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Books > History > Asian / Middle Eastern history > From 1900 > Postwar, from 1945 > General
The Battle of Pusan Perimeter was a large-scale battle between
United Nations and North Korean forces lasting from August 4 to
September 18, 1950. It was one of the first major engagements of
the Korean War. An army of 140,000 UN troops, having been pushed to
the brink of defeat, were rallied to make a final stand against the
invading North Korean army, 98,000 men strong. UN forces, having
been repeatedly defeated by the advancing North Koreans, were
forced back to the "Pusan Perimeter," a 140-mile (230 km) defensive
line around an area on the southeastern tip of the Korean Peninsula
that included the port of Pusan. The UN troops, consisting mostly
of forces of the Republic of Korea Army (ROK), United States Army,
and British Army, mounted a last stand around the perimeter,
fighting off repeated North Korean attacks for six weeks as they
were engaged around the cities of Taegu, Masan, and P'ohang, and
the Naktong River. The massive North Korean assaults were
unsuccessful in forcing the United Nations troops back further from
the perimeter, despite two major pushes in August and September.
North Korean troops, hampered by supply shortages and massive
losses, continually staged attacks on UN forces in an attempt to
penetrate the perimeter and collapse the line. However, the UN used
the port to amass an overwhelming advantage in troops, equipment,
and logistics, and its navy and air forces remained unchallenged by
the North Koreans during the fight. After six weeks, the North
Korean force collapsed and retreated in defeat after the UN force
launched a counterattack at Inchon on September 15. The battle
would be the furthest the North Korean troops would advance in the
war, as subsequent fighting ground the war into a stalemate.
Early on the morning of January 17, 1991, the Persian Gulf War
began. It consisted of massive allied air strikes on Iraq and Iraqi
targets in Kuwait. The United States Air Force spearheaded the air
offensive and furnished the bulk of the attacking aircraft. During
forty-two days of fighting, the U.S. Air Force simultaneously
conducted two closely coordinated air campaigns: one in support of
allied ground forced; the other, attacking strategic targets.
Planners of the strategic air campaign sought to isolate and
incapacitate Saddam Hussein's government; gain and maintain air
supremacy to permit unhindered air operations; destroy Iraq's
nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities; and eliminate
Iraq's offensive military capability, which included its key
military production facilities, their infrastructure, and the
instruments it used to project its power - the Iraqi Air Force, the
Republican Guard, and short-range ballistic missiles. This study
develops background information to place the Persian Gulf War in
its proper historical and cultural contexts, unfamiliar to and not
easily understood by Americans. The first essay quickly summarizes
the relationship between Arab culture and Islam, the history of
Islam and the Arab conquests, and the creation of one of the flash
points in present-day Middle Eastern conflicts - the Arab-Jewish
dispute over Palestine. The second essay provides a military
analysis of the Arab-Israeli wars from 1948 to 1982. It describes
the performance of the engaged armed forces, the performance of
Western versus Soviet weapons systems, the development of the
respective forces' military professionalization, and the ability of
the warring parties to learn from their experiences. The final
three essays describe the recent history of the three regional
powers of the Persian Gulf - Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. In
addition to providing a detailed character analysis of Saddam
Hussein and a military analysis of the Iran-Iraq War, these final
sections examine the tension that arose in the three nations when
the desire for modernization confronted the demands of Islamic
conservatism.
This edited volume describes various analytic methods used by
intelligence analysts supporting military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan as members of the Iraq and Afghan Threat Finance
Cells-interagency intelligence teams tasked to disrupt terrorist
and insurgent funding. All contributors have deployed to Iraq
and/or Afghanistan and detail both the bureaucratic and
intellectual challenges in understanding terrorist and insurgent
finance networks and then designing operations to attack such
networks via conventional military operations, Special Forces
kill/capture targeting operations, and non-kinetic operations such
as asset freezing or diplomacy. The analytic methods described here
leverage both quantitative and qualitative methods, but in a
language and style accessible to those without a quantitative
background. All methods are demonstrated via actual case studies
(approved for release by the U.S. government) drawn from the
analysts' distinct experiences while deployed. This book will be of
interest to current or aspiring intelligence analysts, students of
security studies, anti-money laundering specialists in the private
sector, and more generally to those interested in understanding how
intelligence analysis feeds into live operations during wartime at
a very tactical level.
The initial conflicts in the Global War on Terrorism, Afghanistan
and Iraq, pose significant challenges for the armed forces of the
United States and its coalition allies. Among the challenges is the
use of field artillery in those campaigns that fall short of
conventional warfare. Engaged in a spectrum from full-scale combat
to stability and support operations, the military is faced with an
ever-changing environment in which to use its combat power. For
instance, it is axiomatic that the massive application of firepower
necessary to destroy targets in decisive phase III combat
operations is not necessary in phase IV stability operations.
However, the phasing of campaigns has become increasingly fluid as
operations shift from phase III to IV and back to phase III, or
activities in one portion of a country are in phase IV while in
another portion phase III operations rage. The challenges of this
environment are significant but not new. The US military has faced
them before, in places like the American West, the Philippines,
Latin America, Vietnam, and others. Dr. Larry Yates' study, Field
Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the
US Experience, captures the unique contributions of that branch in
a variety of operational experiences. In doing so, this work
provides the modern officer with a reference to the continuing
utility of field artillery in any future conflict. combat Studies
Institute.
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, the US Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has captured the experiences
of Soldiers as they conducted difficult operations across the world
in a variety of important ways. Historical accounts of the US
Army's campaigns play a critical role in this process by offering
insights from the past to assist Soldiers with their current-and
future-operational challenges. This volume, A Different Kind of
War, is the first comprehensive study of the US Army's experience
in Afghanistan during the first 4 years of Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF). The work focuses on Army operations in the larger
Joint and Coalition campaign that evolved between October 2001 and
September 2005. Beginning with a description of the successful
offensive against the Taliban regime, launched in late 2001 in
response to the attacks of 9/11, the book then shifts to the less
well-understood campaign that began in 2002 to establish a peaceful
and politically stable Afghanistan. A Different Kind of War is
balanced and honest. Its publication is particularly timely as both
the Army and the Department of Defense are beginning to reassess
and restructure the campaign in Afghanistan. This study will shed a
great deal of light on the overall course of OEF. As the title
suggests, the campaign in Afghanistan was unique. While its initial
phases featured the use of small teams of Special Operations Forces
and air power, the campaign after 2002 evolved into a broader
effort in which conventional forces were responsible for the
creation of security, reconstruction, and programs to train the
Afghan Army. Overall, the story in these pages is one of a
relatively small number of Soldiers conducting multifaceted
operations on difficult terrain and within a complex cultural
environment. A Different Kind of War was written in recognition of
all the men and women who served in Afghanistan to bring stability
and prosperity to that country while protecting the security of the
United States. Their experiences chronicled in this book will help
inform and educate all those who serve the Nation today and in the
future.
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