Why do things look blurry underwater? Why do people drive too fast in fog? How do you high-pass filter a cup of tea? What have mixer taps to do with colour vision? Basic Vision: An Introduction to Visual Perception demystifies the processes through which we see the world. Written by three authors with over 80 years of research and undergraduate teaching experience between them, it leads the reader step-by-step through the intricacies of visual processing, with full-colour illustrations on nearly every page. The writing style captures the excitement of recent research in neuroscience that has transformed our understanding of visual processing, but delivers it with a humour that keeps the reader enthused, rather than bemused. The book takes us through the various elements that come together as our perception of the world around us: the perception of size, colour, motion, and three-dimensional space. It illustrates the intricacy of the visual system, discussing its development during infancy, and revealing how the brain can get it wrong, either as a result of brain damage, through which the network of processes become compromised, or through illusion, where the brain compensates for mixed messages by seeing what it thinks should be there, rather than conveying the reality. The book also demonstrates the importance of contemporary techniques and methodology, and neuroscience-based techniques in particular, in driving forward our understanding of the visual system. Online Resource Centre The Online Resource Centre to accompany Basic Vision features: For registered adopters: Figures from the book available to download, to facilitate lecture preparation. Test bank of multiple choice questions - a readily available tool for either formative or summative assessment. A Journal Club, with questions to lead students through key research articles that relate to topics covered in the book. For students: Annotated web links, giving students ready access to these additional learning resources.

Philosopher Ned Block argues in this book that there is a "joint in nature" between perception and cognition and that by exploring the nature of that joint, one can solve mysteries of the mind. The first half of the book introduces a methodology for discovering what the fundamental differences are between cognition and perception and then applies that methodology to isolate how perception and cognition differ in format and content. The second half draws consequences for theories of consciousness, using results of the first half to argue against cognitive theories of consciousness that focus on prefrontal cortex. Along the way, Block tackles questions such as: Is perception conceptual and propositional? Is perception iconic or more akin to language in being discursive? What is the difference between the format and content of perception, and do perception and cognition have different formats? Is perception probabilistic, and if so, why are we not normally aware of this probabilistic nature of perception? Are the basic features of mind known as "core cognition" a third category in between perception and cognition? This book explores these questions not by appeals to "intuitions," as is common in philosophy, but to empirical evidence, including experiments in neuroscience and psychology. This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), a copy of which is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. Enquiries concerning use outside the scope of the licence terms should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press.

In a major contribution to the theory of perception, A. D. Smith presents a truly original defense of direct realism--the view that in perception we are directly aware of things in the physical world.

"The Problem of Perception" offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of perception can adequately rebut. Smith then develops a theory of perception that does succeed in answering these arguments; and because these arguments are the only two that present direct realism with serious problems arising from the nature of perception, direct realism emerges here for the first time as an ultimately tenable position within the philosophy of perception.

At the heart of Smith's theory is a new way of drawing the distinction between perception and sensation, along with an unusual treatment of the nature of objects of hallucination. With in-depth reference to both the analytical and the phenomenological literature on perception, and with telling criticism of alternative views, Smith's groundbreaking work will be of value to philosophers of perception in both the analytical and the phenomenological tradition, as well as to psychologists of perception.

Colours are increasingly important in our daily life, but how did colour vision evolve? How have colours been made, used and talked about in different cultures and tasks? How do various species of animals see colours? Which physical stimuli allow us to see colours and by which physiological mechanisms are they perceived? How and why do people differ in their colour perceptions? In answering these questions and others, this book offers an unusually broad account of the complex phenomenon of colour and colour vision. The book's broad and accessible approach gives it wide appeal and it will serve as a useful coursebook for upper-level undergraduate students studying psychology, particularly cognitive neuroscience and visual perception courses, as well as for students studying colour vision as part of biology, medicine, art and architecture courses.

This book provides a state-of-the-art discussion forum for topics that are of high interest in the field of visual perception research. Experts from different countries and different scientific disciplines, such as medicine, psychology, neuroscience, sport and movement science, provide a number of significant contributions, covering recent theoretical developments, innovative methodical developments, current research evidence, as well as implications for practical applications in the field of visual perception. Topics discussed in the book include the role of importance in visual perception, accuracy and bias in emotion perception, automated vector-based gaze analysis, visual-vestibular interactions when performing complex skills, variability of fixation durations in healthy participants, gaze behaviour in subjects with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, perception of moving objects in real life, controlling posture in differing perceptual information situations, orientation matching in perceptual space, error correction on the basis of visual information in sports, visual perceptual learning in cytopathology, visuomotor behaviour in virtual reality situations, role of augmented visual feedback in motor learning, informational domains in integrating information from different sensory sources, and the role of visual inputs in sensorimotor integration. Given the wide range of topics and scientific disciplines, this book may be an important source of information for graduate students, researchers and practitioners that study and work in the field of visual perception.

This volumes collects new essays by top philosophers, all on the theme of perception while also making connections between perception and other philosophical areas like epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of action. Perception has become a major area of philosophical interest, with a number of important collections and monographs appearing recently. This may partly be due to the growing use of empirical and neuroscientific data by philosophers of mind. The contributors in this volume represent the high quality of current scholars (many OUP authors) working in the area, among them Jesse Prinz, Fred Dretske, Susanna Siegel, and Benj Hellie. Some of the questions they raise include, What is the object of perception? How can perception give rise to knowledge? What is the link between perception and action? Between perception and belief? How do we perceive colors? What do animals perceive? How do empirical findings inform traditional philosophical thinking about perception? Does perception represent the world? What are the properties that are represented in perception? Nanay also provides a detailed introduction surveying the state of the field. This volume contains new work by some of the top figures in the field on a broad topic of interest.

What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision.

An examination of the two most radical dissociation syndromes of the human pain experience-pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain-and what they reveal about the complex nature of pain and its sensory, cognitive, and behavioral components. In Feeling Pain and Being in Pain, Nikola Grahek examines two of the most radical dissociation syndromes to be found in human pain experience: pain without painfulness and painfulness without pain. Grahek shows that these two syndromes-the complete dissociation of the sensory dimension of pain from its affective, cognitive, and behavioral components, and its opposite, the dissociation of pain's affective components from its sensory-discriminative components (inconceivable to most of us but documented by ample clinical evidence)-have much to teach us about the true nature and structure of human pain experience. Grahek explains the crucial distinction betweenfeeling pain and being in pain, defending it on both conceptual and empirical grounds. He argues that the two dissociative syndromes reveal the complexity of the human pain experience: its major components, the role they play in overall pain experience, the way they work together, and the basic neural structures and mechanisms that subserve them. Feeling Pain and Being in Pain does not offer another philosophical theory of pain that conclusively supports or definitively refutes either subjectivist or objectivist assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Instead, Grahek calls for a less doctrinaire and more balanced approach to the study of mind-brain phenomena.

How do we recognise familiar faces?
What factors determine facial attractiveness?
How does face processing develop in infants and children?
Why do face reconstruction systems, such as Photofit and E-Fit, produce such poor likenesses of the original face?
Face Processing: psychological, neuropsychological and applied perspectives is the first major textbook for 20 years that seeks to answer questions like these. Drawing on the most recent research in the field, and organised around the three main research perspectives - psychological, neuropsychological, and applied - it provides insights on issues of relevance to students from a wide range of disciplines.
Face recognition and expression perception have generated a large amount of research over the last decade, and with high profile media coverage of related issues, such as the misidentification of Brazilian student, Jean Charles de Menezes, face processing is a hot topic within the study of psychology. Face Processing captures the excitement in the field, and with reference to a wealth of studies and real-world phenomena, it reveals how our understanding of face processing has developed over the years.
The first section of the book, on the psychological perspectives of face processing, considers how we are able to recognise familiar faces; how we can extract information such as emotion, sex and age from a face; and how face processing abilities develop.
The second section covers the neuropsychological perspectives, and examines the disorders of face recognition that arise following brain injury, and asks whether faces are a 'special' class of visual stimuli.
Finally, a section on the applied perspectives of face processing describes face reconstruction systems, such as Identikit and Photofit, and their limitations; it discusses methods of constructing facial composites, and the phenomenon of 'verbal overshadowing', whereby verbal descriptions of visual stimuli subsequently leads to a temporary impairment in people's ability to recognise those stimuli.
Assuming no prior knowledge of the subject, this book is the perfect resource for students studying face processing as part of a psychology degree, and the breadth of its coverage makes it of relevance to computer science students, medical students with an interest in neurology, and students of forensic science, too.
Online Resource Centre
The Online Resource Centre to accompany Face Processing: psychological, neuropsychological, and applied perspectives features the following resources for lecturers and students.
For registered adopters
Figures from the book available to download
For students
Hyperlinks to primary literature articles
Web link library

Many different features of the world figure consciously in our perceptual experiences, in the sense that they make a subjective difference to those experiences. These features are thought to range from colours and shapes, to volumes and backsides, from natural or artefactual kinds, to reasons for perceptual belief, and from the existence and externality of objects, to the relationality and wakeful-ness of our perceptual awareness of them. Phenomenal Presence explores the different ways in which features like these may be phenomenally present in perceptual experience. In particular, it focuses on features that are rarely discussed, and the perceptual presence of which is more controversial or less obvious because they are out of view or otherwise easily overlooked; for example, they are given in a non-sensory manner, or they are categorical in the sense that they feature in all perceptual experiences (such as their justificatory power, their wakefulness, or the externality of their objects). The book divides into four parts, each dealing with a different kind of phenomenal presence. The first addresses the nature of the presence of perceptual constancies and variations, while the second investigates the determinacy and ubiquity of the presence of spatial properties in perception. The third part deals with the presence of hidden or occluded aspects of objects, while part four discusses the presence of categorical aspects of perceptual experience. The contributions provide a thorough examination of which features are phenomenally present in perception, and what it is for them to figure in experience in this way.

Whether it was the demands of life, leisure, or a combination of both that forced our hands, we have developed a myriad of artifacts--maps, notes, descriptions, diagrams, flow-charts, photographs, paintings, and prints--that stand for other things. Most agree that images and their close relatives are special because, in some sense, they look like what they are about. This simple claim is the starting point for most philosophical investigations into the nature of depiction.
On Images, by contrast, argues that what it is to be a picture does not fundamentally concern how such representations can be perceived. What matters is not how we perceive representations but how they relate to one another. This kind of approach, first championed by Nelson Goodman in his Languages of Art, has not found many supporters, in part because of weaknesses with Goodman's account. On Images shows that a properly crafted structural account of pictures has many advantages over the perceptual accounts that dominate the literature on this topic. In particular, it explains the close relationship between pictures, diagrams, graphs and other kinds of non-linguistic representation. Kulvicki undermines the claim that pictures are essentially visual by showing how many kinds of non-visual representations, including audio recordings and tactile line drawings, are genuinely pictorial. Part Two shows that the structural account of depiction can help to explain why pictures seem so perceptually special, rather than taking that fact for granted. Based on these results, Part Three provides a new account of pictorial realism.

Seeing Things considers in detail the experience of perceiving visual objects, from high art to everyday artefacts. It looks in particular at the problems encountered with the ways we in Western culture look upon the world and things, and encourages and argues for ways to look and visualise the world more critically, broadly and widely. Sight is one of the main ways we perceive and relate to the world, and yet it is mostly assumed rather than actively reflected on. Objects designated as art and the realm of aesthetics attract some active attention and reflection, but most of the visible world is ignored in the context of what is described here as our 'ordinary blindness'. The author of this book is arguing that the range of things we choose to see and value is arbitrary and limited and the ways in which we relate to things and objects are mostly crude and un-nuanced. It is also argued here that it is desirable to consider more person-like relationships with all manner of visibly perceived objects, from classical sculptures to tennis rackets. If we begin to apply this person-like relationship with things, we transgress the Western secular and religious practice and belief that maintains that the realm of the manufactured is 'dead' and so can be treated by humans exactly as they wish without consideration. This person-like relationship does not mean reanimating or re-sacramentalising the world, but observation and exploration of the actual phenomenology of the object should not be a lost cause. Professor Stephen Pattison is currently Professor of Religion, Ethics and Practice at the University of Birmingham. He is widely published, writing A Critique of Pastoral Care, for SCM, 1988, 1993, 2000. He recently held the prestigious position of Gifford Lecturer in 2007

Epistemological discussions of perception usually focus on something other than knowledge. They consider how beliefs arising from perception can be justified. With the retreat from knowledge to justified belief there is also a retreat from perception to the sensory experiences implicated by perception. On the most widely held approach, perception drops out of the picture other than as the means by which we are furnished with the experiences that are supposed to be the real source of justification-experiences that are conceived to be no different in kind from those we could have had if we had been perfectly hallucinating. In this book a radically different perspective is developed, one that explicates perceptual knowledge in terms of recognitional abilities and perceptual justification in terms of perceptually known truths as to what we perceive to be so. Contrary to mainstream epistemological tradition, justified belief is regarded as belief founded on known truths. The treatment of perceptual knowledge is situated within a broader conception of epistemology and philosophical method. Attention is paid to contested conceptions of perceptual experience, to knowledge from perceived indicators, and to the standing of background presuppositions and knowledge that inform our thinking. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to ways in which key concepts figure in ordinary thinking while remaining resolutely focused on what knowledge is, and not just on how we think of it.

Perception is one of the oldest and most deeply investigated topics in the field of psychology, and it is also raises some profound philosophical questions. It is concerned with how we use the information reaching our senses to guide and control our behaviour as well as to create our particular, subjective experiences of the surrounding world. In this Very Short Introduction, Brian J. Rogers discusses the philosophical question of what it means to perceive, as well as describing how we are able to perceive the particular characteristics of objects and scenes such as their lightness, colour, form, depth, and motion. What we perceive, however, does not always correspond to what exists in the world and, as Rogers shows, the study of illusions can be useful in telling us something about the nature and limitations of our perceptual processes. Rogers also explores perception from an evolutionary perspective, explaining how evolutionary pressures have shaped the perceptual systems of humans and other animals. He shows that perception is not necessarily a separate and independent process but rather part of a 'perceptual system', involving both the extraction of perceptual information and the control of action. Rogers goes on to cover the significant progress made recently in the understanding of perception through the use of precise and controlled psychophysical methods, single cell recordings, and imaging techniques. There have also been many insights from attempts to model perceptual processes in artificial systems. As Rogers shows, these attempts have revealed how difficult it is to programme machines to perform even the most simple of perceptual tasks that we take for granted. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

The collection of papers presented in this publication is characterized by its high degree of interdisciplinarity. The papers cover the fields of computer science, psychology, neuroscience as well as biology. The common denominator of all papers consists in the observation that the sensory systems of man, animals and robots have to solve similar tasks such as goal-directed behaviour, orientation within a 3D world or object identification, to name just a few.

How can we understand a system as intricate as the human brain? Microcosms of the brain presents a bold new approach. It argues that the key to understanding brain function lies in the sensorimotor systems - those that gather sensory data such as light and sound, and use them to control action, steering the eyes, head, or limbs. The book shows how these subsystems can serve as microcosms of the brain - small enough to be analyzed but substantial enough to reveal general principles of brain function. By studying these simple systems and simulating them on computers, we can get some answers to the bigger questions about the brain.

In ten chapters Douglas Tweed explores ten concepts that may help form a basis for the computerized neuroscience of the future: optimization, computation, complexity, learning, dynamics, interfaces, loops, degrees of freedom, information, and inference. He explains these concepts in simple, non-mathematical language, and shows how they can bring some order to our view of the human brain.

Written to be accessible to lay readers as well as students and researchers in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that could dramatically change the way we explore the human mind.

Ways of seeing is a book about human vision. It results from the collaboration between a world famous cognitive neuroscientist and an eminent philosopher. In the past forty years, cognitive neuroscience has made many startling discoveries about the human brain, and about the human visual system in particular. This book brings many recent empirical findings, from electrophysiological recordings in animals, the neuropsychological examination of human patients, psychophysics, and developmental cognitive psychology, to bear on questions traditionally addressed by philosophers. What is the meaning of the English verb 'to see'? How does visual perception yield knowledge of the world? How does visual perception relate to thought? What is the role of conscious visual experience in visually guided actions? How does seeing actions relate to seeing objects? In the process the book provides a new assessment of the 'two visual systems' hypothesis, according to which the human visual system comprises two anatomical pathways with separable visual functions. The first truly interdisciplinary book about human vision, it will be of interest to students and researchers in many areas of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.

The fast-growing interdisciplinary research area of 'language and space' investigates how language and representations of space are linked in information processing systems, like the brain. This is the first book in a new series at the forefront of research in the interfaces between brain, perception, and language. When we use directions in language, such as 'under the tree', how are these directions represented in our minds before we even start speaking, and how are directions expressed in different languages? Considering the way in which language and space are linked has consequences for theories on word meaning (linguistics and philosophy), for the construction of language-to-space interfaces (computer science), for our comprehension of how people use language in different contexts and cultures (psychology and anthropology), and for the way in which we can distinguish between normal and subnormal cognitive processing (neuroscience).

The evocation of narrative as a way to understand the content of consciousness, including memory, autobiography, self, and imagination, has sparked truly interdisciplinary work among psychologists, philosophers, and literary critics. Even neuroscientists have taken an interest in the stories people create to understand themselves, their past, and the world around them. The research presented in this volume should appeal to researchers enmeshed in these problems, as well as the general reader with an interest in the philosophical problem of what consciousness is and how it functions in the everyday world.

The essential nature of learning is primarily thought of as a verbal process or function, but this notion conveys that pre-linguistic infants do not learn. Far from being "blank slates" that passively absorb environmental stimuli, infants are active learners who perceptually engage their environments and extract information from them before language is available. The ecological approach to perceiving-defined as "a theory about perceiving by active creatures who look and listen and move around" was spearheaded by Eleanor and James Gibson in the 1950s and culminated in James Gibson's last book in 1979. Until now, no comprehensive theoretical statement of ecological development has been published since Eleanor Gibson's Principles of Perceptual Learning and Development (1969).

In An Ecological Approach to Perceptual Learning and Development, distinguished experimental psychologists Eleanor J. Gibson and Anne D. Pick provide a unique theoretical framework for the ecological approach to understanding perceptual learning and development. Perception, in accordance with James Gibson's views, entails a reciprocal relationship between a person and his or her environment: the environment provides resources and opportunities for the person, and the person gets information from and acts on the environment. The concept of affordance is central to this idea; the person acts on what the environment affords, as it is appropriate.

This extraordinary volume covers the development of perception in detail from birth through toddlerhood, beginning with the development of communication, going on to perceiving and acting on objects, and then to locomotion. It is more than a presentation of facts about perception as it develops. It outlines the ecological approach and shows how it underlies "higher" cognitive processes, such as concept formation, as well as discovery of the basic affordances of the environment. This impressive work should serve as the capstone for Eleanor J. Gibson's distinguished career as a developmental and experimental psychologist.

The idea that the language we speak influences the way we think has evoked perennial fascination and intense controversy. According to the strong version of this hypothesis, called the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis after the American linguists who propounded it, languages vary in their semantic partitioning of the world, and the structure of one's language influences how one understands the world. Thus speakers of different languages perceive the world differently.Although the last two decades have been marked by extreme skepticism concerning the possible effects of language on thought, recent theoretical and methodological advances in cognitive science have given the question new life. Research in linguistics and linguistic anthropology has revealed striking differences in cross-linguistic semantic patterns, and cognitive psychology has developed subtle techniques for studying how people represent and remember experience. It is now possible to test predictions about how a given language influences the thinking of its speakers.Language in Mind includes contributions from both skeptics and believers and from a range of fields. It contains work in cognitive psychology, cognitive development, linguistics, anthropology, and animal cognition. The topics discussed include space, number, motion, gender, theory of mind, thematic roles, and the ontological distinction between objects and substances. The contributors include Melissa Bowerman, Eve Clark, Jill de Villiers, Peter de Villiers, Giyoo Hatano, Stan Kuczaj, Barbara Landau, Stephen Levinson, John Lucy, Barbara Malt, Dan Slobin, Steven Sloman, Elizabeth Spelke, and Michael Tomasello.

There is a traditional scepticism about whether the world 'out there' really is as we perceive it. A new breed of hyper-sceptics now challenges whether we even have the perceptual experience we think we have. According to these writers, perceptual consciousness is a kind of false consciousness. This view grows out of the discovery of phenomena like change blindness and inattentional blindness. Such radical scepticism has acute and widespread implications for the study of perception and consciousness. Contributors include: psychologists Susan Blackmore, Arien Mack and Bruce Bridgeman and philosophers Daniel Dennett, Andy Clark, Jonathan Cohen, and Charles Siewert.

Eber and Neal address some of the theoretical issues connected with symbolic constructions of reality through human memory and its subsequent representation. Linkages between what we remember and how we represent it give humans their distinctive characteristics. We construct our reality from how we perceive the events in our lives and, from that reality, we create a symbol system to describe our world. It is through such symbolic constructions that we are provided with a usable backdrop for shaping our memories and organizing them into meaningful lines of action.
These case studies present a new and creative synthesis of the multiple meanings of memory and representation within the context of contemporary perceptions of truth.

Where most of the literature in the psychology of music has focused on the processes involved when listening to music, little has been written about the processes involved in making music. Reissued by popular demand, and for the first time in paperback, Generative Processes: The Psychology of Performance, Improvisation, and Composition brings together leading figures in music psychology to present pioneering studies of the processes by which music is generated. The book looks at the generation of expression in musical performance, the problems of synchrony in ensemble performance, the development of children's song, rehearsal strategies of pianists, improvisational skill in trained and untrained musicians, children's spontaneous notations for music, formal constraints on compositional systems, and compositional strategies of music students. Edited by the leading authority on music psychology, the book will be of great interest to cognitive and developmental psychologists, as well as music educators and musicologists