by accident or design, one or more of the 17,000 nuclear weapons in the world today. Many thought such threats ended with the Cold War or that current policies can prevent or contain nuclear disaster. They are dead wrong-these weapons, possessed by states large and small, stable and unstable, remain an ongoing nightmare. Joseph Cirincione surveys the best thinking and worst fears of experts specializing in nuclear warfare and assesses the efforts to reduce or eliminate these nuclear dangers. His book offers hope: in the 1960s, twenty-three states had nuclear weapons and research programs; today, only nine states have weapons. More countries have abandoned nuclear weapon programs than have developed them, and global arsenals are just one-quarter of what they were during the Cold War. Yet can these trends continue, or are we on the brink of a new arms race-or worse, nuclear war? A former member of Senator Obama's nuclear policy team, Cirincione helped shape the policies unveiled in Prague in 2009, and, as president of an organization intent on reducing nuclear threats, he operates at the center of debates on nuclear terrorism, new nuclear nations, and the risks of existing arsenals.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Middle East has been the focus of various projects for the establishment of arms control (including CBMs) regimes. Whereas some of these projects were initiated at the global level, others were discussed and debated at the regional level. This book analyses the global and regional dynamics of arms control in the Middle East in the post-Cold War era. It examines American and European arms control projects, the contexts in which they were presented, the reactions of major regional actors, and their impacts on arms control efforts in the region. It assesses Arab perceptions of the motivations for and constraints on establishing arms control regimes. It also explores the prospects of regional arms control in the context of the ongoing Arab Spring with its ramifications for Arab regional politics, and provides a new perspective on arms control in the Middle East. This volume enriches the ongoing discourse, which to date has been dominated by mainly Western perspectives.

This volume presents a collection of diplomatic documents describing Britain's relations with Eastern Europe from 1979 to 1982, with special focus on the crisis in Poland. After coming to power in 1979, the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher reaffirmed a policy of 'differentiation' between the Soviet Union and the rest of Eastern Europe, and between individual countries; concurrently it encouraged states to exercise a limited amount of independence. This policy was soon put to the test when in 1980 Solidarnosc, the Solidarity trade union led by Lech Walesa, challenged the power of the Party state in Poland. Political demands, social unrest and economic crisis culminated in the imposition of martial law in December 1981, finally suspended in December 1982. The volume maps the UK response, in consultation with Western partners, to the unfolding crisis in Poland, the threat of Soviet intervention and the impact on other Communist states in Europe. The volume also provides a flavour of bilateral UK relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia; highlighting themes such as human rights and trade. This volume will be of great interest to students of British Politics, Eastern European Politics, Cold War History, Diplomacy Studies and International Relations in general.

One of the gravest issues facing the global community today is the threat of nuclear war. As a growing number of nations gain nuclear capabilities, the odds of nuclear conflict increase. Yet nuclear deterrence strategies remain rooted in Cold War models that do not take into account regional conflict. Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments offers an innovative theory of brokered bargaining to better understand and solve regional crises. As the world has moved away from the binational relationships that defined Cold War conflict while nuclear weapons have continued to proliferate, new types of nuclear threats have arisen. Moeed Yusuf proposes a unique approach to deterrence that takes these changing factors into account. Drawing on the history of conflict between India and Pakistan, Yusuf describes the potential for third-party intervention to avert nuclear war. This book lays out the ways regional powers behave and maneuver in response to the pressures of strong global powers. Moving beyond debates surrounding the widely accepted rational deterrence model, Yusuf offers an original perspective rooted in thoughtful analysis of recent regional nuclear conflicts. With depth and insight, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments urges the international community to rethink its approach to nuclear deterrence.

Often lost in the discussion about the nuclear crisis are its regional dynamics. Since 2002, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea have struggled to navigate between the unsettling belligerence of North Korea and the unilateral insistence of the United States. This book focuses on their strategic thinking over four stages of the crisis. Drawing on sources from each of the countries, it examines how the four perceived their role in the Six-Party Talks and the regional context, as they eyed each other. The book emphasizes the significance of these talks for the emerging security framework and great power cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are among the fingers in the dike preventing the unthinkable nuclear, biological, and chemical catastrophe. For decades the ability to ascertain whether states are hiding germ weapons programs has been nonexistent because the 1975 bioweapons ban has no inspection measures. Yet, in 1995 a small United Nations inspection corps pulled off a spectacular verification feat in the face of concerted resistance from Iraq's Saddam Hussein and popular skepticism that it was even possible to conduct effective biological inspections. Working from sketchy intelligence--and hampered by the Iraqis' extensive concealment and deception measures--the inspectors busted open Iraq's cover stories and wrested a confession of biowarfare agent production from Baghdad. This rigorously researched book tells that compelling story through the firsthand accounts of the inspectors who, with a combination of intrepidness, ingenuity, and a couple of lucky breaks, took the lid off Iraq's bioweapons program and pulled off an improbable victory for peace and international security. The book concludes by drawing lessons from this experience that should be applied to help arrest future bioweapons programs, by placing the Iraq bioweapons saga in the context of other manmade biological risks, and by making recommendations to reduce those risks.
While written as an engaging, analytical historical narrative that explains what the biological inspectors knew, when and how they knew it, and how they outmaneuvered the Iraqis, this book's real contributions are the inspectors' blueprint to "get it right" with regard to the verification challenges associated with the bioweapons ban, and the author's roadmap to address the overall biological threats facing the world today.

Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the "tradition of non-use," a time-honored obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear states--thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user.
The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.

This book focuses on an even more urgent and "inconvenient truth" than global warming. At the nuclear precipice, humanity's choices are catastrophe or transformation. This book explores the present nuclear predicament, and how to step away from the precipice and assure humanity's future. It examines the intersections between international law and national policies; and between nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and nuclear disarmament. The book offers a way out if policy makers of leading countries can summon the vision and political will to move in a new direction.

In 2008, the iconic doomsday clock of the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists"was set at five minutes to midnight--two minutes closer to Armageddon than in 1962, when John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev went eyeball to eyeball over missiles in Cuba We still live in an echo chamber of fear, after eight years in which the Bush administration and its harshest critics reinforced each other's worst fears about the Bomb. And yet, there have been no mushroom clouds or acts of nuclear terrorism since the Soviet Union dissolved, let alone since 9/11.
Our worst fears still could be realized at any time, but Michael Krepon argues that the United States has never possessed more tools and capacity to reduce nuclear dangers than it does today - from containment and deterrence to diplomacy, military strength, and arms control. The bloated nuclear arsenals of the Cold War years have been greatly reduced, nuclear weapon testing has almost ended, and all but eight countries have pledged not to acquire the Bomb. Major powers have less use for the Bomb than at any time in the past. Thus, despite wars, crises, and Murphy's Law, the dark shadows cast by nuclear weapons can continue to recede.
Krepon believes that positive trends can continue, even in the face of the twin threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation that have been exacerbated by the Bush administration's pursuit of a war of choice in Iraq based on false assumptions. Krepon advocates a "back to basics" approach to reducing nuclear dangers, reversing the Bush administration's denigration of diplomacy, deterrence, containment, and arms control. As he sees it, "The United States has stumbled before, but America has also made it through hard times and rebounded. With wisdom, persistence, and luck, another dark passage can be successfully navigated."

Over the last decade, the U.S., UK Israel and other states have begun to use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for military operations and for targeted killings in places like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Worldwide, over 80 governments are developing their own drone programs, and even non-state actors such as the Islamic State have begun to experiment with drones. The speed of technological change and adaptation with drones is so rapid that it is outpacing the legal and ethical frameworks which govern the use of force. This volume brings together experts in law, ethics and political science to address how drone technology is slowly changing the rules and norms surrounding the use of force and enabling new, sometimes unprecedented, actions by states. It addresses some of the most crucial questions in the debate over drones today. Are drones a revolutionary form of technology that will transform warfare or is their effect merely hype? Can drone use on the battlefield be made wholly consistent with international law? How does drone technology begin to shift the norms governing the use of force? What new legal and ethical problems are presented by targeted killings outside of declared war zones? Should drones be considered a humane form of warfare? Finally, is it possible that drones could be a force for good in humanitarian disasters and peacekeeping missions in the near future? This book was previously published as a special issue of The International Journal of Human Rights.

The Small Arms Survey 2008 presents two thematic sections. The first examines the problem of diversion in all its aspects: stockpiles, surplus disposal, international transfers, and end-user documentation. It includes a case study on South Africa and a comic strip illustrating the potential ease by which someone with access to forged documentation can make arrangements to ship munitions virtually anywhere. The second thematic section analyses the public health approach to armed violence, scrutinizing risk and resilience factors and considering related interventions. It includes an overview of the burden of armed violence, and two case studies of armed violence in El Salvador and the United States. A chapter on light weapons production rounds out the volume.

While many books discuss how nations can prevent the proliferation of biological and nuclear weapons, this unique and controversial volume begins with the premise that these weapons will certainly multiply despite our desperate desire to slow this process. How worried should we be and what should we do? In From Lambs to Lions, Thomas Preston examines current trends in the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons capabilities, know-how, and technologies for both state and non-state actors-and then projects these trends over the coming ten to fifteen years to assess how they might impact existing security relationships between states. With a new preface to the paperback edition, Thomas Preston also addresses the threat of biological and nuclear weapons proliferation that faces the Obama administration. How might a nuclear North Korea or Iran constrain U.S. freedom of action in its foreign or military policies? How might U.S. security be impacted by the current biotechnical revolution and spread of bioweapons know-how to opponents? How might terror groups like Al Qaeda make use of such weapons in future attacks against the United States or its allies around the world? These are the central, most fundamental questions facing American security policy over the coming decades, and to ignore them is to put ourselves at risk for new 9/11-style surprises. For answers, and for some potentially surprising reassurances, this clear and informative book will be invaluable.