The Pentagon Papers, officially titled "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force," was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. In June of 1971, small portions of the report were leaked to the press and widely distributed. However, the publications of the report that resulted from these leaks were incomplete and suffered from many quality issues.

On the 40th anniversary of the leak to the press, the National Archives, along with the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Presidential Libraries, has released the complete report. The 48 boxes in this series contain a complete copy of the 7,000 page report along with numerous copies of different volumes of the report, all declassified. Approximately 34% of the report is available for the first time.

What is unique about this, compared to other versions, is that:

* The complete Report is now available with no redactions compared to previous releases

* The Report is presented as Leslie Gelb presented it to then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on January 15, 1969

* All the supplemental back-documentation is included. In the Gravel Edition, 80% of the documents in Part V.B. were not included

This release includes the complete account of peace negotiations, significant portions of which were not previously available either in the House Armed Services Committee redacted copy of the Report or in the Gravel Edition.

Part IV. C. 1. Evolution of the War. U.S. Programs in South Vietnam, November 1963-April 1965: NASM 273 -- NSAM 288 -- Honolulu

Part IV. C. 2. a. Evolution of the War. Military Pressures Against NVN. February - June 1964

Part IV. C. 2. b. Evolution of the War. Military Pressures Against NVN. July - October 1964

Part IV. C. 2. c. Evolution of the War. Military Pressures Against NVN. November - December 1964

Part IV. C. 3. Evolution of the War. ROLLING THUNDER Program Begins: January - June 1965

Part IV. C. 4. Evolution of the War. Marine Combat Units Go to DaNang, March 1965

Part IV. C. 5. Evolution of the War. Phase I in the Build-up of U.S. Forces: March - July 1965

Ever since the American Revolution, military service has been a proud tradition for the Zumwalt family. Tradition initially led the author to join his father and brother in the Navy, before later transferring to the US Marine Corps. During his 26 years in uniform, the author saw service in three conflicts-Vietnam, Panama and the first Persian Gulf war. It was Vietnam, however, that ultimately would launch him on an unexpected journey-long after the guns of that war had fallen silent-triggered by the loss of a brother who had fought there. This journey was an emotional one-initially of anger towards the Vietnamese and the conflict that claimed his older brother. But it unexpectedly took a change in direction. In Vietnam almost two decades after Saigon's fall, the author, in a private talk with a former enemy general officer, came to understand an aspect of the war he never before had. In that talk, they shared personal insights about the war-discovering a common bond. It unlocked a door through which the author passed to start his own healing process. It began a journey where he would meet hundreds of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong veterans-listening to their personal stories of loss, sacrifice and hardship. It opened the author's eyes to how a technically inferior enemy, beaten down by superior US firepower, was able to get back up-driven by an "iron will" to emerge triumphant. "Bare Feet, Iron Will" takes the reader on a fascinating journey, providing stories-many never before told-as to how enemy ingenuity played a major role in the conflict, causing us not to see things that were there or to see things there that were not It shares unique insights into the sacrifice and commitment that took place on the other side of Vietnam's battlefields. About the Author JAMES G. ZUMWALT Lieutenant Colonel James Zumwalt is a retired Marine infantry officer who served in the Vietnam war, the 1989 intervention into Panama and Desert Storm. An author, speaker and business executive, he also currently heads a security consulting firm named after his father-Admiral Zumwalt & Consultants, Inc. He writes extensively on foreign policy and defense issues, having written hundreds of articles for various newspapers, magazines and professional journals. His articles have covered issues of major importance, oftentimes providing readers with unique perspectives that have never appeared elsewhere. His work, on several occasions, has been cited by members of Congress and entered into the US Congressional Record.

The Pentagon Papers, officially titled "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force," was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. In June of 1971, small portions of the report were leaked to the press and widely distributed. However, the publications of the report that resulted from these leaks were incomplete and suffered from many quality issues.

On the 40th anniversary of the leak to the press, the National Archives, along with the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Presidential Libraries, has released the complete report. The 48 boxes in this series contain a complete copy of the 7,000 page report along with numerous copies of different volumes of the report, all declassified. Approximately 34% of the report is available for the first time.

What is unique about this, compared to other versions, is that:

* The complete Report is now available with no redactions compared to previous releases

* The Report is presented as Leslie Gelb presented it to then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on January 15, 1969

* All the supplemental back-documentation is included. In the Gravel Edition, 80% of the documents in Part V.B. were not included

This release includes the complete account of peace negotiations, significant portions of which were not previously available either in the House Armed Services Committee redacted copy of the Report or in the Gravel Edition.

Part IV. B. 1. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961

Part IV. B. 2. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-63

Part IV. B. 3. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: The Advisory Build-up, 1961-67

Part IV. B. 4. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, 1962-64

Part IV. B. 5. Evolution of the War. Counterinsurgency: The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-Nov. 1963

The Pentagon Papers, officially titled "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force," was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. In June of 1971, small portions of the report were leaked to the press and widely distributed. However, the publications of the report that resulted from these leaks were incomplete and suffered from many quality issues.

On the 40th anniversary of the leak to the press, the National Archives, along with the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Presidential Libraries, has released the complete report. The 48 boxes in this series contain a complete copy of the 7,000 page report along with numerous copies of different volumes of the report, all declassified. Approximately 34% of the report is available for the first time.

What is unique about this, compared to other versions, is that:

* The complete Report is now available with no redactions compared to previous releases

* The Report is presented as Leslie Gelb presented it to then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford on January 15, 1969

* All the supplemental back-documentation is included. In the Gravel Edition, 80% of the documents in Part V.B. were not included.

This release includes the complete account of peace negotiations, significant portions of which were not previously available either in the House Armed Services Committee redacted copy of the Report or in the Gravel Edition.

This facsimile volume contains:

Part IV. A. 1.] Evolution of the War. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison

Part IV. A. 2.] Evolution of the War. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950-54

Part IV. A. 3.] Evolution of the War. U.S. and France's Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1954-56

Part IV. A. 4.] Evolution of the War. U.S. Training of Vietnamese National Army, 1954-59

Part IV. A. 5.] Evolution of the War. Origins of the Insurgency

A small team from the US Navy arrives in Vietnam in the spring of 1962. At first, its members only hear whispers about what they are supposed to accomplish. The unit goes by the name MTT 10-62 because its mission is so secret. This is the first Sea, Air and Land team-later known as the SEALs-and it's gearing up to train a group of volunteers from the Vietnamese Junk Force in counterinsurgency and maritime warfare. Told mostly through the perspective of Chris "Doc" David-a first class hospital corpsman, first class diver, and diving medical technician-and Lt. Bill Evans, "SEAL Doc" shows how the first SEALs work in conjunction with Army Special Forces and others to stop the spread of communism. While the SEALs are outstanding fighters and tacticians, they get little material support to accomplish their mission. The team arrives in Da Nang with nothing but stateside uniforms, and their vehicles and gasoline must be "liberated" from Vietnamese motor pools. Meanwhile, the daily challenges the SEALs face are preparing them for a final explosive mission and setting the stage for the future development of Navy SEALs in "SEAL Doc, " a historical novel based on the true story of the SEALs.

This controversial and timely book about the American experience in Vietnam provides the first full exploration of the perspectives of the North Vietnamese leadership before, during, and after the war. Herbert Y. Schandler offers unique insights into the mindsets of the North Vietnamese and their response to diplomatic and military actions of the Americans, laying out the full scale of the disastrous U.S. political and military misunderstandings of Vietnamese history and motivations. Including frank quotes from Vietnamese leaders, the book offers important new knowledge that allows us to learn invaluable lessons from the perspective of a victorious enemy. Unlike most military officers who served in Vietnam, Schandler is convinced the war was unwinnable, no matter how long America stayed the course or how many resources were devoted to it. He is remarkably qualified to make these judgments as an infantry commander during the Vietnam War, a Pentagon policymaker, and a scholar who taught at West Point and National Defense University. His extensive personal interviews with North Vietnamese are drawn from his many trips to Hanoi after the war. Schandler provides not only a definitive analysis of the American failure in Vietnam but a crucial foundation for exploring the potential for success in the current guerrilla wars the United States is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"The hot book among Iraq strategists." --David Ignatius, "The Washington Post"
Lewis Sorley's important and influential book "A Better War" sheds light on the often neglected final years in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 and revises our knowledge of the war and its conclusion. Drawing on his exclusive access to still classified tape-recorded meetings of the highest levels of military command in Vietnam, Sorley highlights the dramatic differences in the conception, the conduct, and--at least for a time--the results after General Creighton Abrams succeeded to the top military post in 1968. Meticulously researched and movingly told, "A Better War" is an insightful history and a great human drama of purposeful and principled service in the face of an agonizing succession of lost opportunities--and it is never as important as it is now.
"A comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post-Tet offensive years." --"The New York Times"
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"The book is the missing link in the history of the Vietnam War. It opens the old arguments up again and shows them in a new light." --"Strategic Review"
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"["A Better War"] is an outstanding piece of work, historically important with its use of new evidence, intellectually challenging with its suggestion of new interpretations of events, and highly readable." --"Army"
Lewis Sorley, a third-generation graduate of West Point, also holds a doctorate from Johns Hopkins University. He has served in the U.S. Army, on staff at the Pentagon, and later as a senior civilian official of the Central Intelligence Agency. He lives in Maryland.

This book contains descriptions of all of the naval and riverine weapons used by both sides during the Vietnam War. It also includes the dates that most major weapons were involved.

After spending a year in Germany as a security guard with the 50th Ordnance Company, Curtis Gay went to Viet Nam as a Private First Class. Six months later he was a Sergeant in the 25th Infantry Division and experienced some of the most intense fighting of the war. This book is his story.

Curtis spent a year as a Drill Sergeant at Fort Dix, New Jersey before leaving the Army in 1968. After a long career in the electrical industry, he is retired and lives in Durham, North Carolina with his wife.

Thirty-five long years and I was still seeking answers. If I could make someone in the government listen to the facts, I knew they'd want to act on them. After all, who wouldn't want to find one of our POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War? IS ANYBODY LISTENING? tells of dignitaries, presidents and those involved with the POW/MIA issue as I've known it since November 1968 when my husband, a Special Forces officer, became missing-in-action. The pages reveal my feelings and torment during my many trips to Southeast Asia in search of answers, and my frustrations while wandering the halls of Washington D.C. for help. The book was written to show the issue's insidious cover-up and my commitment to the truth.

This book chronicles one man's journey through life, finding happiness among the hardships and amusement amid the danger in Vietnam. This vivid account takes you on an armchair ride through an unpredictable and intriguing life. Set against the backdrop of The War, follow this young civilian engineer, family man and patriot through a war torn land as he strives to secure his young family's future and seek a more meaningful purpose to his own life. He returns home a changed man, only to confront a completely new set of obstacles, not least of which is a country in turmoil.

Part I is a compendium of World War II service recollections embracing the unusual, bizarre and humorous, most of which never appeared in the news or any publications. However, I do believe readers will be very interested in the other side of war. Part II is an incisive review of Vietnam, and why we failed or should never have been involved militarily. Part III is a current analysis of terrorism and the Iraq war, including a new proposal to address the global aspects of terrorism and the Palestinian issue.

• In-the-cockpit perspective on aerial warfare during the Vietnam War
• Many never-before-heard stories--some of them tragic, others humorous

At the height of the Vietnam War, in 1968 and 1969, Reginald Hathorn (call sign NAIL 31) flew 229 combat missions as a forward air controller for the U.S. Air Force. He inserted Special Forces teams into North Vietnam and Laos, completed missions for the CIA, and flew missions with the Lao Army. Most of the time, he flew into Laos and called in airstrikes against targets inside that country--in a war which did not officially exist, about which the world knew nothing, and which the U.S. government denied.

Helsing provides a unique perspective on the escalation of the Vietnam War. He examines what many analysts and former policymakers in the Johnson administration have acknowledged as a crucial factor in the way the United States escalated in Vietnam: Johnson's desire for both guns and butter--his belief that he must stem the advance of communism in Southeast Asia while pursuing a Great Society at home.

He argues that the United States government, the president, and his key advisers in particular engaged in a major pattern of deception in how the United States committed its military force in Vietnam. He then argues that a significant sector of the government was deceived as well. The first half of the book traces and analyzes the pattern of deception from 1964 through July 1965. The second half shows how the military and political decisions to escalate influenced--and were influenced by--the economic advice and policies being given the President. This in-depth analysis will be of particular concern to scholars, students, and researchers involved with U.S. foreign and military policy, the Vietnam War, and Presidential war powers.

The Vietnam War: An Encyclopedia of Quotations presents the story of this seminal conflict as told through the words of the famous, infamous, and anonymous. All sides of the controversy are presented in chronological resource that starts with a look at Vietnamese history, then traces the events preceding France's war, continues through America's entry into the conflict, and concludes with the war's aftermath. This is the story of the Vietnam War told through quotations in chronological sequence. Starting with the beginnings of Vietnamese history, it traces the events preceding the French war, continues through the American war, and ends with its aftermath. All sides of the controversy are represented. Here are the voices of warriors, presidents, generals, government leaders, civilians, aid workers, pilots, infantrymen, nurses, historians, war correspondents, sociologists, POWs, peasants, draft dodgers, guerillas, and war resisters. They speak from government capitals, hooches, hospital wards, jungle trails, landing zones, aircraft carriers, draft boards, Buddhist temples, and prison cells. They talk of firefights, ambushes in the jungle, bombing raids, coups, assassinations, suicides, demonstrations, atrocities, and teach-ins. Here are Ho Chi Minh, Lyndon Johnson, Giap, Westmoreland, Kennedy, De Gaulle, Eisenhower, Nixon, McNamara, Kissinger, and many people you have never heard of. Meet Hanoi Hannah, who broadcast propaganda from the North Vietnamese capital; John McCain tells you what it was like to be shot down over enemy territory and taken prisoner; John Kerry tells a U.S. Senate committee why he opposes the Vietnam War. You will learn about My Lai, Agent Orange, Kent State, the Pentagon Papers, and the plan to free American POWs that went awry. Features include a chronology, biographical sketches, Medal of Honor winners, bibliography, nineteen photos, and an index.

Winner of the Overseas Press Club's Cornelius J. Ryan Award for Best Nonfiction Book, the Commonwealth Club of California's Gold Medal for Nonfiction, and the PEN Center West Award for Best Research Nonfiction

Twenty-five years after the end of the Vietnam War, historian and journalist A. J. Langguth delivers an authoritative account of the war based on official documents not available earlier and on new reporting from both the American and Vietnamese perspectives. In Our Vietnam, Langguth takes us inside the waffling and deceitful White Houses of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon; documents the ineptness and corruption of our South Vietnamese allies; and recounts the bravery of soldiers on both sides of the war. With its broad sweep and keen insights, Our Vietnam brings together the kaleidoscopic events and personalities of the war into one engrossing and unforgettable narrative.

SOS and then stopped the ship. Seven Khmer Rouge soldiers boarded the Mayaguez and their leader, Battalion Commander Sa Mean, pointed at a map indicating that the ship should proceed to the east of Poulo Wai. One of the crew members broadcast a Mayday which was picked up by an Australian vessel. The Mayaguez arrived off Poulo Wai at approximately 4pm and a further 20 Khmer Rouge boarded the vessel. At 12:05 EST (21:05 Cambodia), a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) was convened to discuss the situation. The members of the NSC were determined to end the crisis decisively, believing that the fall of South Vietnam less than two weeks before and the forced withdrawal of the United States from Cambodia, (Operation Eagle Pull) and South Vietnam (Operation Frequent Wind) had severely damaged the U.S.'s reputation. They also wished to avoid comparisons to the Pueblo incident of 1968, where the failure to promptly use military force to halt the hijacking of a US intelligence ship by North Korea led to an eleven-month hostage situation.