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Books > History > Asian / Middle Eastern history > From 1900 > Postwar, from 1945 > General
In July 2009, Geraint (Gez) Jones was sitting in Camp Bastion, Afghanistan with the rest of The Firm – Danny, Jay, Toby and Jake, his four closest friends, all junior NCOs and combat-hardened infantrymen. Thanks to the mangled remains of a Jackal vehicle left tactlessly outside their tent, IEDs were never far from their mind. Within days they’d be on the ground in Musa Qala with the rest of 3 Platoon – a mixed bunch of men Gez would die for.
As they fight furiously, are pushed to their limits, hemmed in by IEDs and hampered by the chain of command, Gez starts to wonder what is the point of it all. The bombs they uncover on patrol, on their stomachs brushing the sand away, are replaced the next day. Firefights are a momentary victory in a war they can see is unwinnable. Gez is a warrior – he wants more than this. But then death and injury start to take their toll on The Firm, leaving Gez with PTSD and a new battle just beginning.
After leaving the US Navy SEAL Teams in Spring of 2017, Ephraim
Mattos, age 24, flew to Iraq to join a small group of volunteer
humanitarians known as the Free Burma Rangers, who were working on
the frontlines of the war on ISIS. Until being shot by ISIS on a
suicidal rescue mission, Mattos witnessed unexplainable acts of
courage and sacrifice by the Free Burma Rangers who, while under
heavy machine gun and mortar fire, assaulted across ISIS
minefields, used themselves as human shields, and sprinted down
ISIS infested streets-all to retrieve wounded civilians. In City of
Death: Humanitarian Warriors In the Battle of Mosul, Mattos
recounts in vivid detail what he saw and felt while he and the
other Free Burma Rangers evacuated the wounded, conducted rescue
missions, and at times fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Iraqi
Army against ISIS. Filled with raw and emotional detail of what
it's like to come face-to-face with death, this is the harrowing
and uplifting true story of a small group of men who laid down
their lives to save the lives of the Iraqi people and who chose to
live or die by the words, "Greater love hath no man than this, that
a man lay down his life for his friends." As the co-Author of the
#1 New York Times bestselling American Sniper, Scott McEwen has
teamed up with Mattos to help create an unforgettable true story of
an American warrior turned humanitarian forced to fight his way
into and out of a Hell on Earth created by ISIS
Through their dramatic stories, Gopal shows that the Afghan war, so
often regarded as a hopeless quagmire, could in fact have gone very
differently. Top Taliban leaders actually tried to surrender within
months of the US invasion, renouncing all political activity and
submitting to the new government. Effectively, the Taliban ceased
to exist - yet the Americans were unwilling to accept such a
turnaround. Instead, driven by false intelligence from their allies
and an unyielding mandate to fight terrorism, American forces
continued to press the conflict, resurrecting the insurgency that
persists to this day. With its intimate accounts of life in
war-torn Afghanistan, Gopal's thoroughly original reporting lays
bare the workings of America's longest war and the truth behind its
prolonged agony.
First time in paperbackA nonfiction thriller that combines the
manhunt for a friend's killer in Afghanistan with a riveting
investigation into how warfare has changed since IraqCastner's work
as a journalist has extended his following. He is a contributing
writer to VICE, and his work has appeared in the New York Times,
Washington Post , the Atlantic , Wired, Foreign Policy, Outside,
Buzzfeed, Boston Globe, Time, The Daily Beast, the Los Angeles
Review of Books, and on National Public Radio.Brian Castner's
newest book, Disappointment River, will be published by Doubleday
in spring 2018 (month TK).
In early 2002 Sam Faddis was named to head a CIA team that would
enter Iraq, prepare the battlefield and facilitate the entry of
follow-on conventional military forces numbering in excess of
40,000 American soldiers. This force, built around the 4th Infantry
Division would, in partnership with Kurdish forces and with the
assistance of Turkey, engage Saddam's army in the north as part of
a coming invasion. Faddis expected to be on the ground inside Iraq
within weeks and that the entire campaign would likely be over by
summer. Over the next year virtually every aspect of that plan for
the conduct of the war in Northern Iraq fell apart. The 4th
Infantry Division never arrived nor did any other conventional
forces in substantial number. The Turks not only did not provide
support, they worked overtime to prevent the U.S. from achieving
success. An Arab army that was to assist U.S. forces fell apart
before it ever made it to the field. Alone, hopelessly outnumbered,
short on supplies and threatened by Iraqi assassination teams and
Islamic extremists Faddis' team, working with Kurdish peshmerga,
nonetheless paved the way for a brilliant and largely bloodless
victory in the north and the fall of Saddam's Iraq. That victory,
handed over to Washington and the Department of Defense on a silver
platter, was then squandered. The surrender of Iraqi forces in the
north was spurned. All existing governmental institutions were, in
the name of de-Baathification, dismantled. All input from Faddis'
team, which had been in country for almost a full year, was
ignored. The consequences of these actions were and continue to be
catastrophic. This is the story of an incredibly brave and
effective team of men and women who overcame massive odds and
helped end the nightmare of Saddam's rule in Iraq. It is also the
story of how incompetence, bureaucracy and ignorance threw that
success away and condemned Iraq and the surrounding region to
chaos.
"We must remember that in the brutality of battle another such
apocalypse is always just around the corner." -Sebastiao Salgado In
January and February 1991, as the United States-led coalition drove
Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's troops retaliated with
an inferno. At some 700 oil wells and an unspecified number of
oil-filled low-lying areas they ignited vast, raging fires,
creating one of the worst environmental disasters in living memory.
As the desperate efforts to contain and extinguish the
conflagration progressed, Sebastiao Salgado traveled to Kuwait to
witness the crisis firsthand. The conditions were excruciating. The
heat was so vicious that Salgado's smallest lens warped. A
journalist and another photographer were killed when a slick
ignited as they crossed it. Sticking close to the firefighters, and
with characteristic sensitivity to both human and environmental
impact, Salgado captured the terrifying scale of this "huge theater
the size of the planet": the ravaged landscape; the sweltering
temperatures; the air choking on charred sand and soot; the
blistered remains of camels; the sand still littered with cluster
bombs; and the flames and smoke soaring to the skies, blocking out
the sunlight, dwarfing the oil-coated firefighters. Salgado's epic
pictures first appeared in the New York Times Magazine in June 1991
and were subsequently awarded the Oskar Barnack Award, recognizing
outstanding images on the relationship between man and the
environment. Kuwait: A Desert on Fire is the first monograph of
this astonishing series. Like Genesis, Exodus, and The Children, it
is as much a major document of modern history as an extraordinary
body of photographic work.
A former senior mujahidin figure and an ex-counter-terrorism
analyst cooperating to write a book on the history and legacy of
Arab-Afghan fighters in Afghanistan is a remarkable and improbable
undertaking. Yet this is what Mustafa Hamid, aka Abu Walid
al-Masri, and Leah Farrall have achieved with the publication of
their ground-breaking work. The result of thousands of hours of
discussions over several years, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan
offers significant new insights into the history of many of today's
militant Salafi groups and movements. By revealing the real origins
of the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the jostling among the various
jihadi groups, this account not only challenges conventional
wisdom, but also raises uncomfortable questions as to how events
from this important period have been so badly misconstrued.
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an
enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war
the U.S. experienced in the contemporary period - the first recent
war fought for something less than total victory. In Selling the
Korean War, Steven Casey explores how President Truman and then
Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public.
Based on a massive array of primary sources, Casey subtly explores
the government's selling activities from all angles. He looks at
the halting and sometimes chaotic efforts of Harry Truman and Dean
Acheson, Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. He examines the
relationships that they and their subordinates developed with a
host of other institutions, from Congress and the press to
Hollywood and labor. And he assesses the complex and fraught
interactions between the military and war correspondents in the
battlefield theater itself.
From high politics to bitter media spats, Casey guides the reader
through the domestic debates of this messy, costly war. He
highlights the actions and calculations of colorful figures,
including Senators Robert Taft and JHoseph McCarthy, and General
Douglas MacArthur. He details how the culture and work routines of
Congress and the media influenced political tactics and daily news
stories. And he explores how different phases of the war threw up
different problems - from the initial disasters in the summer of
1950 to the giddy prospects of victory in October 1950, from the
massive defeats in the wake of China's massive intervention to the
lengthy period of stalemate fighting in 1952 and 1953.
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The Iraq Papers
(Paperback)
John Ehrenberg, J. Patrice McSherry, Jose Ramon Sanchez, Caroleen Marji Sayej
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R746
R680
Discovery Miles 6 800
Save R66 (9%)
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Ships in 18 - 22 working days
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No foreign policy decision in recent history has had greater
repercussions than President George W. Bush's decision to invade
and occupy Iraq. It launched a new doctrine of preemptive war,
mired the American military in an intractable armed conflict,
disrupted world petroleum supplies, cost the United States hundreds
of billions of dollars, and damaged or ended the lives of hundreds
of thousands of Americans and Iraqis. Its impact on international
politics and America's standing in the world remains incalculable.
The Iraq Papers offers a compelling documentary narrative and
interpretation of this momentous conflict. With keen editing and
incisive commentary, the book weaves together original documents
that range from presidential addresses to redacted memos, carrying
us from the ideology behind the invasion to negotiations for
withdrawal. These papers trace the rise of the neoconservatives and
reveal the role of strategic thinking about oil supplies. In moving
to the planning for the war itself, the authors not only provide
Congressional resolutions and speeches by President Bush, but
internal security papers, Pentagon planning documents, the report
of the Future of Iraq Project, and eloquent opposition statements
by Senator Robert Byrd, other world governments, the Non-Aligned
Movement, and the World Council of Churches. This collection
addresses every aspect of the conflict, from the military's
evolving counterinsurgency strategy to declarations by Iraqi
resisters and political figures-from Coalition Provisional
Authority orders to Donald Rumsfeld's dismissal of the insurgents
as "dead-enders" and Iraqi discussions of state- and nationbuilding
under the shadow of occupation. The economics of petroleum, the
legal and ethical questions surrounding terrorism and torture,
international agreements, the theory of the "unitary presidency,"
and the Bush administration's use of presidential signing
statements all receive in-depth coverage.
The Iraq War has reshaped the domestic and international landscape.
The Iraq Papers offers the authoritative one-volume source for
understanding the conflict and its many repercussions.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) ruled Mosul from
2014-2017 in accordance with its extremist interpretation of
sharia. But beyond what is known about ISIS governance in the city
from the group's own materials, very little is understood about the
reality of its rule, or reasons for its failure, from those who
actually lived under it. This book reveals what was going on inside
ISIS institutions based on accounts from the civilians themselves.
Focusing on ISIS governance of education, healthcare and policing,
the interviewees include: teachers who were forced to teach the
group's new curriculum; professors who organized secret classes in
private; doctors who took direct orders from ISIS leaders and
worked in their headquarters; bureaucratic staff who worked for
ISIS. These accounts provide unique insight into the lived
realities in the controlled territories and reveal how the
terrorist group balanced their commitment to Islamist ideology with
the practical challenges of state building. Moving beyond the
simplistic dichotomy of civilians as either passive victims or ISIS
supporters, Mathilde Becker Aarseth highlights here those people
who actively resisted or affected the way in which ISIS ruled. The
book invites readers to understand civilians' complex relationship
to the extremist group in the context of fragmented state power and
a city torn apart by the occupation.
Ever since its foundation in 2002, the Guantanamo Bay Detention
Facility has become the symbol for many people around the world of
all that is wrong with the 'war on terror'. Secretive, inhumane,
and illegal by most international standards, it has been seen by
many as a testament to American hubris in the post-9/11 era. Yet
until now no one has written about the most revealing part of the
story - the prison's first 100 days. It was during this time that a
group of career military men and women tried to uphold the
traditional military codes of honour and justice that informed
their training in the face of a far more ruthless, less rule-bound,
civilian leadership in the Pentagon. They were defeated. This book
tells their story for the first time. It is a tale of how
individual officers on the ground at Guantanamo, along with their
direct superiors, struggled with their assignment from Washington,
only to be unwittingly co-opted into the Pentagon's plan to turn
the prison into an interrogation facility operating at the margins
of the law and beyond.
A groundbreaking look at how the interrogation rooms of the Korean
War set the stage for a new kind of battle-not over land but over
human subjects Traditional histories of the Korean War have long
focused on violations of the thirty-eighth parallel, the line drawn
by American and Soviet officials in 1945 dividing the Korean
peninsula. But The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War presents
an entirely new narrative, shifting the perspective from the
boundaries of the battlefield to inside the interrogation room.
Upending conventional notions of what we think of as geographies of
military conflict, Monica Kim demonstrates how the Korean War
evolved from a fight over territory to one over human interiority
and the individual human subject, forging the template for the US
wars of intervention that would predominate during the latter half
of the twentieth century and beyond. Kim looks at how, during the
armistice negotiations, the United States and their allies proposed
a new kind of interrogation room: one in which POWs could exercise
their "free will" and choose which country they would go to after
the ceasefire. The global controversy that erupted exposed how
interrogation rooms had become a flashpoint for the struggles
between the ambitions of empire and the demands for decolonization,
as the aim of interrogation was to produce subjects who attested to
a nation's right to govern. The complex web of interrogators and
prisoners-Japanese-American interrogators, Indian military
personnel, Korean POWs and interrogators, and American POWs-that
Kim uncovers contradicts the simple story in US popular memory of
"brainwashing" during the Korean War. Bringing together a vast
range of sources that track two generations of people moving
between three continents, The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War
delves into an essential yet overlooked aspect of modern warfare in
the twentieth century.
When the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (known as "2/3")
arrived in Iraq five years to the day after 9/11, they were sent to
a little-known swath of sparsely-populated desert called the
Haditha Triad in Anbar province. It was the center of the most
intense terrorist activity in Iraq-and it was being carried out by
the well-organised and fearsome Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Into this
cauldron 2/3 was thrown and given a nearly impossible double-sided
mission: eradicate the enemy and build trust with the local
population. After six months of gruelling and exhausting battle-and
the loss of twenty-four brave, dedicated fighters-the warriors of
2/3 had utterly crushed the enemy and brought stability and hope to
the region. In vivid, you-are-there style, The Warriors of Anbar
takes readers onto the front lines of one of the most incredible
stories to come out of America's war in Iraq- the story of how one
Marine battalion decisively wielded the final, enduring death
strike to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Despite its historical importance, the
full story of 2/3 in Iraq has remained untold-until now.
Three days after North Korean premier Kim Il Sung launched a
massive military invasion of South Korea on June 24, 1950,
President Harry S. Truman responded, dispatching air and naval
support to South Korea. Initially, Congress cheered his swift
action; but, when China entered the war to aid North Korea, the
president and many legislators became concerned that the conflict
would escalate into another world war, and the United States agreed
to a truce in 1953. The lack of a decisive victory caused the
Korean War to quickly recede from public attention. However, its
impact on subsequent American foreign policy was profound. In
Truman, Congress, and Korea: The Politics of America's First
Undeclared War, Larry Blomstedt provides the first in-depth
domestic political history of the conflict, from the initial
military mobilization, to Congress's failed attempts to broker a
cease-fire, to the political fallout in the 1952 election. During
the war, President Truman faced challenges from both Democratic and
Republican legislators, whose initial support quickly collapsed
into bitter and often public infighting. For his part, Truman
dedicated inadequate attention to relationships on Capitol Hill
early in his term and also declined to require a formal declaration
of war from Congress, advancing the shift toward greater executive
power in foreign policy. The Korean conflict ended the brief period
of bipartisanship in foreign policy that began during World War II.
It also introduced Americans to the concept of limited war, which
contrasted sharply with the practice of requiring unconditional
surrenders in previous conflicts. Blomstedt's study explores the
changes wrought during this critical period and the ways in which
the war influenced US international relations and military
interventions during the Cold War and beyond.
From the award-winning co-author of I Am Malala, this book asks
just how the might of NATO, with 48 countries and 140,000 troops on
the ground, failed to defeat a group of religious students and
farmers? How did it go so wrong? Twenty-seven years ago, Christina
Lamb left Britain to become a journalist in Pakistan. She crossed
the Hindu Kush into Afghanistan with mujaheddin fighting the
Russians and fell unequivocally in love with this fierce country of
pomegranates and war, a relationship which has dominated her adult
life. Since 2001, Lamb has watched with incredulity as the West
fought a war with its hands tied, committed too little too late,
failed to understand local dynamics and turned a blind eye as their
Taliban enemy was helped by their ally Pakistan. Farewell Kabul
tells how success was turned into defeat in the longest war fought
by the United States in its history and by Britain since the
Hundred Years War. It has been a fiasco which has left Afghanistan
still one of the poorest nations on earth, the Taliban undefeated,
and nuclear armed Pakistan perhaps the most dangerous place on
earth. With unparalleled access to all key decision-makers in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, London and Washington, from heads of state
and generals as well as soldiers on the ground, Farewell Kabul
tells how this happened. In Afghanistan, Lamb has travelled far
beyond Helmand - from the caves of Tora Bora in the south to the
mountainous bad lands of Kunar in the east; from Herat, city of
poets and minarets in the west, to the very poorest province of
Samangan in the north. She went to Guantanamo, met Taliban in
Quetta, visited jihadi camps in Pakistan and saw bin Laden's house
just after he was killed. Saddest of all, she met women who had
been made role models by the West and had then been shot, raped or
forced to flee the country. This deeply personal book not only
shows the human cost of political failure but explains how
short-sighted encouragement of jihadis to fight the Russians,
followed by prosecution of ill-thoughtout wars, has resulted in the
spread of terrorism throughout the Islamic world.
The Iraq War is a visual record of the American-led Operation Iraqi
Freedom of 2003, which resulted in the dramatic overthrow of
dictator Saddam Hussein. In a striking sequence of photographs
Anthony Tucker-Jones shows how this was achieved by the American
and British armed forces in a lightning campaign of just two weeks.
But the photographs also show the disastrous aftermath when the
swift victory was undermined by the outbreak of the Iraqi
insurgency - in the Shia south, in Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle,
and in Fallujah where two ferocious battles were fought. The
author, who is an expert on the Iraqi armed forces and has written
extensively on the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, gives a
fascinating insight into the Iraqi army and air force and into the
multitude of weapons systems Saddam purchased from around the
world. He also looks at the failures on the American and British
side - the flaws in the tactics that were used, the poor
performance of some of the armoured fighting vehicles - and at the
reformed Iraqi armed forces who have now taken responsibility for
security in the country. The Iraq War is a vivid photographic
introduction to a conflict that has only just passed into history.
Following the fight out of the Chosin Reservoir, the 1st Marine
Division embarked aboard ships bound for Pusan. Once offloaded in
mid-December, the division moved inland some 40 miles west to
Masan, an area previously occupied by the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade that summer. As 1950 drew to a close, the military
situation in Korea appeared bleak. American policymakers were even
contemplating evacuating U.S. forces. This U.S. Marine Corps
history provides unique information about important aspects of the
Korean War, with material on the 1st Marine Division, Lt. General
Matthew Bunker Ridgway, Truman fires MacArthur, medical helicopter
evacuation, and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 1951.
Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, Chosin also called Changjin,
campaign early in the Korean War, part of the Chinese Second
Offensive (November-December 1950) to drive the United Nations out
of North Korea. The Chosin Reservoir campaign was directed mainly
against the 1st Marine Division of the U.S.X Corps, which had
disembarked in eastern North Korea and moved inland in severe
winter weather to a mountainous area near the reservoir. The
campaign succeeded in forcing the entire X Corps to evacuate to
South Korea, but the Chinese did not achieve their particular
objective of isolating and destroying the 1st Marine Division.
Instead, in a deliberate retrograde movement that has become one of
the most-storied exploits in Marine Corps lore, the Marines turned
and fought their way down a narrow vulnerable road through several
mountain passes and a bridged chasm until they reached transport
ships waiting at the coast.
Modern warfare is almost always multilateral to one degree or
another, requiring countries to cooperate as allies or coalition
partners. Yet as the war in Afghanistan has made abundantly clear,
multilateral cooperation is neither straightforward nor guaranteed.
Countries differ significantly in what they are willing to do and
how and where they are willing to do it. Some refuse to participate
in dangerous or offensive missions. Others change tactical
objectives with each new commander. Some countries defer to their
commanders while others hold them to strict account. NATO in
Afghanistan explores how government structures and party politics
in NATO countries shape how battles are waged in the field. Drawing
on more than 250 interviews with senior officials from around the
world, David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman find that domestic
constraints in presidential and single-party parliamentary
systems--in countries such as the United States and Britain
respectively--differ from those in countries with coalition
governments, such as Germany and the Netherlands. As a result,
different countries craft different guidelines for their forces
overseas, most notably in the form of military caveats, the
often-controversial limits placed on deployed troops. Providing
critical insights into the realities of alliance and coalition
warfare, NATO in Afghanistan also looks at non-NATO partners such
as Australia, and assesses NATO's performance in the 2011 Libyan
campaign to show how these domestic political dynamics are by no
means unique to Afghanistan.
At the time it was fought, the war in Korea was unique in recent
American military experience. Unlike World Wars I and II, which
were vigorously prosecuted on the battlefield until the enemy
surrendered unconditionally, the Korean conflict ended without
clear-cut military victory for either side. It was fought with
limited means for limited objectives. In fact, political efforts to
resolve the conflict at the negotiating table predominated during
the last two years of the conflict. During this period, neither
side sought a decision by military means. The conflict in Korea
also was an important milestone in the "cold war" relations between
the Communist and non-Communist nations. By launching an unprovoked
attack on a militarily insignificant country located in an area
where none of their vital interests were involved, the Communists
appeared to leaders of the non-Communist states to be giving proof
of their aggressive designs for world domination. As a result, the
United States reversed the policy of reducing its military
establishment and launched an impressive expansion of its armed
forces. At the same time, the United States joined with its North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to create a military
command for the alliance and to incorporate German forces in it. In
the Far East, the United States also acted to shore up the defenses
of the non-Communist world by entering into treaties with Australia
and New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and
Nationalist China. The Korean War provided the first wartime test
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as part of the machinery set
up by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment. In
this capacity, they provided strategic direction to the United
Nations (UN) forces in the field and were the agency by with
President Truman exercised overall control of war strategy. When
the focus shifted from combat to armistice negotiations, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff continued to play an active role. They participated
in all the key decisions taken during negotiations, and they
provided the channel of communications between the Government in
Washington and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
(CINCUNC), and his armistice negotiating team in Korea. The focus
of this volume is, naturally, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as
they were not acting in a vacuum, it has been necessary to describe
the context in which they functioned. To this end, the actions of
the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning
overall military strategy and armistice negotiations have been
described in some detail. In addition, the consequences of these
actions, on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, have been
sketched in broad outline.
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