"All Good Men" was written to chronicle the experiences of a young lieutenant from the time he joined the First Artillery Battalion to fight in the Korean War in August 1950 until he returned home in December 1951. He describes in gripping detail his days as a forward observer in the Naktong Bulge during the searing heat of August, his exploits as a reconnaissance officer from the Pusan Perimeter through the dash to the Yalu River, his contribution as Assistant Operations Officer to the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion, and his days as a unit commander when he rebuilt his firing battery from scratch after losing most of his experienced personnel. With his untested unit he supported the final advance of the 21st Infantry Regiment 30 miles north of the 38th Parallel in October 1951. The author pays tribute to the men who gave their lives fighting in the stinking rice paddies and frozen hills of that unforgiving land under the harsh conditions of ground combat. His poignant comment is still true today. "They could stand tall in any nation's hall of heroes. They were all good men."

This is the dramatic, fully-researched and definitive account of the war that almost destroyed Israel: the Yom Kippur War. Launched by Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and his primary ally, Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad, on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, the sudden attack took the Israeli Defense Force totally by surprise. Here you will discover how such a colossal intelligence blunder -- one that almost caused the destruction of Israel -- happened. It is a story of incredible courage and bravery of the soldiers on both sides, of the high-stakes diplomatic battles waged by the UN, the United States, and the Soviet Union, even as troops and pilots from Israel and the nine Arab states attacking it shed their blood on the desert sands.

As the first full-length study of conspiracy theories in the Middle East, The Hidden Hand reveals how such theories play a powerful role in the political life of the region. Placing conspiracy theories in their historical context, Daniel Pipes shows how the idea of the conspiracy has come to suffuse life in the Middle East, from the most private family conversations to the highest and most public levels of politics. Pipes then looks at conspiracies and their strength as a partial explanation for much of the region’s problems, including its record of political extremism, its culture of violence, and its lack of modernization. Concluding with speculations about the future of conspiracy theories, Pipes provides a key to understanding the often complicated political culture of the Middle East.

In Shadows and Wind, Robert Templer paints a fascinating and fresh picture of a country usually viewed with hazy nostalgia or deep suspicion. Here is Hanoi, an increasingly tense and troubled city approaching its millennium but uncertain of its direction. Here are people emerging from a long wilderness of malnutrition, discovering a new lifestyle of leisure and luxury. And everywhere are the anomalies that burst the bubble of optimism: a vastly expensive luxury hotel sitting empty in an unknown town six hours from an international airport; museums crammed with fake exhibits. And there remains the one-party Communist state, still wrapped in secrecy and corruption, and making for an uneasy bedfellow with the rapacious capitalism it now encourages. Drawing on hundreds of interviews in Vietnam and years of research, Robert Templer has produced the first in-depth examination of the problems facing modern Vietnam. Shadows and Wind is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the Vietnam that now has emerged from a century of conflict with both foreign powers and with itself.

In this new analysis of democracy in Japan, Bradley Richardson refutes the widely accepted hypothesis that postwar Japan has been a semiauthoritarian and consensual state, heavily influenced by corporations and led by the government bureaucracy. On the contrary, Richardson's extensive newspaper and documentary research shows that Japanese political life has been extremely fragmented and discordant at all levels - in the bureaucracy, legislatures, parties, and interest groups and in business and industry. In Japanese Democracy, Richardson explores power relations and demonstrates how Japan's political system is unlike Great Britain's and similar to those of the United States and Italy, where politics is decentralized and decisions are made at many levels. He draws some important conclusions: that Japan's postwar industrial policy has not always been successful, that the country is as much an economic welfare state as it is an economic "miracle", and that the lack of strong leadership has kept Japan from playing a more assertive role in the international arena. As in the United States, private interests hold central policymaking processes hostage, and weak leadership prevails.

This monograph presents a preliminary account of operations by the embarked Marine units under the operational control of the Commander, Naval Forces, Central Command, in the Persian Gulf from August 1990 to May 1991. It tells the story of the 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) and the 13th and 11th Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) which comprised the Marine Forces Afloat during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The term "Marine Forces Afloat" was chosen carefully because although each of these units served in the same theater of operations, they remained separate entities capable of rapidly integrating into a single force or breaking away to conduct independent operations as the situation required. The Marine Forces Afloat came into existence early in Operation Desert Shield when the seaborne 4th MEB joined the forward-deployed 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) in the North Arabian Sea in mid-September. These Marines were later joined by the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade during what would eventually become the longest continuous shipboard deployment by a brigade-sized force in Marine Corps history. For those Marines, the major events of Desert Shield were a series of large amphibious exercises, maritime interdiction operations, and a daring evacuation of the American Embassy at Mogadishu, Somalia. During Operation Desert Storm the U.S. amphibious threat created a strategic distraction that kept Saddam Hussein's attention focused away from the main attack; Marine Aircraft Group 40 flew the first-ever fixed-wing combat strike off an amphibious assault ship; the 13th MEU made two landings; the 4th MEB conducted amphibious demonstrations off the coast of Kuwait; and the 5th MEB participated in ground combat ashore. On its way home the 5th MEB joined Operation Sea Angel, the international humanitarian effort to assist Bangladesh in dealing with the devastation of Cyclone Marian. This work is one in a series of monographs written by members of Mobilization Training Unit (Historical) DC-7 who deployed to the Persian Gulf. The MTU is a Reserve unit composed of artists, historians, and museum specialists who support the activities of the History and Museums Division in peacetime and stand ready to deploy at a moment's notice in times of crisis. Members of the MTU have covered Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Persian Gulf), Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), Restore Hope (Somalia), Restore Democracy (Haiti), and Deny Flight (Bosnia).

This monograph is an account of the activities of the Marines and units of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in support of the I Marine Expeditionary Force's efforts to liberate Kuwait. This document is part of a preliminary series of official Marine Corps histories that cover Marine Corps operations in the Gulf War. On 2 September 1990, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing took command of Marine aviation forces ashore from a Marine composite aircraft group, which had hurriedly been moved to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Desert Shield. The wing would grow to be the largest deployed in Marine Corps history. It would fly more than 10 different types of aircraft from eight airfield sites that required laying more than 4.5 million square feet of ramps, landing, and taxiing areas. In addition, the wing and its support groups would construct six 3,000-man base camps and establish a Marine Air Command and Control System that would operate across four countries in a joint and combined arena. When Operation Desert Storm began, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing was ready and provided more than 18,000 fixed-wing and helicopter sorties in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force's mission of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This monograph is predominantly based on unit command chronologies, more than three dozen interviews with key participants, comments from key participants on the draft monograph, and other source documents available at the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

This monograph tells the story of the Marines and sailors of the 1St Force Service Support Group, the 2d Force Service Support Group, Marine Wing Support Group 37, and the 3d Naval Construction Regiment whose combined efforts gave the I Marine Expeditionary Force the ability to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. This document is part of a preliminary series of official Marine Corps histories that cover Marine Corps operations in the Gulf War. During the Persian Gulf crisis, the History and Museums Division sent a team to Saudi Arabia to produce first-hand accounts of unit operations. In November 1990, five Reserve officers from the Mobilization Training Unit (MTU) (History)-DC-7 arrived in Saudi Arabia, deployed to different commands, accompanied their units throughout the battle, and produced powerful narratives on the operations of I Marine Expeditionary Force, the 1st Marine Division, the 2d Marine Division, and Marine Forces Afloat. Unforeseen circumstances prevented a logistics history from being included in the series, so the Secretary of the Navy recalled Major Steven M. Zimmeck, USMC (Ret), to active duty to complete this account of Marine Corps combat service support in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This monograph is predominantly based upon documentation collected during and immediately after Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Unit command chronologies and interviews recorded by the Battlefield Assessment Team served as the basis of a comment edition which was sent out to key participants in the events depicted. These comments were then incorporated into the final narrative. This methodology produced a history that approaches the accuracy and vigor of the MTU's first-hand accounts. Please note that this manuscript was prepared using different files which contained missing pages. This was done to ensure that ALL of the pages from the original manuscript are intact.

These memoirs are not an attempt to answer, solve, or resolve the problems arising from or about the three-year-long Korean War or the much longer stalemate that followed. This story was written to let you know how one very young, very scared marine saw his very first war and how he reacted to the killing and the mayhem of it. The stories are my view of that war, a war gone to ground in the trench lines. Dig into the stories and you may find something you were not expecting.

I am well aware that my view of the Korean War has no historical importance. Still, it is my view, and I want to share it with you. I do not have a cause to plead or an ax to grind, and that alone ought to count for something. My memoirs are selective and most certainly tainted with time. My recollections are a lot like boot mines, and ought to be approached with caution.

I was a grunt, a Four Deuce forward observer, assigned to duty with a marine infantry company every time the 1st Marine Regiment went back up on line. During the time I was in Korea my boondockers were firmly planted in trench-line mud. When I came home in September 1952, I was proud that I had helped in the attempt to stop Communism in Korea. I was proud of all the men I served, and served with, and I was a little bit proud of myself, too.

On General Douglas MacArthur's orders, a force of 12,000 U.S. Marines were marching north to the Yalu river in late November 1950. These three regiments of the 1st Marine Division--strung out along eighty miles of a narrow mountain road--soon found themselves completely surrounded by 60,000 Chinese soldiers. Despite being given up for lost by the military brass, the 1st Marine Division fought its way out of the frozen mountains, miraculously taking thier dead and wounded with them as they ran the gauntlet of unceasing Chinese attacks. This is the gripping story that Martin Russ tells in his extraordinary book. Breakout is an unforgettable portrayal of the terror and courage of men as they face sudden death, making the bloody battles of the Korean hills and valleys come alive as they never have before.

"Remarkable...breathtaking in its scope and historical precision, this is highly recommended volume for both publivc and academic libraries.—Library Journal.

In 1950, just five years after the end of World War II, Britain and America again went to war--this time to try and combat the spread of communism in East Asia following the invasion of South Korea by communist forces from the North. This book charts the course of the UK-US 'special relationship' from the journey to war beginning in 1947 to the fall of the Labour government in 1951. Ian McLaine casts fresh light on relations between Truman and Attlee and their officials, diplomats and advisors, including Acheson and MacArthur. He shows how Britain was persuaded to join a war it could ill afford and was forced to rearm at great cost to the economy. The decision to participate in the war caused great strain to the Labour party--provoking the Bevan-Gaitskell split which was to keep the party out of office for the next decade. McLaine's revisionist study shows how disastrous the war was for the British--and for the Labour party in particular. It sheds important new light on UK-US relations during a key era in diplomatic and Cold War history.

"Hiking through peaceful villages in central Bali, we found it difficult to envision the fires of retribution that lit the island's skyline just four years ago". Thus in 1969 a reporter for National Geographic summed up the dilemma facing those who think about Bali. How can the bloody massacres that shook the island in the 1960s be reconciled with the pervasive view of Bali as an earthly paradise whose people live in harmony with nature and each other? Geoffrey Robinson explores this discrepancy, and in doing so exposes the multiple myths about Bali. His work offers the first thorough political history of this varied and complex island. Scrutinizing the Balinese experience under Dutch colonial rule and during the National Revolution (1945-1949), the Sukarno era (1950-1965), and the military coup and countercoup of 1965, "the year of living dangerously", Robinson discloses previously unexplored conflicts of class and culture which have permeated the island's recent history. He shows how the wide shifts in Balinese politics throughout this century - from the apparent harmony of the colonial period to the chronic violence of revolution and coup - are best understood by relating the island's social, cultural, and economic circumstances to the larger political environment, both national and international. A cogent explanation of Bali's troubled past and paradoxically untroubled reputation, this book is at once a unique history and a critique of popular and scholarly portrayals of modern Bali.

This monograph is a preliminary accounting of the role of the U.S. Marine Corps' senior command in the Persian Gulf conflict from 8 August 1990 to 16 April 1991. It is one of a series covering the operations of the 1st Marine Division; the 2d Marine Division; the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; Combat Service Support Element, comprised of 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups units; Marines afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq and Turkey.

In October 1973, the State of Israel was invaded by Egyptian and Syrian forces. Despite early losses, Israel managed to outfight its opponents. The brief and bloody Yom Kippur War stands as a unique chapter in modern military history. Fought primarily by tank units, the war became a story not only of battle strategy and tactics, but also one of human discipline, endurance and sacrifice.

While many historians have chronicled the events of the Yom Kippur War, few have been seasoned by actual combat. Avigdor Kahalani, commander of a tank battalion on the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War, describes this experience in "The Heights of Courage." Beginning with a description of the initial Syrian offensive, he recounts the personal endeavors of his men, their fears and their ambitions, as well as their emotional and physical hardships. His stark account traces the efforts of the Israel Armored Corps as they struggle to overcome extreme difficulties and setbacks. The author describes their ultimate penetration into enemy territory and their approach to within forty kilometers of Damascus.

Uncovering the secrets behind the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam, this is "a brutal, cautionary tale that serves as a painful reminder of the worst that can happen in war."—Chicago Tribune.

Military, social and economic historians have long appreciated the significance of the conflict in Korea in shaping the post-war world. The policy of containment was formed, China was established as an important military power, and the US increased its military expenditure fourfold as a result of a conflict which killed over 33,000 Americans. What has been less appreciated is the role played by the United Nations and the British Commonwealth in influencing US strategy at this time of crisis: the Truman administration invested time and effort into gaining UN approval for the conflict in Korea, and the course of the war was adapted to keep UN allies, often holding crucial strategic positions in other Cold War theatres, in tow. Robert Barnes develops a fresh perspective on these fluctuating relationships, the tensions between Washington and its British Commonwealth allies and their impact on the direction of the conflict in order to challenge the common view that the United States was able to use its dominant position within the UN to pursue its Cold War ambitions with impunity. This important new interpretation is supported by evidence from a wealth of sources, from official government records to private papers and memoirs written by the most important American and Commonwealth personalities directly involved in shaping the UN's response to the conflict. This study presents a thorough deconstruction of the decision-making process behind US handling of the Korean War from the outbreak of conflict in 1950 to the Geneva Conference of 1954. This will be essential reading for students of International Relations, Cold War Studies and modern History.

How the war in Vietnam came to represent the outer limits of feasible American intervention, how the working of the democratic process finally forced President Johnson to abandon a policy of escalation, and why the particular events of March 1968 signaled the end of an era constitute the subject matter of this prize-winning, firsthand account. As under secretary of the Air Force from October 1967 to February 1969, Townsend Hoopes had an insider s perspective on events. His book is both compelling memoir and searching historical inquiry. For this new paperback edition, Mr. Hoopes has written a supplemental chapter interpreting the final events of 1973-75 and assessing with masterful clarity the whole period of American involvement in Vietnam, from 1945 to 1975."

Owen W. Gilman Jr. stresses the US experience of war in the twenty-first century and argues that wherever and whenever there is war, there will be imaginative responses to it, especially the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the trauma of September 11, the experience of Americans at war has been rendered honestly and fully in a wide range of texts--creative nonfiction and journalism, film, poetry, and fiction. These responses, Gilman contends, have packed a lot of power and measure up even to World War II's literature and film. Like few other books, Gilman's volume studies these new texts-- among them Kevin Powers's debut novel The Yellow Birds and Phil Klay's short stories Redeployment, along with the films The Hurt Locker, American Sniper, and Billy Lynn's Long Halftime Walk. For perspective, Gilman also looks at some touchstones from the Vietnam War. Compared to a few of the big Vietnam books and films, this new material has mostly been read and watched by small audiences and generated less discussion. Gilman exposes the circumstances in American culture currently preventing literature and film of our recent wars from making a significant impact. He contends that Americans' inclination to demand distraction limits learning from these compelling responses to war in the past decade. According to Gilman, where there should be clarity and depth of knowledge, we instead face misunderstanding and the anguish endured by veterans betrayed by war and our lack of understanding.

The words of President Truman, General MacArthur, Senator McCarthy, President Eisenhower, and others, reporter's stories, and letters from soldiers shed light on the war, which began as a civil war between Korean nationalists and escalated into a struggle between the U.S. and Communist China, throwing America into the first major showdown of the Cold War.

THE GRIPPING FIRST-PERSON ACCOUNT OF BIN LADEN'S EXECUTION For the first time, read the first-hand account of the planning and execution of the extraordinary mission to kill the terrorist mastermind. No Easy Day puts readers inside the elite, handpicked twenty-four-man team known as SEAL Team Six as they train for the most important mission of their lives. From the crash of the Black Hawk helicopter that threatened the mission with disaster, to the radio call confirming their target was dead, the SEAL team raid on bin Laden's secret HQ is recounted in nail-biting second-by-second detail. Team leader Mark Owen takes readers behind enemy lines with one of the world's most astonishing fighting forces, in the only insider's account of their most spectacular mission. 'No Easy Day amounts to a cinematic account of the raid to kill Bin Laden: you feel as if you're sitting in the Black Hawk as it swoops in' NY Times 'A blistering first-hand account' The Sun

A timely lesson in the perils of nation-building and a sobering reminder of the limits of military power from the Costa Award winning author of The Volunteer. In its earliest days, the American-led war in Afghanistan appeared to be a triumph - a 'good war' in comparison to the debacle in Iraq. It has since turned into one of the longest and most expensive wars in recent history. The story of how this good war went so bad may well turn out to be a defining tragedy of the twenty-first century - yet, as acclaimed war correspondent Jack Fairweather explains, it should also give us reason to hope for an outcome grounded in Afghan reality. In The Good War, Fairweather provides the first full narrative history of the war in Afghanistan, from the 2001 invasion to the 2014 withdrawal. Drawing on hundreds of interviews, previously unpublished archives, and months of experience living and reporting in Afghanistan, Fairweather traces the course of the conflict from its inception after 9/11 to the drawdown in 2014. In the process, he explores the righteous intentions and astounding hubris that caused the West's strategy in Afghanistan to flounder, refuting the long-held notion that the war could have been won with more troops and cash. Fairweather argues that only by accepting the limitations in Afghanistan - from the presence of the Taliban to the ubiquity of poppy production to the country's inherent unsuitability for rapid, Western-style development - can we help to restore peace in this shattered land. The Good War leads readers from the White House Situation Room to Afghan military outposts, from warlords' palaces to insurgents' dens, to explain how the US and its British allies might have salvaged the Afghan campaign - and how we must rethink other 'good' wars in the future.