The book is part of the Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series. It depicts the Marine involvement in the events from the Nevada Battles to the Armistice.

Since reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan began in 2001, the U.S. government, the international community, and the Afghan government have made improving Afghanistan's justice system a priority. Key documents have noted the importance of the justice sector, including the U.S. government's Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan and the Afghan Government's National Priority Programs focus on strengthening Afghan rule of law and Afghan citizens' access to justice. The Department of State (State) has invested in a variety of rule of law programs since 2005, including programs managed by its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to train Afghan justice sector personnel. State also serves as the lead coordinator for U.S. justice sector development efforts in Afghanistan, responsible for coordinating the activities of several U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Justice. INL has spent approximately $205.5 million on its Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) to provide training to Afghan justice sector officials, to develop a case management system to track cases throughout Afghanistan's justice system, and to build the capacity and administrative skills of officials within Afghan ministries

This monograph is a preliminary accounting of the role of the U.S. Marine Corps' senior command in the Persian Gulf conflict from 8 August 1990 to 16 April 1991. It is one of a series covering the operations of the 1st Marine Division; the 2d Marine Division; the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; Combat Service Support Element, comprised of 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups units; Marines afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq and Turkey.

On Sunday, 25 June 1950, Communist North Korea unexpectedly invaded its southern neighbor, the American-backed Republic of Korea (ROK). The poorly equipped ROK Army was no match for the well prepared North Korean People's Army (NKPA) whose armored spearheads quickly thrust across the 38th Parallel. The stunned world helplessly looked on as the out-numbered and outgunned South Koreans were quickly routed. With the fall of the capital city of Seoul imminent, President Harry S. Truman ordered General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, in Tokyo, to immediately pull all American nationals in South Korea out of harm's way. During the course of the resultant noncombatant evacuation operations an unmanned American transport plane was destroyed on the ground and a flight of U.S. Air Force aircraft were buzzed by a North Korean Air Force plane over the Yellow Sea without any shots being fired. On 27 July, an American combat air patrol protecting Kimpo Airfield near the South Korean capital actively engaged menacing North Korean planes and promptly downed three of the five Soviet-built Yak fighters. Soon thereafter American military forces operating under the auspices of the United Nations Command (UNC) were committed to thwart a Communist takeover of South Korea. Thus, only four years and nine months after V-J Day marked the end of World War II, the United States was once again involved in a shooting war in Asia.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched and led military operations in Afghanistan in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda's use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. Many observers argue that in succeeding years, as U.S. and world attention shifted sharply to the war in Iraq, the Afghan war became the "other war" and suffered from neglect. The Obama Administration, however, has made the war in Afghanistan a higher priority, by giving it early attention, regularly conducting strategy reviews, and making significant additional commitments of civilian and military resources. By early 2011, senior leaders, including the Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General David Petraeus, were pointing to discrete progress on the ground, though noting that such progress was still "fragile and reversible." In late 2010, NATO and the Afghan government agreed to pursue a key medium-term goal: the transition of lead responsibility for security to Afghans throughout the country by the end of 2014. The U.S. government has stated its intention to begin drawing down some U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July 2011, and also to maintain a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014. Strategic vision for Afghanistan is still, many would argue, a work in progress. President Karzai has consistently stressed the theme of "Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership." President Obama has consistently stressed the core goals of the United States: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return. Yet for the U.S. government, fundamental issues remain unresolved. These include: determining the minimum essential conditions required for Afghanistan itself to be able to sustain stability with relatively limited international support; defining the appropriate combination of U.S. efforts, together with other international resources, over time, required to achieve those minimum conditions; and balancing U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and the region against other imperatives, in a constrained fiscal environment. This report, which will be updated as events warrant, describes and analyzes the key players in the war in Afghanistan; the strategic outlooks of the Afghan government, the U.S. government, and NATO; the threats to the security and stability of the Afghan state and its people; the major facets of the current effort: security, governance and anti-corruption, development, reconciliation and reintegration, and transition; mechanisms in place to measure progress; and critical issues that Congress may wish to consider further.

This official U.S. Marine Corps history provides unique information about an important aspect of the Korean War. Some of the subjects included in this history: Major General Field Harris, Colonel Lewis B. Chesty Puller, Major General Oliver P. Smith, 1st Marine Division, General Douglas MacArthur, President Truman, USS Mount McKinley, Wolmi-Do, the drive to Kimpo, amphibious assault, DUKWs.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) overthrew Saddam's regime and opened up one of the world's most secretive governments to outside analysis, presenting a once-in-a-generation opportunity for military leaders and historians to delve deep into the decision-making processes of a former adversary. For the first time since a similar project at the end of World War II, we have an opportunity to evaluate military events from not only our own vantage point but also from the perspective of the opposing political and military leadership. Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani originated this vital and interesting work when he was Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). As part of a major effort to ensure we fully understood the lessons of OIF, he commissioned a comprehensive analysis of US strengths and weaknesses. This first-of-its-kind venture was led by Brigadier General Robert W. Cone, the then-Director of USJFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned (JCOA). Almost as soon as this effort got underway in the spring of 2003, Admiral Giambastiani realized that the study would not be complete unless information about what drove the Iraqis to make the decisions they did was fully integrated into the analysis. To accomplish this, project leader Kevin Woods led a small team of professionals in a systematic two-year study of the former Iraqi regime and military. This book is the fi rst major product of that effort. It presents a comprehensive historical analysis of the forces and motivations that drove our opponent's decisions through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders and by making extensive use of thousands of official Iraqi documents. Kevin and his team have crafted a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process. Moreover, it goes a long way towards revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from the insiders' point of view. Presented herein is crucial information currently missing from still ongoing analyses of OIF, and much of its content will counter currently accepted wisdom. While the practice of self-critique and gathering lessons learned are distinguishing features of the US military, in almost every past instance our understanding of events remained incomplete because any assessment was limited to a "blue" only view of the situation. While we often had a relatively complete picture of what our adversary did, we remained in the dark as to what motivated his actions. At the conclusion of past conflicts, we were left to speculate which of our actions were causing specific enemy responses and why. Expert analysts and "red team" assessments attempt to make this speculation as informed as possible, but because of the impenetrability of closed regimes, even their usefulness is somewhat limited. In this case, however, by adding the actual "red team's view" to the compilation of multiple, differing viewpoints, this study hopes to contribute to a more fully developed history of the war, and allow all concerned to get closer to "ground truth." General Lance Smith, the current USJFCOM Commander, and the JCOA team remain committed to this and similar projects as part of an ongoing process of learning and improving through the sharing of "ground truth." Though this project is an important initial step, we acknowledge the history of OIF is far from complete. Researchers continue to locate, translate, and analyze information that will shed new light on our former adversary's perspective of the conflict. It is in the interest of getting as much accurate information as possible into the hands of those already studying Operation Iraqi Freedom that we release this book.

Merriam Press Military Monograph 96. Second Edition (March 2012). On July 15, 1950, only a few weeks after North Korea invaded South Korea with overwhelming force, General Douglas MacArthur authorized the creation of a Provisional Raider Company to blow up bridges and railway tunnels behind enemy lines. Of 800 potential volunteers, 115 made the cut and endured weeks of grueling amphibious and demolitions training. On September 9, they and a small contingent of British Commandos left to conduct a raid at Kunsan, South Korea. On subsequent assignments, the Raiders went ashore at Inchon with the Marines, and with the X Corps at Wonsan. They conducted long-range intelligence-gathering patrols in which they also inserted and removed Korean agents. During the Chosin Reservoir campaign they were assigned to take and hold open the mountain passes for the withdrawal of the Marines and the 7th Division. The Raiders were evacuated from North Korea on December 14, 1950, and assigned anti-guerrilla activities in South Korea. At Chang-to they were cut off and surrounded by two North Korean regiments. On April 1, 1951, all Ranger and Special Operations units were disbanded because the Army high command believed they were not being utilized properly. This is the story of that unit as told by one of its members, John Connor. In about seven months of almost continual combat, they managed to accumulate four battle stars, a bronze arrowhead for a combat assault landing, Presidential Unit citations from both the U.S. Navy and the Republic of Korea, along with a special commendation from the commanding general of X Corps for imposing losses on the enemy far in excess of their own numbers. Contents: * Introduction * Prologue * Childhood * Basic Training * Occupation Duty * Camp McGill * Kusan * Inchon and Kimpo * North Korea * Chosin Reservoir * South Korea * The Battle at Chang-to * Business as Usual * Deactivation * Epilogue * Afterword * Satellite photo of Korean Peninsula at night * Surrender leaflet and news article * Presidential Unit Citation * Personal message to General Collins from GHQ, 1950 * Fragmentary order to Colonel Ely * Commendation to CO, Special Activities Group * Permanent orders to John Connor * Bibliography * 31 photos * 7 documents * 2 maps.

This monograph provides a historical overview of Afghanistan's recent history, reviews the contemporary causes of internal instability, illustrates the international response, and analyses three existing approaches to PRTs: those of the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. It also identifies and evaluates a number of PRT tactical and operational lessons learned. The monograph concludes by combining the pertinent lessons learned into a recommended PRT "blueprint" to meet the contemporary and evolving challenges of provincial security and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

"Wounded" is an eloquent, gritty account of the ordeal suffered by injured American soldiers during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The human elements of courage, love, fear, and sacrifice paint an intriguing picture of the reality of war. Author Ed Hrivnak, a flight nurse witness to the pain and suffering, offers a heroic narrative for the reader. There are valiant accounts of battle followed by the reality of life altering injuries, and how troops support each other and persevere.

"Wounded" closes all gaps between the reader, the injured troops in the field, and the medevac personnel helping them during their darkest hours. The book offers a unique look at what it was like to evacuate wounded at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Hrivnak wants the reader to fully understand the price of war. This international odyssey transcends the casualty statistics forgotten in the news. A wounded soldier is a human being who is vulnerable and weakened. Those who care for them, at times struggling to maintain life, are also scarred. These men and women are an incredible source of strength, courage, and devotion.

"Wounded" completes Captain Hrivnak's original journal, featured in the Emmy winning and Oscar nominated film, "Operation Homecoming. "

As a Navy SEAL on combat deployment in Iraq, Mike Ritland saw a military working dog in action and instantly knew he'd found his true calling. Ritland started his own company, training and supplying dogs for the SEAL teams, US Government, and Department of Defence. He knew that fewer than 1 per cent of all working dogs had what it takes to contribute to the success of our nation's elite combat units, and began searching the globe for animals who fit this specific profile. The results were a revelation: highly trained working dogs capable of handling both detection and apprehension work in the most extreme environments and the tensest of battlefield conditions. Though fiercely aggressive and athletic, these dogs develop a close bond with their handlers and other team members. Truly integrating themselves into their units, these K9 warriors are much like their human counterparts-unwavering in their devotion to duty, strong enough and tough enough to take it to the enemy through pain, injury, or fear.

What makes a successful military man? How can one man best serve his country, preserve our freedoms, and achieve his personal best? Shaping the Battlefield is Captain Adam Hogue's incredible, true story of how he offers combat support during the surge in forces in Afghanistan in 2011, leads a successful mission, and completes his astonishing project with courage, grace, and a good sense of humor. Hogue's story begins in the debris of 9/11, a moment that shocked the world and caused men and women to go into action to fight terrorism. Clearly and vividly, Hogue shows how 9/11 changed his life. A huge supporter of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, he joins the war effort in 2005 to "put his money where his mouth is," so to speak. Worried that the war will end before he has a chance to deploy, Hogue takes an Active Duty Operational Support assignment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. There, he works with the United States Special Operations Command Sustaining Brigade. Sixteen months into his assignment, he is sent to Afghanistan, where he is tasked with planning a surge in forces to support operations. In January 2011, Hogue and forty-seven other people arrive in Germany. Hogue makes his narrative sparkle by giving an insider's view to events. For example, any time the Air Force lands a plane in Germany, Spain, or any other interesting location, Hogue knows it's a well-known secret that the plane will go down for maintenance. Hogue also supplies fascinating details on rules and regulations, like obeying speed limits, how and when to salute officers, and why, if you didn't follow protocol, the Military Police would come in. Beautifully detailed and remarkably told, Shaping of the Battlefield juxtaposes the beauty of the terrain with the evils of the terrorists. As he builds and expands the Special Forces footprint in Afghanistan, he gets to see the war from both an inside and outside perspective, both while planning as a junior officer, and sitting in on high level meetings. This experience gives him a special understanding of the war, people, and the challenges. But being at a desk is not very challenging, and though Hogue is giving his job one hundred percent, he's soon chafing at the bit to do something more exciting, which happens very soon when he is sent to Mazir-I-Sharif, where he is instrumental in building a base for over three hundred soldiers. This is a tremendous memoir with a real in-the-trenches feel. Hogue details the dangers of his mission in pitch-perfect prose, and he makes you feel his own growth as both a leader and a man. As Hogue himself says of his mission, "As we flew into the clouds and over the mountains, none of us really knew what was going to happen next, but that was always the case in Afghanistan. You never knew what was going to happen next, but in this case, we received a mission and shaped our own piece of the battlefield." Whether you are in the military, you know someone in the armed forces, or you simply have an interest in the events tearing apart Afghanistan, you are sure to love Shaping the Battlefield.

LTC Harry Tunnell's Red Devils is the history of one Soldier's and one unit's experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom. War must be studied from a variety of perspectives if one hopes to understand it and profit from that understanding. Like studies of grand strategy and operational histories, personal accounts of war are a critical aspect of understanding that immensely complex phenomenon. Using a journal which he kept during the war, then reflecting on his experiences while recovering from the wounds he suffered and while at student at the National War College, LTC Tunnell tells the story of the 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment in Northern Iraq. The story of the Red Devils covers that crucial period of time from early 2003 when the Army prepared for war, through the end of so called 'major combat operations, ' and into the start of the insurgency and counterinsurgency which goes on to this day. This is not a comprehensive, polished historical analysis, but a first-hand account of Operation Iraqi Freedom's earliest period. Red Devils represents one man's attempt to make sense of his and his unit's experiences in Iraq. It represents only a small part of the history of many units and individuals which have taken part in, and continue to take part in, the defining military campaign of our time. We hope this study will be useful as readers attempt understand that complex campaign

Eyewitness to War Oral History Series: US Army Advisors in Afghanistan is the third publication by the Combat Studies Institute that makes exclusive use of oral history. This volume is a product of interviews obtained by the CSI Operational Leadership Experience (OLE) project and our Contemporary Operations Study Team (COST). The interviews used in this volume range from a senior officer who conceptualized the idea for Task Force Phoenix, the Coalition Joint Task Force that execute a broad-based training, mentoring, and assistance program aimed at improving the Afghan National Army's (ANA) ability to field mission-ready operational commands, to embedded transition team members assigned to coach, teach and mentor their ANA counterparts. The interviews are in their own words; they provide frank commentary to a range of topics including pre-deployment training, logistics support, poppy eradication (and some of the corruption they encountered associated with that task) and integration of Special Forces with conventional infantry on operations.

American air power is a dominant force in today's world. Its ascendancy, evolving in the half century since the end of World War II, became evident during the first Gulf War. Although a great deal has been written about military oper ations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this deeply researched volume by Dr. Diane Putney probes the little-known story of how the Gulf War air campaign plan came to fruition. Based on archival documentation and interviews with USAF planners, this work takes the reader into the planning cells where the difficult work of building an air campaign plan was accomplished on an around-the-clock basis. The tension among air planners is palpable as Dr. Putney traces the incremental progress and friction along the way. The author places the complexities of the planning process within the con- text of coalition objectives. All the major players are here: President George H. W. Bush, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General Colin Powell, General Chuck Horner, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The air planning process generated much debate and friction, but resulted in great success - a 43-day conflict with minimum casualties. Dr. Putney's rendering of this behind-the-scenes evolution of the planning process, in its complexity and even suspense, provides a fascinating window into how wars are planned and fought today and what might be the implications for the future.

We have been at war for four and one-half years. The financial burden of executing Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom caused military services to undergo extensive cost-cutting efforts. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) community is not exempt. Recently, the Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group (AFNGOSG) requested an additional study of lower missile readiness rates, presumably to identify any potential cost savings from reduced maintenance and security footprints. This research offers an initial study by analyzing the impact of lowered ICBM alert rates caused by not repairing off-alert missiles until a lowered alert-rate threshold is reached and any correlation to a potential decrease in daily ICBM maintenance team utilization. The intent of this research is to provide an analysis of the ICBM maintenance team utilization at the current ICBM alert rate and at lowered alert rates. Quantitative research methodologies are used to model historical ICBM maintenance data from the 341st Maintenance Group (MG) and simulate future maintenance team utilization at both the current and decreased ICBM alert rates. The results of this simulation and modeling show negligible savings in overall ICBM maintenance team utilization. One maintenance section under study showed a statistically significant but slight increase in team utilization as the alert rate decreased. Another section under study exhibited a slight decrease in team utilization deemed statistically significant, however, extremely hard to quantify as the increase in team utilization was only .62 percent. The remaining four maintenance sections under study had statistically the same team utilization at all alert-rate levels.

Complexity theory has attracted considerable interest from operational artists in recent times. However, because it is still an emerging field, there are few -if any - historical case studies that show how complexity applies to military operations. Using the comparison method, this review compares the similarities and differences between a historical case study and insights from complexity theory in order to evaluate the utility of complexity theory for military practice. The first three months of Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway's command of the Eighth Army during the Korean War is chosen for the historical case study, as an exemplar of successful operational command. Complexity theory is compared with how Ridgway understood, perceived, and approached the complexity of his operational environment. Complexity theory offers broad guidelines for action, such as: use simple rules to generate complex behavior; look at the system from multiple scales to gain better perspective; achieve a holistic picture of the situation by recognizing interdependence; and continually adapt to a changing environment. The comparative analysis shows good agreement between these recommendations of complexity theory and Ridgway's successful campaign. A significant implication of this research is that complexity theory and history can be complementary perspectives for appreciating operational art. Leaders who understand complexity theory as well as military history may be better prepared for the challenges they will face in an uncertain future.

Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) irregular warfare and "nation-building" mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan's history and culture, the region's contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in U.S. Government strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in U.S. Government structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. As a rationally ordered expression of the ways and means to be applied in the protection of vital national security interests, strategy is supposed to represent a careful analysis and prioritization of the particular interests at stake. In turn, these interests are linked to feasible methods and the resources that are available for their protection, all placed within the context of competing global security demands and a serious consideration of risk. In the case of Afghanistan, however, U.S. Government strategic guidance has been disjointed-- or inconsistent and lacking coherence--while interagency efforts have been "disunified," with agency outputs too often fragmented, inadequate, or internally at odds with one another. As a result, U.S. strategic supervision of the Afghan operation has been muddled and shifting at best, even as our government's interagency processes and available agency capabilities have fallen far short of what is needed to carry out the complex and broad requirements of irregular warfare and "nation-building." Given the breadth, length, and expense of the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan, these strategic and operational shortfalls also carry with them potentially dire consequences for U.S. national security interests around the globe, considering potential first- and second-order effects and other associated risks. U.S. Government disjointed ways, coupled with a corresponding disunity of means, represent the proximate cause of our struggles in Afghanistan, and these deficiencies must be addressed if this mission and other similar future endeavors are to succeed.

Before BENGHAZI, There was EXTORTION 17.... August 06, 2011, 2:20 a.m.-Operation Lefty Grove is underway, a highly dangerous mission to take out another high-level Taliban operative, three months after the death of Osama Bin Laden. In the dark of night, twenty-five US Special Ops Forces and a five-man flight crew on board Extortion 17, a CH-47 Chinook helicopter. Seven unidentified Afghan Commandos are allowed to join them. Ground forces have already been engaged in a three-hour exhaustive battle. Extortion 17's specially trained warriors drop into the Hot Landing Zone to help their fellow warriors. But there's a problem: the standard chopper escorts have all been directed elsewhere. Mission directions are unclear. Worse, pre-assault fire to cover the Chinook transporting our brave fighting men is not ordered. On that fateful night, Extortion 17 would never touch down. Taliban fighters fired three rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) in rapid succession. The first RPG shot below the Chinook, but the second made contact in what the military would later describe as a "one-in-a-million shot." The shot struck a rotor blade on the aft (rear) pylon, shearing off ten and a half feet of the blade. The third shot flew above the falling chopper. Within a matter of seconds, the chopper begins to spin violently out of control and then drops vertically into a dry creek bed and is engulfed in a large fireball. There are no survivors. The thirty brave Americans lost that night were more than just warriors. They were husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons. Billy Vaughn's son, Aaron Carson Vaughn, was one of them. Over the next few months as unsettling information on the tragic incident is released to the families, Billy Vaughn becomes increasingly disturbed. Billy discovers that US military forces are not being led to win battles, but have been sent on a fool's errand to "win the hearts and minds" of other nations. He is told that the US Rules of Engagement have prevented our brave defenders from defending themselves. Adding insult to injury, Billy learned that a Muslim Imam was invited by our own US military leaders to "pray" over his son's dead body. As US war heroes lay in their caskets before their last flight home, the Imam damned America's fallen warriors as "infidels" who would burn in hell. As US military leaders observed the ceremony at Bagram Air Base, the Imam boasted over the deaths of US heroes with words such as, "The companions of heaven Muslims] are the winners." Betrayed is a heart rending account in America's history, an engaging story of faith, patriotism, honor, duty and loss. Betrayed is not just the biography of an American military family, it is a crucial, true-life narrative that every American must read and understand about their government and the danger America's military strategy currently poses to all families. Betrayed is a book Billy Vaughn wishes he didn't have to write. But his son is gone and there are still unanswered questions. He needs to know if finding the truth may prevent another father from standing in his shoes.

The body armor and equipment weigh down your fatigued body. Just the day prior you argued with your wife on your first 10 minute call you had in a month. Your nose no longer detects the horrid stench of your comrades who haven't showered in weeks. Everyone's ripped uniforms are barely held together by tape and pathetic sewing jobs. You just want the patrol to be over so you can finish the hours of guard sure to follow and hopefully get some sleep. If only...BOOM Suddenly your exhausting, boring, and very monotonous world is interupted by a swift burst of unwanted violence. Welcome to The Triangle of Death, what the Iraqis called The Graveyard of the Americans. Peer into an Infantryman's first-hand account based on the journal the author kept during his deployment to Iraq from 2006-2007. He does not hide the ugliness of war, but tells of the worst things it brings out of us, as well as our best. When all Hell breaks loose it is easy to wonder where God is. Often He is not in the wind, earthquake, or fire raging around us, but in the gentle whisper that follows. "Not in the Wind, Earthquake, or Fire is a book that will give you a first-hand look through the eyes of a soldier in a war zone with IEDs, and the infiltration of fighters that don't want non-Muslims in their country or even living at all. If readers are at all interested in finding out more about where U.S. dollars are going and how our troops are coping, reading Not in the Wind, Earthquake, or Fire will give you some idea." Robert Medak Writer/Editor/Reviewer/Marketer "I know what it is like to be stuck in a war zone for multiple tours as I did three in Vietnam. I found the sketches and photographs extremely helpful in understanding the situation. I know, also, that the manner in which operations are now conducted have changed greatly since the early '70s and I found those very informative. It should be read by all who doubt our commitments on the War on Terrorism." Steven W. Johnson Author - Not Much of a Crime Philip Sharp powerfully reveals the truths about deployments experienced by what is known as the "Regular Army." He uncovers the highs of deployments, as well as the lows. Not in the Wind, Earthquake, or Fire reminded me that I have forgotten so much about these types of experiences, yet I have been molded by them all." Timothy L. Mcollister. Afghanistan Veteran, Sniper, US Army 10th Mountain Division.

I hate war. War kills. War maims. War orphans. And it leaves a deep scar not only on the land, that will take years to heal, but also in the hearts of those who are affected by the war. I am one of those who carry a deep emotional wound to this day, more than sixty years later.

During World War II, under Japan, my father was imprisoned because he was a Christian minister who refused to bow down to the picture of the Japanese emperor. My elder brother volunteered to join the Japanese military in the hope of having his father released from the prison. He left home as a vibrant, fifteen-year-old boy and returned home as a worn-out, injured, eighteen-year-old man after the war; he died a year later. During the Korean War, two North Korean officers came to my house and took my father away because he was a Christian minister. He never returned.

"Shattered by the Wars" is a story of love, sacrifice, faith, and suffering, all wrapped in one package. The heroine in the story is my mother, as seen by her youngest son. Mother prayed without ceasing. Through her unceasing prayers, she was able to walk through the dark tunnel of trials and tribulations and lead us onward with love and grace and absolute faith in God.

Private Damien Thomlinson is a former member of the elite 2nd Commando Regiment of the Australian Army who was terribly injured in after a bomb explosion in Afghanistan. His inspiring journey back from the dead stands as proof that no challenge is too great and that the ANZAC spirit is truly alive and well. After losing both his legs in an accident in Afghanistan, Special Forces soldier Damien thomlinson was determined not only to survive, but to meet life head on. this is an uplifting story of guts, drive and exceptional resilience. Without warning, Private Damien thomlinson's life changed forever. On a night patrol in Afghanistan in 2009, his vehicle drove over a taliban explosive device. His right leg turned instantly to red mist and his left leg was severed below the knee. His arms and hands were shattered and his nose smashed. Blood poured into his lungs. He was as close to death as you can get. Damien's story could have been a tragedy, but because of his enormously optimistic spirit it is instead one of triumph and inspiration. Once a commando, always a commando. Damien was determined not to be defined or limited by his injuries. With dogged focus and commitment, he set about reclaiming his life - on his own terms. His extraordinary drive and willpower saw him walking again on prosthetic legs just eight weeks from the time of his accident, ready to stand and welcome his unit home from Afghanistan. He set himself extraordinary challenges including walking the demanding 96km Kokoda track in honour of a fallen comrade and becoming the public face of the Commando Welfare trust. Damien is now an aspiring Paralympian, determined to represent Australia in snowboarding. His life has irrevocably changed, but he believes it has changed for the better. Damien's positive attitude and larrikin, never-say-die spirit are an inspiration to all of us, and the story of his journey is humbling, heartbreaking and truly awe-inspiring.

This report discusses logistics in the Persian Gulf war as it applies to all military operations and in particular to air operations. Simply put, how did the United States equip its forces for Desert Shield and Desert Storm? Logistics also includes fictions for maintaining an air base and support services. These aspects of logistics will be covered in the two parts of this volume.

To some people, the Korean War was just a "police action," preferring that euphemism to what it really was - a brutal and bloody war involving hundreds of thousands of air, ground, and naval forces from many nations. It was also termed a "limited war," in that it took place in a small region of the world versus the worldwide conflict that had ended less than five years earlier. But this "police action," this "limited war," cost an estimated 2.4 million military casualties on both sides, while at least another 2 million civilians were also casualties. The United States military alone suffered 33,742 killed and another 103,234 wound-ed. The war in the air was as bloody and violent as that on the ground. The United Nations air forces lost 1,986 aircraft, with the USAF sustaining 1,466 of these. Air Force personnel casualties totaled 1,841, including 1,180 dead. These losses were far greater than can be accounted for in the glib terms "police action" and "limited war." As the years passed following the end of the war, Korea receded in memory. Another war - in Southeast Asia - became lodged in the public's mind, and the Korean War became "forgotten." But to those veterans and historians alike participating in the proceedings recorded in this volume, their reminiscences and perspectives provide the reader with compelling arguments why the Korean War deserves to be remembered.

The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 capped an era of USAF modernization and enhanced readiness begun in the late 1970s and that continued through the 1980s. The long lead-time weapons acquisition and training programs, begun a decade or more earlier, came to fruition against a far different opponent and in an unforeseen locale than that envisioned by their creators. The force designed to counter the superpower foe of the Cold War, the USSR, never fought a direct battle against that enemy during the existence of the Soviet Union. Instead, the USAF fought the first war of the so-called New World Order, a war that had as much in common with the colonial wars of the late nineteenth century as it had with the high-technology wars of the late twentieth century. The USAF shouldered the bulk of the fighting for the first thirty-nine of the conflict's forty-two days. This volume covers the air offensive against strategic military and economic targets within the pre-August 1990 borders of Iraq. The offensive air plan once again displayed the ability of the U.S. military to turn the necessity of improvisation into a virtue when, in mid-August 1990, an element of the Air Staff in the Pentagon wrote the basis of the offensive plan in ten days. The plan was founded upon the precepts of Col. John A. Warden III's air power theories-centers of gravity, shock effect, and the importance of leadership-related targets. Once the outline plan reached the arena of operations, the U.S. Central Air Forces (CENTAF), under the able leadership of Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, adopted the targeting philosophy of the plan and, after many modifications owing to new targets and an increased force structure, employed it with devastating effect. The author describes not only the outstanding performance of USAF men and machines but also the difficulties and complexities of coordinating the many elements of air and staff operations. Among these were the complex coordination of the fighters with their tankers, the speedy transmission of data from the allseeing eyes of AWACS and JSTARS aircraft, the multiple bomb runs over chemical and biological warfare bunkers, and the shortcomings of certain types of intelligence. All these factors impacted on mission effectiveness. The author also diagrams how outside influences-political pressure from neutrals, such as the Israelis, and from public news media-can affect the direction of the bombing effort. Although this account of the air campaign in the Persian Gulf concentrates on the operational history of a six-week war, it also places that war into its larger political and military context, especially in its tale of the interplay between the U.S. military and civilian leadership. It illustrates, with reference to actual missions, the operational advantages of stealth fighter bombers as well as their vulnerabilities. Davis presents the reader with a detailed account of one of the USAF's most important air operations in the last half of the twentieth century. In the decade after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the pattern of strategic air operations against Iraq became the template for USAF operations over Bosnia and during the air war over Serbia and, most recently, in Afghanistan as well. In planning for air operations in the Balkans, USAF officers were strongly influenced by John A. Warden's methodology and ideology with its emphasis on centers of gravity and strikes on leadership targets. Stealth air combat operations, inaugurated en masse in the Gulf War, became even more prevalent with the introduction of the B-2 bomber. Likewise, the use of precision weapons grew. The aversion of western democracies to both military and civilian casualties and their effect on targeting, tactics, and strategy first encountered over Iraq became more pronounced in subsequent conflicts-as did the continuing challenge in matching accurate intelligence to precision weapons.