For a philosopher with an abiding interest in the nature of objective knowledge systems in science, what could be more important than trying to think in terms of those very subjects of such knowledge to which men like Galileo, Newton, Max Planck, Einstein and others devoted their entire lifetimes? In certain respects, these systems and their structures may not be beyond the grasp of a linguistic conception of science, and scientific change, which men of science and philosophy have advocated in various forms in recent times. But certainly it is wrong-headed to think that one's conception of science can be based on an identification of its theories with languages in which they may be, my own alternatively, framed. There may be more than one place in book (1983: 87) where they may seem to get confused with each other, quite against my original intentiens. The distinction between the objec tive knowledge systems in science and the dynamic frameworks of the languages of the special individual sciences, in which their growth can be embedded in significant ways, assumes here, therefore, much impor tance. It must be recognized that the problems concerning scientific change, which these systems undergo, are not just problems concerning language change."

What can the philosophy of language learn from the classical Indian philosophical tradition? As recently as twenty or thirty years ago this question simply would not have arisen. If a practitioner of analytic philosophy of language of that time had any view of Indian philosophy at all, it was most likely to be the stereotyped picture of a gaggle of navel gazing mystics making vaguely Bradley-esque pronouncements on the oneness of the one that was one once. Much work has been done in the intervening years to overthrow that stereotype. Thanks to the efforts of such scholars as J. N. Mohanty, B. K. Matilal, and Karl Potter, philoso phers working in the analytic tradition have begun to discover something of the range and the rigor of classical Indian work in epistemolgy and metaphysics. Thus for instance, at least some recent discussions of personal identity reflect an awareness that the Indian Buddhist tradition might prove an important source of insights into the ramifications of a reductionist approach to personal identity. In philosophy of language, though, things have not improved all that much. While the old stereotype may no longer prevail among its practitioners, I suspect that they would not view classical Indian philoso phy as an important source of insights into issues in their field. Nor are they to be faulted for this."

This collection of essays is dedicated to 'Joe' Karel Lambert. The contributors are all personally affected to Joe in some way or other, but they are definitely not the only ones. Whatever excuses there are - there are some -, the editors apologize to whomever they have neglected. But even so the collection displays how influential Karel Lambert has been, personally and through his teaching and his writings. The display is in alphabetical order - with one exception: Bas van Fraassen, being about the earliest student of Karel Lambert, opens the collection with some reminiscences. Naturally, one of the focal points of this volume is Lambert's logical thinking and (or: freed of) ontological thinking. Free logic is intimately connected with description theory. Bas van Fraassen gives a survey of the development of the area, and Charles Daniels points to difficulties with definite descriptions in modal contexts and stories. Peter Woodruff addresses the relation between free logic and supervaluation semantics, presenting a novel condition which recovers desirable metatheoretic properties for free logic under that semantics. Terence Parsons shows how free logic can be utilized in interpreting sentences as purporting to denote events (true ones succeed and false ones fail) and how this helps to understand natural language.

The goal of this book is to ascertain Lessing's views on argumentation and rhetoric. I intend to establish that these views constitute a systematic and coherent theory and to argue that for Lessing rhetoric in argument can yield philosophical truth. Analysis of Lessing's views also sheds light on the general significance of rhetoric in the 18th century. The denial that rhetoric has claims to truth is a long-standing prejudice of Western thought. This position is evident in Kant's rejection of rhetoric in philosophical discourse. But in my view, the situation in the 18th century in Germany was somewhat more complex. Rhetoric did not die a quiet death but was very much alive in polemical tracts, and Lessing was a pivotal figure in a culture dominated by argument and disputation. I asked myself why and how this polemical age came to an end and how does the rejection of polemics by the 19th century affect our understanding of the 18th century? In the Introduction, I address some of these questions and establish a historical framework for the development of polemics in the 18th century. Another reason this polemical age has traditionally been seen as problematic for the scholars of the period is because argument, disputation and debate cannot be submitted to the same easy analysis as the systematic treatises produced at the end of the century.

In this book, Adolphs and Carter explore key approaches to work in spoken corpus linguistics. The book discusses some of the pioneering challenges faced in designing, building and utilising insights from the analysis of spoken corpora, arguing that, even though writing is heavily privileged in corpus research, the spoken language can reveal patterns of language use that are both different and distinctive and that this has important implications for the way in which language is described, for the study of human communication and for the field of applied linguistics as a whole.

"

Spoken Corpus Linguistics" is divided into two main parts. The first part sets the scene by discussing traditional and new approaches to monomodal spoken corpus analysis, with a focus on discourse organisation and conversational interaction and with particular attention to forms of language such as discourse markers and multi-word units, areas of language not conventionally described but which are argued to be of importance to spoken language description and to spoken language learning and teaching research within the field of applied linguistics. The second part of the book moves into the multimodal domain and focuses on alignments between language and gesture in a spoken corpus, with particular reference to gestural movements of the head and the hand and to the different ways in which prosody might be used to enhance communication. A brief final chapter discusses new developments in the area of spoken corpus research, including the relationship between language and context, emerging research methods as well as discussing possible shifts in scope and emphasis in spoken corpus research in the future.

Relativism, an ancient philosophical doctrine, is once again a topic of heated debate. In this book, Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva present the recent arguments for and against various forms of relativism. The first two chapters introduce the conceptual and historical contours of relativism. These are followed by critical investigations of relativism about truth, conceptual relativism, epistemic relativism, and moral relativism. The concluding chapter asks whether it is possible to make sense of relativism as a philosophical thesis. The book introduces readers to the main types of relativism and the arguments in their favor. It also goes beyond the expository material to engage in more detailed critical responses to the key positions and authors under discussion. Including chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading, and a glossary, Relativism is essential reading for students of philosophy as well as those in related disciplines where relativism is studied, such as anthropology, sociology, and politics.

This volume contains the majority of the papers presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, held in Lubbock, Texas, October 16-19, 1980. The varied styles topics, methodologies, and intellectual traditions represented here reflect the current state of flux in semiotics--a healthy chaos, in which new ideas vie for survival and experiment is at a premium. Because of this variety, we have kept our editorial in terventions to a minimum. In addition, we have refrained from imposing any topical classification. While we could have used the panel titles as a taxonomic principle, this would not have produced a sufficiently even format. We have therefore uti lized the alphabetical order of authors' surnames as being os tensibly the least "loaded." These Proceedings represent a current view of the "semi otic scene," especially in the U.S.A. They also include some work representative of architectural semiotics from the U.K. We have tried to bring the volume to publication rapidly, since the immediacy of the contents would seem to be the pri mary asset of any such project. We would like to express the Society's collective grati tude to the 1980 Program Committee chaired by Richard Bauman (University of Texas-Austin), the Lubbock Local Arrangements Committee chaired by Nancy P. Hickerson (Texas Tech Universi ty), and our special thanks to Laurel Phipps of the School of Continuing Education at Texas Tech University.

During the last decades, legal theory has focused almost completely on norms, rules and arguments as the constitutive elements of law. Concepts were mostly neglected. The contributions to this volume try to remedy this neglect by elucidating the role concepts play in law from different perspectives. A main aim of this volume is to initiate a debate about concepts in law. Ake Frandberg gives an overview of the many different uses of concepts in law and shows amongst others that concepts in the law should not be confused with the role of concepts in descriptions of the law. Dietmar von der Pfordten criticizes the restriction to norms as parts of the law in contemporary legal theory by questioning what concepts are and what their function is, both in general and in legal conceptual schemes. Giovanni Sartor assumes the inferential analysis of meaning proposed by Alf Ross in his ground breaking paper Tu-tu and addresses the question how possession of a concept, including the rules defining it, is possible without endorsing these rules. Jaap Hage argues that 1. legal status words such as 'owner' have a meaning because they denote things or relations in institutional reality, 2. the meaning of these words consists in this denotation relation, 3. knowledge of this meaning presupposes knowledge of the rules governing these words. Torben Spaak contributes to this volume with an exemplary analysis of one of the most central concepts of the law, namely that of a legal power. Lorenz Kahler discusses the role of concepts in determining the scope of application of legal rules and raises from this perspective the question to what extent legal concept formation can be arbitrary. Ralf Poscher argues that as soon as a concept is used in stating the law, the precise scope of application of this concept has become a legal matter. This means that the use of 'moral' concepts in the law does not automatically lead to a moral import into the law. Dennis Patterson holds that Hart's concept of law can be understood as a so-called 'practice theory' and provides an overview of such a theory."

Singular reference to ourselves and the ordinary objects surrounding us is a most crucial philosophical topic, for it looms large in any attempt to understand how language and mind connect to the world. This book explains in detail why in the past philosophers such as Frege, Russell and Reichenbach have favoured a descriptivist approach to this matter and why in more recent times Donnellan, Kripke, Kaplan and others have rather favoured a referentialist standpoint. The now dominant referentialist theories however still have a hard time in addressing propositional attitudes and empty singular terms. Here a way out of this difficulty emerges in an approach that incorporates aspects of the old-fashioned descriptivist views of Frege, Russell and Reichenbach without succumbing to the anti-descriptivist arguments that back up the current referentialist trend. The resulting theory features a novel approach to the semantics and pragmatics of determiner phrases, definite descriptions, proper names and indexicals, all treated in uniform fashion in both their anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses.

This work will be of interest to researchers in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and theoretical linguistics. The wealth of background information and detailed explanations that it provides makes it also accessible to graduate and upper level undergraduates and suitable as a reference book.

Since 1970-ties in the theory of syntax of natural language quite a number of competing, incommensurable theoretic frameworks have emerged. Today the lack of a leading paradigm and kaleidoscope of perspectives deprives our general understanding of syntax and its relation to semantics and pragmatics. The present book is an attempt to reestablish the most fundamental ideas and intuitions of syntactic well-formedness within a new general account. The account is not supposed to compete with any of today s syntactic frameworks, but to provide a deeper understanding of why these frameworks succeed or fail when they do and to show a new way for cooperation between logicians and linguists which may lead in future to a unified, yet more specific account."

This historically-informed critical assessment of Dummett's account of abstract objects, examines in detail some of the Fregean presuppositions of Dummett's account whilst also engaging with phenomenological approaches and recent work on the problem of abstract entities.

I have been thinking about the philosophical issue of truth for more than two decades. It is one of several fascinating philosophical issues that motivated me to change my primary re ective interest to philosophy after receiving BS in mathem- ics in 1982. Some serious academic work in this connection started around the late eighties when I translated into Chinese a dozen of Donald Davidson's representative essays on truth and meaning and when I assumed translator for Adam Morton who gave a series of lectures on the issue in Beijing (1988), which was co-sponsored by my then institution (Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Science). I have loved the issue both for its own sake (as one speci c major issue in the phil- ophy of language and metaphysics) and for the sake of its signi cant involvement in many philosophical issues in different subjects of philosophy. Having been attracted to the analytic approach, I was then interested in looking at the issue both from the points of view of classical Chinese philosophy and Marxist philosophy, two major styles or frameworks of doing philosophy during that time in China, and from the point of view of contemporary analytic philosophy, which was then less recognized in the Chinese philosophical circle.

This volume differs from the volume, Semiotics 1980, in that it is no longer an experimental product, but the result of a permanent commitment of the Semiotic Society of America to publish each year henceforward those papers presented at its Annual Meeting which are submitted to the Secretariat in timely and proper form. Thus Semiotics 1981 marks the beginning, following upon the experimental Semiotics 1980 volume, of an indefinite series of volumes presenting the cross-fertilization of styles, topics, methodologies, and traditions "in which new ideas vie for survival and experiment is at a premium." It is this cross fertilization which is at the heart of the vitality and integration and redistribution of the world of knowledge. The historical value of such a record is obvious. But the more immediate objective of these volumes of annual proceedings is to promote participation in the work of "semioticizing" traditional perspectives and disciplines by providing a forum in which young scholars can meet regularly and find an outlet for their efforts at interdisciplinary thinking which are not always welcome in the journals and proceedings devoted to the promotion only of traditionally specialized perspectives."

This study looks to the work of Tarski's mentors Stanislaw Lesniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and reconsiders all of the major issues in Tarski scholarship in light of the conception of Intuitionistic Formalism developed: semantics, truth, paradox, logical consequence.

Among the several dozens of symposia held on the occasion of the quincentennial of U ppsala University, there was included one symposium devoted to the theme of 'Philosophy and Grammar'. A selection of the most important papers delivered at this symposium have been collected in this volume. The papers need no introduction, but the inclusion of two of them in this collection requires a brief comment. First, the paper by von Wright, although not directly concerned with the central topic of the symposium, has been included because it was the terminating speech of the six parallel symposia (including the symposium on 'Philosophy and Grammar') held by the Humanities Faculty and moreover, because the raison d'etre of the Humanities is analyzed in this paper by a very prominent Swedish-speaking philosopher. Second, Professor Hintikka was unable to participate. In view of his expertise in the field, we nevertheless requested him to contribute a paper, so to speak, post factum. This he very generously did. We wish to express our sincere appreciation to all who participated and/or helped to carry the sessions through to a successful conclusion. We also wish to extend a special thanks to Professor Roman lakobson of Harvard University, who assumed the responsibility of General Chairman of the symposium.

Phenomenology was in large part the discovery of Edmund Husserl, whose Logical Investigations of 1900/01 are normally regarded as the work that launched the phenomenological movement. Yet Husserl's phenomenology, in particular in the form in which it is set out in this his most important contribution to philosophy, is itself part of an Austrian philosophical tradi- tion inspired by Brentano and continued, in very different ways, by Meinong, Stumpf, Twardowski, Ehrenfels, Husserl - and Marty. Like Brentano and all his heirs Marty's philosophical interests were in the philosophy of mind, where this is taken to include or at least ground the philosophy of language, and analytic metaphysics. It is Marty's discussions of topics in these two areas that provide the contributions to this volume with their subject-matter. The papers by Roderick Chisholm, S. -Y. Kuroda, Barry Smith, Peter Simons, Rosaria Egidi, Karl Schuhmann, Elmar Holenstein, Edgar Morscher, Wolf- gang Wenning and myself were presented at the 1984 conference on Anton Marty in Fribourg, Switzerland. Our host in Fribourg was Guido Kung, the conference was made possible by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. I should like to thank both for their help. Geneva, April 1988 KEVIN MULLIGAN Xl Abbreviations Employed in the Text Anton Marty's two major works, the Untersuchungen and the posthumously published Raum und Zeit are referred to in what follows in the following style. U Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Vol. I (only volume published). Halle a. S.

Victor Dudman's revolutionary English Grammar brings grammar and logic together by conceiving grammar as 'the necessary preliminary to logic'. The focus, for logicians, is the discussion of 'conditionals'; for grammarians it is the concise and accurate explanation of the infamous English modals.

Exploring the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein's thought, Iczkovits challenges the view that Wittgenstein had a vision of language and subsequently a vision of ethics, showing how the two are integrated in his philosophical method, and allowing us to reframe traditional problems in moral philosophy considered as external to questions of meaning.

This historically-informed critical assessment of Dummett's account of abstract objects, examines in detail some of the Fregean presuppositions of Dummett's account whilst also engaging with phenomenological approaches and recent work on the problem of abstract entities.

In Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness, Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen and Bert Meuffels report on their systematic empirical research of the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules. The experimental studies they carried out during more than ten years start from the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation developed at the University of Amsterdam, their home university. In these studies they test methodically the intersubjective acceptability of the rules for critical discussion proposed in this theory by confronting ordinary arguers who have not received any special education in argumentation and fallacies with discussion fragments containing both fallacious and non-fallacious argumentative moves. The research covers a wide range of informal fallacies. In this way, the authors create a basis for comparing the theoretical reasonableness conception of pragma-dialectics with the norms for judging argumentative moves prevailing in argumentative practice. Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness provides a unique insight into the relationship between theoretical and practical conceptions of reasonableness, supported by extensive empirical material gained by means of sophisticated experimental research.

In the Introduction to the Polish-language version of the present book I expressed the hope that Polish studies in semiotics would before long be numerous enough to make possible another anthology on semiotics in Poland containing material published since 1970. That hope has in fact come true. The fact that semiotic research has been gaining momentum in this country is reflected in the growing interest in the discipline, in expanding international contacts, and in the steady increase in the number of publications. Thus, 1972 saw the setting up of the Department of Logical Semiotics, headed by the present writer, at Warsaw University Institute of Phi losophy. The seminar on semiotics, which I started in 1961, had met more than two hundred times by the end of 1976; since 1968, meetings have been held jointly with the Polish Semiotic Society. Another semi nar, confined to university staff and concerned with logical semiotics, which was inithted in 1970, had met more than fifty times by the end of 1976. The former seminar often plays host to foreign visiting pro fessors; so far scholars from Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the United States have attended."

Virtually all the papers in these volumes originated in presentations at the Fourth Groniogen Round Table, held in July 1980. That conference, organ ized by the Institute for General linguistics of Groniogen University was the fourth in an irregular series of meetings devoted to issues of topical interest to linguists. Its predecessor, the Third Round Table, was held in June 1976, and dealt with the semantics of natural language. A selection of the papers was published as Syntax and Semantics 10, Selections from the Third Groningen Round Table, ed. by F. Heny and H. Schnelle, Academic Press, 1979. This fourth meeting was more narrowly focussed. The original intention was to examine the hypothesis of Akmajian, Steele and Wasow in their paper 'The Category AUX in Universal Grammar', Linguistic Inquiry 10, 1-64. Ultimately the topic was broadened considerably to encompass not only the syntax, semantics and morphology of auxiliaries and related elements, but to tackle the problem (implicit in the original work of Akmajian, Steele and Wasow) of justifying the selection of categories. for the analysis of natural language. In the summer of 1979, a workshop and short, informal conference were held at the University of Salzburg, in preparation for the Round Table. These were organized in conjunction with the Summer Institute of the linguistiC Society of America. The cooperation of the LSA and of the University of Salzburg, and in particular of the Director of that Institute, Professor Gaberen Drachman, is hereby gratefully acknowledged."

Since the pioneering work of Donald Davidson on action, many philosophers have taken critical stances on his causal account. This book criticizes Davidson's event-causal view of action, and offers instead an agent causal view both to describe what an action is and to set a framework for how actions are explained.

This volume constitutes the Proceedings of a workshop on formal seman tics of natural languages which was held in Tiibingen from the 1st to the 3rd of December 1977. Its main body consists of revised versions of most of the papers presented on that occasion. Three supplementary papers (those by Gabbay and Sma by) are included because they seem to be of particular interest in their respective fields. The area covered by the work of scholars engaged in philosophical logic and the formal analysis of natural languages testifies to the live liness in those disciplines. It would have been impossible to aim at a complete documentation of relevant research within the limits imposed by a short conference whereas concentration on a single topic would have conveyed the false impression of uniformity foreign to a young and active field. It is hoped that the essays collected in this volume strike a reasonable balance between the two extremes. The topics discussed here certainly belong to the most important ones enjoying the attention of linguists and philosophers alike: the analysis of tense in formal and natural languages (van Benthem, Gabbay), the quickly expanding domain of generalized quantifiers (Goldblatt), the problem of vagueness (Kamp), the connected areas of pronominal reference (Smaby) and presupposition (von Stechow) and, last but not least, modal logic as a sort of all-embracing theoretical framework (Bressan). The workshop which led to this collection formed part of the activities celebrating the 500th anniversary of Tiibingen University."

Tran Duc Thao, a wise and learned scientist and an eminent Marxist philoso pher, begins this treatise on the origins of language and consciousness with a question: "One of the principal difficulties of the problem of the origin of consciousness is the exact determination of its beginnings. Precisely where must one draw the line between the sensori-motor psychism of animals and the conscious psychism that we see developing in man?" And then he cites Karl Marx's famous passage about 'the bee and the architect' from Capital: ... what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in the imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement. (Capital, Vol. I, p. 178, tr. Moore and Aveling) Thao follows this immediately with a second question: "But is this the most elementary form of consciousness?" Thus the conundrum concerning the origins of consciousness is posed as a circle: if human consciousness pre supposes representation (of the external reality, of mental awareness, of actions, of what it may), and if this consciousness emerges first with the activity of production using tools, and if the production of tools itself pre supposes representation - that is, with an image of what is to be produced in the mind of the producer - then the conditions for the origins of human"