In Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of mental representational: perception. Focusing on the functions and capacities of perceptual states, Burge accounts for their representational content and structure, and develops a formal semantics for them. The discussion explains the role of iconic format in the structure. It also situates the accounts of content, structure, and semantics within scientific explanations of perceptual-state formation, emphasizing formation of perceptual categorization. In the book's second half, Burge discusses what a perceptual system is. Exploration of relations between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-helps distinguish perceiving, with its associated capacities, from thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing mainly on vision science, not introspection, Perception: First Form of Mind is a rigorous, agenda-setting work in philosophy of perception and philosophy of science.

How can computers recognize faces? Why are caricatures of famous faces so easily recognized? Originally published in 1995, much of the previous research on face recognition had been phenomena driven. Recent empirical work together with the application of computational, mathematical and statistical techniques have provided new ways of conceptualizing the information available in faces. These advances have led researchers to suggest that many phenomena can be explained by the structure of the information available in the population(s) of faces. This broad approach has drawn together a number of apparently disparate phenomena with a common theoretical basis, including cross-race recognition; the distinctiveness of faces; the production and recognition of caricatures; and the determinants of facial attractiveness. This title provides a state of the art review of the field at the time in which the authors use a wide variety of approaches. What is common to all is that the authors base the accounts of the phenomena they study or their model of face recognition on the statistics of the information available in the population of faces. On publication this title was a comprehensive, up-to-date review of an important area of research in face recognition written by active researchers. It includes contributions from mathematics, computer science and neural network theory as well as psychology. It is aimed at research workers and postgraduate students and will be of interest to cognitive psychologists and computer scientists interested in face recognition. It will also be of interest to those working on neural network models of visual recognition, perceptual development, expertise in visual cognition as well as facial attractiveness and caricature.

Anthony J. Lisska presents a new analysis of Thomas Aquinas's theory of perception. While much work has been undertaken on Aquinas's texts, little has been devoted principally to his theory of perception and less still on a discussion of inner sense. The thesis of intentionality serves as the philosophical backdrop of this analysis while incorporating insights from Brentano and from recent scholarship. The principal thrust is on the importance of inner sense, a much-overlooked area of Aquinas's philosophy of mind, with special reference to the vis cogitativa. Approaching the texts of Aquinas from contemporary analytic philosophy, Lisska suggests a modest 'innate' or 'structured' interpretation for the role of this inner sense faculty. Dorothea Frede suggests that this faculty is an 'embarrassment' for Aquinas; to the contrary, the analysis offered in this book argues that were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas's philosophy of mind would be an embarrassment. By means of this faculty of inner sense, Aquinas offers an account of a direct awareness of individuals of natural kinds-referred to by Aquinas as incidental objects of sense-which comprise the principal ontological categories in Aquinas's metaphysics. By using this awareness of individuals of a natural kind, Aquinas can make better sense out of the process of abstraction using the active intellect (intellectus agens). Were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas would be unable to account for an awareness of the principal ontological category in his metaphysics.

This third edition of a classic text which was first published in 1976 is the only comprehensive, up-to-date presentation of psychophysics currently available. It has been used by undergraduate and graduate students, and scholars throughout the world and is consistently thought of as the best single source for learning the basic principles of psychophysics. The coverage of the field is comprehensive, including topics ranging from the classical methods of threshold measurement, to the modern methods of detection theory, to psychophysical scaling of sensation magnitude. The approach is one in which methods, theories, and applications are described for each experimental procedure. New features found in this third edition include: * methodological and theoretical contributions made in the field during this time period, * descriptions of adaptive procedures for measuring thresholds, context effects in scaling, theory of quantal fluctuations, multidimensional scaling, nonmetric scaling of sensory differences, and the relationship between the size of the DL and the slope of the sensation magnitude function, * new methods for measuring the observer's sensitivity of criterion and an expanded discussion of category scaling including the range frequency model and verbally labeled categories, and * methods used to control the observer's nonlinear use of numbers in magnitude estimation such as line-length scaling, magnitude matching, master scaling, and category-ratio scaling.

Beliefs and expectancies influence our everyday thoughts, feelings, and actions. These attributes make a closer examination of beliefs and expectancies worthwhile in any context, but particularly so within the high-stakes arena of the legal system. Whether the decision maker is a police officer assessing the truthfulness of an alibi, a juror evaluating the accuracy of an eyewitness identification, an attorney arguing a case involving a juvenile offender, or a judge deciding whether to terminate parental rights these decisions matter and without doubt are influenced by beliefs and expectancies. This volume is comprised of research on beliefs and expectancies regarding alibis, children s behaviour while testifying, eyewitness testimony, confessions, sexual assault victims, judges decisions in child protection cases, and attorneys beliefs about jurors perceptions of juvenile offender culpability. Areas for future research are identified, and readers are encouraged to discover new ways that beliefs and expectancies operate in the legal system.

This book was originally published as a special issue of "Psychology, Crime & Law.""

This book collects both classic and contemporary articles in visual perception, providing the reader with an overview of key research ideas as they first appeared. The articles span a century of research: the earliest was published in 1894, the most recent in 1997. There are examples from each of the many disciplines that have contributed to our current understanding of vision, including experimental psychology, cognitive psychology, neurophysiology, and functional neuroimaging. The topics include theoretical perspectives, early vision, perceptual organization and constancy, object and spatial vision, and visual attention and awareness. A brief introduction to each article by the editor provides an intellectual context and pointers to subsequent developments. Suggestions for further reading and discussion questions provide a framework for students to strengthen their understanding of different topics.
This book will be an excellent source of supplementary readings in an advanced undergraduate or graduate course in vision, or a stand-alone text for an in-depth graduate seminar. Professionals in psychology, cognitive neuroscience, visual science, and cognitive science will find this a valuable addition to their personal libraries.

Related link: Free Email Alerting

The epistemology and the phenomenology of perception are closely related insofar as both depend on experiences of self-evident objectivity-experiences in which the objectivity of a state of affairs is evident from within our experience of that state of affairs. Jennifer Church offers a distinctive account of perception, showing how imagining alternative perspectives and alternative possibilities plays a key role in creating and validating experiences of self-evident objectivity. Offered first as an account of what it takes to perceive ordinary objects such as birds and trees, the account is then extended to show how it is also possible to perceive such things as causes, reasons, mental states, distant galaxies, molecular arrangements, mathematical relations, and interpersonal obligations. A chapter is devoted to the phenomenology and epistemology of moral perception, including the perception of persons as such; and a chapter is devoted to the peculiarities of aesthetic perception, including the perception of artworks as such. In all of these cases, Church argues, perception can be literal (not merely figurative or metaphorical) and substantive (not merely formal or deflationary). Her account helps to explain the advantages of perceptual versus non-perceptual knowledge. It also helps to make sense of some historical discussions of the role of the imagination in acquiring and validating knowledge, in relation to Plato's cave, Descartes' explanation of rational intuition, and Kant's arguments concerning objectivity, causality, and the Categorical Imperative.

"This volume is the most important if not the final word on the great imagery debate. It examines issues critical to all cognition. For example, whether the brain is a general purpose computer and if the brain's structure imposes limits on what can be represented in our minds." Michael I. Posner, Prof. Emeritus University of Oregon -k No
"The Case for Mental Imagery is destined to be a classic text in psychology. the authors] present an in-depth, philosophically sophisticated, and empirically supported argument that clarifies and settles many of the most contentious issues in the longstanding, decades-long 'imagery debate'...This is an impressive achievement and an outstanding example of the way controversies can be addressed through a combination of sophisticated theoretical concepts paired with expertly conducted scientific research programs."--PsycCRITIQUES -k No
"This is an outstanding book that presents a roadmap of the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying mental imagery. The field of mental imagery has a long and somewhat dark history and the study of the critical cognitive ability has only been considered scientifically legitimate relatively recently. In this book, Kosslyn and colleagues not only summarize the wealth of their own recent scientific findings but elegantly place these findings and their theoretical perspective in the larger historical and contemporary context of studies on mental imagery. The book distills a rich, complicated domain into a series of accessible topics and will serve as an invaluable guide to those entering the field, a refresher for those with passing knowledge, and a major reference for the cognoscenti."--Marlene Behrmann, Professor of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University
"For centuries, mental imagery has been recognized as one of the keys to understanding human intelligence, emotion, and creativity. Stephen Kosslyn developed the first comprehensive theory of this faculty of mind, and for three decades has explored it with theoretical depth, experimental ingenuity, and a relentless drive to get to the bottom of puzzles and controversies. Kosslyn has now given us a magisterial account of this crucial aspect of mental life. A seamless synthesis of mind and brain, The Case for Mental Imagery is a case of cognitive neuroscience at its finest."--Steven Pinker, Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology, Harvard University
"The definitive treatment of mental imagery from a pictorialist point of view."--Ned Block, Silver Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, New York University

To be a "commonsense realist" is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness, objectivity, and causal understanding. This volume collects nineteen original essays by leading philosophers and psychologists on these topics. Questions addressed include: What are the commitments of commonsense realism? Does it entail any particular view of the nature of perceptual experience, or any particular view of the epistemology of perceptual knowledge? Should we think of commonsense realism as a view held by some philosophers, or is there a sense in which we are pre-theoretically committed to commonsense realism in virtue of the experience we enjoy or the concepts we use or the explanations we give? Is commonsense realism defensible, and if so how, in the face of the formidable criticism it faces? Specific issues addressed in the philosophical essays include the status of causal requirements on perception, the causal role of perceptual experience, and the relation between objective perception and causal thinking. The scientific essays present a range of perspectives on the development, phylogenetic and ontogenetic, of the human adult conception of perception.

How do we see? This question has fascinated and perplexed philosophers and scientists for millennia. In visual perception, mind and world meet, when light reflected from objects enters the eyes and stimulates the nerves leading to activity in the brain near the back of the head. This neural activity yields conscious experiences of a world in three dimensions, clothed in colors, and immediately recognized as (say) ground, sky, grass, trees, and friends. The visual brain also produces nonconscious representations that interact with other brain systems for perception and cognition and that help to regulate our visually guided actions. But how does all of this really work? The answers concern the physiology, psychology, and philosophy of visual perception and cognition. Gary Hatfield's essays address fundamental questions concerning, in Part I, the psychological processes underlying spatial perception and perception of objects; in Part II, psychological theories and metaphysical controversies about color perception and qualia; and, in Part III, the history and philosophy of theories of vision, including methodological controversies surrounding introspection and involving the relations between psychology and the fields of neuroscience and cognitive science. An introductory chapter provides a unified overview; an extensive reference list rounds out the volume.

In the last decade, there has been a tremendous surge of research on the mechanisms of human action. This volume brings together this new knowledge in a single, concise source, covering most if not all of the basic questions regarding human action: what are the mechanisms by which action plans are acquired, mentally represented, activated, selected, and expressed? The chapters provide up-to-date summaries of the published research on this question, with an emphasis on underlying mechanisms. This 'bible' of action research brings together the current thinking of eminent researchers in the domains of motor control, behavioural and cognitive neuroscience, psycholinguistics, biology, as well as cognitive, developmental, social, and motivational psychology. It represents a determined multidisciplinary effort, spanning across various areas of science as well as national boundaries.

We effortlessly remember all sorts of events - from simple events like people walking to complex events like leaves blowing in the wind. We can also remember and describe these events, and in general, react appropriately to them, for example, in avoiding an approaching object. Our phenomenal ease interacting with events belies the complexity of the underlying processes we use to deal with them. Driven by an interest in these complex processes, research on even perception has been growing rapidly. Events are the basis of all experience, so understanding how humans perceive, represent, and act on them will have a significant impact on many areas of psychology. Unfortunately, much of the research on event perception - in visual perception, motor control, linguistics, and computer science - has progressed without much interaction. This book is the first to bring together computational, neurological, and psychological research on how humans detect, classify, remember, and act on events. It provides professional and student researchers with a comprehensive collection of the latest reserach in these diverse fields.

True or False?
Most PowerPoint presentations are:

.compelling
.illuminating
.informative
.clear and to the point
Answer: False
Make a change following the principles of Stephen Kosslyn:

.a world authority on the visual brain
.a clear and engaging writer
Making PowerPoint presentations that are clear, compelling, memorable, and even enjoyable is not an obscure art. In this book, Stephen Kosslyn, a renowned cognitive neuroscientist, presents eight simple principles for constructing a presentation that takes advantage of the information modern science has discovered about perception, memory, and cognition. Using hundreds of images and sample slides, he shows the common mistakes many people make and the simple ways to fix them. For example, never use underlining to emphasize a word--the line will cut off the bottom of letters that have descending lines (such as p and g), which interferes with the brain's ability to recognize text. Other tips include why you should state your conclusion at the beginning of a presentation, when to use a line graph versus a bar graph, and how to use color correctly. By following Kosslyn's principles, anyone will be able to produce a presentation that works "

Since antiquity, people have searched for a way to understand the colors we see--what they are, how many there are, and how they can be systematically identified and arranged in some kind of order. How to order colors is not merely a philosophical question, it also has many practical applications in art, design, and commerce. Our intense interest in color and its myriad practical applications have led people throughout history to develop many systems to characterize and order it. The number of color order systems developed throughout history is unknown but ranges in the hundreds. Many are no longer used, but continue to be of historical interest. Despite wrong turns and slow progress, our understanding of color and its order has improved steadily. Although full understanding continues to elude us, it seems clear that it will ultimately come from research in neurobiology, perception and consciousness. Color Ordered is a comprehensive, in-depth compendium of over 170 systems, dating from antiquity to the present. In it, Rolf Kuehni and Andreas Schwarz present a history and categorization of color systems, describe each one using original figures and schematic drawings, and provide a broad review of the underlying theory. Included are a brief overview of color vision and a synthesis of the various systems. This volume is a unique and valuable resource for researchers in color vision, and visual perception, as well as for neuroscientists, art historians, artists, and designers.

First published in 1995, 'The Visual Brain in Action' remains a seminal publication in the cognitive sciences. It presents a model for understanding the visual processing underlying perception and action, proposing a broad distinction within the brain between two kinds of vision: conscious perception and unconscious 'online' vision. It argues that each kind of vision can occur quasi-independently of the other, and is separately handled by a quite different processing system. In the 11 years since publication, the book has provoked considerable interest and debate - throughout both cognitive neuroscience and philosophy, while the field has continued to flourish and develop.
For this new edition, the text from the original edition has been left untouched, standing as a coherent statement of the authors' position. However, a very substantial epilogue has been added to the book in which Milner and Goodale review some of the key developments that support or challenge the views that were put forward in the first edition. The new chapter summarizes developments in various relevant areas of psychology, neuroscience and behaviour. It notably supplements the main text by updating the reader on the contributions that have emerged from the use of functional neuroimaging, which was in its infancy when the first edition was written. Neuroimaging, and functional MRI in particular, has revolutionized the field over the past 11 years by allowing investigators to plot in detail the patterns of activity within the visual brains of behaving and perceiving humans. The authors show how its use now allows scientists to test and confirm their proposals, based as they then were largely on evidence accruedfrom primate neuroscience in conjunction with studies of neurological patients.

Graphs have become a fixture of everyday life, used in scientific and business publications, in magazines and newspapers, on television, on billboards, and even on cereal boxes. Nonetheless, surprisingly few graphs communicate effectively, and most graphs fail because they do not take into account the goals, needs, and abilities of the viewers. In raph Design for Eye and Mind, Stephen Kosslyn addresses these problems by presenting eight psychological principles for constructing effective graphs. Each principle is solidly rooted both in the scientific literature on how we perceive and comprehend graphs and in general facts about how our eyes and brains process visual information. Kosslyn then uses these eight psychological principles as the basis for hundreds of specific recommendations that serve as a concrete, step-by-step guide to deciding whether a graph is an appropriate display to use, choosing the correct type of graph for a specific type of data and message, and then constructing graphs that will be understood at a glance. Kosslyn also includes a complete review of the scientific literature on graph perception and comprehension, and appendices that provide a quick tutorial on basic statistics and a checklist for evaluating computer-graphics programs. Graph Design for Eye and Mind is an invaluable reference for anyone who uses visual displays to convey information in the sciences, humanities, and businesses such as finance, marketing, and advertising.

Whether it was the demands of life, leisure, or a combination of both that forced our hands, we have developed a myriad of artefacts--maps, notes, descriptions, diagrams, flow-charts, photographs, paintings, and prints--that stand for other things. Most agree that images and their close relatives are special because, in some sense, they look like what they are about. This simple claim is the starting point for most philosophical investigations into the nature of depiction. On Images argues that this starting point is fundamentally misguided. Whether a representation is an image depends not on how it is perceived but on how it relates to others within a system. This kind of approach, first championed by Nelson Goodman in his Languages of Art, has not found many supporters, in part because of weaknesses with Goodman's account. On Images shows that a properly crafted structural account of pictures has many advantages over the perceptual accounts that dominate the literature on this topic. In particular, it explains the close relationship between pictures, diagrams, graphs and other kinds of non-linguistic representation. It undermines the claim that pictures are essentially visual by showing that audio recordings, tactile line drawings, and other non-visual representations are pictorial. Also, by avoiding explaining images in terms of how we perceive them, this account sheds new light on why pictures seem so perceptually special in the first place. This discussion of picture perception recasts some old debates on the topic, suggests further lines of philosophical and empirical research, and ultimately leads to a new perspective on pictorial realism.

When we try to remember whether we left a window open or closed, do we actually see the window in our mind? If we do, does this mental image play a role in how we think? For almost a century, scientists have debated whether mental images play a functional role in cognition. In The Case for Mental Imagery, Stephen Kosslyn, William Thompson, and Giorgio Ganis present a complete and unified argument that mental images do depict information, and that these depictions do play a functional role in human cognition. They outline a specific theory of how depictive representations are used in information processing, and show how these representations arise from neural processes. To support this theory, they seamlessly weave together conceptual analyses and the many varied empirical findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In doing so, they present the conceptual grounds for positing this type of internal representation and summarize and refute arguments to the contrary. Their argument also serves as a historical review of the imagery debate from its earliest inception to its most recent phases, and provides ample evidence that significant progress has been made in our understanding of mental imagery. In illustrating how scientists think about one of the most difficult problems in psychology and neuroscience, this book goes beyond the debate to explore the nature of cognition and to draw out implications for the study of consciousness. Student and professional researchers in vision science, cognitive psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience will find The Case for Mental Imagery to be an invaluable resource for understanding not only the imagery debate, but also and more broadly, thenature of thought, and how theory and research shape the evolution of scientific debates.

In the last few years there has been an explosion of philosophical interest in perception; after decades of neglect, it is now one of the most fertile areas for new work. Perceptual Experience presents new work by fifteen of the world's leading philosophers. All papers are written specially for this volume, and they cover a broad range of topics dealing with sensation and representation, consciousness and awareness, and the connections between perception and knowledge and between perception and action. This will be the book on the philosophy of perception, a fascinating resource for philosophers and psychologists.
Contributors include John Campbell, David J. Chalmers, Tim Crane, Fred Dretske, Tamar Szabo Gendler, Anil Gupta, John Hawthorne, Susan Hurley, Mark Johnston, Geoffrey Lee, Eric Lormand, M. G. F. Martin, Alva No, Jesse J. Prinz, Sydney Shoemaker, Susanna Siegel, and Michael Tye.

Adaptation phenomena provide striking examples of perceptual plasticity and offer valuable insight into the mechanisms of visual coding. The technique of psychophysical adaptation has aptly been termed the psychologist's microelectrode because of its usefulness in investigating the coding of sensory information in the human brain. Its broader relevance though is illustrated by the increasing use of adaptation to study more cognitive aspects of vision such as the mechanisms of face perception and the neural substrates of visual awareness. This book brings together a collection of studies from international researchers, which demonstrate the brain's remarkable capacity to adapt its representation of the visual world in response to changes in its environment. A major theme throughout is that adaptation at all stages of visual processing serves a functional role in the efficient representation of the prevailing visual environment. Information about the visual world is coded in the rate at which neurons fire. However, neurons can only respond over a certain range of firing rates. Adaptation of the way in which neurons code visual information tends to make optimal use of this limited response range. Though these principles are well established at the level of light adaptation in the retina, it is only relatively recently that researchers have started to look for analogous behaviour at the higher levels of the visual system. This book is the first to bring together evidence that adaptation in high-level vision, as at the lower levels, serves to fit the mind to the world.

Whether reading, looking at a picture, or driving, how is it that we know where to look next - how does the human visual system calculate where our gaze should be directed in order to achieve our cognitive aims? Of course, there is an interaction between the decisions about where we should look and about how long we should look there. However, our eyes do not just move randomly over the visual field - whether we are reading, driving, or solving a problem. There are systematic variations not only in the duration of each eye fixation, but also in what we are looking at. It is these variations in eye movements that can tell us much about the cognitive processes involved in the performance of these activities. Within reading research, great progress has already been made in understanding these processes and there are now a number of competing and well-formed models. In some other areas of perception, the development of formal theories and the search for critical evidence is less advanced. This book brings together leading vision scientists studying eye movements across a range of activities, such as reading, driving, computer activities, and chess. It provides groundbreaking new research that will help us understand how it is that we know where to move our eyes, and thereby better understand the cognitive processes underlying these activities.

The world of perception is multisensory. Even a simple task such as judging the position of a light in a dark room depends not only on vision but also on sensory signals about the position of our body in space. Likewise, how we experience food depends on sensory signals originating from the mouth, but also from nose signals, and even vision and hearing. However, traditional books on perception still discuss each of the "senses" separately. This book takes a different stance: it defines perception as intrinsically multisensory from the start and examines multisensory interactions as key process behind how we perceive our own body, control its movements, perceive and recognise objects, respond to edible objects, perceive space, and perceive time. In addition, the book discusses multisensory processing in synaesthesia, multisensory attention, and the role of multisensory processing in learning. As an introduction to multisensory perception, this book is essential reading for students in psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience at the advanced undergraduate to postgraduate levels. As the chapters address topics that are often left out of standard textbooks, this book will also serve as a useful reference for specialist perception scientists and clinicians. Finally, as a monograph understandable to the educated non-specialist this book will also be of interest to professionals who need to take into account multisensory processing in domains such as, for instance, physiotherapy, neurological rehabilitation, human-computer interfaces, marketing, or the design of products and services.

Colour has long been a source of fascination to both scientists and philosophers. In one sense, colours are in the mind of the beholder, in another sense they belong to the external world. Colours appear to lie on the boundary where we have divided the world into 'objective' and 'subjective' events. They represent, more than any other attribute of our visual experience, a place where both physical and mental properties are interwoven in an intimate and enigmatic way.

The last few decades have brought fascinating changes in the way that we think about 'colour' and the role 'colour' plays in our perceptual architecture. In Colour: Mind and the Physical World, leading scholars from cognitive psychology, philosophy, neurophysiology, and computational vision provide an overview of the contemporary developments in our understanding of colours and of the relationship between the 'mental' and the 'physical'. With each chapter followed by critical commentaries, the volume presents a lively and accessible picture of the intellectual traditions which have shaped research into colour perception.

Written in a non-technical style and accessible to an interdisciplinary audience, the book will provide an invaluable resource for researchers in colour perception and the cognitive sciences.

Music offers a unique opportunity to better understand the organization of the human brain. Like language, music exists in all human societies. Like language, music is a complex, rule-governed activity that seems specific to humans, and associated with a specific brain architecture. Yet unlike most other high-level functions of the human brain--and unlike language--music is a skil at which only a minority of people become proficient. The study of music as a major brain function has for some time been relatively neglected. Just recently, however, we have witnessed an explosion in research activities on music perception and performance that correlates in the human brain. This volume brings together an outstanding collection of international authorities--from the fields of music, neuroscience, psychology, and neurology--to describe the amazing advances being made in understanding the complex relationship between music and the brain.

What can art tell us about how the brain works? And what can the brain tell us about how we perceive and create art? Humans have created visual art throughout history and its significance has been an endless source of fascination and debate. Visual art is a product of the human brain, but is art so complex and sophisticated that brain function and evolution are not relevant to our understanding? This book explores the links between visual art and the brain by examining a broad range of issues including: the impact of eye and brain disorders on artistic output; the relevance of Darwinian principles to aesthetics; and the constraints imposed by brain processes on the perception of space, motion and colour in art. Arguments and theories are presented in an accessible manner and general principles are illustrated with specific art examples, helping students to apply their knowledge to new artworks.