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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Other warfare & defence issues > Arms negotiation & control
In this analysis of naval arms control between the two world
wars, Emily Goldman dissects the underlying assumptions of arms
control theory that have guided theorizing and practice for the
past thirty years. She concludes that because there has been a
near-exclusive focus on the behavior of the superpowers and on the
consequences of nuclear technology, the arms control process has
been artificially constrained in its scope and potential. Returning
to the most important historical precedent of arms control prior to
the Cold War, Goldman demonstrates that there are two distinct
strategies of arms control, one that integrates force limitation
with political conflict resolution and one that confines itself to
technical limitations exclusively.
Goldman's is the first analytical treatment of the interwar
period that examines arms control in both its technical and
conflict-resolution dimensions in tandem and traces them through
the entire life of the arms control system. By debunking Cold War
orthodoxy about arms control and by illuminating how arms control
functioned between the wars, Goldman shows how the process of arms
control can transcend the narrow goal of regulating the military
balance and become a constructive tool for restructuring power
relationships.
The Washington Conference regulated the inter-war naval race
between the world powers. In the era when it was still believed
that battleships were the epitome of naval power and a sign of a
country's strength, this conference led to limitations on the
building of such weapons by the naval powers of Britain, the USA
and Japan. This collection of essays deals with many aspects of the
conference; the factors that caused it, the interests of the
participating nations both present and future, and the results.
In Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis':
Theoretical Approaches, Halit M.E. Tagma and Paul E. Lenze, Jr.
analyze the 'crisis' surrounding Iran's nuclear program through a
variety of theoretical approaches, including realism, world-systems
theory, liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and
multi-level games. Through these theories, Tagma and Lenze use
established academic perspectives to create a more objective
understanding and explanation of the debates and issues.
Introducing the concept of eclectic pluralism to the study of
international relations, Understanding and Explaining the Iranian
Nuclear 'Crisis' presents theoretical approaches side by side to
explore a complex and evolving international dispute.
Should the United States prevent additional allies from developing
atomic weapons? Although preventing U.S. allies and partners from
acquiring nuclear weapons was an important part of America's Cold
War goals, in the decades since, Washington has mostly focused on
preventing small adversarial states from building the bomb. This
has begun to change as countries as diverse as Germany, Japan,
South Korea, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, among others, have begun
discussing the value of an independent nuclear arsenal. Their
ambitions have led to renewed discussion in U.S. foreign policy
circles about the consequences of allied proliferation for the
United States. Despite the fact that four countries have actually
acquired nuclear weapons, this discussion remains abstract,
theoretical, and little changed since the earliest days of the
nuclear era. Using historical case studies, this book shines a
light on this increasingly pressing issue. Keck examines the impact
that acquiring nuclear arsenals had after our allies developed
them. It achieves this by examining existing and recently
declassified documents, original archival research, and- for the
Israel and especially Pakistan cases- interviews with U.S.
officials who worked on the events in question.
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