This volume is about the many ways we perceive. In nineteen new essays, philosophers and cognitive scientists explore the nature of the individual senses, how and what they tell us about the world, and how they interrelate. They consider how the senses extract perceptual content from receptoral information and what kinds of objects we perceive and whether multiple senses ever perceive a single event. Questions pertaining to how many senses we have, what makes one sense distinct from another, and whether and why distinguishing senses may be useful feature prominently. Contributors examine the extent to which the senses act in concert, rather than as discrete modalities, and whether this influence is epistemically pernicious, neutral, or beneficial. Many of the essays engage with the idea that it is unduly restrictive to think of perception as a collation of contents provided by individual sense modalities. Rather, contributors contend that to understand perception properly we need to build into our accounts the idea that the senses work together. In doing so, they aim to develop better paradigms for understanding the senses and thereby to move toward a better understanding of perception.

Our sense that a waltz is "in three" or a blues song is "in four with a shuffle" comes from our sense of musical meter. Hearing in Time explores the metric aspect of our musical experience from a psychological point of view. Musical meter is taken as a musically-specific instance entrainment, that is, our more general ability to synchronize our actions to the rhythms around us. As such, musical meter is subject to a number of fundamental perceptual and cognitive constraints. These constraints are the cornerstones of Hearing in Time's account of musical meter. Hearing in Time also takes into account the fact that listening to music, like many other rhythmic activities, is something that we do a lot. It also approaches musical meter in the context of music as it is actually performed, with nuances of timing and dynamics, rather than as a theoretical ideal. Hearing in Time's approach to meter is not based on any particular musical style or cultural practice, and so it discusses musical examples from a wide range of musical styles and cultures-from Beethoven and Bach to Brubeck and Ghanaian (Ewe) drumming. In taking this broad approach a number of fundamental similarities between a variety of different metric phenomena-such as the difference between so-called simple versus complex or additive meters-become apparent. Hearing in Time is written for musicians, musicologists, music theorists and psychologists who are interested in rhythm and meter. Only a modest ability read a musical score is presumed, and most musical examples are taken from familiar popular and classical repertory.

Traditional, secular, and fundamentalist-all three categories are contested, yet in their contestation they shape our sensibilities and are mutually implicated, the one with the others. This interplay brings to the foreground more than ever the question of what it means to think and live as Tradition. The Orthodox theologians of the twentieth century, in particular, have emphasized Tradition not as a dead letter but as a living presence of the Holy Spirit. But how can we discern Tradition as living discernment from fundamentalism? What does it mean to live in Tradition when surrounded by something like the "secular"? These essays interrogate these mutual implications, beginning from the understanding that whatever secular or fundamentalist may mean, they are not Tradition, which is historical, particularistic, in motion, ambiguous and pluralistic, but simultaneously not relativistic. Contributors: R. Scott Appleby, Nikolaos Asproulis, Brandon Gallaher, Paul J. Griffiths, Vigen Guroian, Dellas Oliver Herbel, Edith M. Humphrey, Slavica Jakelic, Nadieszda Kizenko, Wendy Mayer, Brenna Moore, Graham Ward, Darlene Fozard Weaver

There is a traditional scepticism about whether the world 'out there' really is as we perceive it. A new breed of hyper-sceptics now challenges whether we even have the perceptual experience we think we have. According to these writers, perceptual consciousness is a kind of false consciousness. This view grows out of the discovery of phenomena like change blindness and inattentional blindness. Such radical scepticism has acute and widespread implications for the study of perception and consciousness. Contributors include: psychologists Susan Blackmore, Arien Mack and Bruce Bridgeman and philosophers Daniel Dennett, Andy Clark, Jonathan Cohen, and Charles Siewert.

This book offers a contemporary philosophy of life drawing upon Buddhist resources from the Vimalakirti Sutra. Among the major themes in this Mahayana Buddhist scripture is the "skillful means" required to live a healthy and undeluded life. The book adopts that theme as a means of developing a practical approach to contemporary Buddhist life. Following many of the brilliant stories in the sutra, this book attempts to provide clear explanations for the primary Buddhist teachings and the relationships that bind them all together into an inspiring way of living. Among the questions addressed are: who is the Buddha, how is a worldview of change and contingency applicable to current life, what does it mean to claim that there is no permanent self, what are the primary characteristics of an admirable Buddhist life, how is freedom conceived in Buddhism, and how do all of these themes help us address issues that are pressing for us today. Although historical questions do arise in the book, its primary purpose is contemporary and practical, an effort to say clearly how this text helps us stake out a way of living for contemporary, global citizens.

The cognitive and neural sciences have been on the brink of a paradigm shift for over a decade now. The traditional information-processing framework in psychology, with its computer metaphor of the mind, is still considered to be the mainstream approach. However, the dynamical-systems perspective on mental activity is now receiving a more rigorous treatment, allowing it to move beyond the trendy buzzwords that have become associated with it. The Continuity of Mind will help to galvanize the forces of dynamical systems theory, cognitive and computational neuroscience, connectionism, and ecological psychology that are needed to complete this paradigm shift.
In this book, Michael Spivey lays bare the fact that comprehending a spoken sentence, understanding a visual scene, or just thinking about the day's events involves the coalescing of different neuronal activation patterns over time, i.e., a continuous state-space trajectory that flirts with a series of point attractors. As a result, the brain cannot help but spend most of its time instantiating patterns of activity that are in between identifiable mental states rather than in them. When this scenario is combined with the fact that most cognitive processes are richly embedded in their environmental context in real time, the state space (in which brief visitations of attractor basins are your 'thoughts') suddenly encompasses not just neuronal dimensions, but extends to biomechanical and environmental dimensions as well. As a result, your moment-by-moment experience of the world around you, even right now, can be described as a continuous trajectory through a high-dimensional state space that comprises diverse mental states.
Spivey has organized The Continuity of Mind to present a systematic overview of how perception, cognition, and action are partially overlapping segments of one continuous mental flow, rather than three distinct mental systems. As a result, the apparent partitions that were once thought to separate mental constructs inevitably turn out, upon closer inspection, to be fuzzy graded transitions. The initial chapters provide first-hand demonstrations of the 'gray areas' in mental activity that happen in between discretely labeled mental events, as well as geometric visualizations of attractors in state space that make the dynamical-systems framework seem less mathematically abstract. The middle chapters present scores of behavioral and neurophysiological studies that portray the continuous temporal dynamics inherent in categorization, language comprehension, visual perception, as well as attention, action, and reasoning. The final chapters discuss what the mind itself must look like if its activity is continuous in time and its contents are distributed in state space. The Continuity of Mind is essential reading for those in the cognitive and neural sciences who want to see where the Dynamical Cognition movement is taking us.

Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans, a collection of original articles on self-awareness in monkeys, apes, humans, and other species, focuses on controversies about how to measure self-awareness, which species are capable of self-awareness and which are not, and why. Several chapters focus on the controversial question of whether gorillas, like other great apes and human infants, are capable of mirror self-recognition (MSR) or whether they are anomalously unable to do so. Other chapters focus on whether macaque monkeys are capable of MSR. The focus of the chapters is both comparative and developmental: several contributors explore the value of frameworks from human developmental psychology for comparative studies. This dual focus - comparative and developmental - reflects the interdisciplinary nature of the volume, which brings together biological anthropologists, comparative and developmental psychologists, and cognitive scientists from Japan, France, Spain, Hungary, New Zealand, Scotland and the United States.

Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating.

Music offers a unique opportunity to better understand the organization of the human brain. Like language, music exists in all human societies. Like language, music is a complex, rule-governed activity that seems specific to humans, and associated with a specific brain architecture. Yet unlike most other high-level functions of the human brain - and unlike language - music is a skill at which only a minority of people become proficient. The study of music as a major brain function has for some time been relatively neglected. Just recently, however, we have witnessed an explosion in research activities on music perception and performance and their correlates in the human brain. This volume brings together an outstanding collection of international authorities - from the fields of music, neuroscience, psychology, and neurology - to describe the amazing advances being made in understanding the complex relationship between music and the brain. Aimed at psychologists and neuroscientists, this is a book that will lay the foundations for a cognitive neuroscience of music.

Attention has long been recognized as a central topic in human psychology. And, in an increasingly 'connected' world, understanding our attentional networks-in particular, their role in the selection of information, the maintenance of alertness and self-control, and the management of emotions-is, arguably, more important than ever. As research in and around the psychology of attention continues to flourish, this new four-volume collection from Routledge meets the need for an authoritative reference work to make sense of a complex body of research. The materials gathered in Volume I include explorations of the limits of attention and early empirical work on methods to probe brain activity. The major works collected in the second volume examine critical theories that allow computer programs to simulate and predict how attention operates, while Volume III is organized around the use of brain imaging, cellular recording, and optogenetics to delineate how the brain carries out the functions of attention. The final volume connects studies of attention to applications, including: connectivity to electronic media; brain-based educational curricula, the economics of decision making, and psychopathologies. With a full index, together with a comprehensive introduction, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, The Psychology of Attention is an essential work of reference. The collection will be particularly useful as a database allowing scattered and often fugitive material to be easily located. It will also be welcomed as a crucial tool permitting rapid access to less familiar-and sometimes overlooked-texts. For researchers and advanced students, it is a vital one-stop research and instructional resource.

How do you feel when you bite into a pear wear a feather boa stand in a noisy auditorium or look for a friend in a crowd? It's likely that one of these situations would be pleasant for you, and perhaps one would be unpleasant. Some people will adore the grainy texture of a pear, while others will shudder at the idea of this texture in their mouths. Touching a feather boa will be fun and luxurious to some, and others will bristle at the idea of all those feathers brushing on the skin. Noisy, busy environments will energize some people, and will overwhelm others. These different reactions reflect people's individual sensory patterns, which in turn affect the way we react to everything that happens to us throughout the day. Living Sensationally identifies four major sensory types: Seekers, Bystanders, Avoiders and Sensors. The author helps readers to find their own patterns and the patterns of those around them, and then offers suggestions for harnessing this knowledge to make their lives more in synch with their sensations. Living Sensationally provides practical sensory ideas for individuals, families and businesses. Armed with the information in Living Sensationally, people will be able to pick just the right kind of clothing, job and home and know why they are making such choices.

In a major contribution to the theory of perception, A. D. Smith presents a truly original defense of direct realism--the view that in perception we are directly aware of things in the physical world.

"The Problem of Perception" offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of perception can adequately rebut. Smith then develops a theory of perception that does succeed in answering these arguments; and because these arguments are the only two that present direct realism with serious problems arising from the nature of perception, direct realism emerges here for the first time as an ultimately tenable position within the philosophy of perception.

At the heart of Smith's theory is a new way of drawing the distinction between perception and sensation, along with an unusual treatment of the nature of objects of hallucination. With in-depth reference to both the analytical and the phenomenological literature on perception, and with telling criticism of alternative views, Smith's groundbreaking work will be of value to philosophers of perception in both the analytical and the phenomenological tradition, as well as to psychologists of perception.

Most research on perception has focused on the perceptual experience of three-dimensional, solid, bounded, and coherent material objects - items like tables and tomatoes. But as well as having perceptual experience of such objects, we also experience such aspects of the world as, for instance, rainbows and surfaces, shadows and absences: things that are ephemeral by contrast with material objects. This book presents fifteen new essays on the perceptual experience of such ephemera. The editors' introduction provides a detailed guide to the topic as a whole, setting out the thematic background to this emerging area of research in contemporary philosophy of perception. The volume winds a path through the ephemeral, considering such topics as sounds, smells, transparency, reflection, camouflage, solidity, and ambient vision. A general aim of the volume is to make a case that the broad range of ephemera it catalogues is far from marginal, or insubstantial with respect to their philosophical interest and value. Philosophical attention to perceptul ephemera may well suggest novel routes to arriving at a more developed understanding of perceptual experience at large and its characteristic features.

The world expert in multisensory perception on the remarkable ways we can use our senses to lead richer lives 'Talks total sense, lots of fun facts, right up there with the best of the best' Chris Evans 'Packed with studies on pain, attention, memory, mood' The Times How can the furniture in your home affect your wellbeing? What colour clothing will help you play sport better? And what simple trick will calm you after a tense day at work? In this revelatory book, pioneering and entertaining Oxford professor Charles Spence shows how our senses change how we think and feel, and how by 'hacking' them we can reduce stress, become more productive and be happier. We like to think of ourselves as rational beings, and yet it's the scent of expensive face cream that removes wrinkles (temporarily), a room actually feels warmer if you use a warmer paint colour, and the noise of the crowd really does affect the referee's decision. Understanding how our senses interact can produce incredible results. This is popular science at its unbelievable best. 'Spence does for the senses what Marie Kondo does for homes' Avery Gilbert, author of What the Nose Knows 'Everything you need to know about how to cope with the hidden sensory overload of modern life, engagingly told' Robin Dunbar, author of How Many Friends Does One Person Need?

Perception is one of the oldest and most deeply investigated topics in the field of psychology, and it is also raises some profound philosophical questions. It is concerned with how we use the information reaching our senses to guide and control our behaviour as well as to create our particular, subjective experiences of the surrounding world. In this Very Short Introduction, Brian J. Rogers discusses the philosophical question of what it means to perceive, as well as describing how we are able to perceive the particular characteristics of objects and scenes such as their lightness, colour, form, depth, and motion. What we perceive, however, does not always correspond to what exists in the world and, as Rogers shows, the study of illusions can be useful in telling us something about the nature and limitations of our perceptual processes. Rogers also explores perception from an evolutionary perspective, explaining how evolutionary pressures have shaped the perceptual systems of humans and other animals. He shows that perception is not necessarily a separate and independent process but rather part of a 'perceptual system', involving both the extraction of perceptual information and the control of action. Rogers goes on to cover the significant progress made recently in the understanding of perception through the use of precise and controlled psychophysical methods, single cell recordings, and imaging techniques. There have also been many insights from attempts to model perceptual processes in artificial systems. As Rogers shows, these attempts have revealed how difficult it is to programme machines to perform even the most simple of perceptual tasks that we take for granted. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

Does life have meaning? Is it possible for life to be meaningful when the world is filled with suffering and when so much depends merely upon chance? Even if there is meaning, is there enough to justify living? These questions are difficult to resolve. There are times in which we face the mundane, the illogically cruel, and the tragic, which leave us to question the value of our lives. However, Iddo Landau argues, our lives often are, or could be made, meaningful-we've just been setting the bar too high for evaluating what meaning there is. When it comes to meaning in life, Landau explains, we have let perfect become the enemy of the good. We have failed to find life perfectly meaningful, and therefore have failed to see any meaning in our lives. We must attune ourselves to enhancing and appreciating the meaning in our lives, and Landau shows us how to do that. In this warmly written book, rich with examples from the author's life, film, literature, and history, Landau offers new theories and practical advice that awaken us to the meaning already present in our lives and demonstrates how we can enhance it. He confronts prevailing nihilist ideas that undermine our existence, and the questions that dog us no matter what we believe. While exposing the weaknesses of ideas that lead many to despair, he builds a strong case for maintaining more hope. Along the way, he faces provocative questions: Would we choose to live forever if we could? Does death render life meaningless? If we examine it in the context of the immensity of the whole universe, can we consider life meaningful? If we feel empty once we achieve our goals, and the pursuit of these goals is what gives us a sense of meaning, then what can we do? Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World is likely to alter the way you understand your life.

Since the time of Hippocrates, madness has typically been viewed through the lens of disease, dysfunction, and defect. Madness, like all other disease, happens when something in the mind, or in the brain, does not operate the way that it should or as nature intended. In this paradigm, the role of the healer is simply to find the dysfunction and fix it. This remains the dominant perspective in global psychiatry today. In Madness: A Philosophical Exploration, philosopher of science Justin Garson presents a radically different paradigm for conceiving of madness and the forms that it takes. In this paradigm, which he calls madness-as-strategy, madness is neither a disease nor a defect, but a designed feature, like the heart or lungs. That is to say, at least sometimes, when someone is mad, everything inside of them is working exactly as it should and as nature intended. Through rigorous engagement with texts spanning the classical era to Darwinian medicine, Garson shows that madness-as-strategy is not a new conception. Thus, more than a history of science or a conceptual genealogy, Madness is a recovery mission. In recovering madness-as-strategy, it leads us beyond today's dominant medical paradigm toward a very different form of thinking and practice. This book is essential reading for philosophers of medicine and psychiatry, particularly for those who seek to understand the nature of health, disease, and mental disorder. It will also be a valuable resource for historians and sociologists of medicine for its innovative approach to the history of madness. Most importantly, it will be useful for mental health service users, survivors, and activists, who seek an alternative and liberating vision of what it means to be mad.

Why do things look blurry underwater? Why do people drive too fast in fog? How do you high-pass filter a cup of tea? What have mixer taps to do with colour vision? Basic Vision: An Introduction to Visual Perception demystifies the processes through which we see the world. Written by three authors with over 80 years of research and undergraduate teaching experience between them, it leads the reader step-by-step through the intricacies of visual processing, with full-colour illustrations on nearly every page. The writing style captures the excitement of recent research in neuroscience that has transformed our understanding of visual processing, but delivers it with a humour that keeps the reader enthused, rather than bemused. The book takes us through the various elements that come together as our perception of the world around us: the perception of size, colour, motion, and three-dimensional space. It illustrates the intricacy of the visual system, discussing its development during infancy, and revealing how the brain can get it wrong, either as a result of brain damage, through which the network of processes become compromised, or through illusion, where the brain compensates for mixed messages by seeing what it thinks should be there, rather than conveying the reality. The book also demonstrates the importance of contemporary techniques and methodology, and neuroscience-based techniques in particular, in driving forward our understanding of the visual system. Online Resource Centre The Online Resource Centre to accompany Basic Vision features: For registered adopters: Figures from the book available to download, to facilitate lecture preparation. Test bank of multiple choice questions - a readily available tool for either formative or summative assessment. A Journal Club, with questions to lead students through key research articles that relate to topics covered in the book. For students: Annotated web links, giving students ready access to these additional learning resources.

Joshua Gert presents an original account of color properties, and of our perception of them. He employs a general philosophical strategy - neo-pragmatism - which challenges an assumption made by virtually all other theories of color. Neo-pragmatism rejects the standard representationalist strategy for solving "placement problems" in philosophy, which relies on the existence of a substantive notion of reference and truth. Instead, it makes use of deflationary accounts of such semantic notions. Applied to the domain of color, the result is a view according to which colors are primitive properties of objects, irreducible to physical or dispositional properties. In this way they are more like numbers, and less like natural kinds such as water or gold. Objective colors are also - contrary to current dogma - insufficiently determinate in their nature to allow them to be associated with precise points in standard color spaces. A given color can present different veridical appearances in different viewing circumstances, and to different normal viewers. It is these appearances, which are to be understood in an adverbial way, that can be located in standard color spaces. In explaining the distinction between objective color and color appearance, a central analogy to which Gert appeals is that between the perceptible three-dimensional shape of an object, and the various ways in which that shape appears from various perspectives. Primitive Colors also offers an account of color constancy, a moderated version of representationalism about visual experience, and a criticism of the thesis of the transparency of experience.

Colours are increasingly important in our daily life, but how did colour vision evolve? How have colours been made, used and talked about in different cultures and tasks? How do various species of animals see colours? Which physical stimuli allow us to see colours and by which physiological mechanisms are they perceived? How and why do people differ in their colour perceptions? In answering these questions and others, this book offers an unusually broad account of the complex phenomenon of colour and colour vision. The book's broad and accessible approach gives it wide appeal and it will serve as a useful coursebook for upper-level undergraduate students studying psychology, particularly cognitive neuroscience and visual perception courses, as well as for students studying colour vision as part of biology, medicine, art and architecture courses.

This book provides a state-of-the-art discussion forum for topics that are of high interest in the field of visual perception research. Experts from different countries and different scientific disciplines, such as medicine, psychology, neuroscience, sport and movement science, provide a number of significant contributions, covering recent theoretical developments, innovative methodical developments, current research evidence, as well as implications for practical applications in the field of visual perception. Topics discussed in the book include the role of importance in visual perception, accuracy and bias in emotion perception, automated vector-based gaze analysis, visual-vestibular interactions when performing complex skills, variability of fixation durations in healthy participants, gaze behaviour in subjects with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, perception of moving objects in real life, controlling posture in differing perceptual information situations, orientation matching in perceptual space, error correction on the basis of visual information in sports, visual perceptual learning in cytopathology, visuomotor behaviour in virtual reality situations, role of augmented visual feedback in motor learning, informational domains in integrating information from different sensory sources, and the role of visual inputs in sensorimotor integration. Given the wide range of topics and scientific disciplines, this book may be an important source of information for graduate students, researchers and practitioners that study and work in the field of visual perception.

We make 3-5 eye movements per second, and these movements are crucial in helping us deal with the vast amounts of information we encounter in our everyday lives. In recent years, thanks to the development of eye tracking technology, there has been a growing interest in monitoring and measuring these movements, with a view to understanding how we attend to and process the visual information we encounter. Eye tracking as a research tool is now more accessible than ever, and is growing in popularity among researchers from a whole host of different disciplines. Usability analysts, sports scientists, cognitive psychologists, reading researchers, psycholinguists, neurophysiologists, electrical engineers, and others, all have a vested interest in eye tracking for different reasons. The ability to record eye-movements has helped advance our science and led to technological innovations. However, the growth of eye tracking in recent years has also presented a variety of challenges - in particular the issue of how to design an eye-tracking experiment, and how to analyse the data. This book is a much needed comprehensive handbook of eye tracking methodology. It describes how to evaluate and acquire an eye-tracker, how to plan and design an eye tracking study, and how to record and analyse eye-movement data. Practicality lies at the heart of the book, providing in-depth guidance to key questions: how raw data samples are converted into fixations and saccades using event detection algorithms, how the different representations of eye movement data are calculated using AOIs, heat maps and scanpaths, and how all the measures of eye movements relate to these processes. Part I presents the technology and skills needed to perform high-quality research with eye-trackers. Part II examines the predominant methods applied to the data which eye-trackers record. These include the parsing of raw sample data into oculomotor events, and how to calculate other representations of eye movements such as heat maps and transition matrices. Part III gives a comprehensive outline of the measures which can be calculated using the events and representations described in Part II. This is a taxonomy of the measures available to eye-tracking researchers, sorted by type of movement of the eyes and type of analysis. For anyone in the sciences considering conducting research involving eye-tracking, this book is an essential reference work.

Anyone interested in the study of attention will have had some exposure to the work of Anne Treisman. Anne Treisman has been one of the most influential cognitive psychologists in the last 50 years. Her research and theoretical insights have influenced a variety of disciplines, including vision sciences, auditory sciences, cognitive psychology, cognitive neurosciences, philosophy, psychiatry, neuropsychology, and behavioral neurology. She is best known for her work on attention. Early in her career, much of that work involved auditory stimuli. Her later work has been primarily in the realm of visual attention. She has been especially concerned with the interactions among visual perception, attention, and memory as they relate to conscious and unconscious experience. Her Feature Integration Theory has been one of the organizing ideas in the field for three decades. While still a graduate student at Oxford, she helped launch the modern study of attention. In the present volume, several of her most influential papers are reprinted (including some of the harder to find early work). To accompany these reprints, the editors invited experts to comment and/or to show how their own work had been shaped by Treisman's ideas and findings. The result is a scientifically rich ride through the world of ideas inspired by Treisman's work. The contributed chapters include discussions of auditory and visual attention, the role of features in selection, parallel and serial processing, and automaticity. They describe the roots and evolution of Feature Integration Theory and related models like Guided Search. They explore the interactions of attention and perception at the cognitive, neuropsychological, and biological levels. Readers can consider the critical role of binding in perception, the role of attention in scene perception, as well as the influence of cognitive load, memory, reflection, and perceptual learning on early and late processing. They will see how methods to study conscious perceptual awareness have evolved over the years.

Perceiving in Depth is a sequel to Binocular Vision and Stereopsis and to Seeing in Depth, both by Ian P. Howard and Brian J. Rogers. This three-volume work is much broader in scope than previous texts and includes mechanisms of depth perception by all senses, including aural, electrosensory organs, and the somatosensory system. The work contains three extensively illustrated and referenced volumes. Volume 1 reviews sensory coding, psychophysical and analytic procedures, and basic visual mechanisms. Volume 2 reviews stereoscopic vision. Volume 3 reviews all mechanisms of depth perception other than stereoscopic vision. Together, these three volumes provide the most detailed review of all aspects of perceiving the three-dimensional world. Volume 3 addresses all depth-perception mechanisms other than stereopsis. The chapter starts with reviews of monocular cues to depth. These cues include accommodation, vergence eye movements, perspective, interposition, shading, and motion parallax. A perceptual constancy is the ability to judge a feature of a stimulus as constant in spite of variations in the retinal image. Constancies in depth perception, such as the ability to perceive the sizes, and 3-D shapes of objects as they move or rotate are reviewed. The ways in which different depth cues interact are discussed. They can complement each other, compete, or interact so as to increase the range of depth perception. The next chapter reviews sources of information, such as changing disparity, image looming, and vergence eye movements, used in the perception of objects moving in depth. Various pathologies of depth perception, including visual neglect, stereoanomalies, and albanism are reviewed. Visual depth-perception mechanisms through the animal kingdom are reviewed, starting with insects and progressing though crustaceans, fish, amphibians, retiles, birds, and mammals. Most animals respond to image looming, and many use perspective and motion parallax to detect depth. Stereoscopic vision based on binocular disparity has evolved in some insects, frogs, and mammals. The chapter includes a discussion of the way in which stereoscopic vision may have evolved. The next chapter describes how visual depth perception is used to guide reaching movements of the hand, avoiding obstacles, and walking to a distant object. The next three chapters review non-visual mechanisms of depth perception. Auditory mechanisms include auditory localization, echolocation in bats and marine mammals, and the lateral-line system of fish. Some fish emit electric discharges and then use electric sense organs to detect distortions of the electric field produced by nearby objects. Some beetles and snakes use heat-sensitive sense organs to detect sources of heat. The volume ends with a discussion of mechanisms used by animals to navigate to a distant site. Ants find their way back to the nest by using landmarks and by integrating their walking movements. Several animals navigate by the stars or by polarized sunlight. It seems to be established that animals in several phyla navigate by detecting the Earth's magnetic field.

An examination of the two most radical dissociation syndromes of the human pain experience-pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain-and what they reveal about the complex nature of pain and its sensory, cognitive, and behavioral components. In Feeling Pain and Being in Pain, Nikola Grahek examines two of the most radical dissociation syndromes to be found in human pain experience: pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain. Grahek shows that these two syndromes-the complete dissociation of the sensory dimension of pain from its affective, cognitive, and behavioral components, and its opposite, the dissociation of pain's affective components from its sensory-discriminative components (inconceivable to most of us but documented by ample clinical evidence)-have much to teach us about the true nature and structure of human pain experience. Grahek explains the crucial distinction betweenfeeling pain and being in pain, defending it on both conceptual and empirical grounds. He argues that the two dissociative syndromes reveal the complexity of the human pain experience: its major components, the role they play in overall pain experience, the way they work together, and the basic neural structures and mechanisms that subserve them. Feeling Pain and Being in Pain does not offer another philosophical theory of pain that conclusively supports or definitively refutes either subjectivist or objectivist assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Instead, Grahek calls for a less doctrinaire and more balanced approach to the study of mind-brain phenomena.