A timely lesson in the perils of nation-building and a sobering reminder of the limits of military power from the Costa Award winning author of The Volunteer. In its earliest days, the American-led war in Afghanistan appeared to be a triumph - a 'good war' in comparison to the debacle in Iraq. It has since turned into one of the longest and most expensive wars in recent history. The story of how this good war went so bad may well turn out to be a defining tragedy of the twenty-first century - yet, as acclaimed war correspondent Jack Fairweather explains, it should also give us reason to hope for an outcome grounded in Afghan reality. In The Good War, Fairweather provides the first full narrative history of the war in Afghanistan, from the 2001 invasion to the 2014 withdrawal. Drawing on hundreds of interviews, previously unpublished archives, and months of experience living and reporting in Afghanistan, Fairweather traces the course of the conflict from its inception after 9/11 to the drawdown in 2014. In the process, he explores the righteous intentions and astounding hubris that caused the West's strategy in Afghanistan to flounder, refuting the long-held notion that the war could have been won with more troops and cash. Fairweather argues that only by accepting the limitations in Afghanistan - from the presence of the Taliban to the ubiquity of poppy production to the country's inherent unsuitability for rapid, Western-style development - can we help to restore peace in this shattered land. The Good War leads readers from the White House Situation Room to Afghan military outposts, from warlords' palaces to insurgents' dens, to explain how the US and its British allies might have salvaged the Afghan campaign - and how we must rethink other 'good' wars in the future.

Following the release of Ridley Scott's Gladiator in 2000 the ancient world epic has experienced a revival in studio and audience interest. Building on existing scholarship on the Cold War epics of the 1950s-60s, including Ben-Hur, Spartacus and The Robe, this original study explores the current cycle of ancient world epics in cinema within the social and political climate created by September 11th 2001. Examining films produced against the backdrop of the War on Terror and subsequent invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, this book assesses the relationship between mainstream cinema and American society through depictions of the ancient world, conflict and faith. Davies explores how these films evoke depictions of the Second World War, the Vietnam War and the Western in portraying warfare in the ancient world, as well as discussing the influence of genre hybridisation, narration and reception theory. He questions the extent to which ancient world epics utilise allegory, analogy and allusion to parallel past and present in an industry often dictated by market forces. Featuring analysis of Alexander, Troy, 300, Centurion, The Eagle, The Passion of the Christ and more, this book offers new insight on the continued evolution of the ancient world epic in cinema.

Harry S. Truman Book Award In The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning, one of our most distinguished military historians argued that the conflict on the Korean peninsula in the middle of the twentieth century was first and foremost a war between Koreans that began in 1948. In the second volume of a monumental trilogy, Allan R. Millett now shifts his focus to the twelve-month period from North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, through the end of June 1951-the most active phase of the internationalized "Korean War." Moving deftly between the battlefield and the halls of power, Millett weaves together military operations and tactics without losing sight of Cold War geopolitics, strategy, and civil-military relations. Filled with new insights on the conflict, his book is the first to give combined arms its due, looking at the contributions and challenges of integrating naval and air power with the ground forces of United Nations Command and showing the importance of Korean support services. He also provides the most complete, and sympathetic, account of the role of South Korea's armed forces, drawing heavily on ROK and Korea Military Advisory Group sources. Millett integrates non-American perspectives into the narrative-especially those of Mao Zedong, Chinese military commander Peng Dehuai, Josef Stalin, Kim Il-sung, and Syngman Rhee. And he portrays Walton Walker and Matthew Ridgway as the heroes of Korea, both of whom had a more profound understanding of the situation than Douglas MacArthur, whose greatest flaw was not his politics but his strategic and operational incompetence. Researched in South Korean, Chinese, and Soviet as well as American and UN sources, Millett has exploited previously ignored or neglected oral history collections-including interviews with American and South Korean officers-and has made extensive use of reports based on interrogations of North Korean and Chinese POWs. The end result is masterful work that provides both a gripping narrative and a greater understanding of this key conflict in international and American history.

In June 2011, the hallways of the district government center in rural Dand District, Afghanistan hummed with activity, with scores of local village elders visiting offices to appeal for assistance and handouts. Outside, insurgents had been pushed out of the district and were confined to sporadic attacks along its fringes. Farmers sold their produce, thousands of children attended school and people voted in district elections. At the very heart of the Taliban insurgency, the government had won the war. However, the district faced a crisis that threatened its future. Resources were shrinking and the new government had concerns about remaining relevant to the people once America left. Within 12 months, Americans pulled out of Afghanistan, leaving the Afghan government to fail, undermining the achievements of thousands of soldiers and civilians. How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan: Two Years in the Pashtun Homeland by Douglas Grindle tells the never-been-told, first person account of how the war in Afghanistan was won, and how the newly created peace started to slip away when vital resources failed to materialize and the American military headed home. By placing the reader at the heart of the American counter-insurgency effort, Grindle reveals little-known incidents that include the failure of expensive aid programs to target local needs, the slow throttling of local government as official funds failed to reach the districts, and our inexplicable failure to empower the Afghan local officials even after they succeeded in bringing the people onto their side. How We Won and Lost the War in Afghanistan presents the side of the hard-working, competent Afghans who won the war and what they really thought of the U.S. military and their decisions. Written by a former field officer for the U.S. Agency for International Development, this book tells of how America's desire to leave the Middle East ultimately overwhelmed our need to sustain victory.