In this analysis of naval arms control between the two world wars, Emily Goldman dissects the underlying assumptions of arms control theory that have guided theorizing and practice for the past thirty years. She concludes that because there has been a near-exclusive focus on the behavior of the superpowers and on the consequences of nuclear technology, the arms control process has been artificially constrained in its scope and potential. Returning to the most important historical precedent of arms control prior to the Cold War, Goldman demonstrates that there are two distinct strategies of arms control, one that integrates force limitation with political conflict resolution and one that confines itself to technical limitations exclusively.

Goldman's is the first analytical treatment of the interwar period that examines arms control in both its technical and conflict-resolution dimensions in tandem and traces them through the entire life of the arms control system. By debunking Cold War orthodoxy about arms control and by illuminating how arms control functioned between the wars, Goldman shows how the process of arms control can transcend the narrow goal of regulating the military balance and become a constructive tool for restructuring power relationships.

The Washington Conference regulated the inter-war naval race between the world powers. In the era when it was still believed that battleships were the epitome of naval power and a sign of a country's strength, this conference led to limitations on the building of such weapons by the naval powers of Britain, the USA and Japan. This collection of essays deals with many aspects of the conference; the factors that caused it, the interests of the participating nations both present and future, and the results.

In Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis': Theoretical Approaches, Halit M.E. Tagma and Paul E. Lenze, Jr. analyze the 'crisis' surrounding Iran's nuclear program through a variety of theoretical approaches, including realism, world-systems theory, liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and multi-level games. Through these theories, Tagma and Lenze use established academic perspectives to create a more objective understanding and explanation of the debates and issues. Introducing the concept of eclectic pluralism to the study of international relations, Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis' presents theoretical approaches side by side to explore a complex and evolving international dispute.

Should the United States prevent additional allies from developing atomic weapons? Although preventing U.S. allies and partners from acquiring nuclear weapons was an important part of America's Cold War goals, in the decades since, Washington has mostly focused on preventing small adversarial states from building the bomb. This has begun to change as countries as diverse as Germany, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, among others, have begun discussing the value of an independent nuclear arsenal. Their ambitions have led to renewed discussion in U.S. foreign policy circles about the consequences of allied proliferation for the United States. Despite the fact that four countries have actually acquired nuclear weapons, this discussion remains abstract, theoretical, and little changed since the earliest days of the nuclear era. Using historical case studies, this book shines a light on this increasingly pressing issue. Keck examines the impact that acquiring nuclear arsenals had after our allies developed them. It achieves this by examining existing and recently declassified documents, original archival research, and- for the Israel and especially Pakistan cases- interviews with U.S. officials who worked on the events in question.