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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Weapons & equipment > General
The German destroyer fleet of World War II consisted of nine classes: the Diether Von Roeder Class, the Leberecht Maas Class and the wartime classes Z23, Z35, Z37, Z40, Z43, Z46 and Z52. These vessels, though fewer in number than the British destroyer fleet, tended to be much bigger and more powerful than their allied counterparts. They served their country well in operations in the Channel, North Sea, the Far North and in the rescue of civilians from East Prussia during the final days of the war. This title describes their design, development and operational use from the fjords of Narvik to the final days of the war.
The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine. Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.
In this fascinating account of the battle tanks that saw combat in the European Theater of World War II, Mary R. Habeck traces the strategies developed between the wars for the use of armored vehicles in battle. Only in Germany and the Soviet Union were truly original armor doctrines (generally known as "blitzkreig" and "deep battle") fully implemented. Storm of Steel relates how the German and Soviet armies formulated and chose to put into practice doctrines that were innovative for the time, yet in many respects identical to one another. As part of her extensive archival research in Russia, Germany, and Britain, Habeck had access to a large number of formerly secret and top-secret documents from several post-Soviet archives. This research informs her comparative approach as she looks at the roles of technology, shared influences, and assumptions about war in the formation of doctrine. She also explores relations between the Germans and the Soviets to determine whether collaboration influenced the convergence of their armor doctrines.
This title follows on from Volume I and charts the continuing development of the U-boat in German service. This includes the development of the Type IX as a long range 'cruiser' intended for solo operations in distant waters. Also covered is the revolutionary Type XXI, conceived of in 1942 and launched in April 1944, the first true submarine rather than submersible, whose arrival was just too late to influence the war. Other vessels included are the Type XXIII, small and armed with only two torpedoes but technically highly advanced, and the Type X minelayers. These were rarely used in their intended role and were more often used as supply boats.
The Krupp industrial empire was one of Germany's wealthiest and most powerful corporations, and it contributed to the armaments used in several of its country's wars. British journalist Peter Batty tells the story of the Krupp family and the company they started during the industrial revolution, and how subsequent Krupps produced cannons used in the Franco-Prussian War, U-boats and shells for World War I, and the countless weapons and vehicles, including the biggest cannon ever made, for Hitler's army. The House of Krupp recounts the trial at Nuremberg of magnate Alfried Krupp, and the rebirth and astounding success of his company in the years after the war years that saw Alfried become one of the richest men in the world."
The ingenuity and technology of the ancient world never ceases to surprise and signalling demonstrates both to the full. There has, however, never been a study of Roman signalling in English, nor has anyone previously tried to operate the techniques described in the classical manual. Dr Woolliscroft's study is in two parts: first he describes the signalling techniques pioneered by the Greeks and developed by the Romans; then he looks at the application of these principles to Hadrian's Wall and to the German Limes, as revealed by archaeological research. In each case he finds that, despite difficult terrain, the layout allows nearly all the small observation posts to see, and thus signal to, one of the main garrison forts. Since on occasion this caused marked tactical weaknesses in the line, it is clear that signalling was given high priority by the frontier designers. Similar results are now being found elsewhere in the Roman world, suggesting that all Rome's very different looking frontier systems may have an underlying uniformity With 80 illustrations and complete with an Appendix containing all the key classical references to signalling, this is a study that will be indispensable for anyone seriously interested in the Roman army or in frontier studies.
Although the United States efforts to prevent the spread of strategic weapons have varied significantly since 1945, they all presumed to be avoiding one or another type of strategic war. To the extent their military scenarios were sound, so too were the nonproliferation remedies these initiatives promoted. But, as Sokolski demonstrates, the obverse was also true--when these intiatives' military hopes and fears were mistaken, their nonproliferation recommendations also missed their mark. What is the best hope for breaking out of this box and securing a higher rate of nonproliferation success? The United States must base nonproliferation policies less on insights concerning strategic military trends and more on the progressive economic and political trends that have increased the number of relatively peaceful, prosperous, liberal democracies. For the proliferating nations that are exceptions to this trend, the U.S. and its allies need to devise ways of competing that will encourage these governments to expend more energies shoring up their weaknesses and eventually giving way to less militant regimes. A major resource for students and military professionals interested in arms control and international relations.
The proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is now the single most serious security concern for governments around the world. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz compare how military threats, strategic cultures, and organizations shape the way leaders intend to employ these armaments. They reveal the many frightening ways that emerging military powers and terrorist groups are planning the unthinkable by preparing to use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in future conflicts. Distinguished specialists consider several states and organizations that have this weaponry: Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel, as well as the Aum Shinrikyo cult. The contributors expose plans for using unconventional weapons, highlighting the revolutionary effects these arsenals might have on international politics and regional disputes.
Lethal Mists is a nontechnical narrative of chemical, biological warfare and terrorism (CBWT) for the general, non-scientist, non-military background reader. It examines the scientific and military basis and considerations behind the use of chemical and biological agents to injure and kill people. It explains in the simplest terms possible the various agent types, their use, effects on people, how they injure or kill, and the means of detection, treatment, antidotes and decontamination. Where technical terms are introduced, they are clearly and simply defined. The tactical considerations for the use of CBWT agents also are explained as they apply to terrorist use against civilian populations. Lethal Mists also views the nature of the threat to civilians, self-defense and warning techniques, and measures one may take to protect family and self if living near a chemical plant. This book is designed to explain to the nontechnical reader just what CBWT is, threats and how you may be alerted to such an act in progress. It is not a cookbook for the production of these highly lethal and indiscriminate agents. It is for education and where possible, self-defense and awareness. After all, the greatest weapons used by the terrorist are ignorance and fear.
As the United States struggled to respond to the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik in 1957, President Eisenhower received a top secret report prepared by a committee of leading scientific, business, and military experts. The panel, called the Gaither Committee in recognition of its first chair, H. Rowan Gaither Jr., emphasized the inadequacy of U.S. defense measures designed to protect the civilian population and the vulnerability of the country's strategic nuclear forces in the event of a Soviet attack. The committee concluded that in the event of a surprise Soviet attack, the United States would not be able to defend itself. The years following Sputnik and the Gaither Committee's report were a watershed period in America's cold war history. During the remaining years of the Eisenhower administration, the intensification of the cold war caused the acceleration of an arms race that dramatically raised the stakes of any potential conflict. The Gaither Committee was at the center of debates about U.S. national security and U.S.-Soviet relations. The committee's recommendations led to increases in defense spending and the development of our nuclear arsenal.
"Gives the statistics a painfully human face." --William F. Schulz, executive director, Amnesty International --U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy --Boston Herald --Utne Reader
At the beginning of the Second World War there was no thought of delivering planes by air across the Atlantic. It was assumed to be too costly and too dangerous, especially in winter. Despite this initial reluctance, between the fall of 1940 and the spring of 1945, Royal Air Force Ferry Command's mixed civilian and military crews flew almost ten thousand aircraft, mainly American-built, to operational squadrons overseas. In Ocean Bridge Carl Christie provides the first full account of the genesis, history, and importance of Ferry Command. From the pioneer transatlantic flights of the interwar period and the early attempts to initiate regular commercial service, Christie traces London's decision to have aircraft, supplies, and passengers delivered across the Atlantic Ocean from Canada and the United States. Under the inspired leadership of a handful of Imperial Airways' captain-navigators, a group of civilian airmen from Britain, Canada, and the United States undertook to fly urgently needed bombers, maritime patrol aircraft, and transports to Europe for the RAF. This informal civilian organization was augmented by graduates of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan in Canada and taken over by the RAF as Ferry Command in 194 1. Some five hundred aircrew, as well as sixty passengers, lost their lives in accidents; Major Sir Frederick Banting, the discoverer of insulin, was killed in the first fatal crash of the ferry service. Ocean Bridge chronicles an often overlooked contribution to Allied victory and aviation history. By war's end the ferry service, through its various incarnations, had created the basis for the network of international air routes and procedures that commercial travellers now take for granted.
Ultimately, World War II was the first war won by technology, but within only a few weeks after the war began, the U.S. Navy realized its torpedo program was a dismal failure. Submarine skippers reported that most of their torpedoes were either missing the targets or failing to explode if they did hit. The United States had to work fast if it expected to compete with the Japanese Long Lance, the biggest and fastest torpedo in the world, and Germany's electric and sonar models. Hellions of the Deep tells the dramatic story of how Navy planners threw aside the careful procedures of peacetime science and initiated "radical research" gathering together the nation's best scientists and engineers in huge research centers and giving them freedom of experimentation to create sophisticated weaponry with a single goal--winning the war. The largest center for torpedo work was a requisitioned gymnasium at Harvard University, where the most famous names in science worked with the best graduate students from all around the country at the business of war. They had to produce tangible weapons, to consider production and supply tactics, to take orders from the military, and, in many cases, also to teach the military how to use the weapons they developed. World War II grew into a chess match played by scientists and physicists, and it became the only war in history to be won by weapons invented during the conflict. For this book, Robert Gannon conducted numerous interviews over a twenty-year period with scientists, engineers, physicists, submarine skippers, and Navy bureaucrats, all involved in the development of the advanced weapons technology that won the war. While the search for new weapons was deadly serious, stretching imagination and resourcefulness to the limit each day, the need was obvious: American ships were being blown up daily just outside the Boston harbor. These oral histories reveal that, in retrospect, surprising even to those who went through it, the search for the "hellions of the deep" was, for many, the most exciting period of their lives.
In this book, the author discusses world-wide developments in armour from the earliest times, and weapons from the Stone Age to the early firearms and cannon. The book provides accounts of how the arms and armour have been used in specific battles.'
Gudmundsson tells the story of field artillery in the 20th century and its impact on the major conflicts of our time. Its purpose is to provide the reader--whether artilleryman or not--with hitherto unavailable insights on the role that artillery plays in the larger battle and how that has helped shape the world that we live in today. Unique aspects of the book include the treatment of technical issues in non-technical language, the extensive use of German and French sources generally unavailable to the English-speaking reader, the shattering of some long-cherished myths, and the discussion of issues that are often papered over in the literature of field artillery--losses from "friendly fire," the frequent impotence of counter-battery fire, and the French origins of current American doctrine. The bulk of the literature on field artillery can be fairly described as "gunner propaganda." Gudmundsson, with his emphasis on the way artillery interacts with other arms and the dynamics of the battle as a whole, takes a more balanced and a more critical view, dealing with the failures as well as the achievements of field artillery. This study provides a thorough overview of field artillery in non-technical language that will be of interest to military professionals, military historians, and wargamers.
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