This volume attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. The worry is that we critical thinkers are all in "epistemic bad faith" in light of what psychology tells us. After all, the research shows not merely that we are bad at detecting "ego-threatening" thoughts a la Freud. It also indicates that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts-e.g., reasons for our moral judgments of others (Haidt 2001), and even mundane reasons for buying one pair of stockings over another! (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) However, reflection on one's thoughts requires knowing what those thoughts are in the first place. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? The activity would just display naivety about psychology. Yet while respecting all the data, this book argues that, remarkably, we are sometimes infallible in our self-discerning judgments. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and there is no Cartesian ambition to provide a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible.

Killing a person is in general among the most seriously wrongful forms of action, yet most of us accept that it can be permissible to kill people on a large scale in war. Does morality become more permissive in a state of war? Jeff McMahan argues that conditions in war make no difference to what morality permits and the justifications for killing people are the same in war as they are in other contexts, such as individual self-defence. This view is radically at odds with the traditional theory of the just war and has implications that challenge common sense views. McMahan argues, for example, that it is wrong to fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause.

The problems associated with understanding come to light in many facets of our lives. This volume is dedicated to describing these facets and clarifying problems related to levels of comprehension, conceptual analysis, understanding oneself and the other as well as cultural aspects of understanding. The authors address the topic in different theoretical frames such as hermeneutics, phenomenology, transcendental, and analytic philosophy.

This book considers how and why forms and meanings of different languages at different times may resemble each other. Its distinguished authors investigate the relationship between areal diffusion and the genetic development of languages, and reveal the means of distinguishing what may cause one language to share the characteristics of another. The chapters cover Ancient Anatolia, Modern Anatolia, Australia, Amazonia, Oceania, Southeast and East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

This book, published in 1976, presents an entirely original approach to the subject of the mind-body problem, examining it in terms of the conceptual links between the physical sciences and the sciences of human behaviour. It is based on the cybernetic concepts of information and feedback and on the related concepts of thermodynamic and communication-theoretic entropy. The foundation of the approach is the theme of continuity between evolution, learning and human consciousness. The author defines life as a process of energy exchange between organism and environment, and evolution as a feedback process maintaining equilibrium between environment and reproductive group. He demonstrates that closely related feedback processes on the levels of the behaving organism and of the organism's nervous system constitute the phenomena of learning and consciousness respectively. He analyses language as an expedient for extending human information-processing and control capacities beyond those provided by one's own nervous system, and shows reason to be a mode of processing information in the form of concepts removed from immediate stimulus control. The last chapter touches on colour vision, pleasure and pain, intentionality, self-awareness and other subjective phenomena. Of special interest to the communication theorist and philosopher, this study is also of interest to psychologists and anyone interested in the connection between the physical and life sciences.

This book presents a state-of-the-art account of what we know and would like to know about language, mind, and brain. Chapters by leading researchers in linguistics, psycholinguistics, language acquisition, cognitive neuroscience, comparative cognitive psychology, and evolutionary biology are framed by an introduction and conclusion by Noam Chomsky, who places the biolinguistic enterprise in an historical context and helps define its agenda for the future.
The questions explored include:
What is our tacit knowledge of language?
What is the faculty of language?
How does it develop in the individual?
How is that knowledge put to use?
How is it implemented in the brain?
How did that knowledge emerge in the species?
The book includes the contributor's key discussions, which dramatically bring to life their enthusiasm for the enterprise and skill in communicating across disciplines. Everyone seriously interested in how language works and why it works the way it does are certain to find, if not all the answers, then a convincing, productive, and lively approach to the endeavour.

In this book, first published in 1987, Professor Schleifer sets Greimas' work in its intellectual context and sets forth the development of his distinctive style of interpretation. Moreover, the author goes on to consider Greimas' work against the latest examinations of discourse in philosophy, depth psychology, and literary criticism. He tests Greimas' semiotic square against Derridean deconstruction, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the literary analyses of Paul de Man. This book will constitute an important and lucid survey of an often inaccessible critic, and will be of interest to students of literature.

The concepts of mind and soul have occupied the thoughts of philosophers throughout the ages and have given rise to numerous conflicting theories. This book provides an incisive and stimulating introduction to central tropics in the philosophy of mind. The author writes about the differences and connections between the ideas of 'mind' and 'soul' and about the metaphysical issues of Dualism, Solipsism, Behaviourism and Materialism. In the course of her account she discusses the arguments of several philosophers including Plato, Descartes, Wittgenstein, Ryle and Hume. Review of the original edition, 1974: "It is clear, incisive and unidiosyncratic. Issues and theories are discussed simply yet without serious distortion or vapidity, and the book is full of argument.' - Stewart Candish, Mind

This book, originally published in 1991, sets forth the assumptions about thought and language that made falsehood seem so problematic to Plato and his contemporaries, and expounds the solution that Plato finally reached in the Sophist. Free from untranslated Greek, the book is accessible to all studying ancient Greek philosophy. As a well-documented case study of a definitive advance in logic, metaphysics and epistemology, the book will also appeal to philosophers generally.

The papers in this collection discuss the central questions about the connections between language, reality and human understanding. The complex relations between accounts of meaning and facts about ordinary speakers' understanding of their language are examined so as to illuminate the philosophical character of the connections between language and reality. The collection as a whole is a thematically unified treatment of some of the most central questions within contemporary philosophy of language.

This title, first published in 1991, opens with an account by Gadamer of his own life and work and their relation to the achievements of hermeneutics. Building upon the key theme of dialogue, Gadamer and Hermeneutics provides a series of essays, either linked Gadamer to other major contemporary philosophers or focusing on a given Gadamerian theme. This book will be of interest to students of literary theory.

Originally published in 1973, this book shows that methods developed for the semantics of systems of formal logic can be successfully applied to problems about the semantics of natural languages; and, moreover, that such methods can take account of features of natural language which have often been thought incapable of formal treatment, such as vagueness, context dependence and metaphorical meaning. Parts 1 and 2 set out a class of formal languages and their semantics. Parts 3 and 4 show that these formal languages are rich enought to be used in the precise description of natural languages. Appendices describe some of the concepts discussed in the text.

The problem of necessity remains one of the central issues in modern philosophy. The authors of this volume, originally published in 1985, developed a new approach to the problem, which focusses on the logical grammar of necessary propositions. This volume gathers their seminal essays on the problem of necessity, together with new material at the original time publication.

This book is the first part of a comprehensive study of Wittgenstein's conception of language description. Describing language was no pastime occupation for the philosopher. It was hard work and it meant struggle. It made for a philosophy that required Wittgenstein's full attention and half his life. His approach had always been working on himself, on how he saw things. The central claim of this book is that nothing will come of our exegetical efforts to see what Wittgenstein's later philosophy amounts to if his work on describing language is not given the place and concern it deserves. The book shows what his philosophy might begin to look like in the light of critical questions around his interest to see the end of the day with descriptions, and these things only.

This book, originally published in 1963 provides a sample of the criticisms of philosophers on the course of linguistic philosophy. A chronological ordr is followed, with work ranging from that of traditionalist thinkers to second thoughts about linguistic philosophy on the part of writers who have been influenced by the movement.

Originally published in 1990, this book centres on a certain way of surveying a variety of theories of language, and on outlining a new proposal of meaning within the framework set by the survey. One of the key features of both survey and proposal is the insistence on the need to locate theories of language within a large framework that includes questions about the nature of thought and about general ontological questions as well. The book deals in an interconnected way with both very general and specific issues. At one end of this spectrum there are discussions of the contrast between realist and nominalist ontologies, while at the other are analyses of specific lexical items of English.

This book advances a reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus that moves beyond the main interpretative options of the New Wittgenstein debate. It covers Wittgenstein's approach to language and logic, as well as other areas unduly neglected in the literature, such as his treatment of metaphysics, the natural sciences and value. Tejedor re-contextualises Wittgenstein's thinking in these areas, plotting its evolution in his diaries, correspondence and pre-Tractatus texts, and developing a fuller picture of its intellectual background. This broadening of the angle of view is central to the interpretative strategy of her book: only by looking at the Tractatus in this richer light can we address the fundamental questions posed by the New Wittgenstein debate - questions concerning the method of the Tractatus, its approach to nonsense and the continuity in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Wittgenstein's early work remains insightful, thought-inspiring and relevant to contemporary philosophy of language and science, metaphysics and ethics. Tejedor's ground-breaking work ultimately conveys a surprisingly positive message concerning the power for ethical transformation that philosophy can have, when it is understood as an activity aimed at increasing conceptual clarification and awareness.

What is philosophy about and what are its methods? Philosophy and Ordinary Language is a defence of the view that philosophy is largely about questions of language, which to a large extent means ordinary language. Some people argue that if philosophy is about ordinary language, then it is necessarily less deep and difficult than it is usually taken to be but Oswald Hanfling shows us that this isn't true. Hanfling, a leading expert in the development of analytic philosophy, covers a wide range of topics, including scepticism and the definition of knowledge, free will, empiricism, folk psychology, ordinary versus artificial logic, and philosophy versus science. Drawing on philosophers such as Austin, Wittgenstein, and Quine, this book explores the nature of ordinary language in philosophy.

According to many commentators, Davidson's earlier work on philosophy of action and truth-theoretic semantics is the basis for his reputation, and his later forays into broader metaphysical and epistemological issues, and eventually into what became known as the triangulation argument, are much less successful. This book by two of his former students aims to change that perception. In Part One, Verheggen begins by providing an explanation and defense of the triangulation argument, then explores its implications for questions concerning semantic normativity and reductionism, the social character of language and thought, and skepticism about the external world. In Part Two, Myers considers what the argument can tell us about reasons for action, and whether it can overcome skeptical worries based on claims about the nature of motivation, the sources of normativity and the demands of morality. The book reveals Davidson's later writings to be full of innovative and important ideas that deserve much more attention than they are currently receiving.

This volume investigates the interconnections between language and literacy in terms of the structures of language as well as the linguistic contexts of literacy. The work for this book was generated in order to focus on studies of the acquisition and impact of literacy on traditional assertions of linguistic analysts. The contributors show that claims regarding descriptions of the linguistic competence of native speakers contain phonemic, morphemic, and sentential constructs applicable only to literate language users. They also suggest that syntactic formalities -- elements lacking extensional reference -- are unlikely in the absence of literacy, and that the notions of "sentencehood" and syntactic well-formedness are functions of literacy. Finally, the book reviews the basic notions of literary relativity and the role of literacy in communication and civilization.

This accessible book provides a foundational understanding of the science of deception and lie detection. Focusing on core issues for the field, it discusses classic and current psychological research into lying as well as theoretical approaches to understanding human lie detection. The book explores engaging questions around how people lie, how people make decisions about believing others, and how we can detect deception. Each chapter is clearly structured to support students of all levels by summarising content, presenting key research and systematically evaluating findings. Chapters explore topics including some of the most promising current lie detection techniques, how and why people lie, how lying develops in children, and whether unconscious thinking can boost lie detection accuracy. Providing an overview of key issues in deception, this book will be of great interest to students and lecturers in the field of deception and lie detection, as well as anyone generally interested in this fascinating field of research.

This original and intriguing collection explores the pressures exerted upon language in the expression of romantic and sexual desire. Simultaneously, it reveals the ways in which language itself exerts its own constraints on the subject's capacity to express desire. The contributors, while using the approaches and methods of empirical linguistics, engage directly with issues of relevance in gender studies and cultural studies. They examine and probe: * language used to mediate romantic and sexual desire * language used by the media to represent intimacy and desire * attitudes and assumptions about romantic and sexual desire embodied in English * implications for the construction of romantic and sexual identity

This book investigates the linguistic status of predication, especially within the generative paradigm. The topics discussed include minimalist accounts of predication, types of predication, copular constructions, topic and focus, theticity and transitivity. The contributions analyze constructions from a wide variety of languages, including English, Polish, Irish, Welsh, Norwegian, German, Arabic, Ostyak, Mongolian, Japanese and Chinese. This book contributes to contemporary debates on understanding predication in linguistics and in the philosophy of language.

Much contemporary metaphysics, moved by an apparent necessity to take reality to consist of given beings and properties, presents us with what appear to be deep problems requiring radical changes in the common sense conception of persons and the world. Contemporary meta-ethics ignores questions about logical form and formulates questions in ways that make the possibility of correct value judgments mysterious. In this book, Wheeler argues that given a Davidsonian understanding of truth, predication, and interpretation, and given a relativised version of Aristotelian essentialism compatible with Davidson's basic thinking, many metaphysical problems are not very deep. Likewise, many philosophers' claims that common sense needs to be modified are unfounded. He argues further that a proper consideration of questions of logical form clarifies and illuminates meta-ethical questions. Although the analyses and arguments he gives are often at odds with those at which Davidson arrived, they apply the central Davidsonian insights about semantics, understanding, and interpretation.

In their struggle for universal suffrage, the Chartists adapted language to further their cause. Adopting the prevailing keywords of the time and reformulating them within their own cultural environment, the Chartists defined and redefined their own political identity and interpreted the situation they lived in. This book is a case study of Chartism as an example of how radical political movements present themselves in language and how they appear in networks of meaning. Chartist vocabulary and keywords are studied in their historical context and decoded according to political, social and cultural significance. Set in constitutional politics of the time, the Chartist network of keywords includes allusions to a radical past and reaches out into an imaginary future of a liberal market economy and social policy. The three main concerns in the Chartist struggle were the individual, Britain as a nation and the influence of political movements abroad.