Stuart Hampshire, one of the most eminent British philosophers of the twentieth century, will be perhaps best remembered for his work on the seventeenth-century philosopher Spinoza, all of which is gathered now in this volume. Among the great thinkers of modern times, only Spinoza created a complete system of philosophy that rivals Plato's, with crucial contributions to every major philosophical topic.
Hampshire's classic 1951 book Spinoza remains the best introduction to this thinker, and it is reprinted here. But what gives particular interest to this new volume is the first publication of Hampshire's last work "Spinoza and Spinozism," an extended presentation of a Spinozist philosophical worldview. Hampshire's influential 1962 essay "Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom" is also included.
Spinoza and Spinozism is thus an ideal companion to the study and interpretation of this great philosopher.

This landmark collection will explore the origins and foundations of music education across five continents. The introduction of music as a compulsory subject in schools is of unique significance for music educationists and researchers. However, their shared knowledge of this phenomenon is fragmentary and there is consequently a need for more comprehensive documentation and analysis of the foundational aspect of school music from a variety of international perspectives. Origins and Foundations of Music Education considers the following key issues: the inclusion of music as part of the compulsory school curriculum in the context of the historical and political landscape; the aims, objectives and content of the music curriculum as a compulsory subject; teaching methods; the provision and training of teachers of music; the experiences of pupils experiencing this musical education. Contributors have carefully selected to represent countries which have incorporated music into compulsory schooling for a variety of differing reasons giving a diverse collection which will guide future actions and policy.

Manifest Activity presents and critically examines Thomas Reid's doctrines about the model of human power, the will, our capacities for purposeful conduct, and the place of our agency in the natural world. Reid is one of the most important philosophers of the 18th century, but hitherto under-appreciated; through the reconstruction of his arguments, many of which have never before been discussed, Gideon Yaffe demonstrates that Reid's simple prose and direct style belie the complexity of the views he advocates and the subtlety of the reasons he offers in their favour. For Reid, contrary to the view of many of his predecessors, it is simply manifest that we are active with respect to our behaviours; it is manifest, he thinks, that our actions are not merely remote products of forces that lie outside of our control. Reid holds, instead, that actions are all and only those events that spring from active power, and he produces insightful and imaginative arguments for the claim that only a creature with a mind is capable of having active power. He believes that only human beings, and creatures 'above us', are capable of directing events towards ends, of endowing them with purpose or direction, the distinctive feature of action. However, he also holds that all events, and not merely human actions, are products of active power, power possessed either by human beings or by God. This collection of theses leads Reid to the view that human behaviour and the progress of nature are both essentially teleological. Patterns in nature are the products of laws of which God is the author; patterns in human conduct are the products of character and the laws that individuals set for themselves. Manifest Activity examines Reid's arguments for this view and the view's implications for the nature of character, motivation, and the special kind of causation involved in the production of human behaviour. Yaffe's assessment will greatly profit anyone working on current theories of action and free will, as well as historians of ideas.

Rousseau and Radical Democracy presents the first comprehensive examination of Rousseau's founding role in, and continuing relevance for, recent and influential theories of democracy. Kevin Inston demonstrates the actuality of Rousseau's thinking through an analysis of his deep connection with the groundbreaking work of contemporary European thinkers, including Lefort, Laclau and Mouffe. The book affirms Rousseau's centrality for current debates in democratic thought by showing how, contrary to common assumptions, his writings emphasise the openness and difference necessary for a dynamic mode of democracy committed to extending the principles of freedom and equality. By connecting Rousseau's philosophy with present-day thinking, Inston stresses the theoretical consistency of his political thought against those influential deconstructive readings of his work by thinkers such as Derrida and De Man. This book argues that the ambiguities and tensions in Rousseau actually form part of the logic of Rousseau's rigorous reflection on democracy that accepts the inherent incompleteness and uncertainty of any political project as the condition of freedom and change.

Vigorous and controversial, this book develops a sustained argument for a realist interpretation of science, based on a new analysis of the concept of predictive novelty. Identifying a form of success achieved in science--the successful prediction of novel empirical results--which can be explained only by attributing some measure of truth to the theories that yield it, Jarrett Leplin demonstrates the incapacity of nonrealist accounts to accommodate novel success and constructs a deft realist explanation of novelty. To test the applicability of novel success as a standard of warrant for theories, Leplin examines current directions in theoretical physics, fashioning a powerful critique of currently developing standards of evaluation.
Arguing that explanatory uniqueness warrants inference, and exposing flaws in contending philosophical positions that sever explanatory power from epistemic justification, Leplin holds that abductive, or explanatory, inference is as fundamental as enumerative or eliminative inference, and contends that neither induction nor abduction can proceed without the other on pain of generating paradoxes.
Leplin's conception of novelty has two basic components: an independence condition, ensuring that a result novel for a theory have no essential role, even indirectly, in the theory's provenance; and a uniqueness condition, ensuring that no competing theory provides a basis for predicting the same result. Showing that alternative approaches to novelty fall short in both respects, Leplin proceeds to a series of test cases, engaging prominent scientific theories from nineteenth-century accounts of light to modern cosmology in an effort to demonstrate theepistemological superiority of his view.
Ambitious and tightly argued, A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism advances new positions on major topics in philosophy of science and offers a version of realism as original as it is compelling, making it essential reading for philosophers of science, epistemologists, and scholars in science studies.

Dummett argues that the aim of philosophy is the analysis of thought and that, with Frege, analytical philosophy learned that the route to the analysis of thought is the analysis of language. Here are bold and deep readings of the subject's history and character, which form the topic of this volume.

In the two related works in this volume, Bentham offers a detailed critique of William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-9). In "Comment on the Commentaries," on which Bentham began work in 1774, he exposes the fallacies which he claims to have detected in Blackstone, and criticizes the theory of the Common Law. He goes on to provide important reflections on the nature of law, and more particularly on the nature of customary and of statute law, and on judicial interpretation.
A Fragment on Government, which was published in 1776, was detached from the "Comment on the Commentaries." Concentrating on a passage of five or six pages in which Blackstone discusses the origin of society and government, Bentham offers three main criticisms. First, he criticizes Blackstone's methodology for failing to distinguish between the role of the expositor and the role of the censor, and thereby confusing the question of what the law is with the question of what the law ought to be. Second, he criticizes Blackstone's assumption that the theory of the social contract represents an adequate justification of the obligation to obey government. Third, he criticizes Blackstone's theory of sovereignty, which claims that in every state there must exist some absolute, undivided power, whose commands are law. Bentham points to the existence of states where sovereign power is both divided and limited.
In these two works, published by OUP for the first time, Bentham outlines a number of themes which he goes on to develop in his later works: the principle of utility; the importance of a "natural arrangement" for a legal system; the point at which resistance to government becomesjustifiable; the exposition of legal terms; and much more.
The volume also contains Bentham's "Preface" intended for, but not published in, the second edition of A Fragment on Government, which appeared in 1823. Having by this committed himself to political radicalism, Bentham uses this occasion to reflect on the text and the circumstances in which it was produced.
The text has been edited by H.L.A. Hart and J.H. Burns, whose reputations in their respective fields of legal theory and history of political thought are unsurpassed. The volume contains an Editorial Introduction which explains the provenance of the text, and the method of presentation. The texts are fully annotated with textual and historical notes, and the volume is completed with a detailed subject index, based on a methodology devised by Hart.

While well-known for his book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's articles have been less widely accessible. These two volumes of Unger's Philosophical Papers include articles spanning more than 35 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Dividing the articles thematically, this first volume collects work in epistemology and ethics, among other topics, while the second volume focuses on metaphysics.
Unger's work has advanced the full spectrum of topics at the heart of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, and ethics. Unger advances radical positions, going against the so-called "commonsense philosophy" that has dominated the analytic tradition since its beginnings early in the twentieth century. In epistemology, his articles advance the view that nobody ever knows anything and, beyond that, argue that nobody has any reason to believe anything--and even beyond that, they argue that nobody has any reason to do anything, or even want anything. In metaphysics, his work argues that people do not really exist--and neither do puddles, plants, poodles, and planets. But, as Unger has often changed his favored positions, from one decade to the next, his work also advances the opposite, "commonsense" positions: that there are in fact plenty of people, puddles, plants and planets and, quite beyond that, we know it all to be true. On most major philosophical questions, both of these sides of Unger's significant work are well represented in this major two volume collection.
Unger's vivid writing style, intellectual vitality, and fearlessness in the face of our largest philosophical questions, make these volumes of great interestnot only to the philosophical community but to others who might otherwise find contemporary philosophy dry and technical.

Impressions of Hume presents new essays from leading scholars in different philosophical, historiographical, and literary traditions to which Hume made defining contributions. Hume has made a variety of impressions on these different areas; his writings, philosophical and otherwise, may indeed be read in a number of different ways. For example, they can be taken as transparent vehicles for philosophical intuitions, problems, and arguments that are still at the centre of philosophical reflection today. On the other hand, there are readings which are interested in locating Hume's views against the background of concerns, debates and discussions of Hume's own time. And this is not all. Hume's texts may be read as highly sophisticated literary-cum-philosophical creations: in such cases, the reader's attention tends to be directed at issues of genre and persuasive strategies rather than on argument. Or they may be regarded as moments in the construction of the ideology of modernity, and as contributions to the legitimation of a given social order. As the true classics that they are, Hume's works are typical 'open texts', which present their readers of all provenances with a bounty of materials and inspirations. It is the editors' conviction that the borders between these approaches are far from neat; and that as much cross-fertilization as possible is to be promoted. Impressions of Hume amply demonstrates the rewards of such an approach.

This groundbreaking interdisciplinary collection interrogates the significance of Deleuze's work in the recent and dramatic nonhuman turn. It confronts questions about environmental futures, animals and plants, nonhuman structures and systems, and the place of objects in a more-than-human world.

The philosopher and psychologist G.F. Stout was the teacher of Moore and Russell around 1894. This book shows that Stout's ideas have played a role in Moore and Russell's development from their early idealism towards analytic realism, where Stout's ideas often find their origin in early phenomenology.
The theory of judgement and proposition that Moore and Russell defended around 1900 has to be understood against the background of a one-dimensional semantics, and the question what guarantees the objectivity of thought and judgement. Both aspects have their origin in Stout's psychological account of judgement and the way he distinguishes between act, content and object. Stout is also of interest for his critique of Russell's theory of descriptions and the multiple relation theory of judgement. The book deals with topics relevant for philosophy today, such as tropes and predication, the problem of error, psychologism, and the relation between question and judgement.

This title brings a deconstructive perspective to theories of justice in the early and later work of Rawls, Habermas and Honneth. Deconstructing influential theories of justice by John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, Miriam Bankovsky explores and critiques the early and later work of these three important liberal theorists. Bankovsky examines the commitments that all these thinkers make to a conception of justice as, in Rawls' words, an 'art of the possible' and the difficulties that such commitments present for their theories. Taking a deconstructive approach, the book argues that such a defence of possibility must be supplemented by an acknowledgment of the ways in which theory ultimately fails to reconcile the conflicting demands of 'justice' - namely, it's demand for responsibility for the other in the particular and for impartiality among all. In so doing, the book draws attention to the 'perfectible' (simultaneously possible and impossible) status of theories of justice, celebrating such perfectibility as the very condition for justice's critical function. "Continuum Studies in Political Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in the field of political philosophy. Making available the latest high-quality research from an international range of scholars working on key topics and controversies in political philosophy and political science, this series is an important and stimulating resource for students and academics working in the area.

This book is a collection of specially commissioned chapters from philosophers, economists, and political scientists, focusing on Adam Smith's two main works Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations with a view to bringing Smith to a mainstream philosophy audience while simultaneously informing Smith's traditional constituency.

This book explores the importance of the philosophical dimension of emotions, turning the traditional relationship between emotions and philosophy upside down: instead of being one of many objects of philosophical thought, an emotion contains an inherent philosophical truth. For this thesis, the author refers to Kierkegaard's groundbreaking discovery of 'anxiety' as an emotional experience that is totally different from fear. This allows a deeper understanding of the emotions, and reveals the philosophical primacy of emotions over thoughts, which always convey a meaning. Part I explores the three aspects of anxiety (anxiety about 'nothing', guilt-anxiety, shame-anxiety) that are distinguished by their capacity to disclose the human condition in its naked thatness, which is generally for most of us too hard to bear. Parts II and III then discuss the basic human need for protection from being overwhelmed by the ontological-emotional experience of anxiety. Part II examines the protection given by negation of this intolerable truth in its direct emotional repudiation in nausea, envy and despair. Part III addresses the protection by the two positive feelings of love and trust, which claim to be stronger than anxiety and therefore to be able to overcome it. Only sympathy cannot be categorised here. It belongs in a psychoanalytic therapy guided by existential perspectives, where the analyst listens with a philosophical ear and recognises his patients as 'reluctant philosophers' who are especially sensitive to the ontological truth disclosed in anxiety and therefore suffer not only 'from reminiscences' (Freud), but also from their own being.

Derrida wrote a vast number of texts for particular events across the world, as well as a series of works that portray him as a voyager. As an Algerian migr , a postcolonial outsider, and an idiomatic writer who felt tied to a language that was not his own, and as a figure obsessed by the singularity of the literary or philosophical event, Derrida emerges as one whose thought always arrives on occasion. But how are we to understand the event in Derrida? Is there a risk that such stories of Derridas work tend to misunderstand the essential unpredictability at work in the conditions of his thought? And how are we to reconcile the importance in Derrida of the unknowable event, the pull of the singular, with deconstructions critical and philosophical rigour and its claims to rethink more systematically the ethico-political field. This book argues that this negotiation in fact allows deconstruction to reformulate the very questions that we associate with ethical and political responsibility and shows this to be the central interest in Derridas work.

An Essay on Metaphysics is one of the finest works of the great Oxford philosopher, historian, and archaeologist R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943). First published in 1940, it is a broad-ranging work in which Collingwood considers the nature of philosophy, especially of metaphysics. He puts forward his well-known doctrine of absolute presuppositions, expounds a logic of question and answer, and gives an original and influential account of causation. The book has been widely read and much discussed ever since. In this revised edition the complete original text is accompanied by three previously unpublished essays by Collingwood which will be essential reading for any serious student of his thought: `The Nature of Metaphysical Study' (1934), `The Function of Metaphysics in Civilization' (1938), and `Notes for a Essay on Logic' (1939). These fascinating writings illuminate and amplify the ideas of the Essay, to which they are closely related. The distinguished philosopher and Collingwood scholar Rex Martin has established authoritative versions of these new texts, added a short set of notes on the Essay, and contributed a substantial introduction explaining the story of the composition of all these works, discussing their major themes, and setting them in the context of Collingwood's philosophy as a whole.

This title introduces the history and methods of Phenomenology through the study of four key thinkers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. This book provides a concise and comprehensive introduction to the concept of phenomenology, perhaps the most important and influential movement in twentieth century philosophy. It explains the development of the phenomenological method in the works of four thinkers: Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It also addresses the criticisms directed at phenomenology by Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, and the ways in which phenomenology has continued to flourish in spite of such critique, in the work of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion. The text includes many helpful features such as key definitions, sample essay and exam questions, an extensive bibliography, and suggested readings for each topic covered, making the book an ideal companion to any course in phenomenology and phenomenological thinkers. The book presupposes no prior knowledge on the part of the reader, making it suitable for those encountering phenomenology for the first time, but it also provides an original interpretation that will be of lasting value to postgraduates and scholars.

Developing work in the theories of action and explanation, Eldridge argues that moral and political philosophers require accounts of what is historically possible, while historians require rough philosophical understandings of ideals that merit reasonable endorsement. Both Immanuel Kant and Walter Benjamin recognize this fact. Each sees a special place for religious consciousness and critical practice in the articulation and revision of ideals that are to have cultural effect, but they differ sharply in the forms of religious-philosophical understanding, cultural criticism, and political practice that they favor. Kant defends a liberal, reformist, Protestant stance, emphasizing the importance of liberty, individual rights, and democratic institutions. His fullest picture of movement toward a moral culture appears in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, where he describes conjecturally the emergence of an ethical commonwealth. Benjamin defends a politics of improvisatory alertness and consciousness-raising that is suspicious of progress and liberal reform. He practices a form of modernist, materialist criticism that is strongly rooted in his encounters with Kant, Hoelderlin, and Goethe. His fullest, finished picture of this critical practice appears in One-Way Street, where he traces the continuing force of unsatisfied desires. By drawing on both Kant and Benjamin, Eldridge hopes to avoid both moralism (standing on sharply specified normative commitments at all costs) and waywardness (rejecting all settled commitments). And in doing so, he seeks to make better sense of the commitment-forming, commitment-revising, anxious, reflective and sometimes grownup acculturated human subjects we are.

How can we take history seriously as real and relevant? Despite the hazards of politically dangerous or misleading accounts of the past, we live our lives in a great network of cooperation with other actors; past, present, and future. We study and reflect on the past as a way of exercising a responsibility for shared action. In each of the chapters of Full History Smith poses a key question about history as a concern for conscious participants in the sharing of action, starting with "What Is Historical Meaningfulness?" and ending with "How Can History Have an Aim?" Constructing new models of historical meaning while engaging critically with perspectives offered by Ranke, Dilthey, Rickert, Heidegger, Eliade, Sartre, Foucault, and Arendt, Smith develops a philosophical account of thinking about history that moves beyond postmodernist skepticism. Full History seeks to expand the cast of significant actors, establishing an inclusive version of the historical that recognizes large-scale cumulative actions but also encourages critical revision and expansion of any paradigm of shared action.

This book pairs close readings of some of the classic writings of existentialist philosophers with interpretations of films that reveal striking parallels to each of those texts, demonstrating their respective philosophies in action. Individual chapters include significant excerpts from the original texts being discussed and illustrated. Pairings cover Schopenhauer and Waking Life, Stirner and Hud, Kierkegaard and Winter Light, Nietzsche and The Fountainhead, Heidegger, Blade Runner and The Thin Red Line, Camus, Leaving Las Vegas and Missing, Sartre, Husbands and Wives, and Michael Collins, de Beauvoir and Revolutionary Road, and Foucault and One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest. Movies with Meaning offers a clear and insightful examination of the relationships between existential philosophers and film, providing both digests of their most significant texts and cinematic illustrations of what each had in mind. For the first time in one place, this book analyses the implications for film of the perspectives of a wide array of the most significant existentialist thinkers. Organized chronologically, like most existentialism anthologies, this is an ideal textbook for an intermediate level existentialism course, or as a companion to a selection of primary texts.

This text offers a series of critical commentaries on, and forced encounters between, different thinkers. At stake in this philosophical and psychoanalytical enquiry is the drawing of a series of diagrams of the finite/infinite relation, and the mapping out of the contours for a speculative and pragmatic production of subjectivity.

This is the first English translation of one of Heidegger's most important early lecture courses, including his most extensive treatment of the topic of destruction. "Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression" is a crucial text for understanding the early development of Heidegger's thought. This lecture course was presented in the summer semester of 1920 at the University of Freiburg. At the center of this course is Heidegger's elaboration of the meaning and function of the phenomenological destruction. In no other work by Heidegger do we find as comprehensive a treatment of the theme of destruction as in this lecture course. Culminating in a destruction of contemporaneous philosophy in terms of its understanding of 'life' as a primal phenomenon, this lecture course can be seen to open the way towards a renewal of the meaning of philosophy as such. This hugely important philosophical work is now available in English for the first time.

Martin Flanagan uses Bakhtins notions of dialogism, chronotope and polyphony to address fundamental questions about film form and reception, focusing particularly on the way cinematic narrative utilizes time and space in its very construction.

This book upends some of the myths that have come to surround the work of the philosopher Theodor W. Adorno - not least amongst them, his supposed fatalism. Sebastian Truskolaski argues that Adorno's writings allow us to address what is arguably the central challenge of modern philosophy: how to picture a world beyond suffering and injustice without, at the same time, betraying its vital impulse. By re-appraising Adorno's writings on politics, philosophy, and art, this book reconstructs this notoriously difficult author's overall project from a radically new perspective (Adorno's famous 'standpoint of redemption'), and brings his central concerns to bear on the problems of today. On the one hand, this means reading Adorno alongside his principal interlocutors (including Kant, Marx and Benjamin). On the other hand, it means asking how his secular brand of social criticism can serve to safeguard the image of a better world - above all, when the invocation of this image occurs alongside Adorno's recurrent reference to the Old Testament ban on making images of God. By reading Adorno in this iconoclastic way, Adorno and the Ban on Images contributes to current debates about Utopia that have come to define political visions across the political spectrum.

Much has been written about Heidegger's reappropriation of Aristotle, but little has been said about the philosophical import and theoretical context of this element of Heidegger's work. In this important new book, Michael Bowler sheds new light on the philosophical context of Heidegger's return to Aristotle in his early works and thereby advances a reinterpretation of the background to Heidegger's forceful critique of the primacy of theoretical reason and his radical reconception of the very nature of philosophical thinking. This book offers a detailed analysis of the development of Heidegger's thought from his early enagagement with neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology. Through this reading, a criticism of the theoretical conception of philosophy as primordial science, especially in relation to life and lived-experience (Erlebnis), emerges. It is in this context that Bowler examines Heidegger's reappropriation of key aspects of Aristotle's thought. In Aristotle's notions of movement, life and activity proper (praxis), Heidegger perceives a new approach to the dilemma presently facing philosophy, namely how philosophy is situated within life and human existence.