The No. 1 Sunday Times and internationally bestselling account of life as a child with autism, now a documentary film Winner of Best Documentary and Best Sound in the British Independent Film Awards 2021. 'It will stretch your vision of what it is to be human' Andrew Solomon, The Times What is it like to have autism? How can we know what a person - especially a child - with autism is thinking and feeling? This groundbreaking book, written by Naoki Higashida when he was only thirteen, provides some answers. Severely autistic and non-verbal, Naoki learnt to communicate by using a 'cardboard keyboard' - and what he has to say gives a rare insight into an autistically-wired mind. He explains behaviour he's aware can be baffling such as why he likes to jump and why some people with autism dislike being touched; he describes how he perceives and navigates the world, sharing his thoughts and feelings about time, life, beauty and nature; and he offers an unforgettable short story. Proving that people with autism do not lack imagination, humour or empathy, THE REASON I JUMP made a major impact on its publication in English. Widely praised, it was an immediate No. 1 Sunday Times bestseller as well as a New York Times bestseller and has since been published in over thirty languages. In 2020, a documentary film based on the book received its world premiere at the Sundance Film Festival. Directed by Jerry Rothwell, produced by Jeremy Dear, Stevie Lee and Al Morrow, and funded by Vulcan Productions and the British Film Institute, it won the festival's Audience Award for World Cinema Documentary, then further awards at the Vancouver, Denver and Valladolid International Film Festivals before its global release in 2021. The book includes eleven original illustrations inspired by Naoki's words, by the artistic duo Kai and Sunny.

Synaesthesia is, in the words of the cognitive neuroscientist Cytowic, a strange sensory blending. Synaesthetes report seeing colours when hearing sounds or proper names, or they experience tastes when reading the names of subway stations. How do these rare cases relate to other more common examples where sensory experiences get mixed - cases like mirror-touch, personification, cross-modal mappings, and drug experiences? Are we all more or less synaesthetes, and does this mean that we are all subjects of crossmodal illusions? Could some apparently strange sensory cases give us an insight into how perception works? Recent research on the causes and prevalence of synaesthesia raises new questions regarding the links between these cases, and the unity of the condition. By bringing together contributions from leading cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers, this volume considers for the first time the broader theoretical lessons arising from such cases of sensory blending, with regard to the nature of perception and consciousness, the boundaries between perception, illusion and imagination, and the communicability and sharing of experiences.

Synaesthesia is a fascinating cognitive phenomenon where one type of stimulation evokes the sensation of another. For example, synaesthetes might perceive colours when listening to music, or tastes in the mouth when reading words. This book provides an insight into the idiosyncratic nature of synaesthesia by exploring its relationships with other dimensions of individual differences. Many characteristics of linguistic-colour synaesthetes are covered including personality, temperament, intelligence, creativity, emotionality, attention, memory, imagination, colour perception, body lateralization and gender. Aleksandra Maria Rogowska proposes that linguistic-colour synaesthesia can be considered as an abstract form of a continuous variable in the broader context of cross- and intra-modal associations. There has been a resurgence of interest in synaesthesia and this book will appeal to students and scientists of psychology, cognitive science and social science, and to those who are fascinated by unusual states of mind.

Traditional, secular, and fundamentalist-all three categories are contested, yet in their contestation they shape our sensibilities and are mutually implicated, the one with the others. This interplay brings to the foreground more than ever the question of what it means to think and live as Tradition. The Orthodox theologians of the twentieth century, in particular, have emphasized Tradition not as a dead letter but as a living presence of the Holy Spirit. But how can we discern Tradition as living discernment from fundamentalism? What does it mean to live in Tradition when surrounded by something like the "secular"? These essays interrogate these mutual implications, beginning from the understanding that whatever secular or fundamentalist may mean, they are not Tradition, which is historical, particularistic, in motion, ambiguous and pluralistic, but simultaneously not relativistic. Contributors: R. Scott Appleby, Nikolaos Asproulis, Brandon Gallaher, Paul J. Griffiths, Vigen Guroian, Dellas Oliver Herbel, Edith M. Humphrey, Slavica Jakelic, Nadieszda Kizenko, Wendy Mayer, Brenna Moore, Graham Ward, Darlene Fozard Weaver

Perceptual organization is the neuro-cognitive process that enables us to perceive scenes as structured wholes consisting of objects arranged in space. Simplicity in Vision explores the intriguing idea that these perceived wholes are given by the simplest organizations of the scenes. Peter A. van der Helm presents a truly multidisciplinary approach to answer fundamental questions such as: Are simplest organizations sufficiently reliable to guide our actions? What is the nature of the regularities that are exploited to arrive at simplest organizations? To account for the high combinatorial capacity and speed of the perceptual organization process, he proposes transparallel processing by hyperstrings. This special form of distributed processing not only gives classical computers the extraordinary computing power that seemed reserved for quantum computers, but also explains how neuronal synchronization relates to flexible self-organizing cognitive architecture in between the relatively rigid level of neurons and the still elusive level of consciousness.

This book describes and proposes an unusual integrative approach to human perception that qualifies as both an ecological and a phenomenological approach at the same time. Thomas Natsoulas shows us how our consciousness - in three of six senses of the word that the book identifies - is involved in our activity of perceiving the one and only world that exists, which includes oneself as a proper part of it, and that all of us share together with the rest of life on earth. He makes the case that our stream of consciousness - in the original Jamesian sense minus his mental/physical dualism - provides us with firsthand contact with the world, as opposed to our having such contact instead with theorist-posited items such as inner mental representations, internal pictures, or sense-image models, pure figments and virtual objects, none of which can have effects on our sensory receptors.

Perceptual organization comprises a wide range of processes such as perceptual grouping, figure-ground organization, filling-in, completion, perceptual switching, etc. Such processes are most notable in the context of shape perception but they also play a role in texture perception, lightness perception, color perception, motion perception, depth perception, etc. Perceptual organization deals with a variety of perceptual phenomena of central interest, studied from many different perspectives, including psychophysics, experimental psychology, neuropsychology, neuroimaging, neurophysiology, and computational modeling. Given its central importance in phenomenal experience, perceptual organization has also figured prominently in classic Gestalt writings on the topic, touching upon deep philosophical issues regarding mind-brain relationships and consciousness. In addition, it attracts a great deal of interest from people working in applied areas like visual art, design, architecture, music, and so forth. The Oxford Handbook of Perceptual Organization provides a broad and extensive review of the current literature, written in an accessible form for scholars and students. With chapter written by leading researchers in the field, this is the state-of-the-art reference work on this topic, and will be so for many years to come.

Structural information theory is a coherent theory about the way the human visual system organises a raw visual stimulus into objects and object parts. To humans, a visual stimulus usually has one clear interpretation even though, in theory, any stimulus can be interpreted in numerous ways. To explain this, the theory focuses on the nature of perceptual interpretations rather than on underlying process mechanisms and adopts the simplicity principle which promotes efficiency of internal resources rather than the likelihood principle which promotes veridicality in the external world. This theoretically underpinned starting point gives rise to quantitative models and verifiable predictions for many visual phenomena, including amodal completion, subjective contours, transparency, brightness contrast, brightness assimilation and neon illusions. It also explains phenomena such as induced temporal order, temporal context effects and hierarchical dominance effects, and extends to evaluative pattern qualities such as distinctiveness, interestingness and beauty.

Perceptual organization is the neuro-cognitive process that enables us to perceive scenes as structured wholes consisting of objects arranged in space. Simplicity in Vision explores the intriguing idea that these perceived wholes are given by the simplest organizations of the scenes. Peter A. van der Helm presents a truly multidisciplinary approach to answer fundamental questions such as: Are simplest organizations sufficiently reliable to guide our actions? What is the nature of the regularities that are exploited to arrive at simplest organizations? To account for the high combinatorial capacity and speed of the perceptual organization process, he proposes transparallel processing by hyperstrings. This special form of distributed processing not only gives classical computers the extraordinary computing power that seemed reserved for quantum computers, but also explains how neuronal synchronization relates to flexible self-organizing cognitive architecture in between the relatively rigid level of neurons and the still elusive level of consciousness.

Originally published in 1927 as part of the Cambridge Psychological Library, this book emphasizes the importance of the biological foundations of psychology, with perception being the bridge between nerve processes and consciousness. Parsons, an ophthalmic surgeon, views problems of perception as being both biological and psychological issues in the conscious and behavioural lives of an animal. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the overlap between psychological and biological processes.

First published in 1924 as the second edition of a 1915 original, and part of the Cambridge Psychological Library, this book examines the chief theories on colour vision in the light of available facts at the time of publication. In the first section of the book, Parsons discusses the physical, anatomical and psychological bases of colour vision in a variety of eyes. The second part analyses colour blindness. The third and final segment evaluates the various theories of colour vision. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of science or colour vision.

Charles Travis presents a series of connected essays on current topics in philosophy of perception. The book is informed throughout by a number of central insights of Gottlob Frege's, notably about some intrinsic differences between objects of thought and objects of perception, and about the essential publicity of thought, and hence of its objects. Travis addresses a number of key questions, including how perception can make the world bear for the perceiver on the thing for him to do or think; what it might be for there to be perceptual experiences indistinguishable from ones of perceiving (hence from experiences of one's surroundings); what it might be for things to look a certain way to the experiencer, where this is not for things to look that way; what the upshot of (sub-personal) perceptual processing might be, what sorts of capacities are drawn on in representing something as (being) something. Besides Frege, the essays owe much to J. L. Austin, something to J. M. Hinton, and more than a little to John McDowell and to Thompson Clarke. They engage critically with McDowell and with Clarke, as well as with such philosophers as Christopher Peacocke, Tyler Burge, Jerry Fodor, Elisabeth Anscombe, A. J. Ayer, and H. A. Prichard.

Perceiving in Depth is a sequel to Binocular Vision and Stereopsis and to Seeing in Depth, both by Ian P. Howard and Brian J. Rogers. This three-volume work is much broader in scope than previous texts and includes mechanisms of depth perception by all senses, including aural, electrosensory organs, and the somatosensory system. The work contains three extensively illustrated and referenced volumes. Volume 1 reviews sensory coding, psychophysical and analytic procedures, and basic visual mechanisms. Volume 2 reviews stereoscopic vision. Volume 3 reviews all mechanisms of depth perception other than stereoscopic vision. Together, these three volumes provide the most detailed review of all aspects of perceiving the three-dimensional world. Volume 3 addresses all depth-perception mechanisms other than stereopsis. The chapter starts with reviews of monocular cues to depth. These cues include accommodation, vergence eye movements, perspective, interposition, shading, and motion parallax. A perceptual constancy is the ability to judge a feature of a stimulus as constant in spite of variations in the retinal image. Constancies in depth perception, such as the ability to perceive the sizes, and 3-D shapes of objects as they move or rotate are reviewed. The ways in which different depth cues interact are discussed. They can complement each other, compete, or interact so as to increase the range of depth perception. The next chapter reviews sources of information, such as changing disparity, image looming, and vergence eye movements, used in the perception of objects moving in depth. Various pathologies of depth perception, including visual neglect, stereoanomalies, and albanism are reviewed. Visual depth-perception mechanisms through the animal kingdom are reviewed, starting with insects and progressing though crustaceans, fish, amphibians, retiles, birds, and mammals. Most animals respond to image looming, and many use perspective and motion parallax to detect depth. Stereoscopic vision based on binocular disparity has evolved in some insects, frogs, and mammals. The chapter includes a discussion of the way in which stereoscopic vision may have evolved. The next chapter describes how visual depth perception is used to guide reaching movements of the hand, avoiding obstacles, and walking to a distant object. The next three chapters review non-visual mechanisms of depth perception. Auditory mechanisms include auditory localization, echolocation in bats and marine mammals, and the lateral-line system of fish. Some fish emit electric discharges and then use electric sense organs to detect distortions of the electric field produced by nearby objects. Some beetles and snakes use heat-sensitive sense organs to detect sources of heat. The volume ends with a discussion of mechanisms used by animals to navigate to a distant site. Ants find their way back to the nest by using landmarks and by integrating their walking movements. Several animals navigate by the stars or by polarized sunlight. It seems to be established that animals in several phyla navigate by detecting the Earth's magnetic field.

The psychologist Edmund Parish makes a valuable contribution to the study of the psychology of perception as well as introducing a theory of insanity in this 1897 work. The author tells the reader that it grew out of an examination of the German 'International Census of Waking Hallucinations in the Sane', the results of which he had analysed. Rather than merely translating the German original, Parish has added new information and considered criticism of his own previous work. The book is a sustained effort to define 'the common organic principle which, under whatever diversity of conditions, underlies alike normal and fallacious perception', by incorporating the most recent psychological and neurological research. Parish is especially interested in casting light on the waking hallucinations of healthy persons, as he regards this phenomenon as having been largely ignored by previous research.

The study of emotional expressions has a long tradition in psychology. Although research in this domain has extensively studied the social context factors that influence the expresser's facial display, the perceiver was considered passive. This 2007 book focuses on more recent developments that show that the perceiver is also subject to the same social rules and norms that guide the expresser's behavior and that knowledge of relevant emotion norms can influence how emotional expressions shown by members of different groups are perceived and interpreted. Factors such as ethnic-group membership, gender and relative status all influence not only emotional expressions but also the interpretation of emotional expressions shown by members of different groups. Specifically, the research presented asks the question of whether and why the same expressions shown by men or women, members of different ethnic groups, or individuals high and low in status are interpreted differently.

Perceptual Constancy examines a group of long-standing problems in the field of perception and provides a review of the fundamentals of the problems and their solutions. Experts in several different fields - including computational vision, physiology, neuropsychology, psychophysics and comparative psychology - present their approaches to one of the fundamental problems of perception: how does the brain extract a stable world from an ever-changing retinal input? How do we achieve color constancy despite changes in the wavelength content of daylight? How do we recognize objects from different viewpoints? And how do we know the sizes of those objects? The volume is divided into three sections, each of which addresses developmental, clinical and comparative issues, psychophysics, and physiology.

Advances in our understanding of the ways in which people obtain information about the world through their hand and skin sense have many practical implications for work with sensorily impaired children and adults. This volume, first published in 1982, draws together the threads of numerous studies to present an overview of knowledge about tactual-haptic perception. It will be a valuable reference text for a wide variety of psychologists and other students of perception as well as for those involved in the education of the blind and deaf. Tactual graphics, the perception of speech via the skin and the written word via Braille, the production and perception of drawings by the blind, and the social significance of touch are among the topics addressed by the chapter authors.

Vision dominates philosophical thinking about perception, and theorizing about experience in cognitive science has traditionally focused on a visual model. In a radical departure from established practice, Casey O'Callaghan provides a systematic treatment of sound and sound experience, and shows how thinking about audition and appreciating the relationships between multiple sense modalities can enrich our understanding of perception and the mind.
Sounds proposes a novel theory of sounds and auditory perception. Against the widely accepted philosophical view that sounds are among the secondary or sensible qualities, O'Callaghan argues that, on any perceptually plausible account, sounds are events. But this does not imply that sounds are waves that propagate through a medium, such as air or water. Rather, sounds are events that take place in one's environment at or near the objects and happenings that bring them about. This account captures the way in which sounds essentially are creatures of time, and situates sounds in a world populated by items and events that have significance for us. Sounds are not ethereal, mysterious entities.
O'Callaghan's account of sounds and their perception discloses far greater variety among the kinds of things we perceive than traditional views acknowledge. But more importantly, investigating sounds and audition demonstrates that considering other sense modalities teaches what we could not otherwise learn from thinking exclusively about the visual. Sounds articulates a powerful account of echoes, reverberation, Doppler effects, and perceptual constancies that surpasses the explanatory richness of alternative theories, and also reveals a number of surprising cross-modal perceptual illusions. O'Callaghan argues that such illusions demonstrate that the perceptual modalities cannot be completely understood in isolation, and that the visuocentric model for theorizing about perception - according to which perceptual modalities are discrete modes of experience and autonomous domains of philosophical and scientific inquiry - ought to be abandoned.

The cooperative action of different regions of our brains gives us an amazing capacity to perform activities as diverse as playing the piano and hitting a tennis ball. Somehow, without conscious effort, our eyes find the information we need to operate successfully in the world around us. The development of head-mounted eye trackers over recent years has made it possible to record where we look during different active tasks, and so work out what information our eyes supply to the brain systems that control our limbs. We are now in a position to explore the strategies that the eye movement system uses in the initiation and guidance of action.
Looking and Acting examines a wide range of visually guided behaviour, from sedentary tasks like reading and drawing, to dynamic activities such as driving and playing cricket. A central theme is that the eye movement system has its own knowledge about where to find the most appropriate information for guiding action - information not usually available to conscious scrutiny. Thus each type of action has its own specific repertoire of linked eye movements, acquired in parallel with the motor skills themselves. Starting with a brief background to eye movement studies, the book then reviews a range of observations and analyses of different activities. It ends with discussions of the nature of visual representation, the neurophysiology of the systems involved, and the roles of attention and learning.
Opening a field in eye movement research, this fascinating book will be of great interest to all vision scientists (psychologists, physiologists, ophthalmologists) whether at professional, graduate, or advanced undergraduate levels. It will also be of value to musicians, artists, sports scientists, and transport engineers, and indeed anyone intrigued by the way we sample the visual world.

If a man born blind were to gain his sight in later life would he be able to identify the objects he saw around him? Would he recognise a cube and a globe on the basis of his earlier tactile experiences alone? This was William Molyneux's famous question to John Locke and it was much discussed by English and French empiricists in the eighteenth century as part of the controversy over innatism and abstract ideas. Dr Morgan examines the whole history of this debate: Locke's own (negative) answer to the question, the contributions of Berkeley, Condillac, Diderot and Voltaire and the factual accounts of early cataract operations and modern laboratory studies. He shows how this debate is involved in the development and eventual separation of philosophy and experimental psychology after the eighteenth century and considers why the original question is effectively still unanswered. This is one problem-area with its intricate cluster of connected conceptual and technical difficulties which suggests the need for some reunion or at least collaboration between the two subjects.

The cognitive and neural sciences have been on the brink of a paradigm shift for over a decade now. The traditional information-processing framework in psychology, with its computer metaphor of the mind, is still considered to be the mainstream approach. However, the dynamical-systems perspective on mental activity is now receiving a more rigorous treatment, allowing it to move beyond the trendy buzzwords that have become associated with it. The Continuity of Mind will help to galvanize the forces of dynamical systems theory, cognitive and computational neuroscience, connectionism, and ecological psychology that are needed to complete this paradigm shift.
In this book, Michael Spivey lays bare the fact that comprehending a spoken sentence, understanding a visual scene, or just thinking about the day's events involves the coalescing of different neuronal activation patterns over time, i.e., a continuous state-space trajectory that flirts with a series of point attractors. As a result, the brain cannot help but spend most of its time instantiating patterns of activity that are in between identifiable mental states rather than in them. When this scenario is combined with the fact that most cognitive processes are richly embedded in their environmental context in real time, the state space (in which brief visitations of attractor basins are your 'thoughts') suddenly encompasses not just neuronal dimensions, but extends to biomechanical and environmental dimensions as well. As a result, your moment-by-moment experience of the world around you, even right now, can be described as a continuous trajectory through a high-dimensional state space that comprises diverse mental states.
Spivey has organized The Continuity of Mind to present a systematic overview of how perception, cognition, and action are partially overlapping segments of one continuous mental flow, rather than three distinct mental systems. As a result, the apparent partitions that were once thought to separate mental constructs inevitably turn out, upon closer inspection, to be fuzzy graded transitions. The initial chapters provide first-hand demonstrations of the 'gray areas' in mental activity that happen in between discretely labeled mental events, as well as geometric visualizations of attractors in state space that make the dynamical-systems framework seem less mathematically abstract. The middle chapters present scores of behavioral and neurophysiological studies that portray the continuous temporal dynamics inherent in categorization, language comprehension, visual perception, as well as attention, action, and reasoning. The final chapters discuss what the mind itself must look like if its activity is continuous in time and its contents are distributed in state space. The Continuity of Mind is essential reading for those in the cognitive and neural sciences who want to see where the Dynamical Cognition movement is taking us.

In recent years, Bayesian probability theory has emerged not only as a powerful tool for building computational theories of vision, but also as a general paradigm for studying human visual perception. The Bayesian approach provides new and powerful metaphors for conceptualizing visual perception, suggests novel questions to ask about perceptual processing, and provides the means to formalize theories of perception that make testable predictions about human perceptual performance. This book provides an introduction to and critical analysis of the Bayesian paradigm. Chapters by leading researchers in computational theory and experimental visual science introduce new theoretical frameworks for building perceptual theories, discuss the implications of the Bayesian paradigm for psychophysical studies of human perception, and describe specific applications of the approach. The editors have created a critical dialogue of ideas through the authors' commentaries on each others' chapters, conveying to the reader a unique appreciation for the issues and ideas raised in the book.

Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating.

The essential nature of learning is primarily thought of as a verbal process or function, but this notion conveys that pre-linguistic infants do not learn. Far from being "blank slates" that passively absorb environmental stimuli, infants are active learners who perceptually engage their environments and extract information from them before language is available. The ecological approach to perceiving-defined as "a theory about perceiving by active creatures who look and listen and move around" was spearheaded by Eleanor and James Gibson in the 1950s and culminated in James Gibson's last book in 1979. Until now, no comprehensive theoretical statement of ecological development has been published since Eleanor Gibson's Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development (1969).

In An Ecological Approach to Perceptual Learning and Development, distinguished experimental psychologists Eleanor J. Gibson and Anne D. Pick provide a unique theoretical framework for the ecological approach to understanding perceptual learning and development. Perception, in accordance with James Gibson's views, entails a reciprocal relationship between a person and his or her environment: the environment provides resources and opportunities for the person, and the person gets information from and acts on the environment. The concept of affordance is central to this idea; the person acts on what the environment affords, as it is appropriate.

This extraordinary volume covers the development of perception in detail from birth through toddlerhood, beginning with the development of communication, going on to perceiving and acting on objects, and then to locomotion. It is more than a presentation of facts about perception as it develops. It outlines the ecological approach and shows how it underlies "higher" cognitive processes, such as concept formation, as well as discovery of the basic affordances of the environment. This impressive work should serve as the capstone for Eleanor J. Gibson's distinguished career as a developmental and experimental psychologist.

Gestalt psychology, neurophysiology and the psychology of perception have tried to answer the question of whether we see forms as a whole or as the sum of their parts, why we perceive things as they are and not as they appear on the retina, which is in fact changed in perspective and in size, and which visual cortical areas and which neurons react to which phenomena. But the most important question for the author is which additional information the thing that is seen conveys. How do we tell the difference between a cheerful and a gloomy face? Why do we see that a bud will open shortly? Why do we find some phenomena to be dangerous and others to be desirable? These question have not yet been investigated in a systematic and scientific way, although they are of vital importance to our behaviour. Jürgen Weber brings together the results of various disciplines and his own research and experience as a sculptor and painter with a scientific background and develops a new theory of perception of form.