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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Other warfare & defence issues > Arms negotiation & control
WINNER OF THE PULITZER PRIZE
The first full account of how the Cold War arms race finally came
to a close, this riveting narrative history sheds new light on the
people who struggled to end this era of massive overkill, and
examines the legacy of the nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons that remain a threat today.
Drawing on memoirs, interviews in both Russia and the US, and
classified documents from deep inside the Kremlin, David E. Hoffman
examines the inner motives and secret decisions of each side and
details the deadly stockpiles that remained unsecured as the Soviet
Union collapsed. This is the fascinating story of how Reagan,
Gorbachev, and a previously unheralded collection of scientists,
soldiers, diplomats, and spies changed the course of history.
This is the first book-length study of why states sometimes ignore,
oppose, or undermine elements of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime-even as they formally support it. Anchored by the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear
nonproliferation regime is the constellation of agreements,
initiatives, and norms that work in concert to regulate nuclear
material and technology. The essays gathered here show that
attitudes on nonproliferation depend on a ""complex, contingent
decision calculus,"" as states continually gauge how their actions
within the regime will affect trade, regional standing, and other
interests vital to any nation. The first four essays take
theoretical approaches to such topics as a framework for
understanding challenges to collective action; clandestine
proliferation under the Bush and Obama administrations and its
impact on regime legitimacy; threat construction as a lens through
which to view resistance to nonproliferation measures; and the
debate over the relationship between nuclear disarmament and
nonproliferation. Essays comprising the second part of the book use
regional and state-specific case studies to look at how U.S.
security guarantees affect the willingness of states to support the
regime; question the perceived spoiler role of a ""vocal minority""
within the Non-Aligned Movement; challenge notions that Russia is
using the regime to build a coalition hostile to the United States;
contrast nonproliferation strategies among Latin American
countries; and explain the lag in adoption of an Additional
Protocol by some Middle East and North African countries. Getting
countries to cooperate on nonproliferation efforts is an ongoing
challenge. These essays show that success must be measured not only
by how many states join the effort but also by how they participate
once they join.
Until now, there has been no detailed account of Israel's
nuclear history. Previous treatments of the subject relied heavily
on rumors, leaks, and journalistic speculations. But with "Israel
and the Bomb, " Avner Cohen has forged an interpretive political
history that draws on thousands of American and Israeli government
documents -- most of them recently declassified and never before
cited -- and more than one hundred interviews with key individuals
who played important roles in this story. Cohen reveals that Israel
crossed the nuclear weapons threshold on the eve of the 1967
Six-Day War, yet it remains ambiguous about its nuclear capability
to this day. What made this posture of "opacity" possible, and how
did it evolve?
Cohen focuses on a two-decade period from about 1950 until 1970,
during which David Ben-Gurion's vision of making Israel a
nuclear-weapon state was realized. He weaves together the story of
the formative years of Israel's nuclear program, from the founding
of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission in 1952, to the alliance
with France that gave Israel the sophisticated technology it
needed, to the failure of American intelligence to identify the
Dimona Project for what it was, to the negotiations between
President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir that led to the current
policy of secrecy. Cohen also analyzes the complex reasons Israel
concealed its nuclear program -- from concerns over Arab reaction
and the negative effect of the debate at home to consideration of
America's commitment to nonproliferation.
"Israel and the Bomb" highlights the key questions and the many
potent issues surrounding Israel's nuclear history. This book will
be a critical resource for students of nuclear proliferation,
Middle East politics, Israeli history, and American-Israeli
relations, as well as a revelation for general readers.
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