The city of an-Najaf, Iraq, is a provincial and market center located on the western branch of the Euphrates River approximately 100 miles south of Baghdad. Its population (prewar) of 563,000 expands at times with pilgrims to this important center of Islamic scholarship and theology. It is the location of several significant shrines for Shi'a Muslims and boasts one of the largest cemeteries in the world. Its more recent history has been marked by conflict of a political nature as the place of exile for Ayatollah Khomeini and site of the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq. It served as the location of Shi'a resistance to perceived political oppression and was a place of battle once more in 2004. This is a "battle study" written purposely from the perspective of the Marines, soldiers, and sailors who fought at an-Najaf in August 2004. Some context is needed to fit these events within the evolution of the campaigning in Iraq in 2004. The Americans deployed to al-Anbar and an-Najaf Provinces, faced a variety of threats as Iraq attempted to again govern itself. Threats were from disparate sources, including Sunni fighters in Fallujah and Shi'a fighters in Najaf. Behind each was the possibility of al-Qaeda in Iraq or criminal exploitation of any disruption of Coalition efforts to establish responsible Iraqi Government. This complexity of threats did not lend itself to easy solutions. In March 2004, Lieutenant General James T. Conway's I Marine Expeditionary Force was faced with an outbreak of Sunni insurgency in Fallujah. At the same time, a Shi'a uprising took place across Iraq, including Baghdad, Najaf, an-Nasiriyah, al-Kut, al-Amarah, and Kirkuk. The fighting spread to Karbala, Hillah, and Basrah with attacks on Iraqi and Coalition outposts. This fighting dropped off in June with the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, but the menace of further violence remained. The Multi-National Force-Iraq, under General George W. Casey Jr., USA, felt that before the Iraqis could be responsible for security in each province, the centers of violence had to be dealt with by a "clear-hold-build" approach. Baghdad, Fallujah, and Najaf were thus targeted. When Muqtada al-Sadr fomented another uprising in August, the recently arrived 11thMarine Expeditionary Unit found itself assigned to quell the uprising in Najaf. It would be reinforced for this effort by two U.S. Army and four Iraqi Army battalions. The narrative that follows documents this effort from the small unit level. The importance of the close relationship between political and military force is emphasized. The intent is to provide a view of combat for the education and training of Marines who might face similar circumstances.

The Battle of Pusan Perimeter was a large-scale battle between United Nations and North Korean forces lasting from August 4 to September 18, 1950. It was one of the first major engagements of the Korean War. An army of 140,000 UN troops, having been pushed to the brink of defeat, were rallied to make a final stand against the invading North Korean army, 98,000 men strong. UN forces, having been repeatedly defeated by the advancing North Koreans, were forced back to the "Pusan Perimeter," a 140-mile (230 km) defensive line around an area on the southeastern tip of the Korean Peninsula that included the port of Pusan. The UN troops, consisting mostly of forces of the Republic of Korea Army (ROK), United States Army, and British Army, mounted a last stand around the perimeter, fighting off repeated North Korean attacks for six weeks as they were engaged around the cities of Taegu, Masan, and P'ohang, and the Naktong River. The massive North Korean assaults were unsuccessful in forcing the United Nations troops back further from the perimeter, despite two major pushes in August and September. North Korean troops, hampered by supply shortages and massive losses, continually staged attacks on UN forces in an attempt to penetrate the perimeter and collapse the line. However, the UN used the port to amass an overwhelming advantage in troops, equipment, and logistics, and its navy and air forces remained unchallenged by the North Koreans during the fight. After six weeks, the North Korean force collapsed and retreated in defeat after the UN force launched a counterattack at Inchon on September 15. The battle would be the furthest the North Korean troops would advance in the war, as subsequent fighting ground the war into a stalemate.

Illusrated with full color maps and photographs. U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism series. Covers the combat service support operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom between November 2002 and October 2003. Tells a story of reorganization, preparation, and execution by the 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups.

This monograph is an account of the activities of the Marines and units of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in support of the I Marine Expeditionary Force's efforts to liberate Kuwait. This document is part of a preliminary series of official Marine Corps histories that cover Marine Corps operations in the Gulf War. On 2 September 1990, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing took command of Marine aviation forces ashore from a Marine composite aircraft group, which had hurriedly been moved to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Desert Shield. The wing would grow to be the largest deployed in Marine Corps history. It would fly more than 10 different types of aircraft from eight airfield sites that required laying more than 4.5 million square feet of ramps, landing, and taxiing areas. In addition, the wing and its support groups would construct six 3,000-man base camps and establish a Marine Air Command and Control System that would operate across four countries in a joint and combined arena. When Operation Desert Storm began, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing was ready and provided more than 18,000 fixed-wing and helicopter sorties in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force's mission of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The Diary of a U.S. Soldier in Germany by Cpl. John Tomikel is a historical document. It describes the life of a soldier in the occupation of West Germany and its relationship to East Europe controlled by the Soviet Union. The Korean War is in progress. The daily life of the soldier and the contacts with German civilians are noted. Halfway through his tour of duty, John is joined by his wife. They rent a room in the city of Wiesbaden and mingle with the natives. John is able to join his wife on most weekends and they enjoy the cultural offerings of the city as well as trips to different areas. This is an excellent documentary of the time and place as well as the life of a soldier. Two momentous events occurred during this time period, the death of Josef Stalin and the cease-fire in the Korean War. This is an interesting adventure as well as a historical document.

Rarely is it a good idea for any field of human endeavor to be dominated by a single theory aimed at addressing a pressing problem. However, such dominance has recently occurred in the American approach to counterinsurgency warfare. In recent years, driven by the perceived failures in the American war in Iraq, the United States military, and in particular the United States Army, has determined that when it comes to counterinsurgency, the population-centric approach is the only way to go. The population-centric approach dominates the Army's capstone manual on Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, a document published in late 2006 in order to help redress shortcomings in fighting the war in Iraq.1 The driving force behind the manual, General David Petraeus, took the principles contained therein with him to Iraq, applied them during the famous surge of 2007-2008, and ultimately turned that war around. According to this popular account, the population-centric approach had been vindicated, and it became something of received truth about how to prosecute counterinsurgency.

Since Vietnam, we have come to realize that today's con icts involve more than victory in battle to succeed. We need to win the hearts and minds of the people as well as the re ghts in order to prevail. Ironically, Marines get this. Their legendary courage and tenacity on the battle eld is equally matched by their compassion and engagement with the traumatized civilian population. Marine General Jim Mattis summed it up best when he said, "We can be your worst enemy or your best friend."

From the award-winning co-author of I Am Malala, this book asks just how the might of NATO, with 48 countries and 140,000 troops on the ground, failed to defeat a group of religious students and farmers? How did it go so wrong? Twenty-seven years ago, Christina Lamb left Britain to become a journalist in Pakistan. She crossed the Hindu Kush into Afghanistan with mujaheddin fighting the Russians and fell unequivocally in love with this fierce country of pomegranates and war, a relationship which has dominated her adult life. Since 2001, Lamb has watched with incredulity as the West fought a war with its hands tied, committed too little too late, failed to understand local dynamics and turned a blind eye as their Taliban enemy was helped by their ally Pakistan. Farewell Kabul tells how success was turned into defeat in the longest war fought by the United States in its history and by Britain since the Hundred Years War. It has been a fiasco which has left Afghanistan still one of the poorest nations on earth, the Taliban undefeated, and nuclear armed Pakistan perhaps the most dangerous place on earth. With unparalleled access to all key decision-makers in Afghanistan, Pakistan, London and Washington, from heads of state and generals as well as soldiers on the ground, Farewell Kabul tells how this happened. In Afghanistan, Lamb has travelled far beyond Helmand - from the caves of Tora Bora in the south to the mountainous bad lands of Kunar in the east; from Herat, city of poets and minarets in the west, to the very poorest province of Samangan in the north. She went to Guantanamo, met Taliban in Quetta, visited jihadi camps in Pakistan and saw bin Laden's house just after he was killed. Saddest of all, she met women who had been made role models by the West and had then been shot, raped or forced to flee the country. This deeply personal book not only shows the human cost of political failure but explains how short-sighted encouragement of jihadis to fight the Russians, followed by prosecution of ill-thoughtout wars, has resulted in the spread of terrorism throughout the Islamic world.

Eyewitness to War Oral History Series: Eyewitness to War The US Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History is a unique publication for the Combat Studies Institute. It is our first publication to make exclusive use of oral history. This study is a derivative of the CSI Operational Leadership Experiences (OLE) project, a program that collects and archives first-person experiences from the Global War on Terror. It can also be considered a companion to the recently published CSI Occasional Paper #20: Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Interviews collected for the OLE project formed the basis for that occasional paper and were so compelling, we felt a need to publish those interviews in a book series. In November 2004, the second battle for Fallujah was a brutal and bloody fight so characteristic of urban terrain. Under the overall command of the 1st Marine Division, four Marine infantry and two US Army battalions (Task Forces 2-2 Infantry and 2-7 Cavalry) were committed to the streets of Fallujah. At this same time, the Army's 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division formed a cordon to hold and isolate the insurgents in the city. Using the fi repower and mobility of the Army's heavy armor and mechanized units to full effect, the Marine Regimental Combat Teams were successful in destroying the enemy and securing Fallujah in ten days. Eyewitness to War interviews span a wide spectrum of participants, from commanders and senior non-commissioned officers at all levels to the first-hand accounts of combat and combat service support personnel on the battlefield. We make no claim that this history is a comprehensive work, as these 37 people are but a fraction of the thousands who took part in the operation. This is primarily an Army oral history, though one of the Marine Regimental Commanders agreed to provide his story. The USMC bore the brunt of fighting in Fallujah and this study does not attempt to overlook their tremendous accomplishments. The individuals featured in this work volunteered to work with our staff over many months. Their stories are a tremendous testimony to the skill, flexibility, and bravery of the US Army today. This collection of personal experiences is the raw material history is made of. It is a riveting and useful way to study the past. And it is our hope that the insights derived from their roles in the second battle for Fallujah will better prepare the US Army for tomorrow's endeavors.

There is a crossroads near Safwan in southeastern Iraq. Nearby, there is a small hill and an airstrip. After the Gulf War, Safwan became a gathering point for refugees fleeing the Iraqi Army as it reestablished control of Basrah. Prior to that, the airstrip was the site of the dictation of armistice terms to that army by the victorious coalition's military high command. Still earlier, at the end of the coalition attack, the absence of American forces on the airstrip and at the road junction was the source of the most serious command crisis of the U.S. expeditionary forces. Its resolution put at risk American soldiers and threatened the reputations of the very commanders who had just conducted the greatest offensive of concentrated armored forces in the history of the United States Army. In many ways, events at Safwan in late February and early March are emblematic of the Gulf War. It is to explain how U.S. forces arrived at Safwan, what they did and did not do there, and what this all meant, that this book is written. The Gulf War was an undoubted success. It was also a war of clear, sharp contrasts. Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait was an obvious wrong that begged for setting right. Saddam's stranglehold on much of the world's proven oil reserves presented a clear and present danger to Western interests, and his wanton attack on Kuwait posed a clear threat to his Arab brothers. Moreover, Saddam's own ineptness in dealing with the crisis ensured the unity of the global community against him unless the diplomatic effort to resolve the situation was seriously mishandled. It was altogether a war of the old comfortable sort-good against evil, a wrong to be righted-a crusade. It was for all that a difficult strategic and operational challenge for the American armed forces, which at first found themselves badly out of position. Though freed of the Soviet threat, U.S. forces were still deployed along the inter-German border and, half a world away, in the continental United States. Saddam was able to snap up Kuwait before Western military forces could intervene. In early August 1990, there was much to be done and precious little time in which to do it. It was a long road to the greatly unbalanced victory on the last day of February in 1991. The purpose of this book is to provide an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. Like all contemporary history, this is written in one respect to provide work for revisionists. That is to say, it is written from the evidence at hand and from the author's observations as the Third Army historian. This book's focus is on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force schwerpunkt-General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." The book is titled "Lucky War" after the affectation of Third Army, whose telephone switch, as far back as General George Patton's World War II headquarters, has been named "Lucky." In the same fashion, the Third Army's tactical operations center in Desert Storm was referred to as "Lucky TOC." Its forward command post was "Lucky Wheels," and so on. "Lucky" is a talisman to Third Army as, incidentally, are "Jay Hawk" to VII Corps, and "Danger" to the 1st Infantry Division. It is for that reason alone that "Lucky" is incorporated in the title.

In 1991, at the start of the first Gulf War, I was as a 4th year medical student in Paris France on a general surgery rotation. Little did I know that fifteen years later, as I cared for Iraqi - civilians, military, terrorists who would have killed us given the chance, the words of Dr. Jean Louis Paille would echo in my mind - "Patient care trumps politics every time... Every time." Under fire and under pressure in Balad, Iraq, Lt. Col Jay T. Bishoff, a United States Air Force surgeon, gives a first-hand account of the war in Iraq through unique photographic images and his personal encounters in his new book, Boots of War. Dr. Bishoff recounts true stories from the 332 EMDG Hospital in Balad Iraq when it was the busiest trauma center in the world. While insurgents launched mortar and rocket attacks onto the Balad, Iraq Air base an average of seven times a day, medical personnel continually cared for critically injured U.S. and coalition soldiers, Iraqi nationals and even the rocket firing insurgents themselves. Full of laughter and tears, these modern-day war stories are unforgettable accounts of Operation Iraqi Freedom, its human cost, and its moral lessons.

The first comprehensive look at youth living in a country attempting to rebuild itself after three decades of civil conflict, Children of Afghanistan relies on the research and fieldwork of twenty-one experts to cover an incredible range of topics. Focusing on the full scope of childhood, from birth through young adulthood, this edited volume examines a myriad of issues: early childhood socialization in war and peace; education, literacy, vocational training, and apprenticeship; refugee life; mental and physical health, including disabilities and nutrition; children's songs, folktales, and art; sports and play; orphans; life on the streets; child labor and children as family breadwinners; child soldiers and militarization; sexual exploitation; growing up in prison; marriage; family violence; and other issues vital to understanding, empowerment, and transformation. Children of Afghanistan is the first volume that not only attempts to analyze the range of challenges facing Afghan children across class, gender, and region but also offers solutions to the problems they face. With nearly half of the population under the age of fifteen, the future of the country no doubt lies with its children. Those who seek peace for the region must find solutions to the host of crises that have led the United Nations to call Afghanistan "the worst place on earth to be born." The authors of Children of Afghanistan provide child-centered solutions to rebuilding the country's cultural, social, and economic institutions.