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Books > History > Asian / Middle Eastern history > From 1900 > Postwar, from 1945 > General
This monograph studies the racial integration of Army ground combat
units in Eighth (US) Army during the Korean War. The purpose of the
monograph is to determine how this change in the utilization of
African-American combat soldiers impacted the effectiveness of a US
Army organization engaged in fighting a war. This monograph
utilizes several methods to accomplish this purpose: study of
pertinent records and Army doctrine, primary and secondary source
historical analysis, and an inter-disciplinary study of military
effectiveness. To answer the primary research question, this
monograph also explores in broad terms the origins of the Cold War
and US national policy after World War II, the use of Korean
soldiers in US Army units during the Korean War, and the Army's
segregation policies. This monograph comes to two major findings.
First, the integration of African-Americans in Army combat units
during the Korean War resulted in improvements in cohesion,
leadership and command, fighting spirit, personnel resources and
sustainment that increased the combat effectiveness of Eighth (US)
Army. Second, contrary to the prevailing Army view, leaders in the
Eighth (US) Army held a positive opinion of the ability of
African-American soldiers to fight in combat. Both of these
findings are evidence of Eighth (US) Army's adaptability.
Mention the Korean War and almost immediately it evokes the memory
of Marines at Pusan, Inchon, Chasin Reservoir, or the Punchbowl.
Americans everywhere remember the Marine Corps' combat readiness,
courage, and military skills that were largely responsible for the
success of these early operations in 1950-1951. Not as dramatic or
well-known are the important accomplishments of the Marines during
the latter part of the Korean War. In March 1952 the 1st Marine
Division redeployed from the East Central front to West Korea. This
new sector, nearly 35 miles in length, anchored the far western end
of I Corps and was one of the most critical of the entire Eighth
Army line. Here the Marines blocked the enemy's goal of penetrating
to Seoul; the South Korean capital. Northwest of the Marine Main
Line of Resistance, less than five miles distant, lay Panmunjom,
site of the sporadic truce negotiations. Defense of their strategic
area exposed the Marines to continuous and deadly Communist probes
and limited objective attacks. These bitter and costly contests for
key outposts bore such names as Bunker Hill, the Hook, the Nevadas
(Carson-Reno-Vegas), and Boulder City. For the ground Marines,
supported by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons, the fighting
continued until the last day of the war, 27 July 1953. The Korean
War marked the first real test of Free World solidarity in the face
of Communist force. In repulsing this attempted Communist
aggression, the United Nations, led by the United States, served
notice that it would not hesitate to aid those nations whose
freedom and independence were under attack. As events have
subsequently proven, holding the line against Communist
encroachment is a battle whose end is not yet in sight. Enemy
aggression may explode brazenly upon the world scene, with an overt
act of invasion, as it did in Korea in June 1950, or it may take
the form of a murderous guerrilla war as it has more recently, for
over a decade, in Vietnam. Whatever guise the enemy of the United
States chooses or wherever he draws his battleline, he will find
the Marines with their age old answer. Today, as in the Korean era,
Marine Corps readiness and professionalism are prepared to apply
the cutting edge against any threat to American security. This is
the concluding volume of a five-part series dealing with operations
of United States Marines in Korea between 2 August 1950 and 27 July
1953. Volume V provides a definitive account of operations of the
1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during
1952-1953, the final phase of the Korean War. At this time the
division operated under Eighth U.S. Army in Korea {EUSAK) control
in the far western sector of I Corps, while Marine aviators and
squadrons functioned as a component of the Fifth Air Force (FAF).
The period covered by this history begins in March 1952, when the
Marine division moved west to occupy positions defending the
approaches to Seoul, the South Korean capital, As it had for most
of the war the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, operating under FAF, flew
close support missions not only for the Marines but for as many as
19 other Allied frontline divisions. Included in the narrative is a
detailed account of Marine POWs, a discussion of the new defense
mission of Marine units in the immediate postwar period, and an
evaluation of Marine Corps contributions to the Korean War.
Marines, both ground and aviation, comprised an integral part of
the United Nations Command in Korea. Since this is primarily a
Marine Corps history, actions of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force
are presented only in sufficient detail to place Marine operations
in their proper perspective. The original text and artwork have
been used in this publication; occasionally there may be instances
of imperfections with these old texts (i.e., blurred or missing
pages, poor image quality)."
The Battle of Inchon was an amphibious invasion and battle of the
Korean War that resulted in a decisive victory and strategic
reversal in favor of the United Nations. The operation involved
some 75,000 troops and 261 naval vessels, and led to the recapture
of the South Korea capital Seoul two weeks later. The code name for
the operation was Operation Chromite. The battle began on 15
September 1950 and ended on 19 September. Through a surprise
amphibious assault far from the Pusan Perimeter that UN and South
Korean forces were desperately defending, the largely undefended
city of Incheon was secured after being bombed by UN forces. The
battle ended a string of victories by the invading North Korean
People's Army (NKPA). The subsequent UN recapture of Seoul
partially severed NKPA's supply lines in South Korea. The majority
of United Nations ground forces involved were U.S. Marines,
commanded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of the United
States Army. MacArthur was the driving force behind the operation,
overcoming the strong misgivings of more cautious generals to a
risky assault over extremely unfavorable terrain.
'This is what an SAS career is really like' AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE
MAGAZINE Elite SAS Patrol Commander Stuart 'Nev' Bonner takes us
inside the extraordinary and dangerous world of secret combat
operations in this explosive, behind-the-scenes look at life inside
the SAS. A world where capture means torture or death, and every
move is trained for with precision detail to bring elite soldiers
to the very peak of fighting ability. In a career spanning twenty
years, fourteen of them in the SAS, Bonner shares with us the
inside story of being out in front - and often behind enemy lines.
From patrolling the mountains of East Timor to covert operations in
Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, from sweeping into the Iraqi
desert ahead of invading US forces to cripple Saddam Hussein's
communications to patrolling in war-torn Baghdad and being in the
middle of the disastrous Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan - this
is a no-holds-barred account of what it's like to live, eat and
breathe SAS. Now part of the HACHETTE MILITARY COLLECTION.
The Mughals, British and Soviets all failed to subjugate
Afghanistan, failures which offer valuable lessons for today.
Taking a long historical perspective from 1520 to 2012, this volume
examines the Mughal, British, Soviet and NATO efforts in
Afghanistan, drawing on new archives and a synthesis of previous
counter-insurgency experiences. Special emphasis is given to
ecology, terrain and logistics to explain sub-conventional
operations and state-building in Afghanistan. War and
State-Building in Modern Afghanistan provides an overall synthesis
of British, Russian, American and NATO military activities in
Afghanistan, which directly links past experiences to the current
challenges. These timely essays are particularly relevant to
contemporary debates about NATO's role in Afghanistan; do the war
and state-building policies currently employed by NATO forces
undercut or enhance a political solution? The essays in this volume
introduce new historical perspectives on this debate, and will
prove illuminating reading for students and scholars interested in
military history, the history of warfare, international relations
and comparative politics.
It's 1952. Marines have been fighting in Korea for just over 2
years. The daring execution of the Inchon Landing, if not
forgotten, might as well have been. For instead of conducting
amphibious assaults and moving rapidly though North Korean forces,
the Marines of the Ist Marine Division are fighting along a main
line of resistance (MLR)-outpost warfare-static warfare that
consisted of slugfests between artillery and mortars, but always
the infantryman moving in small groups attacking and reattacking
the same ground.
The leader of the Chinese communist revolution, Mao Zedong, was
once asked by a journalist what he thought was the lasting impact
of the French Revolution. He allegedly responded that he did not
know the answer to this question as it was "too early to tell." In
this same vein, field historian Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds' book
on the beginning of hostilities in Iraq is one of the first
historical works commissioned by the History Division to focus on
the role of the U.S. Marine Corps in the long war against global
terrorism. This particular book is about Marines during the first
stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It spans the period from 11
September 2001 to March and April 2003, when the Coalition removed
Saddam Hussein from power, and concludes in November 2003 when the
Marines left Kuwait to return to their home bases in the United
States. While many then believed that the "kinetic" phase of the
fighting in Iraq was largely over, as we now know, it was only a
prelude to a longer but just as deadly phase of operations where
Marines would be redeployed to Iraq in 2004 to combat insurgents
(both foreign and domestic) who had filtered back into the country.
However, this phase of the fighting would be very different from
the one the Marines and U.S. Army had fought in the spring of 2003
in the march up to take Baghdad. The primary focus of the book is I
Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)-the run up to the war in 2002
and early 2003, especially the development of "the plan," with its
many changes, the exhaustive rehearsals, and other preparations,
and then the conduct of decisive combat operations and the
immediate postwar period, mostly under the control of the U.S.
Central Command's Coalition Forces Land Component Command. The book
also touches upon other Marine activities in the Military
Coordination and Liaison Command in northern Iraq and with the
British in the south. Nonetheless, the primary focus remains on I
Marine Expeditionary Force and the interactions of its constituent
elements. Other forthcoming History Division publications will soon
offer detailed narratives on Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) in Afghanistan and II MEF operations inside Iraq.
This is a story about Marines and a tough mission: the Marines of I
and II Marine Expeditionary Forces were deployed to Iraq during
2004-2006 and confronted a violent insurgency and a nation in
chaos. Though the Marines came to fight-they did so admirably in
al-Fallujah, ar-Ramadi, and other hot and dusty locales in al-Anbar
Province-they also laid the foundation for a secure and stable
Iraqi society. Though security and stabilization seemed improbable
if not impossible in al-Anbar Province, the apparent intractable
insurgency was beaten with gritty determination that Marines have
always brought to the fight. Besides using warfighting skills, the
Marines also employed their expertise in civil affairs to help
rebuild a nation in disarray. The military occupation of al-Anbar
Province required patience, perseverance, and fortitude. The cities
and towns were damaged, inhabitants demoralized, and little
remained of civil authority. Hopes remained high that the
occupation would be short-lived and that the Iraqis would pick
themselves up and rebuild. However, those hopes died hard on the
harsh realities of post-invasion Iraq. As the Marines took up new
and unplanned responsibilities, insurgent violence continued and
increased, generated by the national disarray of all social
institutions. For the I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces, nation
building and combat operations would proceed alongside one another
for most of their service in Iraq.
The following account represents one of the earliest efforts to
chronicle Marine Corps operations in Iraq between 2004 and 2005.
This was a significant period in the history of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, seeing two battles fought over the city of Fallujah, the
eruption of the Sadr revolt in an-Najaf, continuous
counterinsurgency operations throughout Iraq, and initial efforts
on the part of Marines to cultivate and forge alliances with the
tribes of Iraq's al-Anbar Province. Almost as soon as Saddam
Hussein's regime collapsed in 2003, it became apparent to U.S.
commanders that a second deployment of Marines to Iraq would be
necessary to conduct security and stability operations. This
monograph recounts the first two years of this second deployment
during which Marines were responsible for Iraq's vast al-Anbar
Province. This study focuses on I Marine Expeditionary Force's
deployment in 2004 and II Marine Expeditionary Force's deployment
of 2005, paying close attention to planning, counterinsurgency
operations, and efforts to build civil-military relations with the
Iraqi population. Particular attention is also paid to the first
and second battles of Fallujah and the battle of an-Najaf. This is
a story of Marines, missions, and machines. The deployment of the I
and II Marine Expeditionary Forces in that sequence to Iraq during
2004-05 contains a surprising number of turns of events. These were
largely successes, but the situations did not always appear so
favorable at the time and often they required tenacious efforts,
skills, courage, and stamina of Marines and their Navy and Army
comrades to reach the desired outcome. The combat record of Marine
Corps forces in Iraq brings great credit upon the Corps and the
armed forces of the United States of America. But, as will be seen
in the following pages, the combat record lies interspersed with a
seemingly endless range of tasks undertaken by the battalions and
the squadrons the Corps operated as it engaged in security and
stabilization operations in al-Anbar and the surrounding provinces.
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