In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus, that the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Compare Introduction to the Phaedrus.) Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dia-logues upon one another by the slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite and contradictory assertions respec-ting their order and sequence. The mantle of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have applied his method with the most various results.

The story of Apollonius King of Tyre has rightly been called the most popular romance of the Middle Ages. From Iceland to Greece, from Spain to Russia, versions of this novel are recorded. It is the variation among the Latin versions and the numerous vernacular adaptations that make this story especially interesting. Shakespeare used and adapted it in his Pericles, Prince of Tyre. Its plot continues to fascinate us. Incest, deception, pirates, famine, sex and shipwreck form its tasty ingredients. Its links with the Greek novel, which today stands in the centre of scholarly interest, are striking. In this commentary the author even attempts to show that the novel originated in Greece, or more precisely Asia Minor, possibly inTarsus. The two recensions (RA and RB) are compared line by line, generally given preference to RA. All these aspects make the present book attractive to scholars of many different disciplines.

In this important and highly original book, place, commonality and judgment provide the framework within which works central to the Greek philosophical and literary tradition are usefully located and reinterpreted. Greek life, it can be argued, was defined by the interconnection of place, commonality and judgment. Similarly within the Continental philosophical tradition topics such as place, judgment, law and commonality have had a pervasive centrality. Works by Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben amongst others attest to the current exigency of these topics. Yet the ways in which they are interrelated has been barely discussed within the context of Ancient Philosophy. The conjecture of this book is that not only are these terms of genuine philosophical importance in their own right, but they are also central to Ancient Philosophy. Andrew Benjamin ultimately therefore aims to underscore the relevance of Ancient Philosophy for contemporary debates in Continental Philosophy.

After resolving to become a Catholic Christian, Augustine spent a decade trying to clarify his understanding of 'contemplation,' the interior presence of God to the soul. That long struggle yielded his classic account in the Confessions. This study explores Augustine's developing understanding of contemplation, beginning with his earliest accounts written before his baptism and ending with the Confessions. Chapter One examines the pagan monotheism of the Roman Platonists and the role of contemplation in their theology. Augustine's pre-baptismal writings are then considered in Chapter Two, tracking his fundamental break from pagan Platonism. Chapter Three then turns to Augustine's developing understanding of contemplation in these pre-baptismal texts. Chapter Four concentrates on Augustine's thought during the decade after his baptism in 387, a period that encompasses his monastic life in Thagaste, and his years first as a presbyter and then as a bishop in Hippo Regius. This chapter follows the arc of Augustine's thought through these years of transition and leads into the Confessions, giving a vantage point to survey its theology of contemplation. Chapter Five concentrates on the Confessions and sets its most famous account of contemplation, the vision at Ostia from Book IX, into a larger polemical context. Augustine's defence of his transcendental reading of scripture in Confessions XII is analysed and then used to illuminate the Ostian ascent narrative. The book concludes with observations on the importance of Augustine's theology of contemplation to the emergence of Christian monotheism in late antiquity.

This volume on Greek synchronic etymology offers a set of papers evidencing the cultural significance of etymological commitment in ancient and medieval literature. The four sections illustrate the variety of approaches of the same object, which for Greek writers was much more than a technical way of studying language. Contributions focus on the functions of etymology as they were intended by the authors according to their own aims. (1) "Philosophical issues" addresses the theory of etymology and its explanatory power, especially in Plato and in Neoplatonism. (2) "Linguistic issues" discusses various etymologizing techniques and the status of etymology, which was criticized and openly rejected by some authors. (3) "Poetical practices of etymology" investigates the ubiquitous presence of etymological reflections in learned poetry, whatever the genre, didactic, aetiological or epic. (4) "Etymology and word-plays" addresses the vexed question of the limit between a mere pun and a real etymological explanation, which is more than once difficult to establish. The wide range of genres and authors and the interplay between theoretical reflection and applied practice shows clearly the importance of etymology in Greek thought.

This book develops a new account of Socratic method, based on a psychological model of Plato's dramatic depiction of Socrates' character and conduct. Socratic method is seen as a blend of three types of philosophical discourse: refutation, truth-seeking, and persuasion. Cain focuses on the persuasive features of the method since, in her view, it is this aspect of Socrates' method that best explains the content and the value of the dialectical arguments. Emphasizing the persuasive aspect of Socratic method helps us uncover the operative standards of dialectical argumentation in fifth-century Athens. Cain considers both the sophistic style of rhetoric and contentious debate in Socrates' time, and Aristotle's perspective on the techniques of argument and their purposes. An informal, pragmatic analysis of argumentation appropriate to the dialectical context is developed. We see that Socrates uses ambiguity and other strategic fallacies with purposeful play, and for moral ends. Taking specific examples of refutations from Plato's dialogues, Cain links the interlocutors' characters and situations with the dialectical argument that Socrates constructs to refute them. The merit of this interpretation is that it gives broad range, depth, and balance to Socrates' argumentative style; it also maintains a keen sensitivity to the interlocutors' emotional reactions, moral values, and attitudes. The book concludes with a discussion of the overall value, purpose, and success of Socratic method, and draws upon a Platonic/Socratic conception of the soul and a dialectical type of self-knowledge.

This work offers a radical new interpretation of Augustine and of a central aspect of medieval thought as a whole.Augustine and Roman Virtue seeks to correct what the author sees as a fundamental misapprehension in medieval thought, a misapprehension that fuels further problems and misunderstandings in the historiography of philosophy. This misapprehension is the assumption that the development of certain themes associated with medieval philosophy is due, primarily if not exclusively, to extra-philosophical religious commitments rather than philosophical argumentation, referred to here as the 'sacralization thesis'.Brian Harding explores this problem through a detailed reading of Augustine's "City of God" as understood in a Latin context, that is, in dialogue with Latin writers, such as Cicero, Livy, Sallust and Seneca. The book seeks to revise a common reading of Augustine's critique of ancient virtue by focusing on that dialogue, while showing that his attitude towards those authors is more sympathetic, and more critical, than one might expect. Harding argues that the criticisms rest on sympathy and that Augustine's critique of ancient virtue thinks through and develops certain trends noticeable in the major figures of Latin philosophy.

Charles E. Snyder considers the New Academy's attacks on Stoic epistemology through a critical re-assessment of the 3rd century philosopher, Arcesilaus of Pitane. Arguing that the standard epistemological framework used to study the ancient Academy ignores the metaphysical dimensions at stake in Arcesilaus's critique, Snyder explores new territory for the historiography of Stoic-Academic debates in the early Hellenistic period. Focusing on the dispute between the Old and New Academy, Snyder reveals the metaphysical dimensions of Arcesilaus' arguments as essential to grasping what is innovative about the so-called New Academy. Resisting the partiality for epistemology in the historical reconstructions of ancient philosophy, this book defends a new philosophical framework that re-positions Arcesilaus' attack on the early Stoa as key to his deviation from the metaphysical foundations of both Stoic and Academic virtue ethics. Drawing on a wide range of scholarship on Hellenistic philosophy in French, Italian, and German, Beyond Hellenistic Epistemology builds bridges between analytical and continental approaches to the historiography of ancient philosophy, and makes an important and disruptive contribution to the literature.

June 18-. Squire Hawkins sat upon the pyramid of large blocks, called the "stile," in front of his house, contemplating the morning. The locality was Obedstown, East Tennessee. You would not know that Obedstown stood on the top of a mountain, for there was nothing about the landscape to indicate it-but it did: a mountain that stretched abroad over whole counties, and rose very gradually. The district was called the "Knobs of East Tennessee," and had a reputation like Nazareth, as far as turning out any good thing was concerned. The Squire's house was a double log cabin, in a state of decay; two or three gaunt hounds lay asleep about the threshold, and lifted their heads sadly whenever Mrs. Hawkins or the children stepped in and out over their bodies. Rubbish was scattered about the grassless yard; a bench stood near the door with a tin wash basin on it and a pail of water and a gourd; a cat had begun to drink from the pail, but the exertion was overtaxing her energies, and she had stopped to rest. There was an ash-hopper by the fence, and an iron pot, for soft-soap-boiling, near it.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback. 'The serial Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (OSAP) is fairly regarded as the leading venue for publication in ancient philosophy. It is where one looks to find the state-of-the-art. That the serial, which presents itself more as an anthology than as a journal, has traditionally allowed space for lengthier studies, has tended only to add to its prestige; it is as if OSAP thus declares that, since it allows as much space as the merits of the subject require, it can be more entirely devoted to the best and most serious scholarship.' Michael Pakaluk, Bryn Mawr Classical Review

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback. This volume includes articles on Heraclitus and the Stoics and on Plotinus, with several on each of Aristotle and Plato. Editor: David Sedley, Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy, University of Cambridge 'unique value as a collection of outstanding contributions in the area of ancient philosophy.' Sara Rubinelli, Bryn Mawr Classical Review

Emotions (pathe) such as anger, fear, shame, and envy, but also pity, wonder, love and friendship have long been underestimated in Plato's philosophy. The aim of Emotions in Plato is to provide a consistent account of the role of emotions in Plato's psychology, epistemology, ethics and political theory. The volume focuses on three main issues: taxonomy of emotions, their epistemic status, and their relevance for the ethical and political theory and practice. This volume, which is the first edited volume entirely dedicated to emotions in Plato's philosophy, shows how Plato, in many aspects, was positively interested in these affective states in order to support the rule of reason. "Emotions in Plato is a rich and illuminating book, which will probably make not a few readers change their view of Plato's attitude to emotions." -Margalit Finkelberg, Tel Aviv University, Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2021.10.16

Lucretius' account of the origin of life, the origin of species, and human prehistory (first century BC) is the longest and most detailed account extant from the ancient world. It is a mechanistic theory that does away with the need for any divine design, and has been seen as a forerunner of Darwin's theory of evolution. This commentary seeks to locate Lucretius in both the ancient and modern contexts. The recent revival of creationism makes this study particularly relevant to contemporary debate, and indeed, many of the central questions posed by creationists are those Lucretius attempts to answer.

In this lively and original book, Russell Winslow pursues a new interpretation of logos in Aristotle. Rather than a reading of rationality that cleaves human beings from nature, this new interpretation suggests that, for Aristotle, consistent and dependable rational arguments reveal a deep dependency upon nature. To this end, the author shows that a rational account of a being is in fact subject to the very same principle that governs the physical motion and generation of a being under inquiry. Among the many consequences of this argument is a rejection of both of the prevailing oppositional claims that Aristotle's methodological procedure of discovery is one resting on either empirical or conceptual grounds: discovery reveals a more complex structure than can be grasped by either of these modern modes. Further, Winslow argues that this interpretation of rational discovery also contributes to the ethical debates surrounding Aristotle's work, insofar as an ethical claim is achieved through reason, but is not thereby conceived as objective. Again, the demand for agreement in ethical/political decision will be disclosed as superseding in its complexity both those accounts of ethical decision as subjective (for example, "emotivist" accounts) and those as objective ("realist" accounts).

The work of Aristotle (384-322 BC) is considered to be one of the great achievements of the ancient world, and is a foundation of both Western and Middle Eastern philosophy and science. Although Aristotle left significant material on almost all branches of learning, what has survived is a somewhat disorganized collection of notes and lectures. Moreover, the centuries of interpretation across various epochs and cultures tend to cloud our understanding of him. Thomas Kiefer breaks through this cloud of interpretation and provides an organized account of one key part of Aristotle's philosophy, namely his theory of knowledge. This theory concerns what is knowledge, what we can know, and how we can do so. Kiefer's book is the first work that takes this theory as its sole focus and reconstructs it systematically. Kiefer's work throughout provides many new interpretations of key parts of Aristotle's philosophy, including an unnoticed -but crucial-distinction between knowledge in general and knowledge for us, the differences between his semantic and psychological requirements for knowledge, and 'nous', which is perhaps the most obscure notion in Aristotle's work. He also concludes with a summary of Aristotle's theory in the terms and style of contemporary epistemology. Kiefer's work should be of interest to anyone involved in the history of philosophy or contemporary epistemology.

This volume, the twenty-fifth year of published proceedings, contains seven papers and commentaries presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during academic year 2008-9. The papers treat topics including: mind and body in Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, a reconsideration of Socratic intellectualism, the positive motivational intent of Platonic poetics, politics and dialectic in the Statesman, Aristotle on community life, the nature of virtue according to Chrysippus, and the beauty of scientific knowledge in Proclus.

What is the relation between time and change? Does time depend on the mind? Is the present always the same or is it always different? Aristotle tackles these questions in the Physics, and Time for Aristotle is the first book in English devoted to this discussion. Aristotle claims that time is not a kind of change, but that it is something dependent on change; he defines it as a kind of 'number of change'. Ursula Coope argues that what this means is that time is a kind of order (not, as is commonly supposed, a kind of measure). It is universal order within which all changes are related to each other. This interpretation enables Coope to explain two puzzling claims that Aristotle makes: that the now is like a moving thing, and that time depends for its existence on the mind. Brilliantly lucid in its explanation of this challenging section of the Physics, Time for Aristotle shows his discussion to be of enduring philosophical interest.

Ce volume s'occupe du "Lexique platonicien" de Timee le Sophiste, auteur qui a appartenu a la deuxieme sophistique. Une introduction de Jonathan Barnes presente l'histoire des manuscrits de ce lexique et de ses editions, ainsi qu'une analyse de sa structure et une evaluation de son importance pour la lexicographie ancienne et pour les etudes platoniciennes. La premiere partie du livre presente une nouvelle edition du texte avec une traduction francaise et quatre apparats, des scolies du manuscrit, des "loci platonici," des "loci similes," et l'apparat critique. La deuxieme partie du livre presente un commentaire fourni, qui considere la relation du lexique avec les lexiques atticistes et byzantins, les scolies et les commentaires platoniciens, ainsi que les textes philosophiques. This book is an edition of the "Lexicon to Plato" written by Timaeus the Sophist. An Introduction by Jonathan Barnes discusses the history of the manuscripts and editions of the "Lexicon," analyses the structure and nature of the work, sites it in the history of ancient lexicography, and attempts to assess its virtues and its importance. The first part of the book contains a new edition of the Greek text, faced by a French translation and equipped with four apparatuses. The second part of the book is the commentary: it is primarily concerned to connect the entries of the "Lexicon" to appropriate passages in Plato, to trace the links between Timaeus and the ancient tradition of Platonic scholarship, and to locate the "Lexicon" in thevoluminous and complex history of ancient lexicography.

From Empedocles to Wittgenstein is a collection of fifteen historical essays in philosophy, written by Sir Anthony Kenny in the early years of the 21st century. In the main they are concerned with four of the great philosophers whom he most esteems, namely Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Wittgenstein. The author is not only one of the most respected historians of philosophy, and possibly the widest-ranging, but also one of the most successful at writing on the subject for a broad readership. In this volume he presents scholarly explorations of some themes which caught his interest as he worked on his acclaimed four-volume New History of Western Philosophy.

Jaap Mansfeld and Frans de Haas bring together in this volume a distinguished international team of ancient philosophers, presenting a systematic, chapter-by-chapter study of one of the key texts in Aristotle's science and metaphysics: the first book of On Generation and Corruption. In GC I Aristotle provides a general outline of physical processes such as generation and corruption, alteration, and growth, and inquires into their differences. He also discusses physical notions such as contact, action and passion, and mixture. These notions are fundamental to Aristotle's physics and cosmology, and more specifically to his theory of the four elements and their transformations. Moreover, references to GC elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus show that in GC I Aristotle is doing heavy conceptual groundwork for more refined applications of these notions in, for example, the psychology of perception and thought, and the study of animal generation and corruption. Ultimately, biology is the goal of the series of enquiries in which GC I demands a position of its own immediately after the Physics. The contributors deal with questions of structure and text constitution and provide thought-provoking discussions of each chapter of GC I. New approaches to the issues of how to understand first matter, and how to evaluate Aristotle's notion of mixture are given ample space. Throughout, Aristotle's views of the theories of the Presocratics and Plato are shown to be crucial in understanding his argument.