A challenging, clear-eyed, and authoritative history of American conservatism and its grave effect on our country's foreign policy
In this compelling and sometimes alarming analysis, J. Peter Scoblic, executive editor of "The New Republic," traces the history of American foreign policy and how it has evolved from the Cold War conservatism of the 1950s to today. The belligerence, intransigence, and disinclination for diplomacy that mars the right wing once brought us to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. More recently it has failed to meet the post-9/11 challenges posed by Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Scoblic argues forcefully that the only way to face these new threats practically and seriously is by adopting an approach exactly opposite to that suggested by conservatism. By diagnosing the origins of Bush's foreign policy, "U.S. vs. Them" illuminates the path to renewed American leadership in the twenty-first century as the most serious danger ever faced looms before us: nuclear terrorism.

A former nuclear weapons designer, Stephen M. Younger understands, as few others can, humankind's potential for violence. He knows that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction means that any nation, group, or even individual could cause unimaginable carnage--and the accelerating pace of communications and transportation means that things can happen faster than we can think about them.

In "Endangered Species," Younger peers into the heart of modern civilization to present a practical plan for ending mass violence, the scourge of our times and a threat to our survival as a species. Looking across our knowledge of psychology, history, politics, and technology, Younger presents a convincing argument that we can escape our spiral into global destruction. But we haven't a moment to lose.

The author describes his visit to the Jewish settlement of Gilo in the West Bank that had been land owned by Christian Palesitians of the village of Beit Jala. It was here in 2005 that Senatory Hillary Clinton viewed the Wall being constructed around Bethlehem and approved of it. Paone describes the terrrible consequences of that wall and the opportunism of Clinton's blessing it.

On December 19, 2003, Libya announced to a surprised world that it had decided to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, as well as its longer-range missiles. Within hours, Prime Minister Blair and President Bush made separate but coordinated statements welcoming Tripoli's decision. Both made clear that Colonel Qadaffi had made this historic choice following months of secret contacts with the United States and United Kingdom. The author of The Libyan Experience, Ambassador Robert Joseph was at the center of this single most successful counterproliferation event of the decade. As the director of the National Security Council's counterproliferation activities, he was one of very few involved in, or even aware of, the secret face-to-face negotiations that preceded Libya's renunciation of its programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In fact, he headed the policy discussions with the Libyans that led to this historic and dramatic outcome. What occurred during those months has never before been made available publically or recorded in sufficient detail to answer key questions about Libyan motivations or to identify the lessons learned from this case that may apply to other proliferation challenges. In The Libyan Experience, Robert Joseph fills the void by providing this first hand account of the events that led to this great counterproliferation. Here is the actual history presented by a central figure involved in that success story. The narrative is both scholarly and highly-readable; at times it as much a real-life thriller as it is an historical text. As only a direct participant can, he describes the interactions with the Libyans and assesses their implications forboth Tripoli's decision and for the future. This is the definitive, true story that now is told thanks to the author's intrepid work and to his meticulous, highly readable accounting and assessment of events. This is a story that is profoundly important to our understanding of proliferation and of the tools and processes most helpful to its prevention and rollback. As such, it is profoundly important to our future.

In his shocking and revelatory new work, the celebrated journalist William Langewiesche investigates the burgeoning global threat of nuclear weapons production. This is the story of the inexorable drift of nuclear weapons technology from the hands of the rich into the hands of the poor. As more unstable and undeveloped nations find ways of acquiring the ultimate arms, the stakes of state-sponsored nuclear activity have soared to frightening heights. Even more disturbing is the likelihood of such weapons being manufactured and deployed by guerrilla non-state terrorists. Langewiesche also recounts the recent history of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist at the forefront of nuclear development and trade in the Middle East who masterminded the theft and sale of centrifuge designs that helped to build Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and who single-handedly peddled nuclear plans to North Korea, Iran, and other potentially hostile countries. He then examines in dramatic and tangible detail the chances for nuclear terrorism. From Hiroshima to the present day, Langewiesche describes a reality of urgent consequence to us all. This searing, provocative, and timely report is a triumph of investigative journalism, and a masterful laying out of the most critical political problem the world now faces.

Most books on missile proliferation focus on the spread of ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, not both. Gormley's work, however, explains why cruise missiles are beginning to spread widely, but does so by explaining their spread in the context of ballistic missile proliferation. It therefore treats both ballistic and cruise missile proliferation as related phenomenon. This work also focuses evenhandedly on both nonproliferation and defense policy (including missile defenses and counterforce doctrines) to fashion a set of integrated strategies for dealing with ballistic and cruise missile proliferation. Signs of missile contagion abound. In this study, Gormley argues that a series of rapid and surprising developments since 2005 suggest that the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering either weapons of mass destruction or highly accurate conventional payloads is approaching a critical threshold. The surprising fact is that land-attack cruise missiles, not ballistic missiles, constitute the primary problem. Flying under the radar, both literally and figuratively, land-attack cruise missiles add a dangerous new dimension to protecting U.S. security interests and preventing regional military instability. Gormley asserts that cruise missiles are not destined to supplant ballistic missiles; rather, they are likely to join them, because when both are employed together, they could severely test even the best missile defenses. Worse yet, Gormley argues, land-attack cruise missiles are increasingly being linked to preemptive strike doctrines, which are fueling regional arms races and crisis instability. This work explains why an epidemic of cruise missile proliferation, long forecastedby analysts, has only recently begun to occur. After first assessing the state of ballistic missile proliferation, Gormley explores the role of three factors in shaping the spread of cruise missiles. These include specialized knowledge needed for missile development; narrative messages about reasons for acquiring cruise missiles; and norms of state behavior about missile nonproliferation policy and defense doctrine. This book then addresses the policy adjustments needed to stanch the spread of cruise missiles in the first place, or, barring that, cope militarily with a more demanding missile threat consisting of both cruise and ballistic missiles.

In October 2002 the United States confronted North Korea with suspicions that Pyongyang was enriching uranium in violation of the Agreed Framework that the nations had worked out during the Clinton administration. North Korea subsequently evicted international monitors and resumed its nuclear weapons program. The Peninsula Question chronicles the resulting second Korean nuclear crisis. Japanese journalist Yoichi Funabashi, informed by interviews with more than 160 diplomats and decision makers from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, provides a behind-the-scenes look at the negotiations to denuclearize the peninsula. Between 2002 and 2006, a series of top level diplomats, including the prime minister of Japan, attempted to engage with North Korea. Funabashi illustrates how the individual efforts of these major powers laid the groundwork for multilateral negotiations, first as the trilateral meeting and then as the Six-Party Talks. The first four rounds of talks (2003 2005) resulted in significant progress. Unfortunately, a lack of implementation after that breakthrough ultimately led to North Korea's missile tests in July and subsequent nuclear tests in October 2006. The Peninsula Question provides a window of understanding on the historical, geopolitical, and security concerns at play on the Korean peninsula since 2002. Offering multiple perspectives on the second Korean nuclear crisis, it describes more than just the U.S. and North Korean points of view. It pays special attention to China's dealings with North Korea, providing rare insights to into the decision-making processes of Beijing. This is an important, authoritative resource for understanding the crisis in Korea and diplomacy in Northeast Asia.

Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has puzzled scholars and commentators. Some have claimed that it was a purely political maneuver, while others have explained it as a ruse conjured up by presidential advisers to weaken Soviet resolve.
These assumptions, however, fail to acknowledge the depth of Reagan's involvement in nuclear abolition, and how passionately committed Reagan was to the pursuit of this goal. In" Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Paul Lettow renders untenable the persistent belief that Reagan was an ideologically shallow figurehead.
Reagan's wish to ban nuclear armament first came to light in 1945, just months after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. While sidestepping political partisanship, Lettow demonstrates that scholars and historians have largely neglected to assess properly the influence of Reagan's ideal and how it led to one of the most important, if the least understood, of Reagan's accomplishments.
In a narrative that covers the start of Reagan's presidency and the 1986 Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, during which SDI was a defining issue, we see SDI for what it was: a full-on assault against nuclear weapons waged as much through policy as through ideology. While cabinet members and advisers-Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger among them-played significant roles, it was Ronald Reagan, himself who presided over every element, large and small, of this paradigm shift in U.S. diplomacy.
Lettow conducted interviews with former Reagan officials-four of his six national security advisers, both of his ambassadors to the USSR, and both ofhis defense secretaries. He also draws upon the vast body of declassified security documents from the Reagan presidency; much of what he quotes from these documents appears publicly here for the first time.
The result is the first major work to apply such evidence to the study of SDI and superpower diplomacy. In "Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Paul" Lettow does not simply add nuance to the existing record; he revises our very understanding of the Reagan presidency.

"From the Hardcover edition.

CONTENTS Preface Nicholas Eberstadt Acknowledgements Introduction Henry D. Sokolski Chapter 1. Planning for a Peaceful Korea: A Report of the Korea Competitive Strategies Working Group Henry D. Sokolski Chapter 2. North Korea's Strategy Stephen Bradner Chapter 3. The North Korean View of the Development and Production of Strategic Weapons Systems Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., and Sharon A. Richardson Chapter 4. The Last Worst Place on Earth: Human Rights in North Korea Jack Rendler Chapter 5. China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula Eric A. McVadon Chapter 6. China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula: A Critical Assessment Larry M. Wortzel Chapter 7. Japan's Grand Strategy on the Korean Peninsula: Optimistic Realism Victor D. Cha Chapter 8. Economic Alternatives for Unification Marcus Noland Chapter 9. Conventional Arms Control in Korea: A Lever for Peace? Bruce William Bennett Working Group Participant List About the Contributors

Iran is aggressively seeking nuclear technology that could be used for making weapons -and its quest has set off alarms throughout the world. This widespread concern stems in part from Iran's uncertain intentions and recent history. Will it remain a revolutionary power determined to subvert its Sunni Arab neighbors, destroy Israel, and spread theocratic government to other lands? Or would an Iran with nuclear weapons merely defend its territory from foreign aggression and live in peace with its neighbors? Are the country's leaders and society willing to negotiate limits on nuclear capability and normalize relations with the West, or will they resist accommodation? Iran's Nuclear Ambitions provides a rare, balanced look into the motivations, perceptions, and domestic politics swirling around Iran. Shahram Chubin, an Iranian-born security expert, details the recent history of Iran's nuclear program and diplomacy. He argues that the central problem is not nuclear technology, but rather Iran's behavior as a revolutionary state, with ambitions that collide with the interests of its neighbors and the West. Topics include: The view from Tehran Iran's nuclear energy rationale Domestic politics, and decisionmaking Sources of concern, including the nature of Iran's regime Its nuclear infrastructure, Missile development, and terrorism Iran's negotiating strategy The international response Iran and regional security, including the U.S. as a threat and rival Iran's regional ambitions, and Israel Policy options

While deterrence was pursued through the threat of causing grievious hurt, vying with annihilation, diplomacy sought to construct a framework where the powerful sought to retain their advantage while pressing for reducing that of the adversary or completley dnying it to others.

The state of the planet, hazardous waste, threats to survival. Are we teachable? Deforestation, desertefication, atmospheric pollution, conditions of success. Weapons of mass destruction. World trade center and global terrorism. International flash points. Sovereignty and power politics. Security and vital interests. Balance of power. International law. United Nation's reform

For nearly fifty years, including the decade and a half since the end of the Cold War, deterrence has remained the central nuclear arms control policy between the United States, Russia, and other principal nuclear powers. The question today is: Has the concept of deterrence outlived its usefulness? In Beyond Nuclear Deterrence, two of Russias top nonproliferation and international security experts, Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, critically assess the history of deterrence as it emerged between the Soviet Union and the U.S. and evolved through the Cold War to include an expanding nuclear club. The authors argue that while deterrence as a concept has always been paradoxical, it is poorly equipped to handle todays most significant nuclear challenges: proliferation and terrorism. Nuclear arms control must move beyond the deadlock of deterrence. The U.S. and Russia need to take the first bilateral steps to remove mutual nuclear deterrence as the foundation of their strategic relationship and implement changes that can be exported internationally.

This book focuses on the Middle East arms control process as it unfolded during the years 1992-1995, as part of the multilateral track of the Arab-Israeli peace process initiated in Madrid, October 1991. This was the story of a regional process in the making: from the very concept of arms control as applied to the region, through the innovative regional forum and format for discussion that was devised for the talks, to the dynamics of the talks and the question of Egypt's position within this novel regional setting. The result was that what seemed at the outset to be a most likely unpromising forum became the setting of unprecedented regional dynamics. The in-depth examination of ACRS -- Arms Control Regional Security working group -- engenders important insights into a number of concepts that lie at the heart of international relations studies: the notion of the strategic game, the meaning of power, the definition of security threats, the notions of hegemony and leadership, state identity, the conduct of regional politics, and the significance of cooperative processes in international relations.

The prospect of a nuclear war in South Asia has drawn global attention and concern. This book studies nuclear risks in the Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian contexts and suggests a wide range of measures by which India, Pakistan and China could reduce nuclear dangers in South Asia. The author argues that there is a direct link between a war or a near war situation and nuclear risks. If the India-Pakistan or the Sino-Indian relationships take a downward turn, three nuclear risks could raise their ugly heads. They include: the intentional use of nuclear weapons, accidental use of nuclear weapons and unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. This book shines a powerful light on the possibility of each of these three nuclear risks in detail. Choudhury suggests that improvement in bilateral relations and nuclear risk reduction are organically linked and in view of the prevailing suspicion, mistrust and animosity among these three countries, it would be best for India, Pakistan and China to concentrate first on measures that can be implemented without requiring any significant changes in their current security policies. If these measures were implemented, they could lay the foundation for more significant measures at a later stage. The only full-length study and a timely epilogue of latest nuclear dialogues between India and Pakistan, Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in South Asia will be a standard reference not only for political scientists and strategic analysts, but also for policy makers, diplomats, journalists, defence personnel and the informed general reader. Published in association with Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo.

What do the men and women of America's diplomatic corps do? William D. Morgan and Charles Stuart Kennedy, themselves career diplomats, culled over 1400 oral interviews with their Foreign Service peers to present forty excerpts covering events from the 1920s to the 1990s. Insiders recount what happens when a consul spies on Nazi Germany, Mao Tse-Tung drops by for a chat, the Cold War begins with the Berlin blockade, the Marshall Plan rescues Europe, Sukarno moves Indonesia into the communist camp, Khrushchev calls President Kennedy an SOB, and our ambassador is murdered in Kabul. consular officers talk about the beginnings of Kremlinology, predicting a coup in Ecuador, Hemingway and the embassy in Havana, the secret formulation of the NATO treaty, Jerusalem after the British and the US recognition of Israel, fighting in the Congo over Katangan secession, dealing with an alcoholic foreign president, human rights work in Paraguay, the U.S. Embassy takeover in Tehran, the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, helping families of the Pan Am 103 victims, Greece and Turkey at odds over a tiny island, embassy roles in Riyadh and Tel Aviv during Desert Storm, and many more.

This assessment was made in response to a request from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to examine the effects of nuclear war on the populations and economies of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is intended, in the terms of the Committee's request, to "put what have been abstract measures of strategic power into more comprehensible terms." The study examines the full range of effects that nuclear war would have on civilians: direct effects from blast and radiation; and indirect effects from economic, social, and political disruption. Particular attention is devoted to the ways in which the impact of a nuclear war would extend over time. Two of the study's principal findings are that conditions would continue to get worse for some time after a nuclear war ended, and that the effects of nuclear war that cannot be calculated in advance are at least as important as those which analysts attempt to quantify. This report provides essential background for a range of issues relating to strategic weapons and foreign policy. It translates what is generally known about the effects of nuclear weapons into the best available estimates about the impact on society if such weapons were used. It calls attention to the very wide range of impacts that nuclear weapons would have on a complex industrial society, and to the extent of uncertainty regarding these impacts. Several years ago, OTA convened a panel of distinguished scientists to examine the effects of a limited nuclear war. The report and testimony of that panel, which were published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, remain valid. That panel recommended that a more thorough and comprehensive study of the effects of nuclear war be undertaken. This study is such an effort.

The North Korean nuclear program is headed in a dangerous direction. Yet the United States and its allies have not set forth a coherent or unified strategy to stop it. This Task Force, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, evaluates the challenges facing the United States in and around the Korean peninsula and assess American options for meeting them. The situation on the peninsula has deteriorated rapidly since October 2002, when North Korea admitted having a secret highly enriched uranium program that put it on course to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. North Korea has since withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, asserted it possess nuclear weapons, and declared that it is reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel. Having initially emphasized the need for a negotiated solution, North Korea's recent rhetoric has stressed the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Co-chaired by Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, and directed by Council Senior Fellow Eric Heginbotham, the Task Force makes specific recommendations to help guide U.S. foreign policy: 1) articulate a strategy around which U.S. regional partners can rally; 2) as part of that strategy, engage in a serious negotiating effort with North Korea and test its intentions by proposing an interim agreement; 3) secure the commitment of U.S. allies to take tougher action should talks fail, 4) restore the health of the U.S.-ROK alliance; 5) persuade China to take greater responsibility for resolving the crisis; and 6) appoint a full-time high-level coordinator for Korea.

Young, brash, sporting a shiny new MBA, and obscenely overpaid, Brian Cruver epitomized the Enron employee when he first entered the company's Houston office; and from day one he found himself a cog in the wheel of a venal greed machine. For the next nine months, he would witness firsthand the now-infamous corporate tragedy that he relates in these ruthlessly honest, often hilarious, and frequently disturbing pages. Here are the accounting tricks, insider stock trades, grossly lucrative fraudulent partnerships, and death dance to bankruptcy. Equally revealing, though, are Cruver's descriptions of everyday life at Enron: the cocky wheeling and dealing, intraoffice relationships, casual conversations at the shredder, and the insidious group-think that committed Enronians to the propaganda of flawed executives like Ken Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, and Andy Fastow. Out of their wreckage, Cruver has fashioned an arresting and cautionary morality tale for our time. Anatomy of Greed was the basis for the CBS-TV movie The Crooked E: a behind-the-scenes chronicle of the last days in the strange life of one of the world's richest, riskiest, and most corrupt corporations. Eight pages of telling photographs are included.

How to evaluate compliance is among the most difficult questions that arise during treaty negotiations and ratification debates. Arguments over verification principles and procedures are increasingly common for accords about the environment, human rights, and economics, but they have been especially important in the arena of national security. Nancy Gallagher explains, "In a world in which states face conflicting pressures to maximize military capabilities and negotiate mutual restraints, the prospects for arms control often hinge on verification... In the standard American formulation, verification is the 'critical element of arms control.'"

In "The Politics of Verification," Gallagher explores the causes of verification controversies and the processes through which they are perpetuated or provisionally resolved. By examining nuclear test ban negotiations from the Eisenhower through the Clinton administrations, Gallagher finds that the assumptions about verification that have dominated U.S. policy shape domestic debates in ways that hinder stable agreement on significant test restrictions. She focuses on the dynamic interconnections between domestic and international politics, and analyzes the slow process of coalition building when conflicting interests and ideas create divisions both among and inside states.

Gallagher concludes that the end of the Cold War has altered the arms control context without resolving basic questions about the appropriate amount and type of verification. Thus, the negotiation and ratification of major cooperative accords will continue to be shaped by verification compromises and coalitions.

Prospects for Peacemaking provides a genuinely fresh look at embedded assumptions about national security. It clears the way for a security policy based less on outmoded premises and more on a purposeful strategy for peace in a nuclear world. And it demonstrates one model of a creative interaction between citizens and specialists, one that can be replicated in any community."To the village square must go the essential facts about atomic weapons," Albert Einstein wrote in 1946. "From there must come America's voice." The seven essays in Prospects for Peacemaking take up Einstein's challenge - even more urgent today - by demystifying the criti cal issues of war, peace, and national security and opening the way for informed citizen involvement in these issues.The opening chapter explains why we are currently at a good point for engaging in the process of rethinking American strategic policy. Those that follow outline the basic premises of the current relations between the United States and the Soviet Union; the way the military thinks about arms and arms control; the question of whether negotiations can ever keep up with technology; the European perspective on arms control; and the special problem of managing crisis situations. The book concludes with an essay by Dean Rusk on diplomacy in the nuclear era.Prospects for Peacemaking grew out of "the Minnesota experiment," an extraordinary year long process of dialogue between experts in the arms-control community and public citizens, sponsored by the University of Minnesota's Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. Harlan Cleveland is Professor of Public Affairs and Dean of the Institute. Lincoln P. Bloomfield is Professor of Political Science at MIT, and an adjunct professor at the Humphrey Institute.

Technical and economic considerations no longer prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations that do not have them. The technology is now widely known and generally accessible, and the cost is not prohibitive. For an increasing number of nations a decision to develop nuclear weapons rests on political and strategic factors. This book contains essays from a 1978 colloquium, jointly sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense, that brought together 50 people from the academic, research organization, intelligence, and national security policymaking communities to discuss the essays and the questions generated by them.