This report brings together analyses of three crucial determinants of an armed force's overall capability: - weapons-the tools used by the soldier, sailor, and airman. - tactics-the way in which the tools are used to produce desired effects. - training-the way in which the individual soldier, sailor, and airman acquires the skills required to combine weapons and tactics into the operation art of warfare.

A very Australian story of heroism and healing. In 2004 Garth Callender, a junior cavalry officer, was deployed to Iraq. He quickly found his feet leading convoys of armoured vehicles through the streets of Baghdad and into the desert beyond. But one morning his crew was targeted in a roadside bomb attack. Garth became Australia's first serious casualty in the war. After recovering from his injuries, Garth returned to Iraq in 2006 as second-in-command of the Australian Army's security detachment in Baghdad. He found a city in the grip of a rising insurgency. His unit had to contend with missile attacks, suicide bombers and the death by misadventure of one of their own, Private Jake Kovco. Determined to prevent the kinds of bomb attacks that left him scarred, Garth volunteered once more in 2009 - to lead a weapons intelligence team in Afghanistan. He was helicoptered to blast zones in the aftermath of attacks, and worked to identify the insurgent bomb-makers responsible. Revealing, moving, funny and full of drama, Garth Callender's story is one of a kind.

"Surprise" is a familiar term in military writings: the achievement of tactical surprise has such obvious benefits that it is enshrined in the military doctrine of most nations. Surprises that emerge in tactics, however, can also operate at the strategic and operational levels. These surprises are particularly dangerous, because they can test the relevance and adaptability of military forces and the "institutional" defense establishments that create, develop, and sustain them. A military establishment that is too slow to recognize and respond to such surprises places its nation's interests at grave risk. In the bipolar strategic environment of the Cold War, deep knowledge of a known adversary reduced the likelihood of such surprises. The same is not true now. This monograph thus comes at an important time, as Western nations contemplate major reductions in defense spending with consequent limitations on force structure. The range of enemy capabilities that a force will be able to match, qualitatively and quantitatively, will become smaller; hence the potential for operational and strategic surprise will increase. In this monograph, Brigadier Andrew Smith uses the improvised explosive device threat as it manifested itself in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 as a case study of such a surprise and how defense establishments responded to it. He argues that, although tactical in itself, this threat posed an operational and strategic threat in a modern "war of discretion" that demanded institutional responses from both the U.S. and Australian institutional militaries, including major equipment, training, and budgetary changes within iv time frames that circumvented the normal peacetime force development cycles of those countries. There are disappointments in the way both countries met this challenge. A key conclusion from this analysis is the critical role of strategic leadership in recognizing the scale of surprise and in forcing the necessary institutional response. At a time when budgets will not allow surprise to be addressed by maintaining large and technically diverse forces at high readiness, the ability to recognize and respond adroitly to operational and strategic surprise may be a critical requirement for a modern defense establishment.

The United States' (US) invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent removal of the Taliban regime are considered monumental successes. In the wake of this success remained the challenge of developing an Afghan National Army (ANA) in order to defend the democratically elected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). This monograph proposes that international assistance, the development of internal Afghan industrial capacity and improved strategic level mentorship are the critical components in forming a self-sustaining ANA. The approach to analyzing ANA development centered on four areas within this research. ANA logistics culture was studied by reviewing the current, past and a desired logistics system to determine its potential for self-sufficiency. Regional neighbors were analyzed to identify their relationships with Afghanistan that could enhance partnered efforts in order to improve internal capacity. The analysis then explored the role of US advisors in Afghanistan as they seek to train and mentor Afghan leaders for the purpose of planning and executing strategic level logistics operations. Finally, the US success in developing a self-sustaining Greek National Army (GNA) following World War II offered some lessons learned that could be applied to the ongoing advisory effort in Afghanistan.

Before the Korean War, the primary mission of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer's Far East Air Forces was air defense of the Japanese homeland. Most of the aircraft constituting Stratemeyer's inventory were interceptors, not designed for the type of combat that would be required now that the United States was joining in the UN effort to end the war in Korea. The Joint Army/USAAF doctrine of 1946, known as Field Manual 31-35, Air Ground Operations, was also considered outdated in the present circumstance. A new approach to warfighting had to be developed in response to the strong influence of General Douglas MacArthur and other of his air officers in the Army-dominated General Headquarters Far East Command. Close air support of the ground forces as provided by Fifth Air Force came at some cost, and tempers flared in the process, but the air commanders in Korea never deprived the ground commanders of close air support if it was needed. Indeed, without the close air support provided to the airmen, the ground campaign would have been a much more bloody and difficult affair than it was.

Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) irregular warfare and "nation-building" mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan's history and culture, the region's contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in U.S. Government strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in U.S. Government structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. As a rationally ordered expression of the ways and means to be applied in the protection of vital national security interests, strategy is supposed to represent a careful analysis and prioritization of the particular interests at stake. In turn, these interests are linked to feasible methods and the resources that are available for their protection, all placed within the context of competing global security demands and a serious consideration of risk. In the case of Afghanistan, however, U.S. Government strategic guidance has been disjointed-- or inconsistent and lacking coherence--while interagency efforts have been "disunified," with agency outputs too often fragmented, inadequate, or internally at odds with one another. As a result, U.S. strategic supervision of the Afghan operation has been muddled and shifting at best, even as our government's interagency processes and available agency capabilities have fallen far short of what is needed to carry out the complex and broad requirements of irregular warfare and "nation-building." Given the breadth, length, and expense of the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan, these strategic and operational shortfalls also carry with them potentially dire consequences for U.S. national security interests around the globe, considering potential first- and second-order effects and other associated risks. U.S. Government disjointed ways, coupled with a corresponding disunity of means, represent the proximate cause of our struggles in Afghanistan, and these deficiencies must be addressed if this mission and other similar future endeavors are to succeed.

The Combat Studies Institute provides a wide range of military, historical, and educational support to the Combined Arms Center, Training and Doctrine Command, and the United States Army. The Combat Studies Institute researches, writes, and publishes original interpretive works on issues of relevance to the US Army. The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) publication collection contains reports and books pertaining to American history, military guidelines, foreign affairs, and more. Titles featured in this collection include: Art of War Papers: Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior, Law of War: Can 20th Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism? and Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City. This title is one of many in the Combat Studies Institute collection.

Three days after North Korean premier Kim Il Sung launched a massive military invasion of South Korea on June 24, 1950, President Harry S. Truman responded, dispatching air and naval support to South Korea. Initially, Congress cheered his swift action; but, when China entered the war to aid North Korea, the president and many legislators became concerned that the conflict would escalate into another world war, and the United States agreed to a truce in 1953. The lack of a decisive victory caused the Korean War to quickly recede from public attention. However, its impact on subsequent American foreign policy was profound. In Truman, Congress, and Korea: The Politics of America's First Undeclared War, Larry Blomstedt provides the first in-depth domestic political history of the conflict, from the initial military mobilization, to Congress's failed attempts to broker a cease-fire, to the political fallout in the 1952 election. During the war, President Truman faced challenges from both Democratic and Republican legislators, whose initial support quickly collapsed into bitter and often public infighting. For his part, Truman dedicated inadequate attention to relationships on Capitol Hill early in his term and also declined to require a formal declaration of war from Congress, advancing the shift toward greater executive power in foreign policy. The Korean conflict ended the brief period of bipartisanship in foreign policy that began during World War II. It also introduced Americans to the concept of limited war, which contrasted sharply with the practice of requiring unconditional surrenders in previous conflicts. Blomstedt's study explores the changes wrought during this critical period and the ways in which the war influenced US international relations and military interventions during the Cold War and beyond.

This report discusses logistics in the Persian Gulf war as it applies to all military operations and in particular to air operations. Simply put, how did the United States equip its forces for Desert Shield and Desert Storm? Logistics also includes fictions for maintaining an air base and support services. These aspects of logistics will be covered in the two parts of this volume.

In the summer of 2010, a unit of Danish soldiers known as ISAF-10 deployed to Afghanistan under British command. In Helmand Province, they tried to secure a fragile peace while dealing with the challenges of training an often apparently indifferent Afghan police and army, ensuring a functioning collaboration with the British despite insufficient military intelligence and divergent military cultures, and fell under frequent attack by an increasingly sophisticated and deadly Taliban. In this remarkable book, Kjeld Hald Galster tells their story. He also looks at the wider picture, examining coalitions ranging from Ancient Greece to the Cold War. Exploring the millennia-long history of coalition warfare, he looks at what makes them work, the lessons they teach us, and how they reflect - and predict - the rise and downfall of the coalitions of the willing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and those yet to come.

This book contains the personal journey and incredible struggles of a combat tested Air Force Chief Master Sergeant. Reading this book is like taking a tour back in time to the peak of the war in Iraq. The reader will feel the stress of being under attack, know the agony of seeing brothers in arms being wounded and patched up, and most importantly, feel the pain a leader carries with them when troops are killed in action. During this journey, Chief Scott Dearduff and his commanding general lead thousands of Airmen stationed across the entire country of Iraq. During that 12 month tour of combat duty, 13 of their Airmen were killed in action. The chief details the struggles that a leader deals with during those most difficult of time. He also shares the internal battle that he felt by being at war again while his family waited for him at home, not really knowing if he would make it home again. This book is not about killing the enemy, but more about those who served and those who sacrificed to meet the demands of the mission. The reader will feel like they have been to Iraq when the book is done. It should be read by every mother, father, sister, brother, friend and family member of any US service member who served in Iraq. These stories, which are never told on the national news, will help you understand that there is passion and compassion in war time, even on the darkest of days.

Despite the vast research by Americans on General Matthew B. Ridgway's miraculous transformation of the Eighth Army during the Korean War, few studies have examined his operational approach, while contrasting it with General Douglas MacArthur's. The constructed reality that emerges from the literature is that General MacArthur's operational desires led to a strained relationship with President Truman and ultimately limited his ability to employ forces in the manner he believed necessary to defeat the Communist Chinese Forces. Similarly, the impression of General Ridgway painted by historical text is that sheer will stopped and turned around the frantic retreating army, which subsequently halted the CCF advance and pushed the communists beyond the 38th Parallel. Army Design Methodology provides a powerful tool for viewing these actions in a new perspective. This monograph examines the actions of General MacArthur and General Ridgway and their application of critical and creative thinking to the problem created by the entry of Communist Chinese Forces onto the Korean Peninsula in October and November of 1950. This study details the significant reframing that characterized the methods applied by General Ridgway during 1950 and 1951, providing future operational commanders a relevant historical example of Army Design Methodology in action.

In commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War, the official history offices of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force and their respective historical associations collaborated to sponsor as comprehensive a symposium as possible, including as participants some of the coalition partners who contributed forces and weapons to the war. The intent of this symposium, titled Coalition Air Warfare during the Korean War, 1950 -1953, was to focus not only on the contributions made by the armed forces of the United States, but also on those of America's allies. The diverse group of panelists and speakers included not only scholars with subject matter expertise, but also veteran soldiers, sailors, and airmen who had served in that conflict. It was hoped that the melding of these diverse perspectives would provide interesting, if sometimes conflicting, views about the Korean War. The symposium organizers designated an agenda of six specific panels for investigation, including Planning and Operations; Air Superiority, Air Support of Ground Forces; Air Interdiction and Bombardment, Air Reconnaissance and Intelligence, and Logistical Support of Air Operations. Each session began with commentary by the panel chairman, which was followed by formal papers, and in some instances included a lively question and answer session. The papers and most of the proceedings found their way into print and are recorded here in an effort to permanently capture the activities, challenges, contributions, and heroics of the coalition air forces and the airmen who fought during the Korean conflict.

Early on the morning of January 17, 1991, the Persian Gulf War began. It consisted of massive allied air strikes on Iraq and Iraqi targets in Kuwait. The United States Air Force spearheaded the offensive and furnished the bulk of the attacking aircraft. During 43 days of fighting, the U.S. Air Force simultaneously conducted two closely coordinated air campaigns. This study develops background information to place the Persian Gulf War in its proper historical and cultural contexts, unfamiliar to and not easily understood by Americans.