It's 1952. Marines have been fighting in Korea for just over 2 years. The daring execution of the Inchon Landing, if not forgotten, might as well have been. For instead of conducting amphibious assaults and moving rapidly though North Korean forces, the Marines of the Ist Marine Division are fighting along a main line of resistance (MLR)-outpost warfare-static warfare that consisted of slugfests between artillery and mortars, but always the infantryman moving in small groups attacking and reattacking the same ground.

Illusrated with full color maps and photographs. U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism series. Covers the combat service support operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom between November 2002 and October 2003. Tells a story of reorganization, preparation, and execution by the 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups.

The Diary of a U.S. Soldier in Germany by Cpl. John Tomikel is a historical document. It describes the life of a soldier in the occupation of West Germany and its relationship to East Europe controlled by the Soviet Union. The Korean War is in progress. The daily life of the soldier and the contacts with German civilians are noted. Halfway through his tour of duty, John is joined by his wife. They rent a room in the city of Wiesbaden and mingle with the natives. John is able to join his wife on most weekends and they enjoy the cultural offerings of the city as well as trips to different areas. This is an excellent documentary of the time and place as well as the life of a soldier. Two momentous events occurred during this time period, the death of Josef Stalin and the cease-fire in the Korean War. This is an interesting adventure as well as a historical document.

Since Vietnam, we have come to realize that today's con icts involve more than victory in battle to succeed. We need to win the hearts and minds of the people as well as the re ghts in order to prevail. Ironically, Marines get this. Their legendary courage and tenacity on the battle eld is equally matched by their compassion and engagement with the traumatized civilian population. Marine General Jim Mattis summed it up best when he said, "We can be your worst enemy or your best friend."

Rarely is it a good idea for any field of human endeavor to be dominated by a single theory aimed at addressing a pressing problem. However, such dominance has recently occurred in the American approach to counterinsurgency warfare. In recent years, driven by the perceived failures in the American war in Iraq, the United States military, and in particular the United States Army, has determined that when it comes to counterinsurgency, the population-centric approach is the only way to go. The population-centric approach dominates the Army's capstone manual on Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, a document published in late 2006 in order to help redress shortcomings in fighting the war in Iraq.1 The driving force behind the manual, General David Petraeus, took the principles contained therein with him to Iraq, applied them during the famous surge of 2007-2008, and ultimately turned that war around. According to this popular account, the population-centric approach had been vindicated, and it became something of received truth about how to prosecute counterinsurgency.

The first comprehensive look at youth living in a country attempting to rebuild itself after three decades of civil conflict, Children of Afghanistan relies on the research and fieldwork of twenty-one experts to cover an incredible range of topics. Focusing on the full scope of childhood, from birth through young adulthood, this edited volume examines a myriad of issues: early childhood socialization in war and peace; education, literacy, vocational training, and apprenticeship; refugee life; mental and physical health, including disabilities and nutrition; children's songs, folktales, and art; sports and play; orphans; life on the streets; child labor and children as family breadwinners; child soldiers and militarization; sexual exploitation; growing up in prison; marriage; family violence; and other issues vital to understanding, empowerment, and transformation. Children of Afghanistan is the first volume that not only attempts to analyze the range of challenges facing Afghan children across class, gender, and region but also offers solutions to the problems they face. With nearly half of the population under the age of fifteen, the future of the country no doubt lies with its children. Those who seek peace for the region must find solutions to the host of crises that have led the United Nations to call Afghanistan "the worst place on earth to be born." The authors of Children of Afghanistan provide child-centered solutions to rebuilding the country's cultural, social, and economic institutions.

The first comprehensive look at youth living in a country attempting to rebuild itself after three decades of civil conflict, Children of Afghanistan relies on the research and fieldwork of twenty-one experts to cover an incredible range of topics. Focusing on the full scope of childhood, from birth through young adulthood, this edited volume examines a myriad of issues: early childhood socialization in war and peace; education, literacy, vocational training, and apprenticeship; refugee life; mental and physical health, including disabilities and nutrition; children's songs, folktales, and art; sports and play; orphans; life on the streets; child labor and children as family breadwinners; child soldiers and militarization; sexual exploitation; growing up in prison; marriage; family violence; and other issues vital to understanding, empowerment, and transformation.

Children of Afghanistan is the first volume that not only attempts to analyze the range of challenges facing Afghan children across class, gender, and region but also offers solutions to the problems they face. With nearly half of the population under the age of fifteen, the future of the country no doubt lies with its children. Those who seek peace for the region must find solutions to the host of crises that have led the United Nations to call Afghanistan "the worst place on earth to be born." The authors of Children of Afghanistan provide child-centered solutions to rebuilding the country's cultural, social, and economic institutions.

A summary of the author's experiences in armored recon with the 89th Medium Tank Battalion (a unit attached to the 25th Infantry Division) during the Korean War. Includes comments about the author's early life, his duty in Japan, and how he met his wife-to-be before the war. Also remarks about young men committed to action with limited training, but with a resilience that enabled them to prevent the North Koreans from taking over South Korea.

"Train Wreckers and Ghost Killers" discusses the contributions the British Marines and the Korean Marines made to the Allied Forces in the Korean War. In praise of the British Royal Marines that had been attached to his command since mid-November 1950, Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, wrote that their services in the recently concluded Chosin Reservoir campaign made "a significant contribution to the holding of Hagaru, which was vital to the 1st Marine] Division." General Smith's comments reflected the view held by many Marines, both officers and enlisted, of the fighting abilities of both their British cousins and their Republic of Korea Marine Corps allies. During the three years they fought together on the Korean peninsula, the British, Korean, and U.S. Marines forged bonds that still exist today.

The first major surprise of the post World War II years came into play when in late June 1950, the United States found itself responding in crisis fashion to the North Korean invasion of the new republic of South Korea, just four years and nine months after VJ-Day. The nation became involved in Korea as a result of the Cairo and Yalta conferences in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the concept of a free and independent post-war Korea.

The book is part of the Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series. It depicts the Marine involvement in the events from the Nevada Battles to the Armistice.

Since reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan began in 2001, the U.S. government, the international community, and the Afghan government have made improving Afghanistan's justice system a priority. Key documents have noted the importance of the justice sector, including the U.S. government's Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan and the Afghan Government's National Priority Programs focus on strengthening Afghan rule of law and Afghan citizens' access to justice. The Department of State (State) has invested in a variety of rule of law programs since 2005, including programs managed by its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to train Afghan justice sector personnel. State also serves as the lead coordinator for U.S. justice sector development efforts in Afghanistan, responsible for coordinating the activities of several U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Justice. INL has spent approximately $205.5 million on its Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) to provide training to Afghan justice sector officials, to develop a case management system to track cases throughout Afghanistan's justice system, and to build the capacity and administrative skills of officials within Afghan ministries

This monograph is a preliminary accounting of the role of the U.S. Marine Corps' senior command in the Persian Gulf conflict from 8 August 1990 to 16 April 1991. It is one of a series covering the operations of the 1st Marine Division; the 2d Marine Division; the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; Combat Service Support Element, comprised of 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups units; Marines afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq and Turkey.

On Sunday, 25 June 1950, Communist North Korea unexpectedly invaded its southern neighbor, the American-backed Republic of Korea (ROK). The poorly equipped ROK Army was no match for the well prepared North Korean People's Army (NKPA) whose armored spearheads quickly thrust across the 38th Parallel. The stunned world helplessly looked on as the out-numbered and outgunned South Koreans were quickly routed. With the fall of the capital city of Seoul imminent, President Harry S. Truman ordered General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, in Tokyo, to immediately pull all American nationals in South Korea out of harm's way. During the course of the resultant noncombatant evacuation operations an unmanned American transport plane was destroyed on the ground and a flight of U.S. Air Force aircraft were buzzed by a North Korean Air Force plane over the Yellow Sea without any shots being fired. On 27 July, an American combat air patrol protecting Kimpo Airfield near the South Korean capital actively engaged menacing North Korean planes and promptly downed three of the five Soviet-built Yak fighters. Soon thereafter American military forces operating under the auspices of the United Nations Command (UNC) were committed to thwart a Communist takeover of South Korea. Thus, only four years and nine months after V-J Day marked the end of World War II, the United States was once again involved in a shooting war in Asia.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched and led military operations in Afghanistan in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda's use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. Many observers argue that in succeeding years, as U.S. and world attention shifted sharply to the war in Iraq, the Afghan war became the "other war" and suffered from neglect. The Obama Administration, however, has made the war in Afghanistan a higher priority, by giving it early attention, regularly conducting strategy reviews, and making significant additional commitments of civilian and military resources. By early 2011, senior leaders, including the Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General David Petraeus, were pointing to discrete progress on the ground, though noting that such progress was still "fragile and reversible." In late 2010, NATO and the Afghan government agreed to pursue a key medium-term goal: the transition of lead responsibility for security to Afghans throughout the country by the end of 2014. The U.S. government has stated its intention to begin drawing down some U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July 2011, and also to maintain a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014. Strategic vision for Afghanistan is still, many would argue, a work in progress. President Karzai has consistently stressed the theme of "Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership." President Obama has consistently stressed the core goals of the United States: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return. Yet for the U.S. government, fundamental issues remain unresolved. These include: determining the minimum essential conditions required for Afghanistan itself to be able to sustain stability with relatively limited international support; defining the appropriate combination of U.S. efforts, together with other international resources, over time, required to achieve those minimum conditions; and balancing U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and the region against other imperatives, in a constrained fiscal environment. This report, which will be updated as events warrant, describes and analyzes the key players in the war in Afghanistan; the strategic outlooks of the Afghan government, the U.S. government, and NATO; the threats to the security and stability of the Afghan state and its people; the major facets of the current effort: security, governance and anti-corruption, development, reconciliation and reintegration, and transition; mechanisms in place to measure progress; and critical issues that Congress may wish to consider further.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) overthrew Saddam's regime and opened up one of the world's most secretive governments to outside analysis, presenting a once-in-a-generation opportunity for military leaders and historians to delve deep into the decision-making processes of a former adversary. For the first time since a similar project at the end of World War II, we have an opportunity to evaluate military events from not only our own vantage point but also from the perspective of the opposing political and military leadership. Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani originated this vital and interesting work when he was Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). As part of a major effort to ensure we fully understood the lessons of OIF, he commissioned a comprehensive analysis of US strengths and weaknesses. This first-of-its-kind venture was led by Brigadier General Robert W. Cone, the then-Director of USJFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned (JCOA). Almost as soon as this effort got underway in the spring of 2003, Admiral Giambastiani realized that the study would not be complete unless information about what drove the Iraqis to make the decisions they did was fully integrated into the analysis. To accomplish this, project leader Kevin Woods led a small team of professionals in a systematic two-year study of the former Iraqi regime and military. This book is the fi rst major product of that effort. It presents a comprehensive historical analysis of the forces and motivations that drove our opponent's decisions through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders and by making extensive use of thousands of official Iraqi documents. Kevin and his team have crafted a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process. Moreover, it goes a long way towards revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from the insiders' point of view. Presented herein is crucial information currently missing from still ongoing analyses of OIF, and much of its content will counter currently accepted wisdom. While the practice of self-critique and gathering lessons learned are distinguishing features of the US military, in almost every past instance our understanding of events remained incomplete because any assessment was limited to a "blue" only view of the situation. While we often had a relatively complete picture of what our adversary did, we remained in the dark as to what motivated his actions. At the conclusion of past conflicts, we were left to speculate which of our actions were causing specific enemy responses and why. Expert analysts and "red team" assessments attempt to make this speculation as informed as possible, but because of the impenetrability of closed regimes, even their usefulness is somewhat limited. In this case, however, by adding the actual "red team's view" to the compilation of multiple, differing viewpoints, this study hopes to contribute to a more fully developed history of the war, and allow all concerned to get closer to "ground truth." General Lance Smith, the current USJFCOM Commander, and the JCOA team remain committed to this and similar projects as part of an ongoing process of learning and improving through the sharing of "ground truth." Though this project is an important initial step, we acknowledge the history of OIF is far from complete. Researchers continue to locate, translate, and analyze information that will shed new light on our former adversary's perspective of the conflict. It is in the interest of getting as much accurate information as possible into the hands of those already studying Operation Iraqi Freedom that we release this book.