Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina.
Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy missions. The Army's monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses. Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that American forces suffered in Vietnam.
Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.

This book contains descriptions of all of the naval and riverine weapons used by both sides during the Vietnam War. It also includes the dates that most major weapons were involved.

Part I is a compendium of World War II service recollections embracing the unusual, bizarre and humorous, most of which never appeared in the news or any publications. However, I do believe readers will be very interested in the other side of war. Part II is an incisive review of Vietnam, and why we failed or should never have been involved militarily. Part III is a current analysis of terrorism and the Iraq war, including a new proposal to address the global aspects of terrorism and the Palestinian issue.

This book chronicles one man's journey through life, finding happiness among the hardships and amusement amid the danger in Vietnam. This vivid account takes you on an armchair ride through an unpredictable and intriguing life. Set against the backdrop of The War, follow this young civilian engineer, family man and patriot through a war torn land as he strives to secure his young family's future and seek a more meaningful purpose to his own life. He returns home a changed man, only to confront a completely new set of obstacles, not least of which is a country in turmoil.

Pham Xuan An was a Communist agent whose espionage adventures - under the cover story of a celebrated war correspondent in the Western Media -- were as brilliant for Hanoi as they were shattering for Washington during the tumultuous days of the Vietnam War. He has been dubbed "the perfect spy" and affectionately referred to by some as "the spy who loved us". Not quite. Journalist and Southeast Asian specialist Luke Hunt prises this story open. He knew and interviewed An for many years, along with many friends and colleagues in journalism who knew him best in war, on the journalistic beat and amid the collapse of South Vietnam.

The Vietnam War has had many long-reaching, traumatic effects, not just on the veterans of the war, but on their children as well. In this book, Weber examines the concept of the war as a social monad, a confusing array of personal stories and public histories that disrupt traditional ways of knowing the social world for the second generation.

Helsing provides a unique perspective on the escalation of the Vietnam War. He examines what many analysts and former policymakers in the Johnson administration have acknowledged as a crucial factor in the way the United States escalated in Vietnam: Johnson's desire for both guns and butter--his belief that he must stem the advance of communism in Southeast Asia while pursuing a Great Society at home.

He argues that the United States government, the president, and his key advisers in particular engaged in a major pattern of deception in how the United States committed its military force in Vietnam. He then argues that a significant sector of the government was deceived as well. The first half of the book traces and analyzes the pattern of deception from 1964 through July 1965. The second half shows how the military and political decisions to escalate influenced--and were influenced by--the economic advice and policies being given the President. This in-depth analysis will be of particular concern to scholars, students, and researchers involved with U.S. foreign and military policy, the Vietnam War, and Presidential war powers.

The Vietnam War: An Encyclopedia of Quotations presents the story of this seminal conflict as told through the words of the famous, infamous, and anonymous. All sides of the controversy are presented in chronological resource that starts with a look at Vietnamese history, then traces the events preceding France's war, continues through America's entry into the conflict, and concludes with the war's aftermath. This is the story of the Vietnam War told through quotations in chronological sequence. Starting with the beginnings of Vietnamese history, it traces the events preceding the French war, continues through the American war, and ends with its aftermath. All sides of the controversy are represented. Here are the voices of warriors, presidents, generals, government leaders, civilians, aid workers, pilots, infantrymen, nurses, historians, war correspondents, sociologists, POWs, peasants, draft dodgers, guerillas, and war resisters. They speak from government capitals, hooches, hospital wards, jungle trails, landing zones, aircraft carriers, draft boards, Buddhist temples, and prison cells. They talk of firefights, ambushes in the jungle, bombing raids, coups, assassinations, suicides, demonstrations, atrocities, and teach-ins. Here are Ho Chi Minh, Lyndon Johnson, Giap, Westmoreland, Kennedy, De Gaulle, Eisenhower, Nixon, McNamara, Kissinger, and many people you have never heard of. Meet Hanoi Hannah, who broadcast propaganda from the North Vietnamese capital; John McCain tells you what it was like to be shot down over enemy territory and taken prisoner; John Kerry tells a U.S. Senate committee why he opposes the Vietnam War. You will learn about My Lai, Agent Orange, Kent State, the Pentagon Papers, and the plan to free American POWs that went awry. Features include a chronology, biographical sketches, Medal of Honor winners, bibliography, nineteen photos, and an index.

SOS and then stopped the ship. Seven Khmer Rouge soldiers boarded the Mayaguez and their leader, Battalion Commander Sa Mean, pointed at a map indicating that the ship should proceed to the east of Poulo Wai. One of the crew members broadcast a Mayday which was picked up by an Australian vessel. The Mayaguez arrived off Poulo Wai at approximately 4pm and a further 20 Khmer Rouge boarded the vessel. At 12:05 EST (21:05 Cambodia), a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) was convened to discuss the situation. The members of the NSC were determined to end the crisis decisively, believing that the fall of South Vietnam less than two weeks before and the forced withdrawal of the United States from Cambodia, (Operation Eagle Pull) and South Vietnam (Operation Frequent Wind) had severely damaged the U.S.'s reputation. They also wished to avoid comparisons to the Pueblo incident of 1968, where the failure to promptly use military force to halt the hijacking of a US intelligence ship by North Korea led to an eleven-month hostage situation.

Month by month, Witcover re-creates 1968 as he travels with, and reports on, the political fortunes of Lyndon Johnson, Eugene McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Robert Kennedy, George Romney, and Hubert Humphrey. He conveys the actual words of national figures and commentary by rock artists, media people, economists, Vietnam veterans, and Haight-Ashbury hippies. That year Witcover crossed the country from New Hampshire to California; he was standing on the rioting streets of Washington with Robert Kennedy after King was shot; he was in the kitchen of the Ambassador Hotel the night Kennedy was gunned down. An eyewitness to history, he presents a unique perspective that captures the mood of a nation and the life of ordinary people as shattering news erupts from assassins' bullets and backroom deals. Witcover broadens our understanding of how that year sowed the seeds of liberalism's demise, the shame of Watergate, Reagan's long reign, and today's new Democratic agenda.

In Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, accomplished foreign relations historian David F. Shmitz provides students of US history and the Vietnam era with an up-to-date analysis of Nixon's Vietnam policy in a brief and accessible book that addresses the main controversies of the Nixon years. President Richard Nixon's first presidential term oversaw the definitive crucible of the Vietnam War. Nixon came into office seeking the kind of decisive victory that had eluded President Johnson, and went about expanding the war, overtly and covertly, in order to uphold a policy of "containment," protect America's credibility, and defy the left's antiwar movement at home. Tactically, politically, Nixon's moves made sense. However, by 1971 the president was forced to significantly de-escalate the American presence and seek a negotiated end to the war, which is now accepted as an American defeat, and a resounding failure of American foreign relations. Schmitz addresses the main controversies of Nixon's Vietnam strategy, and in so doing manages to trace back the ways in which this most calculating and perceptive politician wound up resigning from office a fraud and failure. Finally, the book seeks to place the impact of Nixon's policies and decisions in the larger context of post-World War II American society, and analyzes the full costs of the Vietnam War that the nation feels to this day.

Esteemed journalism historian James Startt has crafted an intriguing case study of the relationship between political leadership and the mass media during its early days, using the political ascendancy of Woodrow Wilson as its focus. Wilson's emergence as a major political figure coincided with the arrival of a real mass media and a more independent, less partisan style of political coverage. While most nineteenth-century presidents remained aloof from the press, Wilson understood it could no longer be ignored: "The public man who fights the daily press won't be a public man very long."

From the streets of America, youths were drafted and sent to war in Vietnam. Inner city youths and farm boys were thrown into a master plan only the American Military could have created. Never having driven a car, John Montgomery became a mechanic. Greg Foster became a Combat Medic. They trained and lived during interesting times. They witnessed the American response to poverty and civil rights, assassins, corrupt politicians, and other maladies of the American condition. Youth In Asia follows the personal growth of its characters through illusions and disillusionment, through love and hate, and shows how the experience of Vietnam left its mark, often hidden just below the surface in many fine Americans who will never forget how it happened.