1 The present volume is rich in essential phenomenological descriptions 2 and insightful historico-critical analyses, some of which cannot be fully appreciated, however, except by close examination on the part of the reader. Accordingly, such a task ought to be left to the consideration and judgment of the latter, save where such discussions are directly relevant to the topics I will be dwelling upon. I prefer, then, to approach the matters and questions contained here otherwise, namely, archeologically. In this I 3 follow Jose Huertas-Jourda, the editor of the corresponding French vol- 4 ume, in his felicitous terminological choice, although I adopt it here for my purposes in an etymological sense, i. e. , as signifying a return to prin- 5 ciples or origins. This, after all, is consistent not only with the spirit and practice of phenomenology, as acknowledged by Aron Gurwitsch often enough, but as well with what he has actually said, to wit: it is a qu- tion of 1 Cf. , e. g. , infra,in An Outline of Constitutive Phenomenology, Chapter 4, pp. 185 ff. (Henceforth I shall refer to this book as Outline. ) This essay will be devoted to the study of selected parts of the contents of this volume, although, when necessary, use will be made here of other works by various authors, including Gurwitsch. 2 Cf. , e. g. , ibid. , Chapter 3, pp. 107 ff.

The interrelationships between somatic and psychiatric complaints involve virtually every major organ system and every psychiatric diagnostic category. Psychiatric distress frequently finds expression in physical ailment or pain, and chronic physical illness or disability is a common exacerbant of psychiatric symptoms. The complexity of the interplay between psychological and physiological disease is profound, and many of the mechanisms involved remain undefined or imperfectly understood. Our intention in assembling this volume, the fifth in the Baylor Psychiatry Series, has been to consolidate the most recent medical and psychiatric opinion on the description and treatment of psychophysiological disorders. We have included reviews and new material on disorders long understood to be in the psychophysiological realm, such as gastrointestinal disease, pulmonary reactions, headache, and hypertension. Additionally, there are contributions on conditions less frequently, but no less clearly, recognized as psychophysiological or psychosomatic, including immune response deficits, epilepsy, stuttering, and sleep disorders. Chapters on Couvade syndrome, menstrually related mood disturbance, obesity, keratoconus, and anorexia nervosa examine the degree to which psychological and physical events interact in conditions usually considered attributable essentially to a single system. Drs. Dowling and Gaitz have written excellent reviews of developmental elements in psychophysiological events, and examine such disorders as they are specific to the very young or the very old. Treatment approaches to the variety of disorders are discussed in chapters by Dr. Decker, who describes multifaceted modalities, Dr. Lomax, who examines psychotherapeutic techniques, and in a final chapter on psychopharmacological mitigation of psychophysiological syndromes.

An individual has the potentiality to develop himself/herself during each period of his/her life. This potential for development can be affected by many diff- ent factors. These factors are divided into two main areas as internal factors and external factors. The common assumption is that internal factors are more effective than external factors. This is the dilemma about learning which p- cess of lifelong learning is related to self-actualization. In this paper, discussion is limited to concept of lifelong learning and self actualization. LIFELONG LEARNING An individual can take proper support form many components such as family, education system, media and peers. However, they may not provide proper s- port for the individual. Thus, the individual needs more pedagogical support to solve problems of life, develop his/her skills and capabilities. The pedagogical support should be given by educational system. Teaching and learning in some areas such as math, science, drawing, social studies and so on were de ned as pedagogical support in the past. But, this approach is weakening in today. During teaching and learning processes teacher and learner should focus on the learning rather than the teaching. The concept of learning is likely to be argued in many dimensions. The c- cepts of teaching and learning tend to be rede ned based on the latest changes.

The articles collected in the present volume were written during a period of more than 30 years, the ?rst having been published in 1929, the last in 1961. They are arranged here in a systematic, not a chronological, order, starting from a few articles mainly concerned with psychological m- ters and then passing on to phenomenology in the proper sense. Within the latter group, the sequence is from articles dealing with more g- eral questions of principle to those in which rather special questions are discussed. The articles are reprinted or translated unchanged except for "phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego," in which a certain number of pages have been omitted because the author has long since come to consider them erroneous. Almost all of the articles are in the service of Husserlian phenomen- ogy, which they are intended to advance and to develop further rather than merely expound. When the author made his ?rst acquaintance with Husserl's philosophy about 40 years ago, he was overwhelmed by the spirit of uncompromising integrity and radical philosophical respon- bility, by the total devotedness which made the man disappear behind his work. Soon the young beginner came to realize the fruitfulness both of what Husserl had actually accomplished and of what he had initiated, the promise of further fruitful work.

Our world s cultural circles are permeated by the philosophical influences of existentialism and phenomenology. Two contemporary quests to elucidate rationality took their inspirations from Kierkegaard s existentialism plumbing the subterranean source of subjective experience and Husserl s phenomenology focusing on the constitutive aspect of rationality. Yet, both contrary directions mingled readily in common vindication of full reality.

In the inquisitive minds (Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Stein, Merleau-Ponty, et al.), a fruitful cross-pollination of insights, ideas, approaches, fused in one powerful wave disseminating throughout all domains of thought.

Existentialist rejection of ratiocination and speculation together with Husserl s shift to the genesis of rapproches philosophy and literature (Wahl, Marcel, Berdyaev, Wojtyla, Tischner, etc.), while the foundational underpinnings of language (Wittgenstein, Derrida, etc.) opened the "hidden" behind the "veils" (Sezgin and Dominguez-Rey)."

From Aristotle to the present, memory has been grasped as a trace or impression of lost reality bridging physiological experience and consciousness. Philosophers have vainly sought the nature of this bridge. The present-day physiologizing/naturalizing of consciousness is not resolving their congenital continuity, in which the very existence and practice of life is rooted. We have to change our approach (Erwin Straus). The Aristotelian congenital ties between memory and temporality, acquire crucial significance in our primogenital ontopoiesis of life (Tymieniecka). It reveals memory to be the factor that carries this coalescence and the becoming of life itself. This can be the fruit only of the generative springs of life, first phenomenology/philosophy, the ontopoietic logos of life.

In this collection we explore memory in the constitution of reality: rememorizing and interpretation, consciousness/action, facts/imagination, history/myths, self-realization/metamorphosis."

Benjamin Fondane: A Poet-Philosopher Caught Between the Sunday of History and the Existential Monday examines the life and work of Benjamin Fondane, a poet and a literary critic, a philosopher and a playwright, who wrote film scripts and worked as a director on the stage as well as in films. In addition, Fondane was active in two cultures, the Romanian and the French. His existential philosophy is highly relevant to the domain of contemporary Jewish thought, and his literary activities are linked to the twentieth-century European avant-garde. This book discusses all of these topics and provides background for the Romanian and French cultural scene of the period as well as locating the writer within the context of the dramatic events of the twentieth century.

Under the title of "Phenomenology: Continuation and Crit icism," the group of essays in this volume are presented in honor of Dorion Cairns on his 70th birthday. The contributors comprise friends, colleagues and former students of Dorion Cairns who, each in his own way, share the interest of Dorion Cairns in Husserlian phenomenology. That interest itself may be best defined by these words of Edmund Husserl: "Philosophy - wis dom (sagesse) - is the philosopher's quite personal affair. It must arise as his wisdom, as his self-acquired knowledge tending toward universality, a knowledge for which he can answer from the beginning . . . " 1 It is our belief that only in the light of these words can phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy be continued, but always reflexively, critically. For over forty years Dorion Cairns has, through his teaching and writing, selflessly worked to bring the idea expressed by Husserl's words into self conscious exercise. In so doing he has, to the benefit of those who share his interest, confirmed Husserl's judgement of him that he is "among the rare ones who have penetrated into the deepest sense of my phenomenology, . . . who had the energy and persist ence not to desist until he had arrived at real understanding."

THEODORE KISIEL Date of birth: October 30,1930. Place of birth: Brackenridge, Pennsylvania. Date of institution of highest degree: PhD., Duquesne University, 1962. Academic appointments: University of Dayton; Canisius College; Northwestern University; Duquesne University; Northern Illinois University. I first left the university to pursue a career in metallurgical research and nuclear technology. But I soon found myself drawn back to the uni versity to 'round out' an overly specialized education. It was along this path that I was 'waylaid' into philosophy by teachers like H. L. Van Breda and Bernard Boelen. The philosophy department at Duquesne University was then (1958-1962) a veritable "little Louvain," and the Belgian-Dutch connection exposed me to (among other visiting scholars) Jean Ladriere and Joe Kockelmans, who planted the seeds which eventually led me to the hybrid discipline of a hermeneutics of natural science, and prompted me soon after graduation to make the first of numerous extended visits to Belgium and Germany. The endeavor to learn French and German led me to the task of translating the phenomenological literature bearing especially on natural science and on Heidegger. The talk in the sixties was of a "continental divide" in philosophy between Europe and the Anglo-American world. But in designing my courses in the philosophy of science, I naturally gravitated to the works of Hanson, Kuhn, Polanyi and Toulmin without at first fully realizing why I felt such a strong kinship with them, beyond their common anti positivism."

In the wake of so many other keys to the treasure, whoever undertakes still another book of criticism on the novels and drama of Samuel Beckett must assume the grave burden of justifying the attempt, especially for him who like one of John Barth's recent fictional characterizations of himself, believes that the key to the treasure is the treasure itself. No one will ever have the privilege of the last word on these texts, since any words other than the author's own found therein must be referred back to the text themselves for cautious verification. Indeed, the words the author has used to create the oeuvre stand by virtue of their own creativeness, or fail in their pretense, and need no critical comment to be appreciated for what they have achieved or have failed to achieve. In criticism there is no privileged point of view - not even the author's own. He has consulted his knowledge and experience to make the work, and whoever would criticize his efforts would seem to owe him the indulgence of doing the same. If communication is mediated through the works, the author and his readers respond in recipro cal fashion to the expressiveness of their contexts. For the philosopher of art, the challenge is extremely tempting - on a manifold count."

It is our hope that this volume will serve to document both the history of the Collegium Phaenomenologicum during its first ten years as well as some of the philosophical work that has grown out of the annual gatherings in Perugia. The Introduction narrates the history and is supplemented by the Appendices, in which the programs and the participants for each of the ten years are listed. The essays, on the other hand, present in more finished form work that was developed in connection with courses, lectures, or seminars conducted during the first ten years of the Collegium. Giuseppina Moneta John Sallis Jacques Taminiaux Introduction The Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Its First Ten Years GIUSEPPINA C. MONETA The idea of the Collegium Phaenomenologicum first took shape in a conversa tion that I had with Werner Marx at his home in Bollschweil in the Spring of 1975. Previously I had thought of the possibility of a gathering of phenom enologists somewhere in Italy during the summer months. And when I ex plained to Werner Marx that it would not be difficult to find accommodation for such a gathering in a Franciscan monastery in Umbria, he responded enthusiastically and assured me that such a project would have the support of the Husserl Archives in Leuven and in Freiburg."

philosophers with both hermeneutic-phenomenological and scientific back- grounds (such as Heelan, Ihde, Theodore Kisiel, Joseph Kockelmans) have begun to read the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and others as also entailing a positive re-evaluation of practices of the natural sciences. A few professional scientists with a scholarly background in hermeneutic- phenomenological philosophy (among whom is Martin Eger) have begun to do the same. A number of more mainstream philosophers of science are utilizing hermeneutical insights effectively and perceptively (Joseph Rouse), while many sociologically-trained scholars who speak with the terminolo- gy and often the assumptions of analytic philosophy reveal in their work a deep appreciation for the hermeneutical insight into the nature of his tori- cally situated knowledge (Harry Collins, Bruno Latour, Andrew Pickering, Simon Schaffer, Steve Shapin and others inftuenced by social constructivism). of these initiatives manifest the rediscovery that all dis course is situat- All ed culturally and historically. The days are gone when it could be seriously 2 debated whether a hermeneutical perspective on the natural sciences exists. The challenge remains today to understand more explicitly the hermeneutical dimension of the natural sciences in terms of an overarching hermeneutic of all knowledge.

In recommending a book like this, one is tempted to fall back on cliches such as 'brilliant insights', 'original perspectives', etc. The origina lity of this book is on a different plane. The problem of subject and object has been central to Western philo sophic thinking at least since the time of Descartes. So much so that many students of philosophy see it as the philosophical problem. In his Mundus Cognobilis and Mundus Causalis Mr. Mes offers an ontological-epistemological view, the originality of which consists precisely in the fact that it is not an innovation. Rather, it seeks to put 'in order' the elements already at hand in such a way as to show the subject-object paradox to be non-existent where it seems to be significant and trivial where it really does occur. He has a new and interesting perspective both on what 'materialism' might mean and on how a 'scientific' view of the world has to be constructed. 'Energy-patterns' emerge as explanatory ulti mates, although there is no effort to arrive at any sort of ultimate meta physics."

In this book, Robert Sokolowski argues that being a person means to be involved with truth. He shows that human reason is established by syntactic composition in language, pictures, and actions and that we understand things when they are presented to us through syntax. Sokolowski highlights the role of the spoken word in human reason and examines the bodily and neurological basis for human experience. Drawing on Husserl and Aristotle, as well as Aquinas and Henry James, Sokolowski here employs phenomenology in a highly original way in order to clarify what we are as human agents.

Dear Father Richardson: It is with some hesitation that I attempt to answer the two principal questions you posed in your letter of March I, 1962. The first touches on the initial impetus that determined the way my thought would gO. l The other looks for information about the much discussed "reversal" [in my development]. I hesitate with my answers, for they are necessarily no more than indications [of much more to be said]. The lesson of long experience leads me to surmise that such indications will not be taken as directions for the road of independent reflection on the matter pointed out which each must travel for himself. [Instead they] will gain notice as though they were an opinion I had ex pressed, and will be propagated as such. Every effort to bring what has been thought closer to prevailing modes of (re)presen tation must assimilate what-is-to-be-thought to those (re)presen tations and thereby inevitably deform the matter. 2 This preamble is not the lament of a man misunderstood; it is rather the recognition of an almost insurmountable difficulty in making oneself understood. The first question in your letter reads: "How are we properly to understand your first experience of the Being-question in 1 [Translator's note. With regard to the translati~ of Denken, see below, p. 16, note 43. ] I [Translator's note. For the translation of VorsteUung by "(re)presentation," see below, p. 108, note 5. ] VORWORT Sehr geehrter Herr P.

The principal differences between the contemporary philosophic traditions which have come to be known loosely as analytic philosophy and phenomenology are all related to the central issue of the interplay between predication and perception. Frege's critique of psychologism has led to the conviction within the analytic tradition that philosophy may best defend rationality from relativism by detaching logic and semantics from all dependence on subjective intuitions. On this interpretation, logical analysis must account for the relationship of sense to reference without having recourse to a description of how we identify particulars through their perceived features. Husserl' s emphasis on the priority and objective import of perception, and on the continuity between predicative articulations and perceptual discriminations, has yielded the conviction within the phenomenological tradition that logical analysis should always be comple mented by description of pre-predicative intuitions. These methodological differences are related to broader differences in the philosophic projects of analysis and phenomenology. The two traditions have adopted markedly divergent positions in reaction to the critique of ancient and medieval philosophy initiated by Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes at the beginning of the modern era. The analytic approach generally endorses the modern preference for calculative rationality and remains suspicious of pre-modern categories, such as formal causality and eidetic intuition. Its goal is to give an account of human intelligence that is compatible with the modern interpretation of nature as an ensemble of quantifiable entities and relations."

This book introduces Hegel's best-known and most influential work, Phenomenology of Spirit, by interpreting it as a unified argument for a single philosophical claim: that human beings achieve their freedom through retrospective self-understanding. In clear, non-technical prose, Larry Krasnoff sets this claim in the context of the history of modern philosophy and shows how it is developed in the major sections of Hegel's text. The result is an accessible and engaging guide to one of the most complex and important works of nineteenth-century philosophy, which will be of interest to all students and teachers working in this area.

In recent years there has been a great deal of talk about a possible death of art. As the title of Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art" suggests, the essay challenges such talk, just as it in turn is challenged by such talk, talk that is supported by the current state of the art-world. It was Hegel, who most profoundly argued that the shape of our modern world no longer permits us to grant art the significance it once possessed. Hegel's proclamation of the end of art in its highest sense shadows this commentary, as it shadows Heidegger's essay. Heidegger's problematic turn from the philosopher Hegel to the poet Holderlin is born of the conviction that we must not allow Hegel to here have the last word. At stake is the future of art. But more importantly, if we are to accept Heidegger's argument, at stake is the future of humanity. But all who are eager to find in Heidegger's essay pointers concerning where not just art, but we should be heading, should be made wary by Heidegger's politicizing of art and aestheticizing of politics. Both remain temptations that demand a critical response. This commentary demonstrates the continued relevance of Heidegger's reflections."

The history of Indian logic is roughly divided into three periods: old Nyaya, Buddhist logic and new Nyaya. Each period is characterized by the production of some outstanding Sanskrit text. The main texts of the first and second period have been translated into, and explained in, European languages. But the principal text of the third period, GaIigesa's Tattvacintamal).i, is still not accessible through a Western language. The present book is intended to fill up this gap to some extent. The object of this study is to present both to sanskritists and to logicians an essential part of Indian logic as laid down in the first two sections of the Anumanakhal).c;la of the Tattvacintamal).i. No attention will be paid here to the doctrines of GaIigesa's predecessors and the theories developed by his commentators. Though this study is not con cerned with comparative philosophy, Western logic will be employed for the purpose of interpretation. Under Western logic I bring both traditional logic and modern logic, which, in my opinion, form one discipline of reasoning. This may account for my use of some Latin terms belonging to scholastic thought. Transliteration and translation have been made from the text of the Anumitiniriipal).a and Vyaptivada in the Bibliotheca Indica edition of GaIigesa's Tattvacintamal).i (with Mathuranatha's commentary), Part II Anumanakhal).c;la from Anumiti to Biidha, Calcutta, 1892. A photostatic copy ofthat text precedes the transliteration, translation and commentary."

Phenomenology represents a mainstream in the philosophy of subjectivity as well as a rich tradition of inquiry in psychiatry. The conceptual and empirical study of language has become increasingly relevant for psychiatric research and practice. Schizophrenia is still the most enigmatic and most relevant mental disorder. This volume represents an attempt to bring specialists from different fields together in order to integrate various conceptual and empirical approaches for the benefit of schizophrenic research. We hope that it will facilitate discussions among members of such diverse fields as psychiatry, psychology, and philosophy.

CHAPITRE I: Niveau d'alterite . 5 CHAPITRE II: Niveau mathematique 34 CHAPITRE III: Niveau physique . 53 CHAPITRE IV: Niveau bio1ogique 78 CHAPITRE V: Niveau social . 107 CHAPITRE VI: Niveau historique . 165 CHAPITRE VII: Niveau personnel 226 CHAPITRE VIII: Niveau d'ipseite 264 INDEX DES NOMS PROPRES . 310 INTRODUCTION Lorsque les philosophes du XVIIe et du XVIIIe siecle -a commen- cer par Hobbes et Descartes - decouvrent dans les mathematiques Ie modele de toute connaissance certaine, et tendent a delimiter a priori les pouvoirs de l'esprit, ils posent ces limites en definissant en meme temps ce que sont des connaissances imaginaires. Ce sera, pour Hobbes, ce royaume des Fees auquel, dans Ie Leviathan, il compare l'Eglise; pour Descartes Ie royaume de l'enfance et du prejuge. II s'agit du lieu d'une imagination dereglee, malsaine, ou regnent les pieges d'un langage vain, par lequel des esprits qui se pretendent savants seduisent, egarent, en croyant et en faisant croire qu'un objet reel ou possible correspond aux mots dont ils se servent. On n'est pas delivre de ce qu'on nie: Ie monde de Descartes sera un monde feint, l'imagination va constituer Ie centre de la pensee de Hume et se confondre chez lui avec la raison. Les monades seront, de l'aveu de Leibniz, des fictions commodes, et Kant fera de la force d'i- magination la charniere entre l'intuition et Ie concept.

The present wntmg attempts a clarification of the questIon bearing on technology and of its "Essence" in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. In view of this, our initial task will consist in examining the origins of modern technology, which Heidegger descries in the primordial "experience" of Being as cpvO'u;, together with the human manners of comportment to this the primordial manifestness of Being. We will begin in Part One by attending primarily, but not exclusively, to the subjective dimen sion, allowing thereby the manner of the historical "progression" of Being, that is, its transforming self-showing, to stand in the background. This procedure seems to us not merely appropriate with respect to our purpose as a whole, but moreover cor responds to the matter at issue, for Being in its own progression is essentially self-concealing, which in turn brings to prominence the "subjective" in union with the varied modes of the "Being of beings," termed "beingness." In conformity with Heidegger's interpretation of "Metaphysics," there can be but little doubt that Being itself persists throughout in presence only as absence. Thus, we will trace out this manner of Being's presence in absence and the respective dominating human manners of relatedness to Being's beingness, that is, we must observe the transformation of original vo6v (or I, SYElV, TSXV1J), into Platonic i6slV ( 'j6S Y. )."

Es ist nicht abzusehen, wozu Husserl-Studien dienen sollen, wenn nicht von der Phanomenologie im Sinne Husserls eine Hilfe zu erwarten ist, einen Einblick zu gewinnen in das, was ist. Ein Ver- such, Einblick zu gewinnen in das, was ist: so jedenfalls wird die erste berechtigte Antwort auf die Frage "Was ist Phanomenolo- gie?" lauten mussen, wenn die Beschaftigung mit Phanomenolo- gie und insbesondere mit Husserl-Studien nicht eben eine blosse Beschaftigung sein soll. Ist die Phanomenologie nun ein Versuch, Einblick zu gewinnen in das, was ist, so heisst das: ein Versuch neben anderen mehr, unter diesen ein eigenartiger, gegenuber diesen ein neuer. Was ist das Eigentumliche dieses neuen Versuchs, des Versuchs, Einblick zu gewinnen in das, was ist, auf dem Wege einer Phanomenologie? Was ware der neue und eigentumliche Gesichtspunkt, von dem aus diese einen Einblick in das, was ist, zu gewinnen sucht? Husserl gibt die klare Auskunft: "Der Gesichtspunkt der Funktion ist der zentrale der Phanomenologie, die von ihm ausstrahlenden Untersuchungen umspannen so ziemlich die ganze phanomeno- logische Sphare, und schliesslich treten alle phanomenologischen Analysen irgendwie in ihren Dienst als Bestandstucke oder Unter- stufen";1 denn "die allergrossten Probleme sind die funktionellen Probleme, bzw. die der 'Konstitution der Bewusstseinsgegenstand- lichkeiten. '" 2 Der zentrale Gesichtspunkt der Phanomenologie, welcher ihr eigentumlich ist, ist derjenige, der die Probleme der Konstitution der Bewusstseinsgegenstandlichkeiten sichtbar macht. Was sind das fur Probleme? 1 Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie, I, 1913, s. 176. 2 Ebenda.

Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature. l Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a conse quence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism."

The essays in this volume constitute a portion of the research program being carried out by the International Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences. Established as an affiliate society of the World Institute for Ad vanced Phenomenological Research and Learning in 1976, in Arezzo, Italy, by the president of the Institute, Dr Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, this particular society is devoted to an exploration of the relevance of phenomenological methods and insights for an understanding of the origins and goals of the specialised human sciences. The essays printed in the first part of the book were originally presented at the Second Congress of this society held at Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, 12-14 July 1979. The second part of the volume consists of selected essays from the third convention (the Eleventh International Congress of Phenomenology of the World Phenomen ology Institute) held in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1981. With the third part of this book we pass into the "Human Rights" issue as treated by the World Phenomenology Institute at the Interamerican Philosophy Congress held in Tallahassee, Florida, also in 1981. The volume opens with a mono graph by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka on the foundations of ethics in the moral practice within the life-world and the social world shown as clearly distinct. The main ideas of this work had been presented by Tymieniecka as lead lectures to the three conferences giving them a tight research-project con sistency."