The role of the Organized Reserves in the history of the US Army has taken many twists and turns since the nation's founding. The organization and missions of the Army's reserves, both the National Guard and the Army Reserve, are once again undergoing fundamental change to meet the needs of the 21st century. In Iroquois Warriors in Iraq, Mr. Steve Clay analyzes the role played by the "Iroquois Warriors" of the US Army Reserve's 98th Division (Institutional Training). In an unprecedented move, the soldiers of the 98th were called on in mid-2004 to deploy to Iraq and to fulfill a critical role in the building, training, and advising of the new Iraqi Army. Prior to 2004, a US Army Reserve institutional training division had never deployed overseas to a theater of operations, nor were they designed to function as unit trainers and combat advisors. The author highlights the challenges faced by the 98th Division as it trained for and deployed to Iraq for this unusual mission. Among those challenges were how to train and prepare for the mission, who to send, how to integrate reservists into the new Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), and whether to deploy the 98th as a unit or as a collection of individual soldiers. Throughout the turbulent period of 2004 and 2005 in Iraq, the soldiers of the 98th Division added to the proud legacy of the US Army Reserve. Iroquois Warriors in Iraq tells the story of the history of the 98th Division (IT), it is a compelling narrative of the earliest phases of the Army's efforts to build the Iraqi armed forces, and it offers a number of key insights for the Army as it conducts the Long War.

Eyewitness to War Oral History Series: US Army Advisors in Afghanistan is the third publication by the Combat Studies Institute that makes exclusive use of oral history. This volume is a product of interviews obtained by the CSI Operational Leadership Experience (OLE) project and our Contemporary Operations Study Team (COST) The interviews used in this volume range from a senior officer who conceptualized the idea for Task Force Phoenix, the Coalition Joint Task Force that execute a broad-based training, mentoring, and assistance program aimed at improving the Afghan National Army's (ANA) ability to field mission-ready operational commands, to embedded transition team members assigned to coach, teach and mentor their ANA counterparts. The interviews are in their own words; they provide frank commentary to a range of topics including pre-deployment training, logistics support, poppy eradication (and some of the corruption they encountered associated with that task) and integration of Special Forces with conventional infantry on operations. As the US Army continues its advisory mission in Afghanistan and in other countries around the globe, the relevancy of US Army Advisors in Afghanistan grows and should be on the reading list for Soldiers tasked with this mission.

Disillusioned by movies and naive, the author is determined to enter into the military early and become a war hero."

Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory that they had experience in World War II. In that earlier, larger war, victory over Japan cam after two atomic bombs destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But in Korea five years later, the United States limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after Communist china entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limit, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel two invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other United National forces could fight without fear of air attack.

The 24th Division and XVIII Airborne Corps performed the impossible in February 1991. In less than 100 hours, MG McCaffrey moved across 635 miles of desert, reached the Euphrates River from the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabi, turned east toward Basrah and Saddaam Hussein and his elite guard surrendered. An equally impossible feat, surgical support accompanied him throughout his attack, never more than 30 minutes from the fight. The Dream, is the story of how the medical plan came together. Never before in the history of the Armed Forces had the medical force been faced with such a challenge. The doctrine, the manuals that were supposed to provide the answers repeatedly came up short. The Dream provides the answers to how support never envisioned before not only stayed with the fighting force, but improved their survival rate almost 10% higher than previous conflicts.

Dealing with tribal systems has posed a continuing challenge to Al-Qaida as it operates in the Middle East and Africa, where a tribal environment is still an integral part of society in many of the countries. How Al-Qaida views and manages the tribal system within its individual areas of operation in many cases can mean the difference between success and failure, and the jihadist movement cannot ignore this issue, which has been a major factor affecting its prospects, especially in Iraq. This study examines Al-Qaida's experience dealing with the tribes in Iraq in terms of a triangular relationship involving the Sunni tribes, Al-Qaida, and the government (or the United States as the governing authority in the initial stages), with latter two entities often competing for the allegiance of the tribes.

On 23 March 2003, 5,800 U.S. Marines and U.S. Navy Corpsmen-the warriors of Task Force Tarawa-began fighting a ferocious battle in the city of an-Nasiriyah, Iraq. As the first large-scale battle fought by U.S. Marines in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Nasiriyah became a test of the Coalition's ability and resolve to defeat a determined, resourceful foe that relied on a combination of conventional units and tactics and irregular forces willing to violate the laws of war. Task Force Tarawa's Marines adapted quickly, and the battle of Nasiriyah, with its asymmetrical warfare, emphasis on combined arms and joint operations, and Coalition forces' ability to react quickly and aggressively against unexpected enemy tactics became emblematic of the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom campaign.

The role of the Organized Reserves in the history of the US Army has taken many twists and turns since the nation's founding. The organization and missions of the Army's reserves, both the National Guard and the Army Reserve, are once again undergoing fundamental change to meet the needs of the 21st century. In Iroquois Warriors in Iraq, Mr. Steve Clay analyzes the role played by the "Iroquois Warriors" of the US Army Reserve's 98th Division (Institutional Training). In an unprecedented move, the soldiers of the 98th were called on in mid-2004 to deploy to Iraq and to fulfill a critical role in the building, training, and advising of the new Iraqi Army. This monograph is the story of how that concept evolved and how it came to form a nexus with MNSTC-I that resulted in the use of a USAR training division for an overseas combat mission for the first time in US Army history. The monograph presents issues connected with the mobilization, deployment, training, and integration of Reserve Component (RC) units and personnel in general; the use of units to perform tasks not part of their mission essential task list (METL); and issues associated with the major task assigned to the 98th Division-training and advising a foreign army. It finishes with an analysis of the overall mission and provides conclusions and recommendations for consideration. The intent of this monograph is to expose leaders and soldiers to the issues described above, so in future conflicts, and perhaps even for the current conflict, they might gain insights that will enable them to develop solutions should similar problems arise.

Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War, by historian and retired Army Colonel describes the little known history of the Army's amphibious operations during the Korean War. This book is part of our tradition of publishing high-quality historical studies from outside authors that have continuing relevance to the US Army today. After the massive Chinese attacks of November and December 1950, the Army conducted a number of amphibious withdrawals as it fell back southward on the Korean peninsula to more defensible positions. Throughout the war, the Army also conducted a number of non-assault amphibious operations and over-the-shore logistical operations. Since the Korean War, the Army's amphibious role has greatly decreased in importance. The Army, however, conducted extensive riverine operations in Vietnam and continues to employ them in Iraq. Additionally, over-the-shore logistics remains an important part of Army doctrine and logistical capability today. This historical study chronicles an aspect of the US Army's history that may seem remote from the challenges facing the Army in 2008.

Infidels in the Garden of Mesopotamia is an extensive work that provides the reader with an insiders look into the world of high threat protection operations in hostile and semi permissive environments worldwide.

The Second Battle of Seoul was the battle to recapture Seoul from the North Koreans in late September 1950. The advance on Seoul was slow and bloody, after the landings at Inchon. The reason was the appearance in the Seoul area of two first-class fighting units of the North Korean People's Army, the 78th Independent Infantry Regiment and 25th Infantry Brigade, about 7,000 troops in all. The NKPA launched a T-34 attack, which was trapped and destroyed, and a Yak bombing run in Incheon harbor, which did little damage. The NKPA attempted to stall the UN offensive to allow time to reinforce Seoul and withdraw troops from the south. Though warned that the process of taking Seoul would allow remaining NKPA forces in the south to escape, MacArthur felt that he was bound to honor promises given to the South Korean government to retake the capital as soon as possible. On the second day, vessels carrying the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division arrived in Incheon Harbor. General Almond was eager to get the division into position to block a possible enemy movement from the south of Seoul. On the morning of September 18, the division's 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment landed at Incheon and the remainder of the regiment went ashore later in the day. The next morning, the 2nd Battalion moved up to relieve an U.S. Marine battalion occupying positions on the right flank south of Seoul. Meanwhile, the 7th Division's 31st Infantry Regiment came ashore at Incheon. Responsibility for the zone south of Seoul highway passed to 7th Division at 18:00 on September 19. The 7th Infantry Division then engaged in heavy fighting with North Korean soldiers on the outskirts of Seoul. Before the battle, North Korea had just one understrength division in the city, with the majority of its forces south of the capital. MacArthur personally oversaw the 1st Marine Regiment as it fought through North Korean positions on the road to Seoul. Control of Operation Chromite was then given to Major General Edward Almond, the X Corps commander. General Almond was in an enormous hurry to capture Seoul by September 25, exactly three months of the North Korean assault across the 38th parallel. On September 22, the Marines entered Seoul to find it heavily fortified. Casualties mounted as the forces engaged in desperate house-to-house fighting. Anxious to pronounce the conquest of Seoul, Almond declared the city liberated on September 25 despite the fact that Marines were still engaged in house-to-house combat. This U.S. Marine Corps history provides unique information about an important aspect of the Korean War. Subjects covered in this history include: the 1st Marine Division; Major General Oliver P. Smith; Seoul/Wonsan campaign; aerial medical evacuation; close air support in the recapture of Seoul; marine combat vehicles; Bushmaster; 1950 street fighting.

Making history useful to the reader - this is one of the missions of the Combat Studies Institute. We strive to produce works that recount historical events to inform decision makers and to enable experiential learning. This collection of events put together by John McGrath, which occurred in Iraq during the 2003-2005 timeframe, addresses that mission. The authors largely used primary source material - interviews and unit histories - to develop these vignettes and in doing so have made the works relatable not only to Soldiers who experienced similar situations but to any reader who can imagine themselves having to function in these types of situations. We honor those involved in these actions and hope that by recounting their stories others may not only recognize them for their service but may also learn and grow from their experience. This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in 2006 with the publication of "In Contact " by the Combat Studies Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study methodology commonly found in military literature. The final version of "Between the Rivers," instead of following this strict case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders in Iraq in 2003-2005. The present volume lies directly within the tradition of these predecessor works on small-unit actions. Since the fall of2001, the United States Army, along with the other American armed services, has been engaged in military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because the current conflict has so many different fronts and facets, no handful of small- unit case studies could do justice to such a complex tapestry of events. This book thus represents a volume that showcases the American soldier in combat operations within the context of the Global War on Terrorism/The Long War. This series of five case studies is drawn from events in Iraq. Four of the studies discuss combat operations within a counterinsurgency framework at the company and battalion levels. The final case study presents a deployment dilemma facing a brigade-level task force commander when he was asked to replace a whole division in the same geographical space. In each case, the story is derived from oral interviews and key documents and is fully annotated. The primary purpose for presenting these vignettes is to provide a vicarious education in what future participants will face as the War on Terrorism continues and beyond.

Eyewitness to War Oral History Series: Eyewitness to War The US Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History is a unique publication for the Combat Studies Institute. This study is a derivative of the CSI Operational Leadership Experience (OLE) project, a program that collects and archives first-person experiences from the Global War on Terror. It can also be considered a companion to the recently published CSI Occasional Paper #20: Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Interviews collected for the OLE project formed the basis for that occasional paper and were so compelling, we felt a need to publish those interviews in a book series. In November 2004, the second battle for Fallujah was a brutal and bloody fight so characteristic of urban terrain. Under the overall command of the 1st Marine Division, four Marine infantry and two US Army battalions (Task Forces 2-2 Infantry and 2-7 Cavalry) were committed to the streets of Fallujah. At this same time, the Army's 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division formed a cordon to hold and isolate the insurgents in the city. Using the fi repower and mobility of the Army's heavy armor and mechanized units to full effect, the Marine Regimental Combat Teams were successful in destroying the enemy and securing Fallujah in ten days. Eyewitness to War interviews span a wide spectrum of participants, from commanders and senior non-commissioned officers at all levels to the first-hand accounts of combat and combat service support personnel on the battlefield. We make no claim that this history is a comprehensive work, as these 37 people are but a fraction of the thousands who took part in the operation. This is primarily an Army oral history, though one of the Marine Regimental Commanders agreed to provide his story. The USMC bore the brunt of fighting in Fallujah and this study does not attempt to overlook their tremendous accomplishments. The individuals featured in this work volunteered to work with our staff over many months. Their stories are a tremendous testimony to the skill, flexibility, and bravery of the US Army today. This collection of personal experiences is the raw material history is made of. It is a riveting and useful way to study the past. And it is our hope that the insights derived from their roles in the second battle for Fallujah will better prepare the US Army for tomorrow's endeavors.