For nearly fifty years, including the decade and a half since the end of the Cold War, deterrence has remained the central nuclear arms control policy between the United States, Russia, and other principal nuclear powers. The question today is: Has the concept of deterrence outlived its usefulness? In Beyond Nuclear Deterrence, two of Russias top nonproliferation and international security experts, Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, critically assess the history of deterrence as it emerged between the Soviet Union and the U.S. and evolved through the Cold War to include an expanding nuclear club. The authors argue that while deterrence as a concept has always been paradoxical, it is poorly equipped to handle todays most significant nuclear challenges: proliferation and terrorism. Nuclear arms control must move beyond the deadlock of deterrence. The U.S. and Russia need to take the first bilateral steps to remove mutual nuclear deterrence as the foundation of their strategic relationship and implement changes that can be exported internationally.

The prospect of a nuclear war in South Asia has drawn global attention and concern. This book studies nuclear risks in the Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian contexts and suggests a wide range of measures by which India, Pakistan and China could reduce nuclear dangers in South Asia. The author argues that there is a direct link between a war or a near war situation and nuclear risks. If the India-Pakistan or the Sino-Indian relationships take a downward turn, three nuclear risks could raise their ugly heads. They include: the intentional use of nuclear weapons, accidental use of nuclear weapons and unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. This book shines a powerful light on the possibility of each of these three nuclear risks in detail. Choudhury suggests that improvement in bilateral relations and nuclear risk reduction are organically linked and in view of the prevailing suspicion, mistrust and animosity among these three countries, it would be best for India, Pakistan and China to concentrate first on measures that can be implemented without requiring any significant changes in their current security policies. If these measures were implemented, they could lay the foundation for more significant measures at a later stage. The only full-length study and a timely epilogue of latest nuclear dialogues between India and Pakistan, Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in South Asia will be a standard reference not only for political scientists and strategic analysts, but also for policy makers, diplomats, journalists, defence personnel and the informed general reader. Published in association with Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo.

What do the men and women of America's diplomatic corps do? William D. Morgan and Charles Stuart Kennedy, themselves career diplomats, culled over 1400 oral interviews with their Foreign Service peers to present forty excerpts covering events from the 1920s to the 1990s. Insiders recount what happens when a consul spies on Nazi Germany, Mao Tse-Tung drops by for a chat, the Cold War begins with the Berlin blockade, the Marshall Plan rescues Europe, Sukarno moves Indonesia into the communist camp, Khrushchev calls President Kennedy an SOB, and our ambassador is murdered in Kabul. consular officers talk about the beginnings of Kremlinology, predicting a coup in Ecuador, Hemingway and the embassy in Havana, the secret formulation of the NATO treaty, Jerusalem after the British and the US recognition of Israel, fighting in the Congo over Katangan secession, dealing with an alcoholic foreign president, human rights work in Paraguay, the U.S. Embassy takeover in Tehran, the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, helping families of the Pan Am 103 victims, Greece and Turkey at odds over a tiny island, embassy roles in Riyadh and Tel Aviv during Desert Storm, and many more.

Arms control, for decades at the core of the foreign policy consensus, today is among the more contentious issues in American politics. It is pilloried and considered out of mode in many conservative quarters, while being viewed as nearly sacrosanct in many liberal circles. In this new book, Michael Levi and Michael O'Hanlon argue that neither the left nor the right has a correct view of the proper utility of arms control in the age of terror. Arms control in the traditional sense--lengthy treaties to limit nuclear and other military competitions among the great powers--is no longer particularly useful. Nor should arms control be pursued as a means to the end of constraining the power of nations or of promoting global government. It is still a critical tool, though, for controlling dangerous technologies, particularly those that, in the hands of hostile states or terrorist organizations, could cause massive death and destruction. Arms control and coercive action, including military force, must be integrated into an overall strategy for preventing proliferation, now more than ever before. Arms control should be used to gain earlier warning of illicit activities inside dangerous states, allowing the international community to take coercive action in a timely way. The authors propose three new criteria to guide future arms control efforts, designed to respond to today's geopolitical realities. Arms control must focus on the dangers of catastrophic technology, not so much in the hands of major powers as of small states and terrorist groups. Their criteria lead to a natural focus on nuclear and biological technologies. Much tougher measures to prevent countries from gaining nuclear weaponstechnoloty while purportedly complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and procedures for controlling dangerous biological technologies will be most prominent in this framework, while lower priority is giben to efforts such as bilateral nuclear accords and most types of arms control for outer space. This book provides a framework for an effective arms control strategy in a new age of international security.

The North Korean nuclear program is headed in a dangerous direction. Yet the United States and its allies have not set forth a coherent or unified strategy to stop it. This Task Force, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, evaluates the challenges facing the United States in and around the Korean peninsula and assess American options for meeting them. The situation on the peninsula has deteriorated rapidly since October 2002, when North Korea admitted having a secret highly enriched uranium program that put it on course to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. North Korea has since withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, asserted it possess nuclear weapons, and declared that it is reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel. Having initially emphasized the need for a negotiated solution, North Korea's recent rhetoric has stressed the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Co-chaired by Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, and directed by Council Senior Fellow Eric Heginbotham, the Task Force makes specific recommendations to help guide U.S. foreign policy: 1) articulate a strategy around which U.S. regional partners can rally; 2) as part of that strategy, engage in a serious negotiating effort with North Korea and test its intentions by proposing an interim agreement; 3) secure the commitment of U.S. allies to take tougher action should talks fail, 4) restore the health of the U.S.-ROK alliance; 5) persuade China to take greater responsibility for resolving the crisis; and 6) appoint a full-time high-level coordinator for Korea.

How to evaluate compliance is among the most difficult questions that arise during treaty negotiations and ratification debates. Arguments over verification principles and procedures are increasingly common for accords about the environment, human rights, and economics, but they have been especially important in the arena of national security. Nancy Gallagher explains, "In a world in which states face conflicting pressures to maximize military capabilities and negotiate mutual restraints, the prospects for arms control often hinge on verification... In the standard American formulation, verification is the 'critical element of arms control.'"

In "The Politics of Verification," Gallagher explores the causes of verification controversies and the processes through which they are perpetuated or provisionally resolved. By examining nuclear test ban negotiations from the Eisenhower through the Clinton administrations, Gallagher finds that the assumptions about verification that have dominated U.S. policy shape domestic debates in ways that hinder stable agreement on significant test restrictions. She focuses on the dynamic interconnections between domestic and international politics, and analyzes the slow process of coalition building when conflicting interests and ideas create divisions both among and inside states.

Gallagher concludes that the end of the Cold War has altered the arms control context without resolving basic questions about the appropriate amount and type of verification. Thus, the negotiation and ratification of major cooperative accords will continue to be shaped by verification compromises and coalitions.

Young, brash, sporting a shiny new MBA, and obscenely overpaid, Brian Cruver epitomized the Enron employee when he first entered the company's Houston office; and from day one he found himself a cog in the wheel of a venal greed machine. For the next nine months, he would witness firsthand the now-infamous corporate tragedy that he relates in these ruthlessly honest, often hilarious, and frequently disturbing pages. Here are the accounting tricks, insider stock trades, grossly lucrative fraudulent partnerships, and death dance to bankruptcy. Equally revealing, though, are Cruver's descriptions of everyday life at Enron: the cocky wheeling and dealing, intraoffice relationships, casual conversations at the shredder, and the insidious group-think that committed Enronians to the propaganda of flawed executives like Ken Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, and Andy Fastow. Out of their wreckage, Cruver has fashioned an arresting and cautionary morality tale for our time. Anatomy of Greed was the basis for the CBS-TV movie The Crooked E: a behind-the-scenes chronicle of the last days in the strange life of one of the world's richest, riskiest, and most corrupt corporations. Eight pages of telling photographs are included.

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative has kindled a national debate over the roles of strategic nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defenses, and arms control in U.S. national security policy. It has also underscored the important ramifications of U.S. military space policy.At the requests of the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress undertook an assessment of the opportunities and risks involved in an accelerated program of research on new ballistic missile defense technologies, including those that might lead to deployment of weapons in space. Debate over the relevant political, military, and technical issues has been hotly contested by participants with widely varying assumptions and points of view. OTA has not attempted to resolve the debate, but rather to try to clarify the issues and enhance the level of discourse.This report examines both the "why" and the "what" of ballistic missile defenses. Why would we want ballistic missile defense weapons if we could have them? Would the advantages of deploying them outweigh the disadvantages? What technologies are under investigation for BMD applications? How might those applications serve our strategic goals? These policy and technology questions interact with one another in complex ways: what seems technologically possible conditions perceptions of policy options, while policy choices shape technological pursuits.

Prospects for Peacemaking provides a genuinely fresh look at embedded assumptions about national security. It clears the way for a security policy based less on outmoded premises and more on a purposeful strategy for peace in a nuclear world. And it demonstrates one model of a creative interaction between citizens and specialists, one that can be replicated in any community."To the village square must go the essential facts about atomic weapons," Albert Einstein wrote in 1946. "From there must come America's voice." The seven essays in Prospects for Peacemaking take up Einstein's challenge - even more urgent today - by demystifying the criti cal issues of war, peace, and national security and opening the way for informed citizen involvement in these issues.The opening chapter explains why we are currently at a good point for engaging in the process of rethinking American strategic policy. Those that follow outline the basic premises of the current relations between the United States and the Soviet Union; the way the military thinks about arms and arms control; the question of whether negotiations can ever keep up with technology; the European perspective on arms control; and the special problem of managing crisis situations. The book concludes with an essay by Dean Rusk on diplomacy in the nuclear era.Prospects for Peacemaking grew out of "the Minnesota experiment," an extraordinary year long process of dialogue between experts in the arms-control community and public citizens, sponsored by the University of Minnesota's Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. Harlan Cleveland is Professor of Public Affairs and Dean of the Institute. Lincoln P. Bloomfield is Professor of Political Science at MIT, and an adjunct professor at the Humphrey Institute.

Technical and economic considerations no longer prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations that do not have them. The technology is now widely known and generally accessible, and the cost is not prohibitive. For an increasing number of nations a decision to develop nuclear weapons rests on political and strategic factors. This book contains essays from a 1978 colloquium, jointly sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense, that brought together 50 people from the academic, research organization, intelligence, and national security policymaking communities to discuss the essays and the questions generated by them.

Although the United States efforts to prevent the spread of strategic weapons have varied significantly since 1945, they all presumed to be avoiding one or another type of strategic war. To the extent their military scenarios were sound, so too were the nonproliferation remedies these initiatives promoted. But, as Sokolski demonstrates, the obverse was also true--when these intiatives' military hopes and fears were mistaken, their nonproliferation recommendations also missed their mark.

What is the best hope for breaking out of this box and securing a higher rate of nonproliferation success? The United States must base nonproliferation policies less on insights concerning strategic military trends and more on the progressive economic and political trends that have increased the number of relatively peaceful, prosperous, liberal democracies. For the proliferating nations that are exceptions to this trend, the U.S. and its allies need to devise ways of competing that will encourage these governments to expend more energies shoring up their weaknesses and eventually giving way to less militant regimes. A major resource for students and military professionals interested in arms control and international relations.

In the early and mid 1990s, several African countries demobilized part of their armed forces. In the light of Africa's large development challenges, continuing wars and insecurity, this study analyzes the following questions: to what extent and how have demobilizations contributed to peace and human development? Where did the soldiers go? What can we learn from the different approaches that have been taken? These questions provide insights in the linkages between development and conflict, and provide lessons for demilitarization and peace building efforts in postwar societies.

"She showed me what one set-on-fire human being can do to shift the consciousness of the world." —Sister Helen Prejean, author of Dead Man Walking

"Dr. Helen Caldicott," the Sunday San Francisco Chronicle declares, "is back on the scene." A Desperate Passion is Caldicott's engaging, inspiring memoir, chronicling her life both on and off the scene. Raised in Australia and trained as a physician, she first found her voice protesting French nuclear tests in the Pacific. Years later she rose to international prominence, founding Physicians for Social Responsibility, "which did perhaps more than any other group to thrust the nuclear issue under the public eye" (New York Times).

"Driven by intense passions, she seems to have adopted the world's population as her children. And all of us are probably better off as a result" (East Bay Express Books)—but Caldicott, wife and mother of three, found that her success did not come without cost. This is a personal story too, a candid, revealing self-portrait of a woman who has not relinquished her remarkable efforts to save the world.

"Our contaminated air and our fractured earth demand a doctor's attention in the nuclear age, and the doctor on this case is a master." —Bloomsbury Review

"Helen Caldicott was the First Lady of the Nuclear Freeze Movement in the 1980s. This story, by an extraordinary woman, is a compelling memoir of those extraordinary times." —Edward M. Kennedy

With the post-cold war emphasis on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the neglected dimension has been the spread of advanced conventional arms. Yet these are the arms most likely to be used in conflict. They present the greatest diversion from economic and social development, and are the centerpiece of regional security balances. This book examines the policies and practices of the major arms-supplying nations, looks at the impact of weapons purchases on the principal recipient regions and the possibilities for regional arms control, and dissects the economics of arms exports for the producer nations in both the developing and industrialized worlds. The book thoroughly discusses the opportunities for, and obstacles to, achieving multilateral restraint on arms. In addition to the editor, contributors are Ian Anthony, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Nicole Ball, Overseas Development Council; Julian Cooper, University of Birmingham; Lawrence Freedman and Martin Navias, King's College, London; Rodney Jones, Policy Architects International; Ethan Kapstein, University of Minnesota; Michael Klare, Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies; Andrew Mack, Australian National University; Abdel Monem Said Aly, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo; Janne Nolan, Brookings Institution; Andrew Ross, Naval War College; Gerald Segal, International Institute for Strategic Studies; and Gerald Steinberg, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. Copublished with the World Peace Foundation

This book examines the nature of the international arms trade and the adjustment of the defense industries in the United States and Russia to the post-cold war world. O'Prey highlights the substantial reduction in demand for armaments both on the world market and by the two countries. Although this decrease in demand results partly from the decline of the superpower rivalry, it also represents the culmination of technological and industrial trends that have been under way for over a decade. O'Prey argues that many observers have not recognized the long-term nature of these changes. As a consequence, industry representatives and some government officials in both countries often unwisely emphasize arms exports as a means to preserve their cold war defense industries. Given the high expectations of export success and low levels of demand, competition among arms suppliers has become intense. In the process, proliferation of armaments, technologies, and production processes to outlaw states has become more likely. In addition, false expectations of arms export success may lead officials to forgo necessary restructuring and conversion of their defense industries. This problem is especially pronounced in Russia. O'Prey offers a number of suggestions for resolving the problems posed by arms export competition and defense industry adjustment. He argues that in virtually all cases, cooperation or partnership between the U.S. and Russia will be essential. Potential measures range from mutual restraint in arms exports to private industry partnerships for defense conversion and ultimately to multilateral initiatives for defense industry and export cooperation.

Worldwide political changes have presented a unique opportunity for forging a new basis of international security relations. The end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the ascending role of the United Nations in regional security affairs have transformed the driving issues of international security. These changes both heighten the demand and offer the potential for global cooperation on an unprecedented scale. Traditional security preoccupations and the foundations of past strategybased on preparation for massive military confrontation are no longer appropriate. Now world leaders must find alternative strategies to ensure international safety. This book brings together a prominent group of experts, including several recently appointed government officials, to examine an alternative form of security, one that emphasizes collaborative rather than confrontational relationships among national military establishment. Global Engagement offers a complete analysis of the concept of cooperative security, which seeks to establish international agreements to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces for mutual benefit. It explains how cooperative security also aims to create mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflict. The contributors identify the trends motivating the movement toward cooperative security and analyze the implications for practical policy action. They examine the problem of controlling advanced conventional munitions, analyze an integrated control arraignment, discuss international principles of equity and their relationship to problems ofsecurity, and offer regional political perspectives while considering social regional security problems. With the altered security environment, cooperation has clearly become the new strategic imperative. Policymakers are challenged to dispose of large arsenals of conventional and nuclear weapons and redirect their efforts to support preventative management of security conditions. Leading the discussion of the security challenges ahead, the authors of this volume debate the utility of cooperative engagement for future strategy.

"The Revolution of 1989" propels European arms control initiatives into a new context. This book presents a concise analysis of arms reduction efforts, putting crucial issues back into focus. Unique in its field, this U.S. Army War College text incorporates the work of practitioners, academics, and members of the U.S. negotiating team. It is written for an audience that will use it to make decisions. Within the first five chapters the reader will understand conventional arms control history: objectives, political procedures, and definitional and external strategic issues affecting negotiations. Successive chapters address: the role of partial disarmament; CFE proposals, data, and military implications of a successful agreement; the U.S. Interagency Group process; the High Level Task Force; and updates on both Vienna negotiations. A clear hard-headed text designed for policy makers, it provides a valuable analysis for courses in foreign policy, negotiation, political theory and practice, and public policy.

This volume opens with a chronology of conventional arms control events from 1967 to 1990. Chapter 2 offers an academic discussion on how and why we developed the general objectives for ongoing CFE and CSBM negotiations in Vienna. Chapter 3 supplies the political insight necessary to comprehend current negotiations. Conventional arms control issues are presented as mini-historical vignettes in Chapter 4. A chapter follows on definitional disarmament. Three successive chapters describe current proposals and progress in the CFE and CSBM talks. Chapter 9 concerns the post-CFE environment--the authors provide a thought-provoking article on a future nonauthoritarian world which looks beyond our current European fixation. The stage is then set for discussion of post-CFE alternative defense strategies and architecture. In closing, the authors reflect on what the effect of U.S. and NATO forces might be after successful conclusions in CFE and CSBM negotiations. The CFE Mandate, NATO's formal proposals, and the Western CSBM proposal are all appended as well as a glossary of terms.