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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Other warfare & defence issues > Arms negotiation & control
This is the first book-length study of why states sometimes ignore,
oppose, or undermine elements of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime-even as they formally support it. Anchored by the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear
nonproliferation regime is the constellation of agreements,
initiatives, and norms that work in concert to regulate nuclear
material and technology. The essays gathered here show that
attitudes on nonproliferation depend on a ""complex, contingent
decision calculus,"" as states continually gauge how their actions
within the regime will affect trade, regional standing, and other
interests vital to any nation. The first four essays take
theoretical approaches to such topics as a framework for
understanding challenges to collective action; clandestine
proliferation under the Bush and Obama administrations and its
impact on regime legitimacy; threat construction as a lens through
which to view resistance to nonproliferation measures; and the
debate over the relationship between nuclear disarmament and
nonproliferation. Essays comprising the second part of the book use
regional and state-specific case studies to look at how U.S.
security guarantees affect the willingness of states to support the
regime; question the perceived spoiler role of a ""vocal minority""
within the Non-Aligned Movement; challenge notions that Russia is
using the regime to build a coalition hostile to the United States;
contrast nonproliferation strategies among Latin American
countries; and explain the lag in adoption of an Additional
Protocol by some Middle East and North African countries. Getting
countries to cooperate on nonproliferation efforts is an ongoing
challenge. These essays show that success must be measured not only
by how many states join the effort but also by how they participate
once they join.
International efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)-including nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons-rest upon foundations provided by global treaties such as
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). Over time, however, states have created a number
of other mechanisms for organizing international cooperation to
promote nonproliferation. Examples range from regional efforts to
various worldwide export-control regimes and nuclear security
summit meetings initiated by U.S. president Barack Obama. Many of
these additional nonproliferation arrangements are less formal and
have fewer members than the global treaties. International
Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation calls attention to the
emergence of international cooperation beyond the core global
nonproliferation treaties. The contributors examine why these other
cooperative nonproliferation mechanisms have emerged, assess their
effectiveness, and ask how well the different pieces of the global
nonproliferation regime complex fit together. Collectively, the
essayists show that states have added new forms of international
cooperation to combat WMD proliferation for multiple reasons,
including the need to address new problems and the entrepreneurial
activities of key state leaders. Despite the complications created
by the existence of so many different cooperative arrangements,
this collection shows the world is witnessing a process of building
cooperation that is leading to greater levels of activity in
support of norms against WMD and terrorism.
The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Volume 42 (Part I): 2017
is a compilation of the resolutions and decisions of the previous
General Assembly, their voting patterns in the General Assembly and
the First Committee, lead sponsors, sponsors and co-sponsors,
references to First Committee report and dates of adoption
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