Research on attention has evolved dramatically since the early work of the 1950s, and even in the few years since the publication of the first edition of this book. There have been significant changes in the study of how we are able to select some aspects for processing and ignore others, and how we are able to combine tasks, learn skills and make intentional actions. Attention is now increasingly seen as a complex process intimately linked with perception, memory and action. New questions are continually being addressed in the area of crossmodal attention and there have been important developments in brain imaging, which allow new insights into the biological bases of attention.
After an initial consideration of what attention might be, this book charts the development in the ideas and theories which surround the field. An entirely new chapter addresses the nature of auditory attention and the question of how visual and auditory attention are combined across modalities. The problems of task combination, skill acquisition and automaticity are considered, as well as the selection and control of action, and conscious and unconscious processing.
"The Psychology of Attention, Second Edition" provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to this fascinating and rapidly developing field.

Research on attention has evolved dramatically since the early work of the 1950s, and even in the few years since the publication of the first edition of this book. There have been significant changes in the study of how we are able to select some aspects for processing and ignore others, and how we are able to combine tasks, learn skills and make intentional actions. Attention is now increasingly seen as a complex process intimately linked with perception, memory and action. New questions are continually being addressed in the area of crossmodal attention and there have been important developments in brain imaging, which allow new insights into the biological bases of attention.
After an initial consideration of what attention might be, this book charts the development in the ideas and theories which surround the field. An entirely new chapter addresses the nature of auditory attention and the question of how visual and auditory attention are combined across modalities. The problems of task combination, skill acquisition and automaticity are considered, as well as the selection and control of action, and conscious and unconscious processing.
"The Psychology of Attention, Second Edition" provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to this fascinating and rapidly developing field.

"Painting does not imitate the world, but is a world of its own."
In 1948, Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote and delivered on French radio a series of seven lectures on the theme of perception. Translated here into English for the first time, they offer a lucid and concise insight into one of the great philosophical minds of the twentieth-century.
The lectures explore themes central not only to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy but to phenomenology as a whole. He begins by rejecting the idea - inherited from Descartes and influential within science - that perception is unreliable, prone to distort the world around us. Merleau-Ponty instead argues that perception is inseparable from our senses and it is how we make sense of the world.
Merleau-Ponty explores this guiding theme through a brilliant series of reflections on science, space, our relationships with others, animal life and art. Throughout, he argues that perception is never something learned and then applied to the world. Ascreatures with embodied minds, he reminds us that we are born perceiving and share with other animals and infants a state of constant, raw, unpredictable contact with the world. He provides vivid examples with the help of Kafka, animal behavior and above all modern art, particularly the work of Cezanne.
A thought-provoking and crystalline exploration of consciousness and the senses, "The World of" "Perception" is essential reading for anyone interested in the work of Merleau-Ponty, twentieth-century philosophy and art.

Contents:
Prologue. Part I: Considerations. The Problem and the Approach. Types of Tasks and Instructions. The Internal Representation of the Instruction. Part II: Report Tasks. An Intentional Machine. Paradigms with Accuracy as the Dependent Variable. Paradigms with Latency as the Dependent Variable. Part III: Act Tasks. Towards an Effective Visual Position. The Cognitive Control of Saccadic Eye Movements. Act Tasks and Report Tasks. Epilogue.

Experts from wine tasters to radiologists to bird watchers have all undergone perceptual learning-long-term changes in perception that result from practice or experience. Philosophers have been discussing such cases for centuries, from the 14th-century Indian philosopher Vedanta Desika to the 18th-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, and into contemporary times. This book uses recent evidence from psychology and neuroscience to show that perceptual learning is genuinely perceptual, rather than post-perceptual. It also offers a taxonomy for classifying cases in the philosophical literature. In some cases, perceptual learning involves changes in how one attends; in other cases, it involves a learned ability to differentiate two properties, or to perceive two properties as unified. Connolly uses this taxonomy to rethink several domains of perception in terms of perceptual learning, including multisensory perception, color perception, and speech perception. As a whole, the book offers a theory of the function of perceptual learning. Perceptual learning embeds into our quick perceptual systems what would be a slower task were it to be done in a controlled, cognitive manner. A novice wine taster drinking a Cabernet Sauvignon might have to think about its features first and then infer the type of wine, while an expert can identify it immediately. This learned ability to immediately identify the wine enables the expert to think about other things like the vineyard or the vintage of the wine. More generally, perceptual learning serves to free up cognitive resources for other tasks. This book offers a comprehensive empirically-informed account, and explores the nature, scope, and theoretical implications of perceptual learning.

Scientists' understanding of two central problems in neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy has been greatly influenced by the work of David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel: (1) What is it to see? This relates to the machinery that underlies visual perception. (2) How do we acquire the brain's mechanisms for vision? This is the nature-nurture question as to whether the nerve connections responsible for vision are innate or whether they develop through experience in the early life of an animal or human. This is a book about the collaboration between Hubel and Wiesel, which began in 1958, lasted until about 1982, and led to a Nobel Prize in 1981. It opens with short autobiographies of both men, describes the state of the field when they started, and tells about the beginnings of their collaboration. It emphasizes the importance of various mentors in their lives, especially Stephen W. Kuffler, who opened up the field by studying the cat retina in 1950, and founded the department of neurobiology at Harvard Medical School, where most of their work was done. The main part of the book consists of Hubel and Wiesel's most important publications. Each reprinted paper is preceded by a foreword that tells how they went about the research, what the difficulties and the pleasures were, and whether they felt a paper was important and why. Each is also followed by an afterword describing how the paper was received and what developments have occurred since its publication. The reader learns things that are often absent from typical scientific publications, including whether the work was difficult, fun, personally rewarding, exhilarating, or just plain tedious. The book ends with a summing-up of the authors'view of the present state of the field. This is much more than a collection of reprinted papers. Above all it tells the story of an unusual scientific collaboration that was hugely enjoyable and served to transform an entire branch of neurobiology. It will appeal to neuroscientists, vision scientists, biologists, psychologists, physicists, historians of science, and to their students and trainees, at all levels from high school on, as well as anyone else who is interested in the scientific process.

"Perceiving the Affordances" is a personal history and intellectual autobiography of Eleanor Gibson, the groundbreaking research psychologist who was influential in the founding of the theory of perceptual development. It is also a biography of her husband, James J. Gibson, who was a major perceptual theorist and the founder of the ecologically-oriented theory of perception. This is the story of their lives together and how each came to make particular contributions. This book is of interest to people who study perception, perceptual development, infancy, developmental psychology, and the history of psychology.

Contents:
1. Introduction to perception 2. Theories and explanations of perception 3. Perceptual organisation 4. The development of visual perception 5. Individual, social and cultural variation in perceptual organisation 6. Study aids [Glossary Bibliography Index]

Widely considered to be the most comprehensive and accessible textbook in the field of Cognitive Psychology Emphasis on applied cognition with 'in the real world' case studies and examples Comprehensive companion website including access to Primal Pictures' interactive 3D atlas of the brain, test simulations of key experiments, multiple choice questions, glossary flashcards and instructor PowerPoint slides Simple, clear pedagogy in every chapter to highlight key terms, case studies and further reading Updated references throughout the textbook to reflect the latest research

Inference has long been a central concern in epistemology, as an essential means by which we extend our knowledge and test our beliefs. Inference is also a key notion in influential psychological accounts of mental capacities, ranging from problem-solving to perception. Consciousness, on the other hand, has arguably been the defining interest of philosophy of mind over recent decades. Comparatively little attention, however, has been devoted to the significance of consciousness for the proper understanding of the nature and role of inference. It is commonly suggested that inference may be either conscious or unconscious. Yet how unified are these various supposed instances of inference? Does either enjoy explanatory priority in relation to the other? In what way, or ways, can an inference be conscious, or fail to be conscious, and how does this matter? This book brings together original essays from established scholars and emerging theorists that showcase how several current debates in epistemology, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind can benefit from more reflections on these and related questions about the significance of consciousness for inference.

The ways in which an individual (the subject) relates to and perceives other people (his or her "objects") has been a preoccupation of psychoanalysis and in recent years a plethora of concepts has grown up in the literature. In this study, the changing meanings of the different concepts are explained from context to context, discussing in depth the theoretical issues underlying them. The text includes an historical survey of how mental objects have been understood in the various "schools" of psychoanalysis as they have developed. The topics discussed include: Freud and his associates; the object-relations approaches of Klein, Fairbairn and Bion; orientations derived from ego psychology such as those of Schafer and Kernberg and the self orientation of Winnicott and Kohut. The author also discusses the conceptual and clinical issues involved in the major differences between the concepts. The three basic meanings of the concepts of mental objects as they have emerged in the literature are demonstrated showing how they are related to ongoing issues in contemporary psychoanalysis.

A topic of universal concern that touches everyone, philosophy of meaning in life has roots in spiritual and religious movements in almost all cultures. Many of the issues dealt with in these movements, such as human vocation, the life worth living, our relation to what is "greater" than us, and our encounters with suffering and with death, are also discussed (even if in a different manner) in the philosophy of meaning in life. However, only recently has the topic received elaborate discussion within analytic philosophy, and become a thriving field of research. This volume presents thirty-two chapters by leading authorities in their respective subfields on a wide array of subjects in meaning in life research. The chapters are organized into six sections. Section I focuses on ways of conceptualizing life's meaning. It discusses, among other issues, whether meaning in life should be understood objectively or subjectively, the relation between meaningfulness and importance, and whether meaningful lives should be understood narratively. Section II, Meaning in Life, Science, and Metaphysics, presents opposing views on whether neuroscience sheds light on life's meaning, inquires whether determinism must render life meaningless, and explores the relation between time, personal identity, and meaning in life. Section III considers life's meaning from both atheist and theist perspectives, and examines the relation between meaningfulness, mysticism and transcendence. Section IV, Ethics and Meaning in Life, examines (among other issues) whether meaningful lives must be moral, how important forgiveness is for meaning, the implications of life's meaningfulness or meaninglessness for procreation ethics, and whether animals can have meaningful lives. Section V compares philosophical and psychological research on life's meaning, explores the experience of meaningfulness, and discusses the relation between meaningfulness and desire, love, and gratitude. Finally, section VI, Living Meaningfully: Challenges and Prospects, elaborates on meaning in life and topics such as suicide, suffering, education, optimism and pessimism. Many of the chapters deal with topics that have never before been discussed in the literature. This handbook presents ground-breaking work within a rapidly developing field and offers the first published scholarly companion to the philosophical study if meaning in life.

As the prototypical exemplar of modern visual technology, photography was once viewed as a way to enable vision to bypass imagination, producing more reliable representations of reality. But as an achievement of technological modernity, photography can also be seen as a way to realize a creation of the imagination more vividly than can painting or drawing. Photography and Imagination investigates, from diverse points of view focusing on both theory and practice, the relation between these two terms. The book explores their effect on photography's capacity, through various forms and modalities of imaginative investments and displacements, to affect even reality itself.

In our daily lives, in our memories and fantasies, our mental worlds overflow with faces. But what do we really know about this most remarkable feature of the human body? Why do we have faces at all, and brains that are good at reading them? What do our looks say - and not say - about our personalities?
And perhaps the most compelling question of all: Why are we attracted to some faces more than others? 'In Your Face' is an engaging and authoritative tour of the science of facial beauty and face perception.
David Perrett, the pre-eminent scholar in the field, reveals and interprets the most remarkable findings and in the process demolishes many popular myths, setting the record straight on what neuroscience and evolutionary psychology are teaching us about beauty. The record is more surprising and often more unsettling than you might think.

This book, first published in 1979, is about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do. The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The author suggests that natural vision depends on the eyes in the head on a body supported by the ground, the brain being only the central organ of a complete visual system. When no constraints are put on the visual system, people look around, walk up to something interesting and move around it so as to see it from all sides, and go from one vista to another. That is natural vision -- and what this book is about.

Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies beliefs and provides us with knowledge of our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of invariant features in our environment. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perception. How does perception justify beliefs and yield knowledge of our environment? How does perception bring about conscious mental states? How does a perceptual system accomplish the feat of converting varying informational input into mental representations of invariant features in our environment? This book presents a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perception that is informed by empirical research. So it develops an account of perception that provides an answer to the first two questions, while being sensitive to scientific accounts that address the third question. The key idea is that perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities - for example the capacity to discriminate instances of red from instances of blue. Perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence are each analyzed in terms of this basic property of perception. Employing perceptual capacities constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content. The primacy of employing perceptual capacities in perception over their derivative employment in hallucination and illusion grounds the epistemic force of perceptual experience. In this way, the book provides a unified account of perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence.

Ethical Humans questions how philosophy and social theory can help us to engage the everyday moral realities of living, working, loving, learning and dying in new capitalism. It introduces sociology as an art of living and as a formative tradition of embodied radical eco post-humanism. Seeking to embody traditions of philosophy and social theory in everyday ethics, this book validates emotions and feelings as sources of knowledge and shows how the denigration of women has gone hand in hand with the denigration of nature. It queries post-structuralist traditions of anti-humanism that, for all their insights into the fragmentation of identities, often sustain a distinction between nature and culture. The author argues that in a crisis of global warming, we have to learn to listen to our bodies as part of nature and draws on Wittgenstein to shape embodied forms of philosophy and social theory that questions theologies that tacitly continue to shape philosophical traditions. In acknowledging our own vulnerabilities, we question the vision of the autonomous and independent rational self that often remains within the terms of dominant white masculinities. This book offers different modes of self-work, drawing on psychoanalysis and embodied post-analytic psychotherapies as part of a decolonising practice questioning Eurocentric colonising modernity. In doing so it challenges, with Simone Weil, Roman notions of power and greatness that have shaped visions of white supremacy and European colonial power and empire. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of environmental ethics, environmental philosophy, social theory and sociology, ethics and philosophy, cultural studies, future studies, gender studies, post-colonial studies, Marxism, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy and philosophy and sociology as arts of living.

Brain damage may sometimes cause remarkably specific impairments in human behaviour. One very rare and specific impairment is the failure to recognize everyday objects by sight, a problem which is termed "visual agnosia". In this book, the authors discuss the case of a patient, John, who suffered from visual agnosia after having a stroke. John also had difficulty recognizing faces or his immediate environment. The book considers John's case from the point of view of current psychological theories of visual recognition, and from a review of other documented cases. It goes on to consider the implications of John's problems for understanding how we might normally recognize objects, drawing on investigations of his impairments. The book also includes chapters contributed by John and his wife.

First published in 1983. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book explores the evolution of the mental competence for self-reflection: why it evolved, under what selection pressures, in what environments, out of what precursors, and with what mental resources. Integrating evolutionary, psychological, and philosophical perspectives, Radu J. Bogdan argues that the competence for self-reflection, uniquely human and initially autobiographical, evolved under strong and persistent sociocultural and political (collaborative and competitive) pressures on the developing minds of older children and later adults. Self-reflection originated in a basic propensity of the human brain to rehearse anticipatively mental states, speech acts, actions, and states of the world in order to service one's elaborate goal policies. These goal policies integrate offline representations of one's own mental states and actions and those of others in order to handle the challenges of a complex and dynamic sociopolitical and sociocultural life, calling for an adaptive intramental self-regulation: that intramental adaptation is self-reflection.

First published in 1980. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1979. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The scientific story of first impressions--and why the snap character judgments we make from faces are irresistible but usually incorrect We make up our minds about others after seeing their faces for a fraction of a second--and these snap judgments predict all kinds of important decisions. For example, politicians who simply look more competent are more likely to win elections. Yet the character judgments we make from faces are as inaccurate as they are irresistible; in most situations, we would guess more accurately if we ignored faces. So why do we put so much stock in these widely shared impressions? What is their purpose if they are completely unreliable? In this book, Alexander Todorov, one of the world's leading researchers on the subject, answers these questions as he tells the story of the modern science of first impressions. Drawing on psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, computer science, and other fields, this accessible and richly illustrated book describes cutting-edge research and puts it in the context of the history of efforts to read personality from faces. Todorov describes how we have evolved the ability to read basic social signals and momentary emotional states from faces, using a network of brain regions dedicated to the processing of faces. Yet contrary to the nineteenth-century pseudoscience of physiognomy and even some of today's psychologists, faces don't provide us a map to the personalities of others. Rather, the impressions we draw from faces reveal a map of our own biases and stereotypes. A fascinating scientific account of first impressions, Face Value explains why we pay so much attention to faces, why they lead us astray, and what our judgments actually tell us.

This book evaluates the potential of the pragmatist notion of habit possesses to influence current debates at the crossroads between philosophy, cognitive sciences, neurosciences, and social theory. It deals with the different aspects of the pragmatic turn involved in 4E cognitive science and traces back the roots of such a pragmatic turn to both classical and contemporary pragmatism. Written by renowned philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and social theorists, this volume fills the need for an interdisciplinary account of the role of 'habit'. Researchers interested in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, social theory, and social ontology will need this book to fully understand the pragmatist turn in current research on mind, action and society.

The ways we know, think and believe about a whole variety of key areas - different forms of discourse, psychotherapy as well as religion - have much more in common than is usually perceived. In preference to Freud's idea that illusions are the expression of wish-fulfilment, the author of this study uses Winnicott's concept of illusion, as a life-long, ever-changing way of coping with the anxiety of gaps and space. Through a series of parallels running across different disciplines, Michael Jacobs demonstrates the possible analysis of modes of thinking and belief, from intuitive pre-thinking, through authority-driven thinking and belief, and personal and polymathic knowledge, to un-knowing, the last concept being one that is shared by Bion, Winnicott and a major mystical tradition. Using this theoretical model the book provides a map to how clients (and indeed therapists) might think and believe, suggesting ways in which they may be supported as they shift through different modes, with all the anxiety that disillusionment brings.